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Enabling Large-Scale Pervasive Logic Verification
through Multi-Algorithmic Formal Reasoning
Tilman Glökler1 Jason Baumgartner2 Devi Shanmugam2 Rick Seigler2
Gary Van Huben2 Barinjato Ramanandray1 Hari Mony2 Paul Roessler21IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH 2IBM Systems & Technology Group
Abstract— Pervasive Logic is a broad term applied to the variety
of logic present in hardware designs, yet not a part of their primary
functionality. Examples of pervasive logic include initialization and
self-test logic. Because pervasive logic is intertwined with the func-
tionality of chips, the verification of such logic tends to require very
deep sequential analysis of very large slices of the design. For this
reason, pervasive logic verification has hitherto been a task for which
formal algorithms were not considered applicable.
In this paper, we discuss several pervasive logic verification tasks
for which we have found the proper combination of algorithms to
enable formal analysis. We describe the nature of these verification
tasks, and the testbenches used in the verification process. We
furthermore discuss the types of algorithms needed to solve these
verification tasks, and the type of tuning we performed on these
algorithms to enable this analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
High-performance digital designs such as the Cell Proces-
sor [1] and Pentium [2] generally have extremely aggressive
clock frequency goals, which requires manual optimization of
the logic, circuits, and even the layout of critical portions of
the design. Such manual optimization amplifies the risk of
functional design errors, which must be identified and rectified
as early as possible in the design flow to avoid costly design
and manufacturing iterations.
Apart from the primary functionality of a design such as
arithmetic or instruction decode logic, virtually all modern
designs include Pervasive Logic (PL) [3]. The PL includes
logic for controlling the power-on-reset initialization sequence,
for security features to boot only trusted software, and for
enabling manufacturing test capabilities such as built-in self-
test for logic and memory arrays. It also includes debug
functionality for trace logic analysis and to enable access to
internal latches and arrays in the chip.
The PL of a design must be customized to the needs of the
specific design microarchitecture and circuit technology, thus,
it is often entirely manually designed. Furthermore, mainly
for timing reasons, this custom PL must often be manually
integrated into the functional logic itself, and the two are
tightly intertwined. For example, the scan chains, which seri-
ally connect many of the latches in the chip for initialization,
tracing, and test purposes, are often manually connected within
the design HDL itself. This greatly contributes to the risk of
implementation errors within that pervasive logic or even the
functional logic itself. While the goal of functional verifica-
tion is to validate that the design correctly implements its
specification despite the intertwined PL, the goal of Pervasive
Verification (PV) is to further guarantee that the PL works as
intended. In many ways, the correctness of the PL is more
critical than the correctness of the functional logic, since an
error in the latter may well render a costly fabrication of a
chip entirely unusable or untestable, whereas a functional logic
error at least enables the analysis of other aspects of the chip
and may often have a software or hardware workaround.
A. Pervasive Verification Tasks
Most pervasive verification tasks can be subdivided into
validating the following categories of PL.
a) POR, Security, and eFuses: Power-on reset (POR)
refers to the procedure of initializing or booting the chip after
enabling its voltage supply, and is responsible for ensuring
that the chip is brought to a consistent initial state to ensure
proper functional behavior when control is handed over to
software execution. During POR, almost all other pervasive
functionalities are needed such as initialization of latches and
arrays in the proper order, sensing of the security keys in the
electric fuses (eFuses) [4], processing security information to
ensure that only trusted software can be run on the system [5],
bringing up the physical Input / Output interface, enabling run-
time error analysis in debug mode, etc.
b) External Debug Interfaces: External debug interfaces
such as JTAG [6], SPI [7], and I2C [8] are used to debug logic
errors and analyze manufacturing problems in a chip. These
interfaces have access to debug registers which control various
functions in the chip such as clocking and Input / Output setup.
These serial interfaces are also used to access the scan chains
and, thus, enable access to nearly all latches and arrays in the
chip. Special features for supporting the reliability, availability
and serviceability of the chip allow handling of recoverable
or unrecoverable errors (e.g., uncorrectable memory errors),
and provide an interface to system software. Using these
mechanisms, error recovery can be performed on-the-fly by
system software.
c) Debug and Built-In Self-Test Logic: The scan chains
in the chip are used for various purposes including initializa-
tion during POR, reading latch values onto off-chip interfaces,
setting the chip into specific configuration modes, and built-in
self-test.
The trace bus and trace logic analyzer functionality is used
to monitor thousands of chip-internal signals in real-time, non-
intrusively, while the chip is functionally running. This bus
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is configurable either by a scan operation or other dedicated
registers, and can select among various internal signals to be
analyzed by an on-chip evaluation circuit. This functionality
allows one to observe transient events in a running chip, in
contrast to scan-based analysis, which requires the chip to
temporarily suspend functional operation while scanning. The
trace logic analyzer supports many functionalities similar to
a desktop logic analyzer such as triggering on configurable
conditions in real-time, tracing of signals before or after a
trigger has occurred, etc. The results of the trace memory can
be used for performance monitoring of the processor core or
in order to obtain waveforms of internal signals for debugging
purposes in the bring-up lab.
The array built-in self-test (ABIST) functionality is used
to detect fabrication defects in all on-chip memories (RAM
and ROM). The so-called ABIST engines apply parallel read
and write pattern tests to the memories to detect such faults.
If a fault is detected, the ABIST engine has the capability
to identify and report the fault, along with information on
how to “repair” this fault using redundant bit or word-lines, or
other more specific redundancy schemes. The ability to access
internal array cells for debugging is also enabled by ABIST.
Logic built-in self-test (LBIST) [9] is used to detect man-
ufacturing faults in the logic. The LBIST controller has a
Pseudo-Random Pattern Generator [10] which generates test-
patterns. LBIST iteratively uses two different phases: a scan
phase which initializes the LBIST scan chain stumps with
pseudo-random or random-appearing yet deterministic data,
and a functional phase, which clocks the latches for several
time-steps. The next LBIST iteration utilizes the scan chain
stumps to scan values into multiple-input signature registers
(MISRs). In case of a chip with manufacturing faults, the
MISR signature will most likely differ from the expected value
burned into an unfaulty chip. Verification must ensure that
these LBIST phases work as expected; i.e., that all scannable
registers can be initialized correctly, that the functional updates
do not propagate an uninitialized state to the non-scannable
latches, and that the MISR patterns are fully controllable and
match in different LBIST modes.
d) Fencing Logic: Fencing logic at chip or partition
boundaries ensures that a certain chip or partition is isolated
from the surrounding logic while being reset, reconfigured or
while running LBIST. The purpose of fencing logic in such
a scenario is to provide safe and deterministic input values
to the chip / partition. For LBIST, deterministic input values
are essential in order to obtain reproducible signatures in
the MISRs. Reconfiguration of a partition also requires safe
input values in order to guarantee that the final state after
reconfiguration is as expected. Fencing logic can be as simple
as one logic gate connected to every primary input and a fence
enable signal that collectively force safe values at internal
signals. In other cases, registers are used to implement the
fencing logic, which must be initialized to safe values and
then forced to hold their state while the fence is enabled.
e) Time Reference: Time reference is an important func-
tionality for systems such as servers with multiple CPUs
distributed across different locations. Its purpose is the syn-
chronization of the time-of-day clocks to ensure a consistent
time-stamp data across multiple servers and operating systems,
e.g., to enable synchronized database accesses.
B. Pervasive Logic Verification Challenges
One challenge of PV is that the design specification is
extremely project-specific and the logic is often designed
anew for each chip. This results in a specification challenge:
the specification cannot be reused to any extent from design
generation to generation, unlike many other architectural com-
ponents of the chip. Another main issue of PV is due to design
complexity. In contrast to partition or unit verification, many
features of pervasive logic cannot be verified in an isolated
block or unit [11]. As the pervasive logic is intertwined
with the functional logic, PV has to work with very large
components of the design – in cases, even full chip-level
models. The cones of influence of the PV properties often
span hundreds of thousands of state elements due to aspects
such as requiring the use of long serial scan chains [12] and
interfacing with very large memory arrays.
The size of the design components required for many PV
tasks has historically precluded their receiving any substantial
focus from the formal verification community. Furthermore,
the sequential depth of many PV tasks – e.g., to serially scan
data through possibly hundreds of thousands of latches in a
design component – further complicates formal reasoning, e.g.,
to preclude efficient inductive analysis. Due to these chal-
lenges, simulation and hardware emulation have traditionally
been used to validate many pervasive features, along with
static analysis tools that validate aspects such as scan chain
connectivity. While useful for falsification, such approaches
are generally incomplete and cannot guarantee the absence of
design flaws.
II. FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION TESTBENCHES
The verification paradigm we adopt in this paper is that of
a testbench, wherein one develops a set of property automata
or checkers to assess the correct behavior of the design,
in addition to a driver to constrain the input stimuli to
which the design may be subjected to avoid spurious failures.
Initialization data is also generally provided for the design. For
example, one may initially randomize the state elements of the
design, and use the driver to walk the design through a reset
sequence prior to performing functional verification. Or, for
computational efficiency, one may directly restrict the initial
states of the design to those guaranteed by such a power-on
reset sequence, without requiring each verification run to begin
with performing an explicit reset sequence. The verification
task thus consists of trying to obtain a counterexample trace
from a specified initial state to one which drives a logical one
onto the output of a property automata (in the composition of
the design with its checkers and drivers), or proving that no
such counterexample exists.
Given such a testbench, one may deploy a variety of
algorithms to attempt to solve the corresponding properties.
For falsification, one may wish to utilize random simulation,
hardware emulation, or semi-formal analysis. For verification,
one may wish to deploy proof techniques such as reachability
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Fig. 1: Example Trace Bus
analysis [13] or induction [14]. To help compensate for the
generally exponential resource dependency between the size
of the testbench and the resources needed for falsification or
verification, various transformation and abstraction techniques
have been proposed to automatically reduce this size.
In these experiments, we use the IBM internal verification
toolset SixthSense [15]. The set of verification and transfor-
mation engines we report in our results include the following. COM: a combinational optimization engine, which at-
tempts to merge functionally equivalent gates and rewrite
logic cones to reduce their overall size [16], [17]. EQV: a sequential redundancy removal engine, using a
more general set of algorithms to solve a van Eijk-style
induction problem to identify and merge gates which are
sequentially redundant [18], [19], [20]. RET: a min-area retiming engine, which attempts to
reduce the number of registers in the netlist by shifting
them across combinational gates [21]. CUT: a reparameterization engine, which replaces the
fanin-side of a cut of the netlist graph with a trace-
equivalent, yet simpler, piece of logic [22], [23]. LOC: a localization engine, which isolates a cut of
the netlist local to the properties by replacing internal
gates by primary inputs [23]. This transformation is
sound but incomplete – proofs of correctness on the
localized design are valid for the unlocalized design, but
counterexamples may be spurious. To help guide the cut-
selection process, the engine uses a light-weight SAT-
based refinement scheme to include only that logic which
is deemed necessary [24]. RCH: a BDD-based reachability engine [25]. IND: a SAT-based induction engine which uses unique-
state constraints [26]. BMC: a SAT-based bounded model checking engine [16].
Our system uses a high-performance circuit-based SAT
solver with intertwined BDD-based analysis, BDD- and SAT-
sweeping for redundancy removal, and structural rewriting
algorithms, similar to [16].
III. TRACE BUS VERIFICATION
The so-called trace and debug bus is a global on-chip bus
that enables observation of internal signals for debugging
and performance monitoring. This bus is configurable using
hundreds of registers, and routes subsets (e.g., 128-bit slices)
of many thousands of monitorable points to an on-chip logic
analyzer unit. The trace bus represents a major challenge
Primitive Description
Block Type
signal list References design signals as data inputs to the trace bus.
mux Drives the source block selected by a user-defined function
of a selector block.
ramp OR’s two blocks by a user-defined function of an enable block.
speed This block specifies the transfer of data (another block) across
converter asynchronous clocking boundaries with user-defined behavior.
concatenate Concatenates other primitive blocks to form a wider block.
extract References only a subset of another primitive block.
place holder Like signal list; a place-holder for incomplete descriptions.
TABLE I: Primitive blocks used for the tracedef language
for verification, because the available English specification
is often ambiguous, and the straightforward approach to use
directed testcases would be extremely time-consuming, lossy
in coverage, and error-prone.
We addressed these issues by defining a high-level specifica-
tion language, called tracedef, that allows a simple and concise
description of such a bus. This tracedef specification is used
both for documentation (in place of an English specification)
as well as input for automated formal testbench creation. As
with the use of any concise formal specification language, the
use of this language minimizes the risk of specification errors.
Instead of using a more standard language such as PSL [27],
we chose to utilize our own language, which provided a more
concise description of the trace bus using primitive blocks that
closely correspond to the typical logical elements comprising
such a bus as described in Table I. These elements also
have associated delays to reflect those present in the actual
design. The tracedef language describes the trace bus as a tree
structure. The leaves of the tree are the signal list and the
place holder blocks, which model the inputs to the trace bus.
The other primitive blocks in Table I represent the tree nodes.
Each reference from one block to another results in an edge in
the tree, and models a connection in the design. The primitive
block representing the root node of the tree represents the
output of the bus. Figure 1 illustrates an example structure of
such a trace bus.
We developed an automated testbench creation process,
which automatically creates drivers and checkers from a
tracedef specification. The checker is a reference model of
the trace bus using library elements for each of the tracedef
primitives against which the actual trace bus implementation,
intertwined with the functional design logic, is checked for
equivalence. The driver injects nondeterministic cutpoints at
the signal list and place holder elements, though ensures that
only valid trace bus configurations are taken into account
for this equivalence check. For instance, a multiplexer imple-
mentation might use NAND-NOR logic requiring the control
register to be one-hot in order to obtain a valid multiplexer
behavior, whereas other implementations may support arbi-
trary selector values. Our testbench creation process extracts
all valid selector values from the tracedef specification, and
constrains the testbench driver to allow only those valid set-
tings. Additional configuration data, which we term traceconf,
are used to specify constraints for primary inputs such as
clock frequencies, necessary reset signal setup, constant enable
signals, etc.
The design we verified posed an additional challenge since
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Metric Initial COM LOC1 COM EQV Resources
Inputs 33441 21492 11 11 0
792sGates 924723 797710 596 493 0
Registers 142072 125520 193 193 0
624MB
Properties 128 128 11 1 0
TABLE II: Memory Flow Controller Results. 1Localization
performs a case split, solving each property independently; the
largest localized cone is reported. A column with 0 properties
reflects that the corresponding engine solved the problem.
Resources reported are cumulative for all 128 properties.
it uses multiple latch and register types, which are sensitive
either to the rising or the falling edge, or various levels,
of the clock. This complicated the equivalence check using
our simple automatically-generated reference model, which
consisted of just one register type for simplicity. We solved
this problem by constraining the driver cutpoints at the trace
bus data inputs to arbitrary nondeterministic values that cannot
toggle more frequently than once per clock period. This is
a conservative constraint since in the actual design, these
signals are each driven by one type of state element hence
cannot toggle more frequently than once per clock period.
With this constraint, we eliminated spurious mismatches due
to our reference model sampling the cutpoints at a different
clock phase than the actual design.
A. Verification Results
One of the larger design slices that we specified and tested
using the described methodology is that of a Memory Flow
Controller subsystem. This subsystem includes an L2 cache
which is inclusive of L1 cache data, and non-cacheable units,
which handle cache-inhibited requests from the processor core.
There is a controller associated with the cache which handles
various operations including the cacheable load and store
requests from the core and the memory management unit.
For the memory flow controller there are 128 properties,
which are one-bit reference-model checks corresponding to
each output of the 128-bit trace bus. Because the trace buses do
not route data from or through memory arrays, to simplify the
formal verification task we black-boxed all arrays, replacing
their output ports by nondeterministic cutpoints. Table II
provides the results of solving these properties with a multi-
algorithm flow. We report problem size in terms of the number
of nondeterministic input variables, combinational gates (in
terms of synthesis down to 2-input AND gates), registers,
and properties. In addition to a relatively large netlist size,
the memory flow controller spanned nearly 16,000 lines of
design VHDL. If all of the library files used by the memory
flow controller are included, there are more than 300,000 lines
of VHDL. As discussed in Section I, the trace buses were
intertwined with the design logic in the VHDL, complicating
the overall verification task.
Nonetheless, as illustrated by Table II, the ability to leverage
the proper algorithm flow enabled us to solve these problems
efficiently in approximately 13 minutes. All experiments re-
ported in this paper were run using a single processor of
a 16-way 1.9GHz POWER4 system. The optimal solution
first employed low-cost combinational optimization across all
Metric Initial COM LOC1 CUT RET COM Resources
Inputs 4188 2878 173 151 238 0
14508sGates 271270 144559 857 1193 1292 0
Registers 83880 33322 370 370 109 0
412MB
Properties 1381 700 11 1 1 0
TABLE III: Load Store Unit Results. 1Localization performs
a case split; the largest localized cone is reported. Resources
reported are cumulative for all properties.
properties, simplifying subsequent localization analysis. After
a dramatic reduction through localization, each subsequent
localized property was solved efficiently using combinational
optimization followed by van Eijk-style induction. Though
each property represented a bit-slice of the trace bus, isomor-
phisms among the properties were broken at numerous points
due to intertwined BIST chains and lack of isomorphisms
among the functional logic being sampled by the trace bus.
We also applied this methodology in numerous places in
the processor core. For example, we applied the technique
to the load-store unit, again black-boxing the larger memory
arrays for reduced resources. The results of this verification
are provided in Table III. Though somewhat smaller than
the memory flow controller, this run took nearly 4 hours to
complete. The longer run-times were partially attributed to the
larger number of properties, and partially to more complex
control logic requiring more post-localization transformations
before proofs became feasible. These transformations included
reparameterization and min-area retiming. After retiming, the
resulting problem became a tautology easily discharged by
combinational optimization. In contrast, without localization,
retiming was unable to sufficiently simplify the problem to
render tautologies. Without these transformations, induction
alone was very expensive and could not solve the properties
within 48 hours.
Dozens of design flaws were encountered during these
efforts. The most basic, as would be expected, were that
incorrect signals were propagated through the debug bus with
incorrect timing as compared to the specification, typically
due to improper multiplexor selector implementations or bad
wiring of the bus. Some of the more intricate flaws were due
to clock gating controls disabling certain latches when they
were needed to route data, or speed conversion logic sampling
signals with improper timing.
IV. ABIST VERIFICATION
Array Built-In Self-Test (ABIST) logic is used in a chip to
identify manufacturing defects such as stuck-at faults or short
circuits in a memory array [28]. Such logic consists of an
ABIST engine connected to one or more arrays. The ABIST
engine drives address and control information, along with
specific write-data patterns, into the scan latches adjacent to
the array. The chosen write-data patterns are carefully selected
so as to attempt to cover all possible fault types as efficiently as
possible. The ABIST engine then triggers the writing of the
scanned data into the array using dedicated communication
latches. These latches act as pipeline stages to enable the
shared ABIST engine to reside further from the array itself
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Fig. 2: ABIST Design
than otherwise possible in silicon due to timing requirements
and circuit delay.
After sequentially writing all rows and columns of the array,
the ABIST engine next reads the written content out of the
array in the same order that it was written. This read-out data is
then compared against the expected data. Any deviation from
the expected data is reported as a fault in the array structure.
Using such a scanned ABIST approach, the ABIST engine
cannot test the array faster than the number of clock periods
necessary to serially scan all address, control and data bits
required to trigger the writes and reads of all necessary patterns
and all array cells. In order to alleviate this problem, shadow
scan latches are added for the address and control path of
the array. These latches are interleaved to allow multiple
addresses to be applied on successive clock cycles, eliminating
the bottleneck of the serial communication channel between
the ABIST engine and array. While merely an optimization
technique for the ABIST performance, such constructs signif-
icantly increase the complexity of the ABIST logic and its
verification.
Many modern array implementations provide repair capa-
bility: if a repairable fault is detected, the array may utilize
redundant bit or word lines to mask a specific number of
repairable faults for subsequent chip operation [29].
Verification of ABIST logic typically consists of artificially
seeding errors into the array, and validating that the ABIST
engine correctly identifies them, and if applicable, provides
information on how to repair them. The main goal of lever-
aging formal analysis in ABIST verification was to be able to
exhaustively test the response of the ABIST engine against the
very large set of possible error types. To speed up verification,
many ABIST implementations have the ability to program the
ABIST engine to cover only specific portions of the arrays:
e.g., a smaller set of rows and columns than the large number
of rows and columns that comprise a cache. We exploited
this capability when performing verification of the ABIST
design. Nonetheless, due to the sheer size and sequential depth
of these verification runs, attempting any form of exhaustive
simulation becomes computationally infeasible. Though these
factors also posed great challenges to formal analysis, the
availability of the proper set of algorithms ultimately enabled
symbolic algorithms to scale to this task.
A. Verification Results
To compensate for the sheer size of the ABIST logic,
comprising an entire L2 cache plus the dedicated scan and
controller latches, in addition to the ABIST engine itself, our
formal testbenches programmed the ABIST engine to operate
only upon specific slices of the L2 cache. Without operating
on single slices alone, the size of the given testbench was
5,321,918 state elements and 32,143,002 gates. The smallest
testbench we could obtain for an array slice, which was
still big enough to provide meaningful verification results,
contained 246,302 state elements.
The properties we developed for the testbench checked that: The state machines of the ABIST engine properly tran-
sition from write phase to read phase to compare phase,
and finally properly report the end of the testing phase. The ABIST engine properly “times” the sending of data
to the individual arrays given the pipeline depth of the
communication channels between them. The ABIST engine properly communicates with the
proper arrays. Injected errors are properly detected by the ABIST en-
gine. The ABIST engine properly indicates whether a re-
pairable number of errors was detected.
Because the goal of the ABIST engine is to properly detect
errors, our testbench performed single- and multiple-bit error
injection by randomly selecting array cells to “corrupt” by
altering the data written by the ABIST engine in transit to the
arrays prior to the read and compare phases.
Table IV summarizes our verification results for one slice.
Due to the nature of this logic, few transformations were useful
to reduce it; isomorphisms were broken by the nature of the
ABIST engine and pipeline stages, and there was little redun-
dancy to be exploited. More aggressive transformations such
as sequential redundancy removal were time-consuming given
the size of the logic, and not very powerful in their reductions.
Reachability was clearly infeasible in this domain, and due
to the sequential depth of the ABIST engine’s sequence,
induction also became infeasible. We thus resorted to bounded
unreachability analysis using BMC. Luckily, since the duration
of the ABIST engine process is readily quantifiable, this
bounded unreachability approach provided full confidence of
correctness of the checked properties.
The behavior of the ABIST engine is largely deterministic;
once triggered, it walks through a long execution stream. The
primary sources of nondeterminism include the black-boxing
done to prune the testbench down to a single slice, and the
random selections for error injection. The six properties from
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Metric Initial COM BMC 440,000 Resources
Inputs 29176 29086 0
1611sGates 1567812 1394640 0
Registers 246302 230495 0
5976MBProperties 6 6 0
TABLE IV: ABIST Engine Results
Table IV include validation that the ABIST engine cycles
through its write, read, and compare phases properly, and
that errors are properly identified by the ABIST engine. Note
that we completed a bounded analysis of 440,000 time-steps
for these checks. The “ABIST check done” occurred at time
30,407, giving us confidence that the ABIST engine properly
detected all forms of failures. For this reason, we could have
concluded that a 30,407-step BMC was adequate to infer
correctness - though analysis beyond the critical time-frames
was trivial given the nature of our BMC engine.
Our BMC engine uses a structural SAT solver applied in an
incremental manner, time-step by time-step. It is highly tuned
to unfold only critical signals at critical time-steps, leveraging
the simplification performed at earlier time-steps to reduce the
size of unfoldings of later time-steps in addition to reusing
learned clauses. For ABIST verification, the actual symbolic
reasoning about the unfolded instance is not very difficult for
the SAT solver; the key was tuning the BMC infrastructure
for large designs and very deep unfoldings. For time-frames
beyond that which the ABIST engine was operating, structural
analysis alone detected that the unfoldings were trivial. It is
worth noting that, after tuning our SAT solver in this manner,
BMC became several orders of magnitude faster than even
random simulation for this large design, since the latter could
not be as optimally tuned to operate only on critical portions
of the design over time.
Numerous design flaws were exposed during the ABIST
testing, including faulty reporting of array errors and incorrect
staging of communication channels between the ABIST engine
and arrays.
V. FENCING LOGIC VERIFICATION
Fencing logic is typically a small yet essential part of
systems with multiple chips or multiple clock domains. The
intent of such logic is to prevent spurious logic activity while
the system is in the process of being reset, reconfigured or
while running LBIST. For example, when an incoming fence
signal is active for a particular domain, the internal logic of
the receiving domain must be impervious to random transitions
that may occur on any number of incoming interface buses or
signals [30].
Verification of fencing logic requires demonstrating that
all logic associated with a particular fence or set of fences
is effectively quiesced during any window of time that the
fences are active. For optimality of the design, the fencing
logic itself is often kept minimal, risking the exposure that
certain input stimulus may erroneously sensitize transitions in
the fenced design. Since a single fence line typically serves
to protect a multitude of interface signals from interacting
with a large amount of downstream logic, simulation alone
is often insufficient to expose all possible logic interactions
Metric Initial COM EQV IND Resources
Inputs 548878 32362 843 0
211sGates 748426 245309 43978 0
Registers 73368 23560 5922 0
748MBProperties 4665 4665 1837 0
TABLE V: Fencing Logic Results
and flaws. This renders simulation-based approaches largely
insufficient to yield acceptable coverage, and motivates a
formal verification approach.
Due to the straight-forward nature of the verification task,
we were able to develop a largely automated formal testbench
creation paradigm as follows. A property is automatically generated for each register
in the fenced design region, checking that the register’s
value does not alter during the fencing condition. All fencing-control inputs are configured to enable fenc-
ing. The remaining design inputs are categorized from the
design specification as being fenceable vs. unfenceable.
Fenceable inputs are precisely those which the fencing
logic is required to shelter the design from being sensi-
tized to, hence these inputs are left unconstrained in the
testbench. Others may come from adjacent logic blocks
which themselves are to be fenced, hence these are driven
to arbitrary constant values to avoid rendering spurious
failures.
A. Verification Results
We deployed our fencing logic verification methodology on
a custom data-flow chip. For our first deployment, before we
had a well-tuned sequential redundancy removal engine, we
limited our verification to 21 individual units of that chip,
each of which was limited to several thousand state elements
which were solvable within 10 minutes. Unit-level inputs from
other fenced blocks were treated as fenceable as per the above
methodology, and driven constant; all others were randomized.
Later in the project, a highly-tuned EQV engine scalable
to larger designs became available. This engine trivialized
those unit-level runs to being solvable within a matter of
seconds. We thus found that we were able to apply this
methodology at the level of the entire chip, though black-
boxing the logic arrays since that had no impact on the
fenced logic. With this methodology, we were able to leave
all chip inputs nondeterministic (aside from those enabling
fencing), relying upon the inter-unit connections to effectively
propagate the fenced constants throughout the chip. This saved
manual effort, since we no longer had to categorize inputs
as fenceable vs. non-fenceable. This also eliminated the risk
of missed design flaws associated with mis-categorization.
Table V provides the results of these experiments.
Six design flaws were identified during this testing, wherein
the fencing logic was inadequate to prevent the sampling of
design input values into the fenced logic.
VI. EXTERNAL TIME REFERENCE (ETR) VERIFICATION
ETR denotes a mechanism to keep all processor cores in
all nodes of a system synchronized to the same accurate
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“Time Of Day” [31]. Such a mechanism is very important,
for example, in synchronizing database accesses. Each node
in a system is connected to the ETR via the ETR Attachment
Facility (EAF). The ETR itself is connected to an External
Time Source (ETS), usually an atomic clock. Such a system
is illustrated in Figure 3.
The ETR generates timing information from the ETS, en-
codes it and sends it serially in the form of a bit stream to each
EAF. For enhanced reliability, this information is redundantly
transmitted across two identical channels, and the ETR can
dynamically switch between channels if it detects errors. The
EAF decodes this bit stream from the selected channel, stores
the results and propagates them to the individual CPUs.
Each EAF channel has two main components: a decoder
and a store unit. In the decoder, the incoming stream is first
sampled at the frequency of the local clock, then passed to an
edge-detection unit to extract a bit stream from the samples.
The extracted bits are then packed into 16-bit symbols by a
deserializer. Afterwards, the decoded symbols are passed to the
store unit, which categorizes them as control vs. data words
of the following types. The data symbols include Data Byte
Symbols (DBS) and Longitudinal Redundancy Check symbols
(LRC), which serve as a parity-check for the DBS. The control
symbols include the following: Idle (IDL), which is used to synchronize the EAF to the
incoming stream. Data frame start (FST), which is used to flag the start of
a data frame containing DBS symbols. On-time symbol (OTS), which is used to indicate the end
of the stream, and triggers the propagation of the timing
information decoded by the EAF channel.
The ETR periodically sends a pattern composed of these
symbols, beginning with a sequence of IDL symbols and
terminated by one OTS. Each pattern may contain numerous
duplicates of the data frame. The rest of the pattern is filled
with IDL symbols. Figure 4 illustrates such a pattern.
Before the channel stores and begins processing the timing
data, it needs to be synchronized to the incoming ETR stream.
This synchronization is achieved by detecting and aligning
against a long sequence of IDL symbols. Once synchronization
is achieved, the data symbols are stored and validated by
comparing the received LRC symbol to a locally-generated
value. If the comparison matches, the data is considered to
be valid and the subsequent received data frames are ignored,
IDL OTS
FST DBS DBS DBS DBS LRC
IDLIDL IDLIDL Data Frame Data Frame
Fig. 4: Example ETR Pattern
since they are only duplicates. If the comparison fails, the
process is repeated with the duplicate data frames until valid
data is detected. On detection of an OTS symbol, successfully
stored data is propagated to the processors. Otherwise, the
cause of the failure is reported, such as failure to synchronize,
data errors, or missing OTS.
A. Verification Results
The type of properties we verified of the ETR included as-
pects such as correct symbol decoding, correct synchronization
to the incoming signal, proper storage and propagation of data,
and proper error detection and handling.
A black-box approach of verifying the overall ETR and
EAF logic was quite challenging for formal verification. This
system comprised a large number of state elements even after
all transformations had been deployed, and was sequentially
very deep. A white-box approach was therefore adopted using
two testbenches: the first testbench deals with the serial part
of the unit, namely the decoding of the bit stream. This
testbench is used to validate properties for symbol decoding
and synchronisation. The second testbench deals with the
parallel part of the unit, namely the storing of the timing
information and the switching between the two channels.
This testbench is used to validate properties about proper
data storage and error handling. The actual design logic was
identical across both testbenches; however, the drivers and
checkers tied in to the design at different points.
One example property verified of the serial testbench is that
every symbol coming from the ETR is correctly decoded. The
driver of our testbench was configured to drive a stream of
random symbols to the ETR. Because the stream is entirely
nondeterministic, we constrained our testbench to validate
only the decoding of a single arbitrary symbol. Because the
necessary amount of time to decode a symbol was fixed, a
BMC approach was adequate to complete this verification task.
Nonetheless, the depth of the check was quite large, primarily
because the clock frequencies across the ETR and EAF differ
by a factor of 96 (hence we used oscillators of periodicity 2
and 2  96 in our driver to clock the two components). The
results are depicted in Table VI.
One example property we verified of the parallel testbench
is that the detection of the OTS occurs properly. In particular,
we built a driver that randomly determines the length of
streams it will send from the first data frame to the final
OTS (refer to Figure 4). The property verified that if the
OTS occurs outside of the allowed tolerance, a missing OTS
interrupt is generated. The results are depicted in Table VII.
Because the ETR system is architected to be extremely robust,
the timeout period for a missing OTS is quite high, hence this
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Metric Initial COM EQV COM BMC 6,162 Resources
Inputs 2957 18 16 16 0
843sGates 72340 49489 3460 3264 0
Registers 9544 5576 725 725 0
324MBProperties 3 3 3 3 0
TABLE VI: ETR Serial Property Results
reachability computation required 17,698 image computations
for convergence.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Pervasive logic refers to a variety of functionality included
in hardware chips orthogonal to their primary architectural
functionality, such as logic for initializing the design, for
security purposes, and for self-test. Verification of pervasive
logic is challenging for a variety of reasons, including the facts
that pervasive logic is entirely customized for each chip hence
verification and specification reuse tend to be infeasible; the
pervasive logic is intertwined with the functional logic of the
design at all hierarchies; and most pervasive logic verification
tasks require very large design slices (10,000s to millions
of state elements) and require very deep temporal analysis.
These complexities have historically limited pervasive logic
verification to being amenable only to simulation or emulation-
based analysis.
In this paper, we discuss how a robust multi-algorithmic
formal framework has made a variety of pervasive logic
verification tasks feasible and efficient. Given the magnitude
in terms of size and sequential depth of many of these tasks,
without the right set of algorithms, formal analysis would be
infeasible. We in many cases needed to tune our algorithms to
better scale to the necessary magnitudes for these applications.
These formal solutions have made a substantial improvement
to methodologies for verifying such pervasive logic for present
and future designs.
While we have made significant strides in this direction,
we note that pervasive logic verification is still far from a
solved problem. Numerous pervasive verification tasks remain
far outside the realm of proof capability, due to requiring
the analysis of extremely large design components – possibly
entire processor cores and even chips – for which sufficiently
advanced algorithms are not available. Though traditionally
addressed in distinct test conferences and conference tracks,
we thus wish to introduce the challenges of pervasive logic
verification to the formal verification community. In partic-
ular, we wish to encourage increased attention to applicable
methodologies and continued research in the development of
larger-capacity automated proof algorithms to formally address
such pervasive-logic verification needs.
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    We introduce a finer concept of a Hardware Machine, where 
the set of post-reboot operation states is explicitly a part of the 
FSM definition. We formalize an ad-hoc flow of combinational 
equivalence verification of hardware, the way it was performed 
over the years in the industry. We define a concept of post-reboot 
bisimulation, which better suits the Hardware Machines, and 
show that a right form of combinational equivalence is in fact a 
form of post-reboot bisimulation. Further, we show that 
alignability equivalence is a form of post-reboot bisimulation, too, 
and the latter is a refinement of alignability in the context of 
compositional hardware verification. We find that post-reboot 
bisimulation has important advantages over alignability also in 
the wider context of formal hardware verification, where 
equivalence verification is combined with formal property 
verification and with validation of a reboot sequence. As a result, 
we propose a more comprehensive, compositional, and fully-
formal framework for hardware verification. Our results are 
extendible to other forms of labeled transition systems and 
adaptable to other forms of bisimulation used to model and verify 




This work addresses formal hardware verification. The 
aim of hardware equivalence verification is to check for 
“functional equivalence” of two design models according to 
some concept of equivalence. The equivalence of two 
models does not guarantee that they do what they are 
designed for, and it is a task of formal property verification 
and dynamic validation to provide a level of confidence 
that the designs have the desired functionality. In practice, 
equivalence verification and property verification are 
closely related and are often performed under a common 
methodology umbrella and tool set. To date, however, there 
has not been any significant research towards providing a 
unifying theory that would combine equivalence 
verification with property verification using fully formal, 
full-proof methods (and not relying on a non-exhausting 
simulation). 
Since verification of complex hardware is not 
imaginable without employing abstraction and 
compositional methods, hardware equivalence verification 
in practice consists in the following steps: 
 
1. Decompose the specification and implementation 
models using mapped cut points in them. 
2. Use boundary constraints to make the corresponding 
component slices equivalent. 
3. Build a reboot sequence that via 3-valued simulation 
[HC98] brings the models into states satisfying the 
boundary constraints (and possibly other properties). 
4. Check that all properties remain valid post-reboot, 
using (non-exhaustive, 3-valued) simulation.  
 
The most widespread equivalence verification method 
in the industry was and still is some form of combinational 
verification [KvE04], where the slices are combinational, 
i.e., they contain no internal state elements. Hardware is 
represented as a Finite State Machine (FSM) [Koh78, 
HS96]. In its classical definition, combinationally 
equivalent FSMs M1 and M2 are actually the same FSMs: 
their transition relations and output functions are defined 
via the same Boolean functions that may be implemented 
differently in M1 and M2. In practice, however, a form of 
assume-guarantee framework is used (like the one outlined 
above), where the requirement of component equivalence is 
weakened to a form of conditional equivalence under 
“don’t cares”, or under combinational or temporal logic 
assumptions. Thus, combinational equivalence in practice 
does not correspond to its classical definition.  
For hardware FSMs designed to operate correctly after 
simulating them with a reboot sequence, several concepts 
of equivalence have been developed (besides combinational 
equivalence), such as sequential hardware equivalence, 
also called alignability equivalence [Pix92], delayed safe 
replaceability [SPAB01], exact 3-valued equivalence 
[RSSB99], and steady-state equivalence [KH02]. The latter 
two forms of equivalence have been used for retiming 
verification [LS91], which is the second most widespread 
form of hardware equivalence verification. Retiming 
verification of sequential components is often combined 
with combinational verification of combinational 
components.  It is unclear what kind of equivalence is 
proved between the specification and implementation 
FSMs as a result of such a combination of verification 
methods. Furthermore, step 4 of the above outlined 
procedure of compositional verification, which relates 
reboot sequence with the used boundary properties, was 
never considered as part of formal equivalence verification. 
Indeed, it is currently based on a non-exhaustive dynamic 
simulation and thus cannot guarantee a full proof. 
The main results of this work are: 
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1. From practice to theory: We formalize several 
dominating hardware equivalence verification methods 
into a unified theory (we identify and fill the 
verification holes along the way) – the outcome is post-
reboot equivalence. 
2. From theory to practice: We propose (fully) formal, 
practically applicable hardware equivalence 
verification algorithms and methodology allowing 
combination of formal equivalence verification with 
formal property verification.  
3. Relevance in practice: We present experimental 
evidence demonstrating that the new theory makes 
difference in the practice of full-chip verification. 
4. Extendible and adaptive concepts: While we focus on 
bit-wise hardware machines, the new equivalence 
concept is defined in terms of bisimulation, which 
allows (1) extending the results to (possibly non-
deterministic) Labeled Transition Systems, into which 
both hardware and software can be modeled at higher 
levels of abstraction, and (2) adapting it to other useful 
forms of (bi)simulation. 
 
The concept of post-reboot equivalence proposed here 
is a refinement of alignability equivalence [Pix92]. The 
compositional verification framework that we propose is 
based on a more recent work [KSKH04] that proves weak 
compositionality of alignability via defining a concept of 
stable decomposition of the specification and 
implementation FSMs. The latter framework assumes, 
however, that the two FSMs are weakly synchronizable 
(WS for short [PR96]) with the same input sequence, but it 
does not provide any practical algorithm for formally 
verifying whether or not a given input vector sequence is a 
ws-sequence. This makes the methodology proposed in 
[KSKH04] incomplete. This incompleteness is caused by 
the fact that the latter work used the alignability 
equivalence as the basis, and it is unclear how a practical, 
formal verification method can be proposed for verifying 
ws-sequences without adopting the post-reboot equivalence 
concept, as we do here. Furthermore, alignability 
equivalence is not satisfactory in practice, since it is not 
enough for a reboot sequence to be a ws-sequence: to make 
the hardware work properly, the reboot sequence should 
bring it to a designated set of states that meet some 
architectural requirements. For example, physical addresses 
in the memory, initial values of counters, and some states at 
the internal sub-systems must have specific values. The 
concept of WS does not capture these requirements. 
Finally, alignability equivalence is not expressive enough 
to relate the provability of commonly observable temporal 
logic formulas in one FSM to their validity in an equivalent 
FSM. These points will later be clarified in detail. 
The theoretical contribution of our work can briefly be 
summarized as follows: We introduce a concept of post-
reboot bisimulation as a pair (π, B), where B is a 
bisimulation between compatible FSMs M1 and M2 (i.e. the 
FSMs have the same inputs and outputs) and π brings any 
pair of states of M1×M2 into a pair in B. We formalize the 
concept of post-reboot combinational equivalence and 
show that it is a post-reboot bisimulation. We show that 
alignability is a post-reboot bisimulation, too. We also 
show that the set of all post-reboot bisimulations (when it is 
non-empty) forms a complete lattice [DP90]. Its top 
element corresponds to bisimulations formed from all ws-
states, and the bottom element corresponds to the 
bisimulations formed from the states in sink strongly 
connected components [PR96] of M1 and M2. Post-reboot 
combinational verification and compositional alignability 
verification correspond to building post-reboot 
bisimulations that are between the top and bottom 
bisimulations, and therefore these forms of verification are 
feasible in practice. 
Further, we define an upper semi-lattice [DP90] of 
weak-synchronizing sequences. It is in fact this order that 
allows us to demonstrate how “the strength” of a reboot 
sequence can affect the post-reboot validity of a temporal 
specification of the design – and this indeed clarifies the 
subtle differences between post-reboot equivalence and 
alignability: Since a reboot sequence π must bring any state 
pair of M1×M2 into a non-empty bisimulation B, the 
sequence π must be a ws-sequence for both M1 and M2. The 
converse need not be true: some of the ws-sequences 
cannot serve as useful reboot sequences because they may 
not meet some non-functional requirements that should be 
satisfied during the post-reboot operation of the circuit. 
Examples of non-functional requirements (for the FSM 
formalism) are power and timing constraints, as well as the 
architectural requirements mentioned above, which may be 
satisfied in some but not all ws-states. Non-functional 
requirements can also be temporal logic specifications that 
were not encoded into the circuit design as observable 
output behaviors. Thus, post-reboot bisimulation can be 
viewed as a useful refinement of alignability equivalence, 
especially when equivalence verification is considered in a 
wider context of formal verification of hardware designs, 
and may be combined with verification of temporal 
properties and validation of (candidate) reboot sequences. 
In the next section, we recall the FSMs and concepts 
related to alignability and introduce Hardware Machines. In 
section 3, we introduce post-reboot bisimulation, relate it to 
alignability, and give its lattice-theoretic characterization. 
In Section 4, we propose a revised definition of 
combinational equivalence. We discuss the advantages of 
post-reboot bisimulation for verification of hardware 
machines in Section 5. Our conclusions appear in Section 6. 
 
2. Hardware Machines 
 
In this section, we introduce Hardware Machines, to 
reflect the fact that the set of operation states of a hardware 
design is a subset, usually proper, of the WS-states.  
 
Definition 2.1 [Koh78] A Finite State Machine (FSM) M is 
a tuple (S,Σ,Γ,δ,λ), where S is a finite set of states (ranged 
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over by s, t, s1, …); Σ is a finite input alphabet (ranged over 
by a, …); Γ is a finite output alphabet (ranged over by e, 
…); δ: S × Σ  S is a state transition (or next-state) 
function; and λ: S × Σ  Γ is an output function. Here, Σ 
and Γ correspond to the Boolean vectors of input and 
output variables (i.e., bits that can be 0 or 1) and, similarly, 
states are Boolean vectors of state (i.e., latch) variables. 
 
Notation: Below, unless otherwise stated, M1  and M2 
denote compatible FSMs, i.e., M1  and M2 have the same 
sets of inputs and outputs. We denote the state set of M by 
S(M). Further,   π and ρ denote input sequences for M. We 
write a: s  t if δ(s,a) = t, and we write π: s * t  if 
π transforms s into t (here * denotes transitive reflexive 
closure of ). Recall that a: s  t means that input a brings 
M from state s (the current state) to state t (the next state); 
and λ(s,a) = e means that at current state s, if the input is a, 
the output value (at current state) is e. Finally, OM(s,π), or 
simply O(s,π),  denotes the output value of M after 
simulating M with π, where M is initially at state s, and 
S(s,π) denotes the state into which π brings s.  
We recall that the product M1×M2 of M1 and M2 has the 
same inputs and outputs as the two FSMs; its states are 
pairs of states of M1 and M2, and its output function and 
state transition function are pairs of the output functions 
and state transition functions of M1  and M2, respectively.  
 
Definition 2.2  
• [Koh78, HS96] Let M1 and M2  be FSMs. States s1∈ 
S(M1) and s2∈ S(M2) are equivalent, written as s1 ≈ s2, 
if ∀π: O(s1, π)=O(s2, π). The state (s1,s2) is then called 
an equivalent state of the product machine M1×M2. 
• [PR96] A weak synchronizing sequence (ws-sequence 
for short) of an FSM M is an input sequence that 
brings M from any state to a subset of equivalent states 
{s1,…,sm}. Each such state si is called a ws-state of M, 
and M is called weakly-synchronizable. 
 
Below, StateEq(M1,M2), or simply StateEq, denotes the 
state equivalence relation on S(M1)×(M2);  ≈ is the infix 
notation for StateEq.  By equivalent states we always mean 
state-equivalence. Note that every state reachable from a 
ws-state of M is a ws-state. WS(M), or simply WS, denotes 
the set of all ws-states of M.  
 
Definition 2.3 [Pix92] Let M1 and M2 be FSMs. 
• A binary input sequence π is an aligning sequence for a 
state (s1,s2) of M1×M2 if it brings M1×M2 from state 
(s1,s2) to an equivalent state. 
• M1 and M2 are alignable, M1≈alnM2, if every state of 
M1×M2 has an aligning sequence.  
 
It is shown in [Pix92] that M1≈alnM2 iff there is a 
sequence (called a universal aligning sequence) that aligns 
each state of M1×M2. The following theorem is an easy 
consequence of the results of [Pix92].  
 
Alignment Theorem: FSMs M1 and M2 are alignable if 
and only if each FSM is weakly synchronizable and there is 
an equivalent pair s1 ≈ s2 of states in M1 and M2. The 
concatenation of ws-sequences of M1 and M2 is a ws-
sequence for both of them and it weakly synchronizes M1 
and M2 into equivalent ws-states (when M1≈alnM2). 
 
If an FSM is not weakly-synchronizable, for any input 
sequence ρ, there always exist power-up states s1 and s2 
such that the states O(s1, ρ) and  O(s2, ρ) are not 
equivalent.  This means that, whatever the ρ, the FSM 
exhibits a non-deterministic observational (output-) 
behavior after ρ. Therefore, in the alignability equivalence, 
weak synchronization is a necessary condition for an FSM 
to be equivalent to another FSM (or to itself). Below in the 
discussion, we will only consider such FSMs. 
Since alignability equivalence is only concerned with 
the output behavior, and equivalent states of an FSM 
cannot be distinguished by observing the outputs, Pixley 
[Pix92] worked with equivalence classes of states [s]≈. He 
showed that, for any non-equivalent ws-states s and t, there 
is a transition path from (an element of) [s]≈ to (an element 
of) [t]≈ and vice versa. Hence, whatever the ws-sequence π 
is chosen to synchronize an FSM M, the set of its post-ws 
states, up-to ≈, is always the same – it coincides with the 
set of equivalence classes of WS(M). Thus, for alignability 
equivalence, the set of all ws-states is (implicitly) 
considered as the set of operation states. 
In practice, equivalence verification between FSMs M1 
and M2 is usually combined with verifying that the 
specification model M1 (written in a hardware description 
language) satisfies its temporal logic specification, say P. In 
this wider context, working with equivalence classes of 
states is inadequate, as if a state s satisfies P, its equivalent 
states need not to. And for ws-states, it is no longer valid 
that there is a transition path between any pair of ws-states. 
Therefore, it does make a difference which ws-sequence is 
chosen to weakly synchronize the FSMs – the resulting sets 
of post-ws operation states may be different. For one ws-
sequence π, the respective post-ws operation states of M1 
may satisfy P while for another ws-sequence ρ, the 
resulting post-ws operation states might not satisfy P. A 
simple example of this is given in Section 5. This 
observation led us to introduce the following concept: 
 
Definition 2.4 A Hardware Machine (HM) is a pair H=(M, 
R), where M is an FSM and R ⊆ WS(M) is closed under 
transition; R is called the set of operation states of H.   
 
In the above definition, R must be understood as a set of 
states into which a ws-sequence ρ brings H from any state. 
We could have chosen to make ρ a part of definition of an 
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HM. We will see below that R can be defined as a set of 
constraints on the boundaries of component slices of a 
suitable decomposition of M, thus we found it more natural 
to use R than ρ as part of the HM definition.  
 
3. Post-reboot equivalence 
 
In this section, we introduce post-reboot bisimulation 
(PRB) and post reboot equivalence, and construct the lattice 
of PRBs. We show how PRB is related to alignability and 
discuss how the two differ (theoretically), by defining an 
upper-semi-lattice on ws-sequences. We also relate PRB 
with FSM bisimulation as defined in [AGM01]. 
The following concept of bisimulation for compatible 
FSMs is induced by the bisimulation concept for LTSs 
[Par81, Mil89]. Recall that an FSM can be viewed as an 
LTS by considering a pair (a, λ(s,a)) as the label for 
transition s  δ(s,a), where a is an input [HS96].  
 
Definition 3.1: Let Mi = (Si, Σ, Γ,δi, λι), i = 1,2, be FSMs, 
and let B ⊆ S1×S2 be  a relation such that: 
• B(s1,s2)⇒ ∀a∈Σ: λ1(s1,a) =λ2(s2,a) & B(δ1(s1,a),δ2(s2,a)). 
Then, B is called an FSM bisimulation and M1 and M2 are 
called bisimilar with respect to B. States (s1,s2)∈S1×S2 are 
called bisimilar, written as s1∼s2, if they are contained in a 
bisimulation on S1×S2. 
 
State equivalence is an early form of FSM-bisimulation: 
s1∼s2 iff s1 ≈ s2. Therefore, the state equivalence relation 
StateEq ⊆ S(M1)×S(M2) is the largest (w.r.t. ⊆) 
bisimulation between M1 and M2. It in interesting to note 
that FSMs M1 and M2 are replaceable, or FSM-equivalent 
[Koh78], iff StateEq(M1,M2) is a non-empty bisimulation. 
 
Corollary 3.1 Let M1  and M2  be FSMs, let S1⊆ S(M1) and 
S2⊆S(M2) be closed under transition, and let StateEq(S1,S2) 
= StateEq∩(S1×S2). Then StateEq(S1,S2) is the largest 
bisimulation between M1 and M2 contained in S1×S2.  
 
Definition 3.2 Let Mi = (Si, Σ, Γ,δi, λι), i = 1,2, be FSMs, 
let π be a sequence of inputs from Σ, and let B⊆S1×S2 be a 
bisimulation between M1 and M2. A pair (π,B) is a post-
reboot bisimulation (or PRB) between M1 and M2 iff: 
• ∀(s1,s2)∈S1×S2. (π: s1 * t1 & π: s2 * t2) ⇒ B(t1,t2).  
M1 and M2 are called post-reboot bisimilar or post-reboot 
equivalent if there is a PRB between them. 
 
Theorem 3.1 The set of all post-reboot bisimulations 
between FSMs M1 and M2, when it is a non-empty set, is a 
complete lattice w.r.t. the partial order defined by: (π1,B1) ≤ 
(π2, B2) iff B1⊆ B2.  
 
Let (π,B) be a PRB between M1 and M2; then one can 
associate with π a smallest bisimulation Bπ such that (π,Bπ) 
is a PRB; Bπ is the intersection of all Bi such that (π, Bi) is a 
PRB. Therefore, we can define a (strict) order on input 
sequences as follows: π1 p  π2 iff Bπ1 ⊃ Bπ2; that is, π1 
cannot transfer all state pairs of M1×M2 into Bπ2, whereas 
π2 can; therefore, we call π2 a stronger reboot sequence 
than π1. We write π1 ≡ π2  iff Bπ1 = Bπ2. When M1=M2, the 
order p  is in fact an order on the ws-sequences of M1. The 
order p  has upper bounds but need not have a bottom 
element, thus need not be a lattice. Indeed, consider the 
FSM M∴ in Figure 1. Note that s1 ≈ s4 and s2 ≈ s3. 
Therefore, input sequences 1 and 0 are both ws-sequences 
of M∴ and so is 10. Note that 1 ≡ 11 ≡ 111 …; 0 ≡ 00 
≡ 000…; and 01 ≡ 10 ≡ 100…. Thus, quotientp  / ≡  has 

















The deep analysis of weak synchronization via strongly 
connected components (or SCCs) of the state transition 
graphs presented in [PR96] is closely related to our lattice-
theoretic characterization of PRB: Recall that an SCC is a 
set of states where between any two states there is a state 
transition path.  A sink SCC is one from which there is no 
exiting transition. Then, in any smallest PRB (π, B), states 
in B belong to sink SCCs of M1 and M2 and π is a strongest 
ws-sequence. This follows easily from the construction of 
ws-sequences that bring any state into a sink SCC, in 
[PR96], and from Corollary 3.1. 
Post-reboot bisimulation relates to the bisimulation 
concept for FSMs with start states [AGM01] as follows. If 
an FSM M comes with a start state sI∈S(M), we assume 
that there is an input sequence πI, often of length 1, such 
that ∀s∈S(M). πI:s * sI; that is, πI is a synchronizing 
sequence for M. Such an assumption is natural for 
hardware FSMs, since hardware can power up at any state, 
and assumption of a start state actually implies assumption 
of a ws-sequence that brings the FSM into the start state. 
Now let M1 and M2 be FSMs with start states sI1 and sI2, 
respectively. Then [AGM01] requires (sI1,sI2) to belong to 
any bisimulation B⊆S1×S2, which is equivalent to requiring 
that (πI,B) is a PRB for any non-empty bisimulation 
B⊆S1×S2, where πI is such that ∀s1∈S1. πI: s1 * sI1 and 
∀s2∈S2. πI: s2 * sI2; but any non-empty bisimulation B 
should anyway contain (sI1,sI2) because B is closed under 
transition and πI transfers every state pair into (sI1,sI2).   
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Definition 3.2 Let M1 and M2  be FSMs. Let S1 ⊆ S(M1) 
and S2 ⊆ S(M2). We call a bisimulation B⊆ S(M1)×S(M2) 
an on-to bisimulation on S1×S2 iff B ⊆ S1×S2 and 
• ∀s1∈ S1. ∃s2∈ S2. B(s1,s2) & ∀s2∈ S2. ∃s1∈ S1. B(s1,s2). 
 
Post-reboot equivalence is related to alignability as follows. 
 
Theorem 3.2 Let WS1 and WS2 be weak-synchronization 
states of FSMs M1 and M2, respectively (WS1 = ∅  if M1 is 
not weakly synchronizable, and similarly for WS2 and M2). 
Further, let StateEq(WS1,WS2) = StateEq ∩ (WS1×WS2). 
Then the following are equivalent: 
1. M1 and M2 are alignable;  
2. StateEq(WS1,WS2)  ≠  ∅; 
3. StateEq(WS1,WS2) is a non-empty on-to bisimulation, 
on WS1×WS2, between M1 and M2. 
4. M1 and M2 are post-reboot equivalent. 
 
It is easy to see that in any PRB (π, B) between M1 and 
M2, π is a universal aligning sequence for M1 and M2, thus 
p  orders universal aligning sequences of M1 and M2. 
 
4. Combinational equivalence as post-reboot 
equivalence 
 
In this section, we examine combinational verification 
of state-matching FSMs, expose the verification holes in its 
current formalism, and relate it to post-reboot equivalence 
in an attempt to come up with a satisfactory formalism.  
To do this, we explain in an example the compositional 
alignability verification framework proposed in [KSKH04]. 
The specification and implementation FSMs M1 and M2 are 














component A1 component B1
component A2 component B2
 
A 1-1 correspondence between the component slices of 
M1 and M2 is defined via mapping the corresponding slice 
boundaries, where the boundary signals are latches. For 
example, the boundary signals of components A1 and A2 
are mapped (they have the same names), and so are the 
boundary signals of B1 and B2. FSM decomposition is 
needed to reduce equivalence verification for M1 and M2 to 
equivalence verification of the components, and for this to 
work, boundary properties are added to the components to 
eliminate behaviors of the components that will never 
happen during a post-reboot behavior of the FSMs. For 
example, by using the constraint l1 = ¬l2, it is possible to 
prove that the conditional FSMs obtained from B1 and B2 
by restricting the allowed input sequences are alignable. To 
make usage of such a constraint sound, one must insure that 
the constraint is valid in all post-reboot operation states. 
Indeed, in this example it is enough to use any ws-sequence 
as a reboot sequence to ensure the constraint. Since the 
constraint is actually the output constraint for components 
A1 and A2, its validity in all post-reboot states of M1 and 
M2 is proved locally in the components A1 and A2 – the 
constraint is valid in all post-ws states of A1 and A2. 
There is another condition for a safe usage of boundary 
properties – the resulting conditional FSMs must be stable 
[KSKH04]. The intuition is that, in stable conditional 
FSMs, an input vector is allowed in a state transition path 
iff it is allowed in all state transition paths. Such a 
conditional FSM can be mapped to an equivalent (non-
conditional) FSM whose input signature is a subset of that 
of the conditional FSM, therefore, the alignability theory is 
valid for stable conditional FSMs. Components B1 and B2 
constrained with l1 = ¬l2 are stable conditional FSMs, 
because input vectors l1 = l2 = 0 and l1 = l2 = 1 are never 
allowed while the remaining two input vectors are always 
allowed. 
Only a subset of boundary properties is used for the 
assume-guarantee compositional proofs. Such properties 
are called verification properties. Their conjunction is 
denoted by VPD. A decomposition D of (M1, M2) is called 
stable if all the components are stable under the verification 
properties, and the output properties of each component are 
valid in ws-states of the component (constrained by 
respective input properties). When D is stable, VPD 
determines a relation RD⊆S(M1)×S(M2) as follows: (s1,s2) 
∈ RD iff (s1,s2) satisfies VPD and the induced state of each 
component in D is a ws-state for that component 
(constrained with VPD). It is assumed that the same name 
(mapped) latches are assigned the same values in (s1,s2). 
Now recall that two FSMs are called state-matching if 
there is a 1-1 mapping between their latches. Often, for 
state-matching FSMs, it is allowed that a latch in one model 
is mapped to more than one latch in the other model. 
Sometimes, a mapping may have a polarity: a latch in one 
model may be mapped on a negation of a latch in the other 
model. This slightly more general treatment can easily be 
reduced to a situation where the latch mapping is 1-1, and 
no polarity is involved, and we adopt these assumptions. 
When performing combinational equivalence 
verification, a mismatch in functionality of a component 
pair is allowed if the supporting components (or the 
supporting logic) in M1 and M2 can never generate a value 
combination that produces the mismatch. For example, the 
outputs l1 and l2 of components A1 and A2 of FSMs M1 and 
M2 in Figure 2 can only generate values satisfying the 
“mutex” property l1 = ¬l2 (except the start time 0 when the 
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latches l1 and l2 may have arbitrary values).  To formalize 
this intuition, let us call a decomposition D of M1×M2 
combinational if D is stable and each latch of M1 and M2 is 
an output of a component of M1 or M2. 
 
Definition 4.1 Let M1 and M2 be state-matching FSMs. We 
call M1 and M2 combinationally equivalent if there is a 
combinational decomposition D of (M1, M2) such that: 
• Outputs of any matching component pair (A1,A2) in D 
are equal at the next time if their inputs satisfy VPD at 
the current time and their outputs are equal at the current 
time. 
• The verification properties on outputs of any component 
pair (A1,A2) in D are valid at the next time if their inputs 
satisfy VPD at the current time and their outputs are 
equal at the current time. 
 
As already explained on an example above, by allowing 
the properties on component boundaries, one actually 
assumes a reboot sequence, and expects the FSMs' 
behaviors to match post-reboot. Therefore, unless M1×M2 
can be driven from an arbitrary state into a state satisfying 
RD, combinational equivalence w.r.t. D is meaningless – it 
is vacuous. Hence the following definition: 
 
Definition 4.2 Let M1 and M2 be combinationally 
equivalent w.r.t. a combinational decomposition D, and let 
there be an input sequence π that brings any state pair of 
M1×M2 into a state pair in RD. Then we call M1 and M2 
post-reboot combinationally equivalent (w.r.t. D). 
 
The problem of verifying that a reboot sequence will 
bring the circuits into a bisimulation has not been addressed 
by formal methods and traditionally this was not considered 
as part of combinational equivalence verification, which is 
a verification gap. In Section 5, we will discuss how to 
formally verify whether a pair (π, B) is a PRB, implying 
that π is a legal reboot sequence for bisimulation B.  
 
Theorem 4.1 State-matching FSMs M1 and M2 are 
combinationally equivalent iff there is a combinational 
decomposition D of (M1,M2) such that RD is a bisimulation. 
 
Note that, for a combinational decomposition D, if and 
only if RD is a bisimulation, every component pair has 
matching equivalent ws-states, and thus is alignable (by the 
Alignment Theorem). Hence, we conclude from Theorem 
4.1 that state-matching FSMs M1 and M2 are 
combinationally equivalent w.r.t. a combinational 
decomposition D iff all component pairs of D (constrained 
by VPD) are alignable. Finally, we show that post-reboot 
combinational equivalence is a PRB.  
 
Theorem 4.2 Post-reboot combinationally equivalent state-
matching FSMs M1 and M2 are post-reboot equivalent. 
As already mentioned, combinational verification is 
often combined with retiming verification on the same 
design. For weakly synchronizable FSMs, steady-state 
equivalence, used as the semantics for retiming verification, 
implies alignability [KH03], thus post-reboot equivalence. 
Therefore, the retiming verification with steady-state 
semantics can be safely used as part of compositional post-
reboot equivalence verification, provided the retimed 
components are first proven to be weakly-synchronizable. 
5. Verification of Hardware Machines 
Now, we consider verification of hardware machines in 
a wider context, where equivalence verification is 
combined with assertion verification and reboot sequence 
validation. We do not intend to cover all methodological 
aspects; however, we demonstrate the advantages and 
adequacy of post-reboot equivalence for this task. 
 
Definition 5.1 We call HMs H1=(M1,R1) and H2=(M2,R2) 
equivalent if there is a post-reboot bisimulation (π,B) 
between FSMs M1 and M2 such that B ⊆R1×R2. We call a 
CTL* formula [CGP99] valid in H1 iff it is valid in all states 
in R1. 
 
Consider the following FSM MPR, taken from [PR96]. 
(We use the original notation for states: A,B,C, etc.)  
A B C
D E F













State pairs (A, D), (B, E) and (C, F) are equivalent. Since A 
≈ D, sequence 0 is a ws-sequence for MPR, bringing states 
{A, B} into A and states {C, D, E, F} into D. Since all 
states are accessible from A and D, all states are ws-states. 
Clearly, one has 0 ≡ 01 ≡ 010 p  011 p  0111 ≡ 0110. If 
the designer wants MPR to operate in states {D, E, F} after 
reboot, he/she can choose a strongest reboot sequence, e.g. 
0111, which transfers any state into the sink SCC {D, E, 
F}. Assume P is a property that is not valid at state C and is 
valid in {D, E, F}.  P can be seen as a behavioral 
specification for a design that the designer wants to 
implement. Then, MPR meets its behavioral specification 
with respect to the post-reboot semantics (for the reboot 
sequence 0111, for instance) but it does not meet its 
behavioral specification relative to the alignability 
semantics (e.g. when 0 is chosen as the ws-sequence). In 
this respect, adopting post-reboot semantics has a 
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significant impact on the verification methodology: since 
alignability does not distinguish between ws-sequences, 
adopting the alignability semantics forces the designer to 
modify the implementation of MPR because of a “failing” 
property P. Here is the data from a chip design project that 
we supported: 75% of the logic bugs discovered by post-
reboot simulation, after the equivalence verification was 
completed, were caused by the initialization issues. 
For an FSM M, adopting the alignability semantics 
implies the need to prove for a property P the derived 
property s∈WS(M) ⇒ P(s) for any state s of M. On the 
other hand, adopting post-reboot equivalence for a 
Hardware Machine (M,R) implies instead proving property 
s∈R ⇒ P(s). We have seen that relation R can be 
computed (and is computed in practice) as the relation RD 
associated to a stable decomposition of M (or M×M), while 
WS(M) cannot be computed for industrial designs, and it is 
unclear how a property WS ⇒ P can be verified in general 
for a weakly-synchronizable FSM. 
Let P be a CTL* formula written using the common 
(i.e., mapped) variables of M1 and M2 as the atomic 
propositions; such a formula is observable in both FSMs. 
Note that when we build a PRB (ρ,RD) based on a stable 
decomposition D of (M1,M2), the HMs (M1,R1) and (M2,R2) 
are equivalent, where R1 and R2 are the projections of RD 
on S(M1) and S(M2), respectively. Further, P is valid in 
(M1,R1) iff it is valid in (M2,R2) (cf. [Ch. 11, CGP99]). 
However, based on M1≈alnM2 alone, it is no longer possible 
to infer the validity of P on the ws-states of M2 from its 
validity on ws-states of M1. Indeed, let M’PR be the same 
FSM as the FSM MPR in Figure 3, except now on input 0 
the states A and B transition to D (rather than its equivalent 
state A). Then M’PR  ≈aln MPR and {D, E, F} is the set of 
ws-states of M’PR and, therefore, the property P (from the 
same example) is valid in all ws-states of M’PR while it is 
not valid in the ws-state C of MPR. That is, alignability 
equivalence for FSMs is not informative enough to allow 
inferring common observable properties from one model to 
its equivalent model. Note that considering the boundary 
latches as outputs and thereby strengthening alignability 
equivalence (by ensuring that the atomic propositions have 
the same values in M1 and M2) does not help us resolve the 
validity preservation problem with alignability, because the 
boundary properties are also used in proving the common 
observable properties. 
In Tables 1 and 2, we present information on the 
verification of 5 assertions on the specification model. In 
both experiments, the boundaries of the cones on which the 
properties are checked are built using mapped latches (at 
this point, the equivalence of corresponding components of 
specification and implementation is already proven using 
the verification properties).  If verification fails because of 
a spurious counter-example, the cone is expanded and 
verification is rerun. The use of the (boundary) verification 
properties as assumptions is allowed in the experiment in 
Table 1 and not allowed in the experiment in Table 2. In 
both cases, a SAT-based initialization algorithm is used to 
weakly synchronize the cones [RH02]. Thus, the first 
experiment closely corresponds to post-reboot equivalence 
verification with respect to the post-reboot bisimulation 
defined by the stable decomposition employed in the 
equivalence verification. Since we weakly synchronize the 
cones before verifying the properties, the second 
experiment is only an approximation of proving WS ⇒ P, 
because the computed synchronization sequence may reset 
the cone into a proper subset of the WS states. (We do not 
know how to prove WS ⇒ P for large FSMs.) 
In the tables, we present the  highest level of expansion 
iterations (EI), the size of the cones, the number of 
boundary properties (BP) used in assertion verification, and 
the runtimes. All properties in Table 1 are verified using a 
SAT-based model checker, whereas the same properties in 
Table 2 cannot be verified. Some of them cannot be 
verified because of failures to weakly synchronize the 
cones, and some because of the resulting spurious counter-
examples. As expected, the use of boundary properties as 
assumptions helps confine verification to smaller cones. 
 
assertions EI inputs latches gates BP cpu (sec) 
assert 1 2 114 26 1674 17 154 
assert 2 1 24 20 221 1 155 
assert 3 0 18 3 1012 9 209 
assert 4 0 835 4 6986 64 209 
assert 5 0 19 4 873 2 312 
 
Table 1: assertion verification using boundary properties 
 
assertions EI inputs latches gates cpu (sec) 
assert 1 10 125 526 7871 256 
assert 2 10 369 1133 17690 262 
assert 3 9 69 114 954 211 
assert 4 2 858 37424 250745 596 
assert 5 1 675 18 2585 1325 
 
Table 2: assertion verification without boundary properties 
 
Now let us turn to the question of verifying whether or 
not a sequence π is a ws-sequence for an FSM M. Since it 
is impossible to symbolically simulate [Jon02] a full-chip 
design, an over-approximation of states into which a reboot 
sequence brings a design is computed using 3-valued 
simulation, often also called X-simulation [HC98]. At the 
beginning of simulation, all latch values are set to the X 
value, and all inputs except a few reset signals are 
simulated with X. Propagation of reset signal values forces 
assignment of binary values to most of the latches, and the 
first part of the reboot sequence ends as soon as a fix-point 
of simulation is reached. Reboot sequence then continues to 
initialize counters, memory addresses, and other latches to 
specific values. To the best of our knowledge, no practical, 
formal methods exist for checking whether the over-
approximation set of states of a combined full-chip design 
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M1×M2, built, as above, using 3-valued simulation, is 
indeed a subset of ws-states of M1×M2.  Such a method 
would involve model checking on a huge state space.  
The above question is actually irrelevant for achieving 
compositional post-reboot equivalence verification. 
Suppose a stable decomposition D of M1×M2 has been 
built. Let S be the 3-valued state obtained by simulating 
M1×M2 with π, starting from state X, let OS be the set of 
(binary) states of M1×M2 induced by S (latches with X 
values are assigned all possible binary value combinations), 
and let OS* denote the closure of OS under the transition 
relation. Then it is enough to prove that (π, OS*) is a PRB. 
The latter is a model-checking problem on the components 
of the decomposition (which are within the capacity of the 
model checker): for each component pair (A1,A2) of 
M1×M2, the state pair (t1,t2) induced by any state of OS 
must be an equivalence state of A1×A2, and the verification 
properties on the outputs of  (A1,A2) must be valid for (t1,t2) 
and any state pair reachable from it by any input sequence 




We have proposed a new, finer formalism for modeling 
hardware – Hardware Machines, where the set of post-
reboot operation states is a key component of the definition. 
This led us to introduce post-reboot equivalence, where, 
unlike alignability equivalence, the operation states play an 
important role in the semantics. Indeed, we could refine the 
alignability equivalence into a complete lattice of post-
reboot bisimulations, and refine the homogeneous class of 
ws-sequences into an upper semi-lattice of reboot 
sequences. This new view of hardware also led us to a 
revision of the existing widespread equivalence concepts 
and the way they are employed in practice. We gain a new 
insight into compositional hardware verification, where the 
construction of a set of operation states is a by-product of 
building a stable decomposition of specification and 
implementation models. As a result of this revision, we 
were able to point to verification gaps in the existing 
methods, and propose a unified theory that bridges the 
verification practice to the Hardware Machine formalism. 
We have briefly touched on the subject of assertion 
verification for Hardware Machines, demonstrating that the 
shift from FSMs to Hardware Machines implies important 
differences in the semantics of temporal logic assertions. 
We presented experimental evidence on how such a change 
in assertion semantics affects assertion verification in 
practice. We leave it to future work to come up with a 
comprehensive assertion verification theory and 
methodology that will be fully aligned with compositional 
equivalence verification and reboot sequence verification.  
For non-state-matching designs, there are too many 
options to decompose the design into sub-circuits, and, at 
present, building stable decompositions is semi-automatic: 
heuristic latch mapping algorithms are used to define 
decomposition to start with, and then abstraction refinement 
methods [CGP99] are used to adjust the sub-circuit 
boundaries and add properties. Defining a fully automatic 
algorithm for building stable decompositions is a 
challenging direction for future work.  
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Abstract— We formally define—at the stream transformer
level—a class of synchronous circuits that tolerate any variabil-
ity in the latency of their environment. We study behavioral
properties of networks of such circuits and prove fundamental
compositionality results. The paper contributes to bridging the
gap between the theory of latency-insensitive systems and the
correct implementation of efficient control structures for them.
I. INTRODUCTION
The conventional abstract model for a synchronous circuit is
a machine that reads inputs and writes outputs at every cycle.
The outputs at cycle i are produced according to a calculation
that depends on the inputs at cycles 0, . . . , i. Computations
and data transfers are assumed to take zero delay.
Latency-insensitive design by Carloni et al. [2] aims to relax
this model by elasticizing the time dimension and so decou-
pling the cycles from the calculations of the circuit. It enables
the design of circuits tolerant to any discrete variation (in
the number of cycles) of the computation and communication
delays. With this modular approach, the functionality of the
system only depends on the functionality of its components
and not on their timing characteristics.
The motivation for latency-insensitive design comes from
the difficulties with timing and communication in nanoscale
technologies. The number of cycles required to transmit data
from a sender to a receiver is governed by the distance
between them, and often cannot be accurately known until
the chip layout is generated late in the design process. Tra-
ditional design approaches require fixing the communication
latencies up front, and these are difficult to amend when
layout information finally becomes available. Elastic circuits
offer a solution to this problem. In addition, their modularity
promises novel methods for microarchitectural design that
can use variable-latency components and tolerate static and
dynamic changes in communication latencies, while—unlike
asynchronous circuits—still employing standard synchronous
design tools and methods.
Cortadella et al. [4] present a simple elastic protocol, called
SELF (Synchronous Elastic Flow) and describe methods for
efficient implementation of elastic systems and for conversion
of regular synchronous designs into elastic form. Inspired by
the original work on latency-insensitive design [2], SELF also
differs from it in ways that render the theory developed in [2]
hardly applicable.
In this paper we give theoretical foundations of SELF: a
novel and arguably more practicable definition of elasticity,














Fig. 1. (a) Conventional synchronous adder, (b) Synchronous elastic adder.
proofs are omitted, but are available in the technical report
[7].
A. Overview
Figure 1(a) depicts the timing behavior of a conventional
synchronous adder that reads input and produces output data
at every cycle (boxes represent cycles). In this adder, the i-th
output value is produced at the i-th cycle. Figure 1(b) depicts
a related behavior of an elastic adder—a synchronous circuit
too—in which data transfer occurs in some cycles and not in
others. We refer to the transferred data items as tokens and we
say that idle cycles contain bubbles.
Put succinctly, elasticization decouples cycle count from
token count. In a conventional synchronous circuit, the i-th
token of a wire is transmitted at the i-th cycle, whereas in
a synchronous elastic circuit the i-th token is transmitted at
some cycle k ≥ i.
Turning a conventional synchronous adder into a syn-
chronous elastic adder requires a communication discipline
that differentiates idle from non-idle cycles (bubbles from
tokens). In SELF, this is implemented by a pair of single-
bit control wires: Valid and Stop. Every input or output wire
Z in a synchronous component is associated to a channel in
the elastic version of the same component. The channel is a
triple of wires 〈Z, validZ , stopZ〉, with Z carrying the data and
the other two wires implementing the control bits, as shown
in Figure 2(b). A token is transferred on this channel when
validZ ∧¬stopZ : the sender sends valid data and the receiver
is ready to accept it; see Figure 4. Additional constraints that
guarantee correct elastic behavior are given in Section III.
There we define precisely the class of elastic circuits and what
it means for a circuit Ae to be an elastization of a given circuit
A. In particular, our definition implies liveness: Ae produces
infinite streams of tokens if its environment produces infinite
streams of tokens at the input channels and is ready to accept
infinite streams at the output channels.
Suppose N is a network of standard (non-elastic) compo-
nents, as in Figure 2(a). Suppose we then take elasticizations of
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Fig. 2. A synchronous network (a) and its elastic counterpart (b).
these standard components and join their channels accordingly,
as in Figure 2(b), ignoring the buffer. Will the resulting
network N e be an elasticization of N ? Will it be elastic at all?
These fundamental questions are answered by Theorem 4 of
Section IV, which is the main result of the paper. The answers
are “yes”, provided a certain graph ∆e(N e) associated with
N e is acyclic. This graph captures the information about paths
inside elastic systems that contain no tokens—analogous to
combinational paths in ordinary systems. Importantly, ∆e(N e)
can be constructed using only local information (the “sequen-
tiality interfaces”) of the individual elastic components.
Since elastic networks tolerate any variability in the latency
of the components, empty FIFO buffers can be inserted in
any channel, as shown in Figure 2(b), without changing the
functional behavior of the network. This practically important
fact is proved as a consequence of Theorem 4.
Synchronous circuits are modeled in this paper as stream
transformers, called machines. This well-known technique (see
[8] and references therein) appears to be quite underdeveloped.
Our rather lengthy preliminary Section II elaborates the nec-
essary theory of networks of machines, culminating with a
surprisingly novel combinational loop theorem (Theorem 1).
Figure 3 illustrates Theorem 1 and, by analogy, Theorem 4
as well. It relies on the formalization of the notion of combina-
tional dependence at the level of input-output wire pairs. Each
input-output pair of a machine is either sequential or not, and
the set of sequential pairs provides a machine’s “sequentiality
interface”. When several machines are put together into a
network N , their sequentiality interfaces define the graph
∆(N ), the acyclicity of which is a test for the network to
be a legitimate machine itself.
Elasticizations of ordinary circuits are not uniquely defined.
On the other hand, for every elastic machine A there is a
unique standard machine, denoted Aᵀ, that corresponds to it.
We do not discuss any specific elasticization procedures in this
paper, but state our results in the form that only involves elastic
machines and their unique standard counterparts. This makes
the results applicable to multiple elasticization procedures.
B. Related Work
Carloni et al. [2] pioneered a theory of latency-insensitive
circuits based on their notion of patient processes. Patient
processes are defined at a high level of abstraction that models
communication on a channel only by “token or bubble”, leav-
ing implementation protocol(s) unspecified. In the companion
paper [3], Carloni et al. give an incomplete description of
an implementation protocol. Assuming our recovery of that







































Fig. 3. Four machines (left) put into a network N (middle), and the network’s
dependency graph ∆(N ) (right). The nodes of ∆(N ) are wires; internal
wires get two labels. The arcs are non-sequential input-output wire pairs of
component circuits. Dotted arcs indicate that (1,2) and (7,10) are sequential
pairs for A and C resp.; they are not part of ∆(N ) so ∆(N ) is acyclic.
more complex than that of SELF (Figure 4) and consequently
LID requires significantly more complex implementation. For
example, conversion of a regular design into LID form needs
a wrapper or registers around every module, increasing the la-
tency of each module’s computation by two cycles—a penalty
that is not required in the SELF elasticization. There might
also be practical challenges in interfacing a LID system with
an existing non-LID module, requiring the latter to generate
stop signals with complex semantics.
cycle 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . . .
dataZ ∗ A B B B C ∗ ∗ D D . . .
validZ 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 . . .
stopZ 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 . . .
SELF @ t @ @ t t @ @ @ t . . .
LID @ t t @ t t @ @ @ t . . .
Fig. 4. Comparing the SELF and LID protocols. The bottom rows show the
states of the channel Z, differentiating between bubbles (@) and tokens (t).
When ¬validZ , the value at the data wire is irrelevant (labelled ∗ in cycles
0, 6 and 7). The receiver can issue a stopZ even when the sender does not
send valid data (cycle 7). In the cycles 3, 4, and 9, the sender persistently
maintains the same valid data as in the previous cycle. In SELF, data transfer
takes place in cycles 1,4,5,9, so the transferred sequence is ABCD . . .. In
LID, the same sequence of values on the channel wires signifies transfer of a
different sequence of data: ABBCD . . . This is because a token is transferred
on the LID channel when validZ ∧ ¬(stopZ ∧ pre(stopZ)), where pre
stands for the value during the previous cycle. (The first occurrence of the
stop request stopZ = 1 means “perhaps you will need to stop next cycle”
and the data item B sent through the channel during cycle 2 is assumed to
be successfully transmitted to the receiver.)
We emphasize that the limitations of LID implementations
are not inherent to the concept of patient processes. Regarding
latency properties, they do not seem to be more limited than
elastic systems. Still, it turns out that patient processes are not
general enough to model elastic systems as we define them
in Section III. This we prove in Section V where patient
processes and elastic systems are compared as alternative
formalizations of latency-insensitive circuits.
Suhaib et al. [12] revisited and generalized Carloni’s elasti-
cization procedure, validating its correctness by a simulation
method based on model checking.
Lee et al. [9] study causality interfaces (pairwise input-
output dependencies) and are “interested in existence and
uniqueness of the behavior of feedback composition”, but do
not go as far as deriving a combinational loop theorem.
In their work on design of interlock pipelines [6], Jacobson
et al. use a protocol equivalent to SELF, without explicitly
2
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specifying it.
Manohar and Martin discuss “slack elasticity” of asyn-
chronous implementations in [10]. Their slack elasticity con-
ditions relate to the structure of choices in the asynchronous
specification. Unlike [10], in the current paper we deal with
synchronous systems and we take a black box view of their
control—no information about the control flow (and hence on
the structure of choices) is ever used. Instead the connectivity
information corresponding to the system data-flow is used for
elasticization. Conservatively ignoring control flow may lead
to a performance penalty, but simplifies the translation to an
elastic system.
II. CIRCUITS AS STREAM FUNCTIONS
In this section we introduce machines as a mathematical
abstraction of circuits without combinational cycles. For sim-
plicity, this abstraction implicitly assumes that all sequential
elements inside the circuit are initialized. Extending to par-
tially initialized systems appears to be trivial. While there is a
large body of work studying circuits or equivalent objects with
good (e.g. constructive [1]) combinational cycles and their
composition (e.g. [5]), we deliberately restrict consideration
to the fully acyclic objects, since neither logic synthesis nor
timing analysis can properly treat circuits with combinational
cycles.
Most of the effort in this section goes into establishing
modularity conditions guaranteeing that a system obtained as a
network of machines (the feedback construction in particular)
is a machine itself.
A. Streams
A stream over A is an infinite sequence whose elements
belong to the set A. The first element of a stream a is referred
to by a[0], the second by a[1], etc. For example, the equation
a[i] = 3i + 1 describes the stream (1, 4, 7, . . .).
The set of all streams will be denoted A∞. Occasionally
we will need to consider finite sequences too; the set of all,
finite or infinite, sequences over A is denoted Aω.
We will write a ∼k b to indicate that the streams a and
b have a common prefix of length k. The equivalence rela-
tions ∼0,∼1,∼2, . . . are progressively finer and have trivial
intersection. Thus, to prove two sequences a and b are equal,
it suffices to show a ∼k b holds for every k. Note also that
a ∼0 b holds for every a and b.
We will use the equivalence relations ∼k to express prop-
erties of systems and machines viewed as multivariate stream
functions. All these properties will be derived from the fol-
lowing two basic properties of single-variable stream functions
f : A∞ → B∞.
causality: ∀a, b ∈ A∞. ∀k ≥ 0. a ∼k b ⇒ f(a) ∼k f(b)
contraction: ∀a, b ∈ A∞. ∀k ≥ 0. a ∼k b ⇒ f(a) ∼k+1 f(b)
Informally, f is causal if (for every a) the first k elements of
f(a) are determined by the first k elements of a, and f is
contractive if the first k elements of f(a) are determined by
the first k − 1 elements of a.
Lemma 1: If f : A∞ → A∞ is contractive, then it has a
unique fixpoint.
Remark. One can define the distance d(a, b) between se-
quences a and b to be 1/2k, where k is the length of the
largest common prefix of a and b. This gives the sets A∞ and
Aω the structure of complete metric spaces and Lemma 1 is an
instance of Banach Fixed Point Theorem. See the review paper
[8] for more details and references about the metric semantics
of systems and [13] for “diadic arithmetic of circuits”. We
choose not to use the metric space terminology in this paper
since all “metric reasoning” we need can be as easily done
with equivalence relations ∼k instead. See [11] for principles
of reasoning with such “converging equivalence relations” in
more general contexts.
B. Systems
Suppose W is a set of typed wires; all we know about
an individual wire w is a set type(w) associated to it. A
W -behavior is a function σ that associates a stream σ.w ∈
type(w)∞ to each wire w ∈ W . The set of all W -behaviors
will be denoted JW K. Slightly abusing the notation, we will
also write JwK for the set type(w)∞. Notice that the equiva-
lence relations ∼k extend naturally from streams to behaviors:
σ ∼k σ′ iff ∀w ∈ W. σ.w ∼k σ′.w
Notice also that a W -behavior σ can be seen as a single
stream (σ[0], σ[1], . . .) of W -states, where a state is an as-
signment of a value in type(w) to each wire w.
Definition 1: A W -system is a subset of JW K.
Example. A circuit that at each clock cycle receives an
integer as input and returns the sum of all previously received
inputs is described by the W -system S, where W consists
of two wires u, v of type Z, and S consists of all stream
pairs (a, b) ∈ Z∞ × Z∞ such that b[0] = 0 and b[n] =
a[0]+· · ·+a[n−1] for n > 0. Each stream pair (a, b) represents
a behavior σ such that σ.u = a and σ.v = b.
We will use wires as typed variables in formulas meant to
describe system properties. The formulas are built using ordi-
nary mathematical and logical notation, enhanced with tempo-
ral operators next, always, and eventually, denoted respectively
by ( )+,G,F. As an illustration, the system S in the example
above is characterized by the property v = 0∧G (v+ = v+u).
Also, one has S |= F G (u > 0) ⇒ F G (v > 1000), where |=
is used to denote that a formula is true of a system.
C. Operations on Systems
If W ′ ⊆ W , there is an obvious projection map σ 7→
σ ↓W ′ : JW K → JW ′K. These projections are all one needs
for the definition of the following two basic operations on
systems.
Definition 2: (a) If S is a W -system and W ′ ⊆ W , then
hiding W ′ in S produces a (W − W ′)-system hideW ′(S)
defined by
τ ∈ hideW ′(S) iff ∃σ ∈ S. τ = σ ↓ (W −W ′).
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(b) The composition of a W1-system S1 and a W2-system S2
is a (W1 ∪W2)-system S1 t S2 defined by
σ ∈ S1 t S2 iff σ ↓W1 ∈ S1 ∧ σ ↓W2 ∈ S2.
If W and W ′ are disjoint wire sets, σ ∈ JW K, and τ ∈
JW ′K, then there is a unique behavior ϑ ∈ JW ∪W ′K such that
σ = ϑ ↓W and τ = ϑ ↓W ′. This “product” of behaviors will
be written as ϑ = σ ∗ τ . (If W is the empty set, then JW K has
one element—a “trivial behavior” that is also a multiplicative
unit for the product operation ∗.) We will also use the notation
[u 7→ a, v 7→ b, . . .] for the {u, v, . . .}-behavior σ such that
σ.u = a, σ.v = b, etc.
Hiding and composition suffice to define complex networks
of systems. To model identification of wires, we use simple
connection systems: by definition, Conn(u, v) is the {u, v}-
system consisting of all behaviors σ such that σ.u = σ.v.
Now if S1, . . . ,Sm are given systems and u1, . . . , un,
v1, . . . , vn are some of their wires, the network obtained
from these systems by identifying each wire ui with the
corresponding wire vi (of equal type) is the system
〈S1, . . . ,Sm |u1 = v1, . . . , un = vn〉
defined as hide{u1,...,un,v1,...,vn}(S), where
S = S1 t · · · t Sm t Conn(u1, v1) t · · · t Conn(un, vn).
The simplest case (m = n = 1) of networks is the construction
〈S |u = v〉 = hide{u,v}(S t Conn(u, v)),
used for a feedback definition in Section II-E. A behavior σ
belongs to 〈S |u = v〉 if and only if σ ∗ [u 7→ a, v 7→ a] ∈ S
for some a ∈ JuK.
D. Machines
Suppose I and O are disjoint sets of wires, called inputs
and outputs, correspondingly. By definition, an (I,O)-system
is just an (I ∪ O)-system. Consider the following properties
of an (I,O)-system S.
deterministic:
∀ω, ω′ ∈ S. ω ↓ I = ω′ ↓ I ⇒ ω ↓O = ω′ ↓O
functional:
∀σ ∈ JIK.∃!τ ∈ JOK. σ ∗ τ ∈ S
causal:
∀ω, ω′ ∈ S.∀k ≥ 0. ω ↓ I ∼k ω′ ↓ I ⇒ ω ↓O ∼k ω′ ↓O
Clearly, functionality implies determinism. Conversely, a
deterministic system is functional if and only if it accepts
all inputs. Note also that causality implies determinism: if
ω ↓ I = ω′ ↓ I , then ω ↓ I ∼k ω′ ↓ I holds for every k, so
ω ↓O ∼k ω′ ↓O holds for every k too, so ω ↓O = ω′ ↓O.
Definition 3: An (I,O)-machine is an (I, O)-system that is
both functional and causal.
A functional system S uniquely determines and is deter-
mined by the function F : JIK → JOK such that F (σ) = τ
holds if and only if σ ∗ τ ∈ S. The causality condition for
such S can be also written as follows:
∀σ, σ′ ∈ JIK.∀k ≥ 0. σ ∼k σ′ ⇒ F (σ) ∼k F (σ′).
The system in the example in Section II-B is a machine if
we regard u as an input wire and v as an output wire. The
same is true of the system Conn(u, v): its associated function
F is the identity function.
E. Feedback on Machines
We will use the term feedback for the system 〈S |u = v〉
as mentioned in Section II-C when S is a machine and the
wires u and v of the same type are an input and output of
S respectively. Our concern now is to understand under what
conditions the feedback produces a machine.
To fix the notation, assume S is an (I, O)-machine given
by F : JIK → JOK, with wires u ∈ I , v ∈ O of the same type
A. By the note at the end of Section II-C, we have that for
every σ ∈ JI − {u}K and τ ∈ JO − {v}K,
σ ∗ τ ∈ 〈S |u = v〉
if and only if
∃a ∈ A∞. F (σ ∗ [u 7→ a]) = τ ∗ [v 7→ a]),
so 〈S |u = v〉 is functional when the function Fσuv : A∞ →
A∞ defined by Fσuv(a) = F (σ ∗ [u 7→ a]).v has a unique
fixpoint. By Lemma 1, this is guaranteed if Fσuv is contractive.
The following definition introduces the key concept of
sequentiality that formalizes the intutive notion that there is
no combinational dependence of a given output wire on a
given input wire. Sequentiality of the pair (u, v) easily implies
contractivity of Fσuv for all σ.
Definition 4: The pair (u, v) is sequential for S if for every
σ, σ′ ∈ JIK and every k ≥ 0
∧ σ.u ∼k−1 σ′.u
∧ ∀x ∈ I − {u}. (σ.x ∼k σ′.x)
⇒ F (σ).v ∼k F (σ′).v
Lemma 2 (Feedback): If (u, v) is a sequential input-output
pair for a machine S, then the feedback system 〈S |u = v〉 is
a machine too.
Example. Consider the system S with I = {u, v}, O =
{w, z}, specified by equations
w = u⊕ ((0)#v) z = v ⊕ v,
where all wires have type Z, the symbol ⊕ denotes the
componentwise sum of streams, and # denotes concatenation.
Since z does not depend on u, the pair (u, z) is sequential.
The pair (v, w) is also sequential since to compute a prefix
of w it suffices to know (a prefix of the same size of u and)
a prefix of smaller size of v. The remaining two input-output
pairs (u, w) and (v, z) are not sequential.
To find the machine 〈S | v = w〉, we need to solve the
equation v = u⊕((0)#v) for v. For each u = (a0, a1, a2, . . .),
the equation has a unique solution v = û = (a0, a0 +a1, a0 +
a1+a2, . . .). Substituting the solution into z = v⊕v, we obtain
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a description of 〈S | v = w〉 by a single equation that relates its
input and output: z = û⊕ û. The other feedback 〈S |u = z〉 is
easier to calculate; it is given by equation w = v⊕v⊕((0)#v).
F. Networks of Machines and the Combinational Loop Theo-
rem
Consider a network N = 〈S1, . . . ,Sm |u1 = v1, . . . , un =
vn〉, where S1, . . . ,Sm are machines with disjoint wire sets
and the pairs (u1, v1),. . . ,(un, vn) involve n distinct input
wires ui and n distinct output wires vi. (There is no assump-
tion that ui, vi belong to the same machine Sj .) Our goal is to
understand under what conditions the system N is a machine.
Note that N = 〈S |u1 = v2, . . . , un = vn〉, where S =
S1 t · · · t Sm. It is easy to check that an input-output pair
(u, v) of S is sequential if either (1) (u, v) is sequential for
some Si, or (2) u and v belong to different machines. Thus,
the information about sequentiality of input-output pairs of the
“parallel composition” machine S is readily available from the
sequentiality information about the component machines Si,
and our problem boils down to determining when a multiple
feedback operation performed on a single machine results in
a system that is itself a machine.
Simultaneous feedback specified by a set of two or more
input-output pairs of a machine does not necessarily produce
a machine even if all pairs involved are sequential. Indeed,
in the example in Section II-E, we had a system S with
two sequential pairs (u, z) and (v, w), but (u, z) ceases to
be sequential for 〈S | v = w〉. Indeed, if z and u are related
by z = û⊕ û, then knowing a prefix of length k of z requires
knowing the prefix of the same length of u; a shorter one
would not suffice.
To ensure that a multiple feedback construction produces a
machine, one needs to show that, in addition to the wire pairs
to be identified, sufficiently many other input-output pairs are
also sequential. A precise formulation for a double feedback
is given by a version of the Bekić Lemma: for the system
〈S |u = w, v = z〉 to be a machine, it suffices that three
pairs of wires be sequential—(u, w), (v, z), and one of (u, z),
(v, w). This non-trivial auxiliary result is needed for the proof
of Theorem 1 below, and is a special case of it.
Given an (I,O)-machine S, let its dependency graph ∆(S)
have the vertex set I ∪ O and directed edges that go from u
to v for each pair (u, v) ∈ I × O that is not sequential. For
a network system N = 〈S1, . . . ,Sm |u1 = v1, . . . , un = vn〉,
its graph ∆(N ) is then defined as the direct sum of graphs
∆(S1), . . . ,∆(Sm) with each vertex ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) identified
with the corresponding vertex vi (Figure 3).
Theorem 1 (Combinational Loop Theorem): The network
system N is a machine if the graph ∆(N ) is acyclic.
III. ELASTIC MACHINES
In this section we give the definition of elastic machines.
Its four parts—input-output structure, persistence conditions,
liveness conditions, and the transfer determinism condition—
are covered by Definitions 5-8 below.
A. Input-output Structure, Channels, and Transfer
We assume that the set of wires is partitioned into data,
valid, and stop wires, so that for each data wire X there
exist associated wires validX and stopX of boolean type. (In
actual circuit implementations, validX and stopX need not be
physical wires; it suffices that they be appropriately encoded.)
Definition 5: Let I,O be disjoint sets of data wires. An
[I,O]-system is an (I ′, O′)-machine, where I ′ = I ∪
{validX |X ∈ I} ∪ {stopY |Y ∈ O} and O′ = O ∪
{validY |Y ∈ O} ∪ {stopX |X ∈ I}.
The triples 〈X, validX , stopX〉 (for X ∈ I) and
〈Y, validY , stopY 〉 (for Y ∈ O) are to be thought of as elastic
input and output channels of the system.
Let transferZ be a shorthand for validZ ∧ ¬stopZ and say
that transfer along Z occurs in a state s if s |= transferZ .
Given a behavior σ = (σ[0], σ[1], σ[2], . . .) of an [I,O]-system
and Z ∈ I ∪ O, let σZ be the sequence (perhaps finite!)
obtained from σ.Z = (σ[0].Z, σ[1].Z, σ[2].Z, . . .) by deleting
all entries σ[i].Z such that transfer along Z does not occur
in σ[i]. The transfer behavior σᵀ associated with σ is then
defined by σᵀ.Z = σZ . If all sequences σZ are infinite, then
σᵀ is an (I ∪O)-behavior; in general, however, we only have
σZ ∈ type(Z)ω.
For each wire Z of an [I,O]-system S we introduce
an auxiliary transfer counter variable tctZ of type Z. The
counters serve for expressing system properties related to
transfer. By definition, tctZ is equal to the number of states
that precede the current state and in which transfer along Z
has occurred. That is, for every behavior σ of S, we have
σ.tctZ = (t0, t1, . . .), where tk is the number of indices i
such that i < k and transfer along Z occurs in σ[i]. Note that
the sequence σ.tctZ is non-decreasing and begins with t0 = 0.
The notation min tctS , for any subset S of I ∪ O will be
used to denote the smallest of the numbers tctZ , where Z ∈ S.
B. Definition of Elasticity
An elastic component, when ready to communicate over
an output channel must remain ready until the transfer takes
place.
Definition 6: The persistence conditions for an [I,O]-
system S are given by
S |= G (validY ∧ stopY ⇒ (validY )+ ∧ Y + = Y ) (1)
for every Y ∈ O.
The conjunct Y + = Y can be removed from (1) without
affecting the definition of elastic machines (it follows from
other conditions). The most useful consequence of persistence
is the “handshake lemma”:
S |= GF validY ∧ GF¬stopY ⇒ GF transferY
Liveness of an elastic component is expressed in terms of to-
ken count: if all input channels have seen k transfers and there
is an output channel that has seen less, then the communication
on output channels with the minimum amount of transfer must
be eventually offered. The following definition formalizes this,
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Fig. 5. Liveness: Only the hungriest channels (shaded) are being served.
The numbers indicate the current token count at each channel.
together with a similar commitment to eventual readiness on
input channels. (See also Figure 5.)
Definition 7: The liveness conditions for an [I,O]-system
are given by
S |=G (min tctO = tctY ∧min tctI > tctY ⇒ F validY)(2)
S |=G (min tctI∪O = tctX ⇒ F¬stopX) (3)
for every Y ∈ O and every X ∈ I .
In practice, elastic components will satisfy simpler (but
stronger) liveness properties; e.g. remove min tctO ≥ tctY
from (2) and replace min tctI∪O ≥ tctX with min tctO ≥
tctX in (3). However, a composition of such components,
while satisfying (2) and (3), may not satify the stronger
versions of these conditions.
Consider single-channel [I,O]-systems satisfying the per-
sistence and liveness conditions: an elastic consumer is a
[{Z}, ∅]-system C satisfying (4) below; similarly, an elastic
producer is a [∅, {Z}]-system P satisfying (5) and (6).
C |= GF¬stopZ (4)
P |= G (validZ ∧ stopZ ⇒ (validZ)+) (5)
P |= GF validZ (6)
Let CZ be the {Z, validZ , stopZ}-system characterized by
condition (4)—the largest (in the sense of behavior inclusion)
of the systems satisfying this condition. Similarly, let PZ be
the {Z, validZ , stopZ}-system characterized by properties (5)






Y ∈O CY .
Note that EnvI,O is only a system; it is not functional and so
is not a machine.
When a system satisfying the persistence and liveness con-
ditions (1-3) is coupled with a matching elastic environment,
the transfer on all data wires never comes to a stall:
Lemma 3 (Liveness): If S satisfies (1-3), then for every
behavior ω of S t EnvI,O, all the component sequences of
the transfer behavior ωᵀ are infinite.
As an immediate consequence of Liveness Lemma, if S
satisfies (1-3), then
Sᵀ = {ωᵀ |ω ∈ S t EnvI,O}
is a well-defined (I,O)-system.
Definition 8: An [I,O]-system S is an [I,O]-elastic ma-
chine if it satisfies the properties (1-3) and the associated
system Sᵀ is deterministic.
The liveness conditions (2,3) are visibly related to causality
at the transfer level: k transfers on the input channels imply
k transfers on the output channels in the cooperating envi-
ronment. Thus, it is not surprising (even though the proof is
not obvious) that the determinism postulated in Definition 8
suffices to derive the causality of Sᵀ:
Theorem 2: If S is an [I,O]-elastic machine, then Sᵀ is an
(I,O)-machine.
In the situation of Definition 8, we say that S is an ela-
sticization of Sᵀ and that Sᵀ is the transfer machine of S.
IV. ELASTIC NETWORKS
An elastic network N is given by a set of elastic machines
S1, . . . ,Sm with no shared wires, together with a set of chan-
nel pairs (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn), where the Xi are n distinct
input channels and the Yi are n distinct output channels. As
a network of standard machines, the elastic network N is
defined by
N = 〈S1, . . . ,Sm |Xi = Yi, validXi = validYi , AAAAAAi
stopXi = stopYi (1 ≤ i ≤ n)〉
for which we will use the shorter notation
N = 〈〈S1, . . . ,Sm []X1 = Y1, . . . , Xn = Yn〉〉.
We will define a graph that encodes the sequentiality infor-
mation about the network N and prove in Theorem 4 that
acyclicity of that graph implies that N is an elastic machine
and that N ᵀ = 〈Sᵀ1 , . . . ,Sᵀm |X1 = Y1, . . . , Xn = Yn〉.
A. Elastic Feedback
Elastic feedback is a simple case of elastic network:
〈〈S [] P = Q〉〉 = 〈S |P = Q, validP = validQ, stopP = stopQ〉.
Definition 9: Suppose S is an elastic machine. An input-
output channel pair (P,Q) will be called sequential for S if
S |= G
(
∧ min tctI∪O = tctQ




Condition (7) is a strengthening of the liveness condition
(2) for channel Q. It expresses a degree of independence of
the output channel Q from the input channel P ; e.g., the first
token at Q need not wait for the arrival of the first token
at P . This independence can be achieved in the system by
storing some tokens inside, between these two channels. Note
that (7) does not guarantee that connecting channels P and Q
would not introduce ordinary combinational cycles. Therefore
the acyclicity condition in the following theorem is required
to ensure (by Theorem 1) that the elastic feedback, viewed as
an ordinary network, is a machine.
Theorem 3: Let S be an elastic machine and F the elastic
feedback system 〈〈S [] P = Q〉〉. If the channel pair (P,Q) is
sequential for S, then: (a) the wire pair (P,Q) is sequential for
Sᵀ. If, in addition, ∆(F) is acyclic, then: (b) F is an elastic
machine, and (c) Fᵀ = 〈Sᵀ |P = Q〉.
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B. Main Theorems
Sequentiality of two channel pairs (P,Q), (P ′, Q) of an




∧ min tctI∪O = tctQ




This deviates from the situation with ordinary machines, where
the analogous property holds and is instrumental in the proof
of Combinational Loop Theorem.
To justify multiple feedback on elastic machines, we have
thus to postulate that simultaneous sequentiality is true where
required. Specifically, we demand that elastic machines come
with simultaneous sequentiality information: If S is an [I,O]-




∧ min tctI∪O = tctY




Note that if P ∈ δ(Q), then the pair (P,Q) is sequential, but
the converse is not implied. A function δ : O → 2I with the
property (8) will be called a sequentiality interface for S.
For an [I,O]-elastic machine S with a sequentiality inter-
face δ, we define ∆e(S, δ) to be the graph with the vertex
set I ∪ O and directed edges (X, Y ) where X /∈ δ(Y ). By
Theorem 3(a), ∆e(S, δ) contains ∆(Sᵀ) as a subgraph.
Given an elastic network N = 〈〈S1, . . . ,Sm [] X1 =
Y1, . . . , Xn = Yn〉〉, where each Si comes equipped with a
sequentiality interface δi, its graph ∆e(N ) is by definition the
direct sum of graphs ∆e(S1, δ1), . . . ,∆e(Sm, δm) with each
vertex Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) identified with the corresponding vertex
Yi.
Theorem 4: If the graphs ∆(N ) and ∆e(N ) are acyclic,
then the network system N is an elastic machine, the cor-
responding non-elastic system N̄ = 〈Sᵀ1 , . . . ,Sᵀm |X1 =
Y1, . . . , Xn = Yn〉 is a machine, and N ᵀ = N̄ .
As in Theorem 3, acyclicity of ∆(N ) is needed to ensure
(by Theorem 1) that N defines a machine. Elasticization
procedures (e.g. [4]) will typically produce elastic components
with enough sequential input-output wire pairs, so that ∆(N )
will be acyclic as soon as ∆e(N ) is acyclic.
Note, however, that cycles in ∆e(N ) need not correspond
to combinational cycles in N seen as an ordinary network,
since empty buffers with sequential elements cutting the
combinational feedbacks may be inserted into N . Even though
non-combinational in the ordinary sense, these cycles contain
no tokens and therefore no progress along them can be made.
Theorem 4 impies that insertion of empty elastic buffers
does not affect the basic functionality of an elastic network,
as illustrated in Figure 2(b).
Definition 10: An empty elastic buffer is an elastic machine
S such that Sᵀ = Conn(X, Y ) for some X, Y .
Theorem 5 (Buffer Insertion Theorem): Suppose B is an
empty elastic buffer with channels X, Y . Let N =
〈〈S1, . . . ,Sm [] X1 = Y1, . . . , Xn = Yn〉〉 and M =
〈〈B,S1, . . . ,Sm [] X = Y1, X1 = Y, X2 = Y2, . . . , Xn = Yn〉〉.
If ∆(N ), ∆(M), and ∆e(N ) are acyclic, then M is an elastic
machine, and Mᵀ = N ᵀ.
The precise relationship between graphs ∆(M) and ∆(N )
can be easily described. In practice they are at the same time
acyclic or not, as a consequence of sequentiality of sufficiently
many input-output wire pairs of B.
V. ELASTIC VS. PATIENT SYSTEMS
Elastic machines and patient processes of [2] provide two
formalizations of the intuitive concept of latency-insensitive
circuits. In this section we address their connections and differ-
ences. We begin with an overview of [2], using a minimalistic
approach and terminology that differs from the original. We
believe, however, that Definition 11 below matches the original
definion accurately in most important aspects.
A. Patient Systems
The notation A∗ is for the set of finite sequences over A. A
finitary W -system, by definition, is a set of behaviors σ such
that σ.w is a finite sequence for every w ∈ W .
A stalling stream over A is a stream over A ∪ {@}. We
will refer to @ as the bubble and to elements of A as tokens.
We will consider only stalling streams that contain finitely
many tokens. If a is such a stream, let a ∈ A∗ denote the
sequence over A obtained by dropping all bubbles from a.
Clearly, a is determined by a and the sequence ∂(a) ∈ N∗ of
lengths of bubble sequences between consecutive tokens of a.
For example, if
a = (@,@, 7,@, 4, 5,@,@,@, 8, . . .) (9)
we have a = (7, 4, 5, 8, . . .) and ∂(a) = (2, 1, 0, 3, . . .). Two
stalling streams a, b are latency equivalent, written a $ b,
when a = b. Note that a $ a.
By definition, a stalling W -system is a set of behaviors
σ such that for every w ∈ W , σ.w is a stalling stream over
type(w). Latency equivalence extends to W -behaviors and W -
systems: σ $ τ iff σ.w $ τ.w holds for every w ∈ W ; S $ S ′
iff for every σ ∈ S (σ ∈ S ′) there exists τ ∈ S ′ (τ ∈ S) such
that σ $ τ .
A stalling W -system S determines a standard finitary W -
system Sᵀ = {σ | σ ∈ S}, where σ is given by σ.w = σ.w
(for all w ∈ W ). Clearly, Sᵀ $ S.
Stalling the k-th token of a by d steps produces a latency
equivalent stream that will be denoted stall(a, k, d). Omitting
the easy definition, we give an example: if a is as in (9), then
stall(a, 1, 3) = (@,@, 7,@,@,@,@, 4, 5,@,@,@, 8, . . .)
Definition 11: Let ≺ be a well-founded order1 on W and
let D > 0. A patient W -system (relative to ≺ and D) is a
1Introduction of a well-founded ordering of wires is motivated in [2] with
the purpose of modeling combinational dependencies, but such dependencies
in patient systems are not discussed in any detail. Moreover, the ordering of
wires is implicitly assumed to be total in [2], which is somewhat unnatural.
For instance, when constructing a patient adder with inputs u, v and output
w, one has two ordering choices: u ≺1 v ≺1 w and v ≺2 u ≺2 w. It is not
clear that a patient adder in the ≺1-sense will be patient in the ≺2-sense too.
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stalling system P such that for every σ ∈ P , every u ∈ W ,
and every k ≥ 0 there exists σ′ ∈ P such that
(Pat-1) σ′.u = stall(σ.u, k, 1)
and for every v 6= u there exists dv ≤ D such that
(Pat-2) σ′.v =
{
stall(σ.v, k, dv) if u ≺ v
stall(σ.v, k + 1, dv) otherwise
The main results of [2] can now be summarized:
1) a theorem saying that the composition of patient systems
(with the same W , ≺, and D) is a patient system;
2) the definition and analysis of patient buffers, i.e. patient
systems B such that Bᵀ = Connfin(u, v)—the finitary
connection system;
3) a general construction that, for a given finitary system
M without combinational dependencies (model of a
Moore machine), produces a patient system P such that
P $ M.
B. Comparison
The formalization given by patient systems is at a higher
level of abstraction. While elastic machines deal explicitly with
handshaking signals between communicating systems, patient
systems communicate purely in the token/bubble language.
Given an elastic (as defined in Section III) [I,O]-system E ,
the corresponding stalling (I ∪ O)-system E@ is obtained by
projecting the finite-transfer behaviors of E to data wires and
replacing data items on each wire with @ at all cycles where
transfer along that wire does not occur. Precisely, let EF be
the subset of E consisting of all behaviors ω such that ωᵀ.Z
is finite for all channels Z.2 Then, given ω ∈ EF, we define a
stalling (I ∪O)-behavior ω@ by
(ω@.Z)[i] =
{
(ω.Z)[i] if (ω.validZ)[i] ∧ ¬(ω.stopZ)[i]
@ otherwise
and finally we define the stalling system E@ as the set of all
such behaviors ω@. Clearly, the system (E@)ᵀ is the finitary
version of the standard machine Eᵀ.
Now we can address some questions pertinent to the com-
parison of patient processes vs. elastic machines.
Are patient processes more general? The answer is “no”
because there exist elastic machines E such that E@ is not
patient. To see this, consider an elastic machine E that starts
offering new valid outputs on channel u only on even cycles.
(The existence of such elastic machines is obvious.) Observe
that σ.u = (@, 7, 9, . . .) is possible for some behavior σ of
E@ (token 7, even though transmitted on cycle 1 was first
offered on cycle 0). Then stall(σ.u, 0, 1) = (@,@, 7, 9, . . .)
must also be part of a behavior of E@, by condition (Pat-1)
of Definition 11. This implies that token 9 is first offered on
cycle 3, contrary to our assumption.
The above example can be viewed as an indication that
the condition (Pat-1) is too restrictive. It would be interesting
to see if an appropriate modification of (Pat-1) results in a
definition of patient processes that captures elastic machines.
2One can prove that E is the set of all limits of behaviors of EF and so E
is determined by EF.
Are elastic machines more general? The answer is an easy
“no” since, for example, the set of all possible stalling W -
behaviors is a patient system in the sense of Definition 11.
However, if one adds to Definition 11 a reasonable require-
ment that a patient system be a machine, the answer is not
immediately clear.
Which formalization is easier to use? Without offering a
definitive answer, we would argue that verifying that a low-
level design (RTL, say) implements an elastic machine would
be easier than verifying that it implements a patient system.
The bottom line is that the conditions for a system to be
an elastic machine are expressible as temporal properties of
suitably constructed infinite-state models. This is not obvious
for the determinism condition for Sᵀ in Definition 8, but
can be done by replacing determinism with causality and
introducing auxiliary variables for sequences of transferred
values over channels. Even though (e.g., because of infinite
counters involved) these conditions are not directly checkable
by the existing model checking technology, there are palpable
opportunities to find manageable stronger conditions that taken
together imply elasticity (e.g., postulating a limit on the token
count differences between channels eliminates the need for
infinite counters). On the other hand, the definition of a patient
system, being of the form “for every behavior σ, there exists
a behavior σ′ such that . . . ” appears to us to be intrinsically
more complex. Our only positive conclusion, however, is that
the mechanical checking of either of the definitions is an open
problem deserving further study.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a theory of elastic machines that gives an
easy-to-check condition for the compositional theorem of the
form “an elasticization of a network of ordinary components
is equivalent to the network of components’ elasticizations”.
Verification of a particular implementation is reduced to prov-
ing that conditions of Definition 8 are satisfied for all elastic
components used, and that the graph ∆e(N e) is acyclic for
every network N to which the elasticization is applied. While
the definition of the graphs ∆e may appear complex because
of the sequentiality interfaces involved, it should be noted that
the elasticization procedures, e.g. [4], are reasonably expected
to completely preserve sequentiality: a channel P belongs to
δ(Q) if the wire-pair (P,Q) is sequential in the original non-
elastic machine. This ensures ∆e(N e) = ∆(N ) and so testing
for sequentiality is done at the level of ordinary networks.
Future work will be focused on proving correctness of
particular elasticization methods, on techniques for mechanical
verification of elasticity, and on extending the theory to more
advanced protocols.
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Abstract
The last few years have seen the advent of a new breed of deci-
sion procedures for various fragments of first-order logic based on
propositional abstraction. A lazy satisfiability checker for a given
fragment of first-order logic invokes a theory-specific decision pro-
cedure (a theory solver) on (partial) satisfying assignments for the
abstraction. If the assignment is found to be consistent in the given
theory, then a model for the original formula has been found. Oth-
erwise, a refinement of the propositional abstraction is extracted
from the proof of inconsistency and the search is resumed. We de-
scribe a theory solver for integer difference logic that is effective
when the formula to be decided contains equality and disequality
(negated equality) constraints so that the decision problem partakes
of the nature of the pigeonhole problem. We propose a reduction of
the problem to propositional satisfiability by computing bounds on
a sufficient subset of solutions, and present experimental evidence
for the efficiency of this approach.
1. Introduction
Decision procedures for fragments of first-order logic have been
the subject of intense scrutiny in the last few years. On the one
hand, emerging applications like model checking of infinite state
systems rely on such decision procedures for tasks like predicate
abstraction [1]. On the other hand, algorithmic advances have sig-
nificantly increased the range of problems that can be tackled, and
hence have stimulated interest.
In particular, dramatic increase in performance of propositional
satisfiability (SAT) solvers has led to the development of decision
procedures that rely on the propositional abstraction of formulae
from more expressive logics like the logic of linear arithmetic con-
straints, Presburger arithmetic, or the logic of equality and uninter-
preted function symbols (EUF). The propositional abstraction of a
formula is obtained by replacing the atomic formulae of the specific
theory (e.g., x−y ≤ 5 or f(x) = f(y), where f is an uninterpreted
function symbol) with fresh propositional variables. The satisfying
assignments of the abstraction map to conjunctions of literals in the
original formula that can be checked for consistency with theory-
specific procedures. If such a procedure establishes consistency,
then the given formula is satisfiable and the enumeration termi-
nates. Otherwise, from the proof of inconsistency a refinement of
the propositional abstraction is extracted and the search is resumed.
There are several ways to combine the propositional reasoning
engine with the theory-specific procedures. One broad classifi-
cation is the one into lazy and eager approaches. A lazy solver
produces an initial propositional approximation that is concise and
possibly quite coarse; it relies on the refinements during the enu-
meration of solutions. By contrast, an eager solver adds constraints
to the initial propositional abstraction that embody known relation-
∗This work was supported by SRC contract 2005-TJ-920.
ships among the literals. An example is given by the constraints
that encode transitivity of equality. The most effective solvers of-
ten adopt elements of both approaches and tailor their strategies to
the theory (theories) at hand.
In this paper we focus on Integer Difference Logic (IDL), in
which arithmetic atomic formulae constrain the difference between
the values of pairs of integer variables. This logic finds exten-
sive application to problems involving timing and scheduling con-
straints, resource allocation, and program analysis. IDL is closely
related to Real Difference Logic (RDL), to the point that a deci-
sion procedure for the latter based on propositional abstraction also
works for the former, as long as the coefficients are integers. It is
sufficient to rewrite equality constraints (of the form x− y = n) as
the conjunction of two inequalities. However, if an equality con-
straint is negated, then the conjunction turns into a disjunction,
which requires case splitting in the enumeration of the proposi-
tional solutions. In contrast, we propose an approach that does
not decompose equalities and their negations; rather, it converts the
problem of checking satisfiability of a conjunction of arithmetic
atomic formulae into a set of propositional satisfiability checks—
whose cardinality is bounded by the number of maximal strongly
connected components (SCC) of a suitable constraint graph.
The conversion to propositional satisfiability that we propose is
based on the ability to bound the values of the integer variables that
appear in the formula. While in general such bounds do not exist,
we show that to decide satisfiability of a set of constraints whose
graph is a single SCC it is sufficient to consider a subset of the so-
lutions for which bounds are easily established. We also show how
the general case can be efficiently solved given solutions for the in-
dividual SCCs of the constraint graph. Experimental study shows
that our new approach greatly improves the efficiency of our de-
cision procedure for problem instances in which disequalities play
a significant role, and makes it very competitive with respect to
state-of-the-art tools.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 re-
views background and introduces notation. Section 3 discusses the
bounds on solutions, while Sect. 4 delves into the details of our
theory solver. After a brief survey of related work in Sect. 5, ex-
periments are presented in Sect. 6, and conclusions are offered in
Sect. 7.
2. Preliminaries
Let P be a set of propositional variables and X a set of integer-
valued variables. We define inductively integer difference logic
(IDL) formulae as follows.
• p ∈ P is a (propositional atomic) IDL formula.
• x − y ≤ n and x − y = n are (arithmetic atomic) IDL
formulae, for x, y ∈ X , n ∈ Z.
• If ϕ and ψ are IDL formulae, so are ϕ ∧ ψ and ¬ϕ.
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The following abbreviations are also defined:
x− y < n
.
= x− y ≤ n − 1 x− y 6= n
.
= ¬(x− y = n)
x = y
.
= (x− y = 0) x 6= y
.
= ¬(x = y)
ϕ ∨ ψ
.
= ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) .
A literal is an atomic formula, or the negation of an atomic for-
mula. A clause is the disjunction of a set of literals, and a formula
in conjunctive normal form (CNF) is the conjunction of a set of
clauses. Note that x − y = n could be defined as an abbreviation
((x − y ≤ n) ∧ (x − y ≥ n)). We choose not to do so to stress
that our algorithm does not split equalities or disequalities (as men-
tioned in Sect. 1) and also to keep the definition of clausal formulae
simple.
A model for an IDL formula ϕ is a pair of functions α : X → Z
and β : P → {false, true} such that replacing each variable x ∈ X
with α(x), and every variable p ∈ P with β(p) in ϕ produces a true
statement. A formula is satisfiable if it has a model, and is valid if
every assignment is a model. If a conjunction of literals ϕ is not
satisfiable, then a (minimal) explanation for the unsatisfiability of
ϕ is the conjunction of a (minimal) subset of the literals in ψ which
is not satisfiable.
Propositional logic is the fragment of IDL obtained by omitting
the rule that defines arithmetic atomic formulae. Efficient algo-
rithms to decide the satisfiability of propositional logic formulae
are based on the DPLL procedure [7, 6], and exploit techniques like
clause recording, conflict analysis, nonchronological backtracking,
and fast Boolean constraint propagation [23, 20].
In recent times, decision procedures for IDL, and other fragments
of quantifier-free first-order logic, have been based on the DPLL
procedure as well. Given a set of propositional variables B such
that B ∩ P = ∅, one obtains a propositional formula ϕb from an
IDL formula ϕ by replacing each arithmetic atomic subformula of
ϕ with a distinct variable from B. The resulting formula ϕb is un-
satisfiable only if ϕ is unsatisfiable. Each model of ϕb corresponds
to a conjunction of literals of ϕ. Given a decision procedure for
the conjunction of arithmetic atomic propositions in IDL (a the-
ory solver), one therefore derives a complete decision procedure
for IDL by enumerating the models of ϕb, extracting from each of
them the corresponding conjunction of arithmetic atomic proposi-
tions and their negations, and checking these conjunctions for sat-
isfiability using the theory solver. In the following, we refer to the
conjunction of a set of arithmetic literals as a set of IDL constraints.
An edge integer-labeled directed graph is a tripleG = (V,E, λ),
where V is a set of vertices, E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges, and
λ : E → Z is an edge labeling function. A strongly connected
component (SCC) of G is a subgraph G′ of G such that every two
nodes of G′ are connected by a path in G′. SCC G′ is maximal if
no subgraph of G that is a proper superset of G′ is an SCC; it is
trivial if it consists of one vertex and no arcs. The maximal SCCs
of G define a partition of V . The SCC quotient graph bG = (bV , bE)
of G is a directed acyclic graph with one vertex for each maximal
SCC ofG and an edge (A,B) ∈ bE if and only if there exist x ∈ A
and y ∈ B such that (x, y) ∈ E.
Given a distinguished source vertex s ∈ V , distances of all ver-
tices from s are well defined provided there exists no negative cycle
in G; that is, no cycle such that the sum of the labels on the edges
along the cycle is negative. The Bellman-Ford algorithm [5] reports
negative cycles if they are present, and computes the distance δ(x)
of each vertex in V from the source s otherwise. The slack of an
edge (x, y) ∈ E is given by σ((x, y)) = λ((x, y))−(δ(y)−δ(x)).
It is easy to see that for all e ∈ E, σ(e) ≥ 0 and that σ((x, y)) = 0
if and only if (x, y) is on a shortest path from s to y inG. Distances
and slacks obviously depend on the choice of source vertex.
Given a (finite) set I of inequality constraints (i.e., of the form
x − y ≤ n), their constraint graph G = (V,E, λ) is a labeled
directed graph defined as follows:
• V ⊆ X is the set of variables appearing in the constraints in
I .
• There is an arc (x, y) ∈ E with λ((x, y)) = n if and only if
there is a constraint y − x ≤ n in I .
It is well known [5] that I is satisfiable if and only if G contains no
negative cycle. In fact, adding both sides of the constraints forming
a cycle of length w, one gets 0 ≤ w, which is not satisfiable when
w < 0. If, on the other hand, no negative cycle exists in G, then
one can find a model for I by solving a single-source shortest-path
problem on an augmented graph Ga, obtained from G by adding a
new reference vertex xr and arcs labeled 0 from xr to all the other
vertices. Let δ(x) be the distance of x ∈ V from xr in Ga. Then
δ is a model for I . It is also well known that, given a model of I ,
α : V → Z, and a constant, c ∈ Z, the assignment α′ : V → Z
defined by α′(x) = α(x)+c is also a model of I , because α′(x)−
α′(y) = α(x) − α(y). This observation allows an easy encoding
of range constraints in IDL. A set of constraints {li ≤ xi ≤ ui} is
translated to {xi − y ≤ ui} ∪ {y − xi ≤ −li}, where y is a fresh
variable. The solution α obtained from the constraint graph is then
translated so that α′(y) = 0.
Since integer labels imply integer distances, if the right-hand
sides of the constraints are integer-valued, and the constraints are
satisfiable when the variables are real-valued, then an integer-valued
solution is also guaranteed to exist. Loosely speaking, the satisfia-
bility problem for inequalities is the same for IDL and real differ-
ence logic (RDL). Adding equality constraints to the inequalities
does not change this state of affairs: Given a constraint x− y = n,
one replaces x by y + n; if no immediate inconsistencies arise,
one continues with the construction of the constraint graph. In con-
trast, if disequality constraints (i.e., negations of equalities) are al-
lowed, an unsatisfiable conjunction of IDL constraints may be sat-
isfiable when regarded as an RDL formula. An example is given byV
1≤i≤p
(1 ≤ xi ≤ h) ∧
V
1≤i<j≤p
(xi 6= xj), which exemplifies
the pigeonhole principle.1
3. Bounds on Solutions
It was recalled in Sect. 2 that from a solution α to a set of inequal-
ity constraints, one can derive a family of solutions {α+n}. In gen-
eral, however, not all solutions are obtained one from the other by
translation. Consider the constraints {(x− y ≤ 1), (y − x ≤ 0)}.
It is easy to verify that the two assignments α1(x) = 0, α1(y) = 0
and α2(x) = 1, α2(y) = 0 satisfy the constraints, though there is
no n such that α1 = α2+n. Such solutions are called independent.
In general, there may be several families of independent solutions,
and therefore, multiple distinct solutions that assign a given value
to a distinguished variable. The following result characterizes these
sets of solutions and forms the basis for our treatment of disequality
constraints in IDL.
Theorem 1 Let I be a set of inequality constraints. Let G =
(V,E, λ) be the constraint graph associated to I . Suppose that
G contains no negative cycle and consists of one maximal SCC.
For x ∈ V and n ∈ Z, let Snx be the set of solutions α : V → Z
1This does not contradict what was observed in Sect. 1 because
x 6= y translates into (x < y) ∨ (y < x) for RDL, but translates
into (x ≤ y − 1) ∨ (y ≤ x− 1) for IDL.
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to I such that α(x) = n. Then, for each vertex y ∈ V , there exist
bounds yl and yu such that for every solution in Snx , yl ≤ α(y) ≤
yu:
∀y ∈ V . ∃yl, yu ∈ Z . ∀α ∈ S
n
x . yl ≤ α(y) ≤ yu .
PROOF. By definition of SCC, every vertex in V is reachable
from x in G; likewise, x is reachable from any vertex in G. Let
δxy be the distance of y from x (the length of a shortest path).
Such a distance is defined because there are no negative cycles in
G. Adding both sides of all the constraints along the path yields
y − x ≤ δxy . Therefore, for every solution α ∈ Snx , it must
be α(y) ≤ n + δxy. Said otherwise, yu = n + δxy . For the
lower bound, let δyx be the distance of x from y in G. Then, for
every solution α ∈ Snx , it must be α(y) ≥ n − δyx; that is, yl =
n − δyx.
Satisfaction of disequalities is not affected by translation. There-
fore, a set of constraints including both inequalities and disequal-
ities is satisfiable if and only if there exists a solution α such that
α(x) = n. This allows us to limit the search to the set Snx . The-
orem 1 asserts that solutions in this set are bounded. Hence, we
can resort to finite instantiations to find them. Specifically, we can
encode each integer variable with binary variables and translate the
satisfiability problem for a conjunction of inequality and disequal-
ity constraints into a propositional satisfiability problem.
Theorem 1 applies when the constraint graph consists of one
maximal SCC. If that is not the case, we examine the SCC quo-
tient graph one SCC at the time. If there is no negative cycle in the
constraint graphG, the only reason for unsatisfiability is the inabil-
ity to satisfy the disequalities within some SCC of G. Therefore,
if the finite instantiation of each SCC is satisfiable, the entire set of
constraints is satisfiable. This can be shown as follows.
Let G be the constraint graph. Extend G by adding one edge
for every disequality constraint x − y 6= n (where n may be 0)
such that x and y belong to different SCCs. Let  be the preorder
defined by u  v if there is a path in G from u to v. (The preorder
is updated after each edge addition.) If x  y, add y−x ≤ −n−1
to E; if y  x, add x− y ≤ n − 1. If x and y are not comparable
in the preorder, add either y − x ≤ −n− 1 or x− y ≤ n− 1, but
not both. Note that adding these edges does not create cycles, and
therefore does not change the SCCs of G. (See Sect. 4.)
Let bG = (bV , bE) be the SCC quotient graph of the extended
G. Consider the vertices in bV starting from the minimal SCCs
(those with no predecessors) and proceeding in a chosen topolog-
ical order. Let Ai be the i-th SCC in that order and let αi be a
solution for the constraints corresponding to its edges. Inductively




Aj . Let k be the maximum amount by which
any constraint corresponding to an edge into Ai is violated. (Let
k = 0 if no such violation exists.) Finally, let α′i = αi − k. Then,
βi = βi−1 ∪ α






We assume a decision procedure for IDL based on propositional
abstraction. The given IDL formula ϕ is translated into a propo-
sitional formula ϕb as described in Sect. 2. A propositional rea-
soning engine enumerates the satisfying assignments to ϕb and
calls the theory solver to determine whether those satisfying assign-
ments correspond to consistent assignments to the integer-valued
variables.
The theory solver for IDL is relatively efficient. Therefore, it is
advantageous to call it also on partial assignments to terminate the
fruitless search of part of the state space, or to learn so-called the-
ory consequences [21]. Our implementation follows this approach,
though the equality constraints are split and the full check for in-
consistencies due to disequalities is applied only to complete as-
signments. (See lines 38–42 of Fig. 1.) We omit the details of the
incremental implementation of the Bellman-Ford algorithm. The
interested reader is referred to [26].
4.1 The Theory Solver
The theory solver is called with a collection of arithmetic liter-
als whose corresponding propositional literals are true in a model
of the propositional formula ϕb; it then decides whether there is
an assignment to the integer-valued variables that satisfies the con-
junction of all those literals. The first step is to obtain a set of
arithmetic atomic formulae (without negations) from the given set
of literals. The given literals are rewritten according to their form:
1. x− y ≤ n: unchanged;
2. x = y: unchanged;
3. x− y = n, with n 6= 0: split into (x− y ≤ n) ∧ (y − x ≤
−n);
4. ¬(x− y ≤ n): rewritten as y − x ≤ −n− 1;
5. ¬(x = y): rewritten as x 6= y;
6. ¬(x− y = n), with n 6= 0: rewritten as x− y 6= n.
Constraints of type 1, 3, and 4 are inequalities (I). Constraints
of type 2 are equalities (Q), and finally, constraints of type 5 and
6 are disequalities (D). Specifically, constraints of type 5 form the
set D0 ⊆ D. Let C = I ∪Q ∪D.
The theory solver, whose pseudocode is shown in Figures 1 and 2,
adopts the layered approach of MathSAT [4]. For IDL, it consid-
ers three main layers: equalities, inequalities, and disequalities. Let
X= ⊆ X be the set of integer-valued variables appearing inQ. The
theory solver creates an undirected equality graph Q = (X=,Γ),
where
Γ = {{xi, xj} : xi = xj ∈ Q} .
The vertices of Q are in the same class if they are made equivalent
by the equality constraints. The feasibility ofQwithD0 is checked
by comparing the equivalence class of the two vertices of each dis-
equality constraint in D0. If two vertices are in the same class, an
explanation of infeasibility is returned. If the set of equality con-
straints is feasible, the variables in the same class are merged into
a single variable, and some simplified constraints in D0 and I are
dropped from the set.
The algorithm continues by checking the feasibility of the set of
inequality constraints. Let V ⊆ X be the set of integer-valued
variables appearing in I . The theory solver creates a constraint
graph G = (V,E, λ) from I as explained in Sect. 2. The Bellman-
Ford algorithm is run on G. If a negative cycle is found, the set
I is infeasible; a negative cycle with a subset of Q provides the
explanation of infeasibility. Equality constraints are involved in the
explanation if the constraints on the negative cycle were obtained
by simplification in the equality layer. If there is no negative cycle
in G, the set I ∪ Q is feasible; therefore a solution δ : V → Z is
returned by the Bellman-Ford algorithm.2
The (simplified) set I combined withD is considered in the next
step. Let G0 be the subgraph of G such that the edges with non-
zero slacks for solution δ are removed from G. Since the slacks of
2The algorithm is, in principle, applied to the augmented graph Ga
described in Sect. 2. In practice, no augmentation of G is required:
it suffices to initialize all distances to 0.
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1 TheorySolver (C) {
2 Q = CreateEqualityGraph (Q);
3 Explanation = CheckFeasibilityOfEqualityConstraints (Q, D0);




8 return CheckFeasibilityOfInequalityConstraints (I);
9 }
10 }
11 CheckFeasibilityOfInequalityConstraints (I) {
12 G = CreateConstraintGraph (I);
13 NegCycle = BellmaFordAlgorithm (G);
14 if (NegCycle) {
15 return GenerateExplanationFromNegCycle (NegCycle);
16 } else {
17 SCC = GenerateZeroSlackSccOfConstraintGraph (G);
18 Explanation = CheckFeasibilityOfZeroSlackScc (SCC , D);
19 if (Explanation 6= SAT ) return Explanation ;
20 else {
21 SCC ′ = GeneratePositiveSlackSccOfConstraintGraph (G);




26 CheckFeasibilityOfZeroSlackScc (SCC , D) {
27 For each d ∈ D {
28 Explanation = CheckFeasibilityOfDisequalityConstraint (SCC , d);
29 if (Explanation 6= SAT ) return Explanation ;
30 else DropValidConstraint (d,D);
31 }
32 return SAT ;
33 }
34 CheckFeasibilityOfPositiveSlackScc (SCC ′, D) {
35 for each scc ′ ∈ SCC ′ {
36 (L,U) = GenerateBoundsForEachVariableInScc (SCC ′);
37 Explanation = CheckFeasibilityOfBoundsWithClique(SCC ′, D, L, U );
38 if (Explanation = UNDECIDED or Explanation = PROB SAT and assignment is complete) {
39 CNF = SmallDomainEncodingForConstraintsInScc (SCC ′, D, L, U );
40 Explanation = SatSolver (CNF );
41 if (Explanation 6= SAT ) return Explanation ;
42 }
43 else return Explanation ;
44 }
45 return SAT ;
46 }
Figure 1: Theory Solver Algorithm
the edges of G0 are zero, the difference between the values of two
variables in the same SCC of G0 is the same in all solutions to the
constraints. In fact, each cycle in G0 is of length 0 [17]; hence, if
x and y are on one cycle of G0 and the distance from x to y along
the cycle is k, then the distance from y to x is −k. It follows that
every solution to I must satisfy y − x ≤ k and x − y ≤ −k, that
is, y − x = k. In other words, a maximal SCC of G such that its
vertex set induces also a maximal SCC of G0 has only one family
of solutions. (See Sect. 3.)
Each disequality constraint d ∈ D is checked for feasibility
against each SCC of G0. If the two variables x, y in x − y 6= n
(where n may be 0) are in the same SCC of G0 and δ(x)− δ(y) =
n, then the set I ∪ Q ∪ D is infeasible. The violated disequality
d, together with the cycle that contains x and y and an appropriate
subset of Q constitutes the explanation of infeasibility. If the two
variables x and y in d are in the same SCC and δ(x) − δ(y) 6= n,
then d is dropped from the set. Disequalities connecting variables
in different SCCs of G0 are simply passed on to the next phase of
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47 GenerateBoundsForEachVariableInScc (scc ′) {
48 x = FixValueOfOneVertexInScc (scc ′);
49 U = ComputeUpperBoundForEachVariableInScc (scc ′,x);
50 L = ComputeLowerBoundForEachVariableInScc (scc ′,x);
51 return (L,U);
52 }
53 ComputeUpperBoundForEachVariableInScc (scc ′,x) {
54 return BellmanFordAlgorithmWithFixedVertex (scc ′,x);
55 }
56 ComputeLowerBoundForEachVariableInScc (scc ′,x) {
57 rev = ReverseDirectionOfEdgesInScc (scc ′);
58 return BellmanFordAlgorithmWithFixedVertex (rev ,x);
59 }
60 CheckFeasibilityOfBoundsWithClique (SCC ′, D, L, U ) {
61 V = GatherVariablesInDisequalityConstraints(D);
62 Γ = GatherVariablesWithSameBounds (D, L, U );
63 ρ = GetBoundForGatheredVariables (Γ);
64 D′ = CollectRelevantDisequalityConstrints (D,Γ);
65 Γ′ = RemoveIrrelevantVariableByCheckingDegree (Γ, D′);
66 if (n(Γ′) ≤ ρ and n(V ) = n(Γ)) return PROB SAT ;
67 else if (n(Γ′) ≤ ρ and n(V ) 6= n(Γ)) return UNDECIDED ;
68 if (n(D′) < ((n(ρ) · (n(ρ) + 1))/2 and n(V ) = n(Γ)) return PROB SAT ;
69 else if (n(D′) < ((n(ρ) · (n(ρ) + 1))/2 and n(V ) 6= n(Γ)) return UNDECIDED;
70 C = GenerateMaxClique (Γ′, D′);
71 V ′ = GetVariablesInMaxClique (C);
72 if (n(V ′) < ρ and n(V ) = n(Γ)) return PROB SAT ;
73 else if (n(V ′) < ρ and n(V ) 6= n(Γ)) return UNDECIDED;
74 else return GenerateExplanationFromMaxClique (SCC ′,C);
75 }
76 SmallDomainEncodingForConstraintsInScc (scc ′, D) {
77 CNF = InitializeCNF ();
78 CNF = CNF∪ EncodingForBoundsOfEachVariableInScc (scc ′);
79 CNF = CNF∪ EncodingForInequalityConstraintsInScc (scc ′);
80 CNF = CNF∪ EncodingForDisequalityConstraints (D);
81 return CNF ;
82 }
Figure 2: Theory Solver Algorithm (continued)
the procedure. If no infeasibility is detected with G0, a final fea-
sibility check is performed by the small domain encoding method
discussed in Sect. 3. For each SCC of G, Theorem 1 is used to
compute bounds for each variable as follows.
To compute the upper bound for each variable, a variable in the
SCC is chosen arbitrarily as source. (Variable x in Theorem 1.) The
distance from it is computed for each variable in the SCC by the
Bellman-Ford algorithm. The lower bound for a variable is com-
puted as its distance from the same source variable used to compute
the upper bound after reversing the edges in the SCC. (Note that one
cannot replace the distances computed by these invocations of the
shortest path algorithm with those computed on Ga.)
Some inequalities and disequalities may be automatically satis-
fied for all values of the variables in their ranges. For instance, if
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 2 ≤ y ≤ 3, then x 6= y and y − x ≤ 4 are both
satisfied. These constraints are therefore ignored in the successive
steps, which consist of a quick check based on finding a clique of
the disequality graph, possibly followed by propositional encoding
and satisfiability check.
The quick check is based on two observations: The first is that if
all variables in the SCC have the same range, then the disequalities
define a graph whose chromatic number must not exceed the size of
the range for the constraints to be satisfiable. (The chromatic num-
ber is the least number of colors needed to assign different colors
to adjacent vertices in the graph.) The second observation is that
the chromatic number of a graph is bounded from below by the size
of a clique of the graph and from above by the number of vertices.
The process is described in lines 60–75 of Fig. 2. We identify sets
of variables that have the same bounds and we check whether there
are enough disequalities for the variables in one such set to cause
inconsistency. Specifically, suppose a set Γ = {γ1, . . . , γp} of
variables is found such that all variables in Γ have the same bounds
yl and yu. Let ρ = yu − yl + 1 be the range of each variable in
Γ. If p < ρ disequalities cannot cause inconsistency of this set of
variables. If, on the other hand, the number of variables exceeds
their common range, we check whether the disequalities form a
clique of size greater than ρ. We first eliminate from Γ all vari-
ables that appear in fewer than ρ disequalities of the form γi 6= γj
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(γi, γj ∈ Γ). If Γ is not empty after this process, we greedily
grow a clique, adding every time the variable appearing the largest
number of disequalities among the surviving members of Γ. This
greedy algorithm does not always find the largest clique, but is fast
and works well in practice. The check results in one of three results:
A suitable clique has been found and inconsistency is declared; a
large enough clique was not found because of the heuristic nature
of the algorithm; a large enough clique is known not to exist. In
the first case, an explanation of inconsistency is derived from the
disequalities forming the clique and the inequalities responsible for
the bounds. In the last two cases, the result is inconclusive, because
the chromatic number of a graph can be arbitrarily larger than the
size of even the largest cliques. However, if a large enough clique
does not exist in the graph, and the assignment is partial, we avoid
a full check for inconsistency, which is rather expensive and likely
to fail. (If the assignments to the boolean variables are complete,
on the other hand, the consistency check must be performed for the
whole decision procedure to be sound.)
In the final step of the theory solver, the constraints and the
bounds are converted to a set of clauses whose satisfiability is es-
tablished by calling a propositional SAT solver.3 If the clauses are
satisfiable, an assignment for the integer variables is extracted from
the solution. Otherwise, an explanation for the unsatisfiability is
derived as follows from the proof of unsatisfiability returned by the
SAT solver, which consists of a subset of the clauses that are found
to be unsatisfiable. (The unsatisfiable core.)
Every propositional clause is derived from some arithmetic con-
straint. If a clause appears in the unsatisfiable core, the parent con-
straint is included in the explanation. The bound constraints on the
integer variables also contribute to unsatisfiability. They are ac-
counted for by including all constraints that form the two shortest
path spanning trees found during the computation of the bounds.
5. Related Work
Propositional abstraction as an approach to satisfiability modulo
theories was proposed in [2]. Notable solvers based on that prin-
ciple are MathSAT [4, 3], ICS [8], Verifun [10], BarcelogicTools
[12, 21], SLICE [26], and SATORI [13]. ASAP [16] takes a dual
approach, in which satisfiability of the propositional abstraction
guarantees satisfiability of the original quantifier-free Presburger
formula, while UCLID [18] is an eager solver. Our propositional
enumeration engine is the one of [14, 15].
Finite instantiations for equality logic are studied in [22] and ex-
tended to difference logic in [25]; this last work has several points
of contact with ours, but also important differences. The approach
of [25] is eager, and the ranges are computed once and for all before
invoking the propositional SAT solver. In contrast, we advocate a
lazy approach and a computation of the ranges that takes place in
the theory solver. Because of that, we may compute ranges more
than once, but the size of the range for each variable in our algo-
rithm is bounded by the sum of the slacks in the SCC, which is
much smaller than n + maxC , where maxC is the sum of abso-
lute constants in the formula. In practice, ranges are much smaller
in our algorithm. Moreover, we compute ranges by simply find-
ing shortest paths in the constraint graph. The algorithm of [25],
on the other hand, enumerates paths in the constraint graph and is
exponential in the worst case.
Recent work by Ganai et al. [11] presents a polynomial algo-
rithm for the computation of ranges, which improves over the one
3Our current encoding of the ranges is rather unsophisticated. We
are implementing a heuristic approach to minimizing the total num-
ber of encoding bits required.
of [25], but shares the basic approach: ranges are allocated initially,
so as to be adequate for every formula built from the given set of
difference constraints. Disequalities are converted to disjunctions
of inequalities, instead of being retained as such in the formulation
of the problem. The theory consistency problem is never converted
to propositional satisfiability. Instead, range propagation allows the
solver to refine the initial ranges.
MathSAT introduced the notion of layered, incremental theory
solver, and that of delayed theory combination; DPLL(t) the idea
of exhaustive theory propagation, both of which are included in our
implementation. The importance of considering zero-slack SCCs
was first pointed out in [17], which deals with RDL. Finally, [26]
discusses an efficient way to implement a recursive, backtrackable
Bellman-Ford algorithm.
6. Experimental Results
We have implemented the algorithm presented in Sect. 4 in Sateen,
a theorem prover for quantifier-free first-order logic that combines
the propositional reasoning engine of [14, 15] with theory-specific
procedures. A first set of experiments were done with the full set of
QF IDL (Quantifier free integer difference logic) benchmarks from
SMT-COMP (Satisfiability Modulo Theories Competition [24]). The
experiments were performed on a 1.7 GHz Pentium 4 with 2 GB
of RAM running Linux. Time out was set at 3600 seconds. Sateen
was compared with BarcelogicTools [9], Yices-0.1.1 [27] and Math-
SAT 3.3.1 [19]. The compared solvers are the ones that were sub-
mitted to SMT-COMP in 2005.
Figures 3–5 show scatterplots comparing BarcelogicTools, Yices
and MathSAT to Sateen. Points below the diagonal represent wins
for Sateen. Each scatterplot shows two lines: The main diagonal,
and y = κ · xη , where κ and η are obtained by least-square fitting.
Figure 3 shows that Sateen is comparable to BarcelogicTools. In
Figures 4 and 5, Sateen shows better results compared to Yices and
MathSAT, especially on hard problems. The SMT-COMP bench-
mark formulae are such that usually the sets of constraints passed
to the theory solver either contain few disequality constraints, or
are such that the disequality constraints are dealt with by the zero-
slack SCC algorithm. The main purpose of these experiments is
therefore not to show the effectiveness of the newly proposed algo-
rithm for finite instantiations, but to establish that Sateen is, overall,
a competent solver for IDL, comparable to some of the best tools in
the field.
To assess the effectiveness of the finite instantiation approach,
we have generated two benchmark suites where disequality con-
straints play a significant role: the Queens Suite and the Job Shop
Scheduling Suite. The Queens Suite contains n-Queens problem
and n-Super-Queens problem. The n-Queens problem consists of
placing n queens on a n × n board so that they do not attack each
other. In the n-Super-Queens problem, each queen’s placement is
more restricted by allowing it also the knight’s moves. The Job
Shop Scheduling problem checks the feasibility of processing a
number of jobs, each consisting of several tasks, on a given set of
machines in a given amount of time. These two sets of benchmarks
have disequality constraints that cause pigeonholing problems. In
the experiment on these benchmarks, the timeout was set to 1000
seconds.
Figures 6–8 shows that Sateen is often orders of magnitude faster
than the other solvers on these problems. The symbol × represents
the experiment on the Queens benchmark, and the symbol + repre-
sents the experiment on the Job Shop Scheduling benchmark. We
also provide the comparison between Sateen with our proposed al-
gorithm and a version of Sateen that splits disequalities. Figure 9
shows that the finite instantiation algorithm works significantly bet-
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Figure 5: MATHSAT vs. Sateen on QF IDL
ter than the splitting method. The clique detection algorithm is par-
ticularly helpful in Job Shop Scheduling problems.
7. Conclusions
We have presented an approach to solving integer difference logic
that is particularly effective when the constraints to be solved are
rich in disequalities. By restricting consideration to a small suffi-
cient set of solutions, we are able to compute bounds for the integer
variables occurring in the constraints. Experiments indicate that
this approach is more effective than splitting disequalities into the
















BarcelogicTools : time (s)

















Yices : time (s)
Figure 7: YICES vs. Sateen on Job Shop Scheduling and Queen
Suites
expected from a more sophisticated encoding scheme for the finite
instances that we are currently developing.
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Abstract
In this paper, a new heuristic-based approach is in-
troduced to extract minimally unsatisfiable subformulas
(in short, MUSes) of SAT instances. It is shown that
it often outperforms current competing methods. Then,
the focus is on inconsistent covers, which represent sets
of MUSes that cover enough independent sources of in-
feasibility for the instance to regain satisfiability if they
were repaired. As the number of MUSes can be expo-
nential with respect to the size of the instance, it is
shown that such a concept is often a viable trade-off
since it does not require us to compute all MUSes but
provides us with enough mutually independent infeasi-
bility causes that need to be addressed in order to restore
satisfiability.
1. Introduction
In this paper, the focus is on computational ap-
proaches to detect minimal unsatisfiable subformulas
(MUSes) of unsatisfiable SAT instances. Detecting
MUSes can prove valuable in many applications. For
example, when we check the consistency of knowledge-
bases, we prefer knowing which clauses are contradict-
ing one another rather than only knowing that the
whole base is inconsistent. MUSes provide such an in-
formation, as they represent the smallest explanations
(in terms of the number of involved clauses) for unsat-
isfiability.
Unfortunately, computing MUSes exhibits a high
worst-case complexity. Indeed, checking whether a set
of clauses is a MUS is DP-complete [21], and checking
whether a formula belongs to the set of MUSes of an
unsatisfiable instance or not, is in Σp2 [9]. Moreover,
the number of MUSes can be exponential in the size
of the instance. Indeed, the number of MUSes of an
n-clauses instance is Cn/2n in the worst case. However,
let us stress that the number of MUSes remains often
tractable in real-life situations. For example, in model-
based diagnosis [13], based on experimental studies, it
is often assumed that single faults occur, which is often
translated by a limited number of MUSes.
Recently, several approaches have been proposed
to approximate or compute MUSes. Unfortunately,
they concern specific classes of clauses or they remain
tractable for small instances, only. Among them, let
us mention Bruni’s work [5], who has shown how a
MUS can be extracted in polynomial time through lin-
ear programming techniques for clauses exhibiting a
so-called integral point property. However, only re-
strictive classes of clauses obey such a property (mainly
Horn, renameable Horn, extended Horn, balanced and
matched ones). Other studies about the complexity
and algorithmic properties of extracting MUSes for spe-
cific classes of clauses can be found in [6, 7] and [10]. In
[4], Bruni has also proposed an approach that approxi-
mates MUSes by means of an adaptative search guided
by clauses hardness. Zhang and Malik have described
in [23] a way to extract MUSes by learning nogoods
involved in the derivation of the empty clause by reso-
lution. In [17], Lynce and Marques-Silva have proposed
a complete and exhaustive technique to extract small-
est MUSes. Oh and her co-authors have presented in
[20] a Davis, Putnam, Logemann and Loveland DPLL-
oriented approach that is based on a marked clauses
concept to allow one to approximate MUSes. Liffiton
and Sakallah have shown how MUSes can be computed
through the dual concept of maximally satisfiable sub-
sets [16].
In this paper, a new heuristic-based approach to ap-
proximate and compute MUSes is introduced. It is
based on a concept of critical clauses w.r.t. an inter-
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pretation that allows us to refine the approach by [19]
to locate approximations of MUSes. Although it ex-
ploits a heuristic information, let us stress that the ap-
proach is complete in the sense that it always delivers
a MUS for any unsatisfiable instance. Then, a concept
of inconsistent cover is introduced. Inconsistent covers
represent sets of MUSes that cover enough independent
sources of infeasibility that would allow the instance to
regain satisfiability if they were fixed. As the number
of MUSes can be exponential with respect to the size of
the instance, such a concept can be a viable trade-off
since it does not require us to compute all MUSes but
provides us with enough infeasibility causes that would
allow the instance to become satisfiable if they were all
repaired.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion, the concepts of MUS and inconsistent cover are
presented formally. In section 3, the crucial notion of
critical clause w.r.t. an interpretation is introduced
and analyzed. In section 4, the new approach to ap-
proximate or compute one MUS is presented. Exten-
sive experimental results are given in section 5. Before
we conclude, section 6 shows how the approach can be
extended to compute strict inconsistent covers.
2. MUSes and Inconsistent Covers
Let L be a standard Boolean logical language built
on a finite set of Boolean variables, denoted a, b, etc.
Formulas will be denoted using upper-case letters such
as C. Sets of formulas will be represented using Greek
letters like Γ or Σ. An interpretation is a truth assign-
ment function that assigns values from {true, false} to
every Boolean variable.
A formula is consistent or satisfiable when there is
at least one interpretation that satisfies it, i.e. that
makes it become true. An interpretation will be de-
noted by upper-case letters like I and will be repre-
sented by the set of literals that it satisfies. Actually,
any formula in L can be represented (while preserving
satisfiability) using a set (interpreted as a conjunction)
of clauses, where a clause is a finite disjunction of lit-
erals and where a literal is Boolean variable that can
be negated. SAT is the canonical NP-complete prob-
lem that consists in checking whether a set of Boolean
clauses is satisfiable or not, i.e. whether there exists
an interpretation that satisfies all clauses in the set or
not. Let us also recall the SAT-related optimization
problem, namely max-SAT.
Definition 1 Given a SAT instance Γ, max-SAT con-
sists in finding the maximum number of clauses of Σ
that can be satisfied under a same interpretation.
When a SAT instance is unsatisfiable, it exhibits at
least one minimally unsatisfiable subformula, in short
one MUS.
Definition 2 A MUS Γ of a SAT instance Σ is a set
of clauses s.t.
1. Γ ⊆ Σ
2. Γ is unsatisfiable
3. Every proper subset of Γ is satisfiable
In the following, another crucial concept is the no-
tion of (strict) inconsistent cover.
Definition 3 Two sets of clauses are independent if
and only if their intersection is empty. One (strict)
inconsistent cover IC of an unsatisfiable SAT instance
Σ is a set-theoretic union of (independent) MUSes of
Σ s.t. Σ\IC is satisfiable.
It should be noted that a same unsatisfiable instance
can exhibit several different strict inconsistent covers.
For example, let Σ = {¬a,¬b, a∨b, c,¬d∨b,¬c∨a, d}. Σ
contains 3 MUSes: MUS1 = {a ∨ b,¬a,¬b}, MUS2 =
{d,¬b,¬d∨b} and MUS3 = {c,¬c∨a,¬a}. Σ contains
2 strict inconsistent covers, namely IC1 = MUS1 and
IC2 = MUS2 ∪MUS3.
Although a strict inconsistent cover does not pro-
vide us with the set of all MUSes that may be present
in a formula, it gives us a series of minimal explana-
tions for infeasibility that are sufficient to explain and
potentially repair enough sources of unsatisfiability in
order for the whole formula to regain satisfiability.
A straightforward result is that a strict inconsistent
cover enables us to get a lower-bound of the number of
unsatisfied clauses in a max-SAT solution of an unsat-
isfiable SAT instance.
Property 1 Let Σ be an unsatisfiable SAT instance.
Let IC be a strict inconsistent cover of Σ. Let |IC|
be the number of independent MUSes contained in IC.
For any interpretation I of Σ, at least |IC| clauses of
Σ are falsified under I.
3. A New Heuristic to Detect MUSes
In [19] it is shown how local search can be helpful for
approximating MUSes. The basic idea is that clauses
that are often falsified during a failed local search for
satisfiability belong most probably to MUSes, when the
instance is actually unsatisfiable. When the score of a
clause is the number of times it has been falsified during
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a failed local search (in short, failed LS), discriminat-
ing the clauses with a high score can deliver a good
approximation of the set of MUSes. Such a heuristic
has been studied in an extensive manner in [18] and
[19]. It has also been extended in several ways to ad-
dress decision and optimization problems that belong
to higher levels of the polynomial hierarchy (see e.g.
[11, 3, 12] and [2]).
In the following, we assume that the SAT instance
is unsatisfiable. The above heuristic can require us
to increment the score of clauses even when they do
not actually belong to any MUS. Unless we solve the
problem of finding MUSes itself, we can only rely on
some heuristic indications about the extent to which
a currently falsified clause could or could not belong
to a MUS. In this respect, we claim that some rele-
vant parts of the neighborhood of the current interpre-
tation can be checked and provide more information
about whether a currently falsified clause C should be
counted or not. The idea is to take the structure of
C into account and to increment the score of C only
when it cannot be satisfied without conducting other
clauses to be falsified in their turn. We shall see that
this technique implements definitions that approximate
a proposition that is intrinsic to clauses belonging to
MUSes.
To illustrate this concept, let us use the following
example. Let ∆ = {a∨ b∨ c,¬a∨ b,¬b∨ c,¬c∨ a,¬a∨
¬b∨¬c}. ∆ is unsatisfiable and is its own MUS. Let I =
{a, b, c} an interpretation. Under this interpretation,
only the ¬a∨¬b∨¬c clause is falsified. In the following,
the once-satisfied clause concept will prove useful.
Definition 4 A clause C is once-satisfied by an inter-
pretation I if and only if exactly only one literal of C
is satisfied under I.
In the above example, the clauses ¬a∨ b, ¬b∨ c and
¬c ∨ a are once-satisfied by I = {a, b, c}.
Definition 5 A clause C falsified under an interpre-
tation I is critical w.r.t. I if and only if the opposite
of every literal of C belongs to a clause that is once-
satisfied by I. These once-satisfied clauses that are not
tautological ones are called linked to C.
In the example, ¬a∨¬b∨¬c is falsified under I and
is critical w.r.t. I; its related linked clauses are the
once-satisfied ones ¬a ∨ b, ¬b ∨ c and ¬c ∨ a.
The role of these definitions is easily understood
thanks to the following property.
Property 2 Let C be a critical clause w.r.t. an inter-
pretation I, then any flip from I to I ′ such that C is
satisfied under I ′ will conduct I ′ to falsify at least one
clause that was satisfied under I.
In order to discriminate clauses belonging to MUSes,
the idea is to increment the scores of critical clauses
during the search, together with their linked (satisfied)
clauses, rather than increment the scores of all falsified
clauses. Such a technique can be easily grafted to a
LS algorithm and the updates can be easily computed.
Actually, it implements definitions that approximate a
property that is obeyed by clauses belonging to MUSes.
Property 3 Let I be an interpretation giving an opti-
mal result for max-SAT on an unsatisfiable instance Σ.
Then, any falsified clause C w.r.t. I belongs to at least
one MUS of Σ and is critical w.r.t. I. Moreover, at
least one once-satisfied clause linked to C also belongs
to a MUS of Σ.
Our technique is thus an approximation one in the
sense that clauses and their linked ones are considered
during the whole search, and not w.r.t. interpretations
that are solutions of max-SAT. Indeed, being a criti-
cal clause is neither a necessary nor a sufficient con-
dition to belong to a MUS. As the following exam-
ple illustrates, a critical clause w.r.t. an interpreta-
tion that is not an optimal one w.r.t. max-SAT for an
unsatisfiable formula might not belong to a MUS. Let
∆ = {a∨d,¬a∨¬b,¬d∨e, f,¬e∨¬f}. Clearly, ∆ is sat-
isfiable. ¬e∨¬f is falsified under I = {a, b, d, e, f} and
is critical w.r.t. I. Moreover, a clause from a MUS that
is falsified under a given interpretation I is not neces-
sary critical w.r.t. I, as the following example shows.
Let ∆ = {a∨ d, b,¬a∨¬b,¬d∨ e, f,¬e∨¬f}. Clearly,
∆ is a minimal unsatisfiable set of clauses. ¬a ∨ ¬b
is falsified under I = {a, b, d, e, f}. However, it is not
critical w.r.t. I. Fortunately, the following property
ensures that all clauses from a MUS can be scored by
the heuristic.
Property 4 Let Γ be a MUS. For all clauses C ∈ Γ,
there exists an interpretation I s.t. C is critical w.r.t.
I.
This property ensures that any clause that takes
part to a MUS can be critical w.r.t. at least one in-
terpretation. As such, this property does not guaran-
tee that our scoring heuristic will allow us to exhibit
all clauses belonging to MUSes. Indeed, it does not
indicate that a LS run will necessary increment the
score of all such clauses at least once since LS does not
necessary visit all interpretations. However, the follow-
ing property and its corollary provide us with a good
indication that LS will probably visit interpretations
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where clauses belonging to MUSes are critical. Indeed,
it is well-known that LS is in general attracted by local
minima. Property 5 ensures that all falsified clauses
are critical in local or global minima.
Definition 6 A local minimum is an interpretation
s.t. no flip can increase the number satisfied clauses.
A global minimum (or max-SAT solution) is an in-
terpretation delivering the maximal number of satisfied
clauses.
Property 5 In (local or global) minima, all falsified
clauses are critical.
A corollary ensures that at least one clause per MUS
is critical in such minima.
Corollary 1 In (local or global) minima, at least one
clause per MUS is critical.
4. Approximating and Computing one
MUS
In the following, it is shown that a meta-heuristic
based on scoring critical clauses is viable in order to ap-
proximate or compute MUSes. Actually, due to imple-
mentation efficiency constraints, we update the scores
of critical clauses only. Updating the scores of their
linked clauses does not lead to dramatic performance
improvements, at least w.r.t. our selected LS algorithm
and tested benchmarks.
The main idea is as follows. Let Σ be an unsatisfiable
SAT instance. While local search fails to find a model
of Σ, we remove clauses of Σ with the lowest scores. We
record the obtained sub-formulas on a stack. Next, the
unsatisfiability of the last subformula where LS fails to
find a model is checked. If this subformula is unsat-
isfiable, then it is an approximation of a MUS of Σ.
Otherwise, this unsatisfiability test is repeated on the
lastly recorded supersets of clauses, until one of them
is proved unsatisfiable. This algorithm, called AOMUS
(Approximate One MUS), is described in Algorithm 1.
Then an exact MUS can be obtained by a step-
by-step minimization of the upper-approximation until
the remaining clauses are proven to form a MUS (see
[14] for an alternative method). This process is called
fine-tune (see Algorithm 2). The order of tested
clauses can be guided by the score of each clause.
Let us stress that this algorithm is complete in the
sense that it always delivers one MUS for any unsatisfi-
able instance. The combination of AOMUS algorithm and
fine-tune procedure is called OMUS (find One MUS)
and is described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 1: AOMUS algorithm
Input: an unsatisfiable SAT formula Σ
Output: an Approximation of One MUS of Σ
begin1
stack ←− ∅ ;2
while (LS + Score(Σ) fails to find a model) do3
push(Σ) ;4
Σ←− Σ \ LowestScore(Σ) ;5
repeat6
Σ←− pop() ;7
until Σ is UNSAT ;8
return Σ ;9
end10
Algorithm 2: fine-tune procedure
Input: an approximation of a MUS of Σ
Output: a MUS extracted from Σ
begin1
foreach clause c ∈ Σ sorted w.r.t. their scores do2
if (Σ \ {c} is unsatisfiable) then3
Σ←− Σ \ {c} ;4
return Σ ;5
end6
Its efficiency directly depends on the quality of the
upper-approximation. In the next section, experimen-
tal results show that the approximation delivered by
AOMUS is often of a good quality, because a very small
set of clauses is removed by the fine-tune step and
in consequence a very small number of unsatisfiability
tests are performed (when a clause belongs to the MUS,
the test amounts to a consistency check).
Actually, we refined this basic procedure in the fol-
lowing manner. Assume that the current computed
subformula is actually unsatisfiable; whenever a unique
clause remains falsified during the LS run, we are sure
that this clause belongs to all MUSes of this current
subformula.
We mark these clauses as protected and they can-
not be removed from Σ thereafter. Moreover, this in-
formation is kept all along the process because it can
prove very useful during the minimization procedure.
After the approximation is computed, the idea is to
remove each clause to verify whether it participates
to the cause of unsatisfiability of the formula or not.
However, protected clauses do not need to be tested,
because we know that removing one of them restores
satisfiability. Furthermore, when the remaining falsi-
fied clauses contain protected clauses only, they form
one exact MUS. In this case, the fine-tune step can be
omitted since an exact MUS has been already extracted
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Algorithm 3: OMUS algorithm
Input: an unsatisfiable SAT formula Σ







It appears that this refinement proves useful for
many instances, and allows dramatic efficiency gains
for both AOMUS and OMUS algorithms.
The parameters that were selected for these meth-
ods are as follows. As a case study, Wsat [15] with
the Rnovelty+ option was chosen as the LS proce-
dure. The following parameters were fine-tuned based
on extensive tests on various benchmarks. After each
flip of the LS, the score of critical clauses is increased
by the number of their linked clauses. This tech-
nique allows us to take the length of critical clauses
into account, since the number of linked clauses de-
pends on the length of the critical clause in terms of
the number of involved literals. Now, clauses whose
score is lower than (min-score+ #Flips#Clauses ) are dropped,
where min-score is the lowest score for a clause of Σ;
#Flips and #Clauses are the number of performed
flips and the number of clauses in Σ, respectively. This
procedure was tested extensively on various UNSAT
instances from several difficult benchmarks from DI-
MACS [8] and from the annual SAT competitions [22],
and compared with other published approaches to com-
pute MUSes, as described in the next section.
5. Experimental Results
All experiments have been conducted on Pentium
IV, 3Ghz under linux Fedora Core 4. As our results
show, this approximation delivers an exact result most
of the time. Moreover, the fine-tune procedure en-
sures that a MUS is actually obtained. As most current
approaches do not guarantee that the delivered unsat-
isfiable sets of clauses are actually MUSes, we provide
both the results of applying AOMUS and OMUS. However,
on many instances, approximations delivered thanks to
AOMUS appeared to be actual MUSes. Moreover, very
often, the last subformula where LS fails to find a model
is in fact unsatisfiable. Thus, in practice, the last loop
of the AOMUS algorithm reduces to a unique inconsis-
tency test, most of the time.
We compared our approach with an adaptation of
AOMUS where Score is the basic heuristic of [19], which
simply counts the number of times a clause is falsi-
fied. We also compared our approach with zCore, the
core extractor of zChaff [23]. zChaff is currently one
of the most efficient SAT solvers. We also ran Lynce
and Marques-Silva’s procedure [17], and took Bruni’s
[4] experimental results into account. For Bruni’s tech-
nique, we only mention the experimental results ob-
tained by the author, since this system is not available.
Although a comparison with Bruni’s technique is thus
difficult to achieve from an experimental side, it ap-
pears that Bruni’s technique has been experimented
on small instances, only. zCore proved competitive
for single-MUS instances but failed to deliver good re-
sults when several MUSes are present. Indeed, zCore
does not concentrate on finding one MUS, but on find-
ing proofs of unsatisfiability. Not surprisingly, our ap-
proach proved more efficient than the similar one where
Score is based on [19] heuristic. Most often, it proved
to be more competitive than all the other considered
techniques when very large and difficult multi-MUSes
instances were considered. Noticeably, it was also the
only technique to perform in a competitive way on all
benchmarks. Let us stress that the Lynce-Silva’s pro-
cedure computes the smallest MUS, that zCore deliv-
ers an approximation of a MUS, whereas our OMUS and
AOMUS procedures deliver one exact and one approx-
imate MUS, respectively. Moreover, it should be em-
phasized that MUSes that are discovered by the various
approaches are not necessary the same ones.
In Table 1, some typical experimental results are
given. Except for Bruni’s results which are just size
results that we have extracted from [4], we provide
both the experimental size of the discovered smallest
unsatisfiable subsets, together with the CPU time in
seconds to get them. Time-out indicates that no re-
sult has been obtained within 1 hour CPU time. For
example, for the homer14 instance, AOMUS delivered an
approximate MUS made of 561 clauses within 28.03 s.
Actually, this was an exact MUS, as it was found by
OMUS in 30.64 s. Note that an AOMUS version based on
[19] delivered the same result in 347.19 s. zCore deliv-
ered an approximate MUS made of 1065 clauses within
714 s. Actually, this approximate MUS was a superset
of the MUS discovered by both AOMUS and OMUS. Also,
it can be seen e.g. on the fpga benchmarks that AOMUS
(i.e. our approach without the fine-tune procedure)
delivered smaller unsatisfiable subsets than any other
considered method, most often. Let us also emphasize
that even on small instances like the aim ones, OMUS
proved very competitive, as well.
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Table 1. Experimental results: Approximate One MUS (AOMUS) and find One MUS (OMUS)
Instance #var #cla Lynce&Silva [17] Bruni [5] zCore [23] Scoring like [19] AOMUS OMUS
#cla Time #cla #cla Time #cla Time #cla Time #cla Time
fpga10 11 220 1122 Time out - 561 28.51 561 18.26 561 13.06 561 13.75
fpga10 12 240 1344 Time out - 672 71.27 561 30.11 561 16.9 561 17.03
fpga10 13 260 1586 Time out - 793 166.99 561 51.67 561 25.95 561 31.89
fpga10 15 300 2130 Time out - 1065 570.3 561 128.05 561 44.18 561 68.17
fpga11 12 264 1476 Time out - 738 112.53 738 66.8 738 65.49 738 66.3
fpga11 13 286 1742 Time out - 871 504.97 738 180.66 738 56.71 738 84.74
fpga11 14 308 2030 Time out - 1015 1565.6 738 415.32 738 69.55 738 304.4
fpga11 15 330 2340 Time out - Time out 738 568.79 738 52.14 738 85.2
aim100-1 6-no-2 100 160 53 224 54 54 0.05 53 0.268 53 0.38 53 0.38
aim100-2 0-no-1 100 200 Time out 19 19 0.09 19 0.216 19 0.19 19 0.23
aim200-1 6-no-3 200 320 Time out 86 83 0.07 83 0.37 83 0.44 83 0.83
aim200-2 0-no-3 200 400 Time out 37 37 0.23 37 0.39 37 0.49 37 0.54
aim50-1 6-no-4 50 80 20 1.18 20 20 0.04 20 0.163 20 0.16 20 0.17
aim50-2 0-no-4 50 100 21 3.49 21 21 0.14 21 0.208 21 0.22 21 0.27
2bitadd 10 590 1422 Time out - 815 343.48 1212 42.752 806 189.47 716 268.5
barrel2 50 159 Time out - 77 0.04 100 0.35 77 0.36 77 0.44
jnh10 100 850 Time out 161 68 0.88 128 9.35 79 42.25 79 42.9
jnh20 100 850 Time out 120 102 0.23 104 21.68 87 48.93 87 75.76
jnh5 100 850 Time out 125 86 0.39 140 12.653 88 46.2 86 46.87
jnh8 100 850 Time out 91 90 0.22 162 28.964 69 90.53 67 99.07
homer06 180 830 Time out - 415 15.96 415 10.97 415 9.04 415 9.3
homer07 198 1012 Time out - 506 21.6 415 12.59 415 10.67 415 19.19
homer08 216 1212 Time out - 606 44.46 554 23.43 415 19.79 415 24.65
homer09 270 1920 Time out - 960 141.48 415 93.19 504 60.9 415 81.23
homer10 360 3460 Time out - 940 624.11 1614 148.27 503 466.94 415 513.11
homer11 220 1122 Time out - 561 23.44 561 41.68 561 15.6 561 16.32
homer12 240 1344 Time out - 672 76.19 708 25.92 564 41.03 561 62.34
homer13 260 1586 Time out - 793 152.13 579 67.38 561 76.66 561 78.51
homer14 300 2130 Time out - 1065 714.03 561 347.19 561 28.03 561 30.64
homer15 400 3840 Time out - Time out 677 247.84 561 1048.28 561 1104.13
homer16 264 1476 Time out - 738 115.49 738 78.44 738 61.31 738 62.91
homer17 286 1742 Time out - 871 369.11 870 127.43 738 68.28 738 87.4
More extensive results can be downloaded from http://www.cril.univ-artois.fr/~piette
6. Extracting Strict Inconsistent Covers
These last years, several approaches have been pro-
posed to compute all MUSes of a SAT instance ([1, 16]).
Unfortunately, these computational approaches remain
often intractable since, among other things, the number
of MUSes in a formula can be exponential in the size
of the formula. In this section, a novel method is intro-
duced to compute independent MUSes, i.e. MUSes that
do not share any clause. The idea motivating this ap-
proach is that independent MUSes express independent
−uncorrelated− causes of infeasibility inside a same
formula. This lead us to the concept of strict inconsis-
tent cover of an unsatisfiable instance.
Although an inconsistent cover does not provide us
with the set of all MUSes that may be present in a
formula, it does however provide us with a series of
minimal explanations for unsatisfiability that are suffi-
cient to explain and potentially repair enough sources
of infeasibility in order for the whole formula to regain
satisfiability. Moreover, formulas can have MUSes that
are very small with respect to the size of the formula;
dropping or repairing such MUSes can sometimes be
sufficient to regain satisfiability. Since strict inconsis-
tent covers are composed of independent MUSes, one
Algorithm 4: ICMUS algorithm
Input: an unsatisfiable SAT formula Σ
Output: a strict Inconsistent Cover of Σ
begin1
IC ←− ∅ ;2
while (Σ is unsatisfiable) do3
MUS ←−OMUS(Σ) ;4
IC ←− IC ∪MUS ;5
Σ←− Σ \MUS ;6
return IC ;7
end8
way to obtain a strict inconsistent cover is to com-
pute a single MUS, then remove it from the formula,
and repeat these operations until the remaining sub-
formula becomes satisfiable. This method is described
in the following ICMUS (find a strict Inconsistent Cover
of MUSes) algorithm (see Algorithm 4).
In Table 2, some typical experimental results are
provided. Unsurprisingly, a lot of instances exhibit
very small inconsistent covers in terms of the num-
ber of involved clauses. For example, let us consider
ezfact16_2. This formula contains 1113 clauses, and
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Table 2. Inconsistent covers for various classes of formulas
Instance #var #cla Time #MUSes in the IC (#var,#cla) for each MUS
dp02u01 213 376 1.19 1 (47,51)
dp03u02 478 1007 362 1 (327,760)
23.cnf 198 474 2.68 1 (165,221)
42.cnf 378 904 9 1 (315,421)
fpga10 11 uns rcr 220 1122 56 2 (110,561) (110,561)
fpga11 12 uns rcr 264 1476 128 2 (132,738) (132,738)
ca002 26 70 0.61 1 (20,39)
ca004 60 168 1.11 1 (49,108)
ca008 130 370 5.26 1 (110,255)
term1 gr rcs w3 606 2518 6180 11 (12,22) (21,33) (30,58) (12,22) (12,22) (12,22) (12,22) (12,22) (12,22) (24,39) (21,33)
C220 FV RZ 14 1728 4508 28 1 (10,14)
C220 FV RZ 13 1728 4508 46 1 (9,13)
C170 FR SZ 96 1659 4955 18 1 (81,233)
C208 FA SZ 121 1608 5278 21 1 (18,32)
C168 FW UT 851 1909 7491 83 1 (7,9)
C202 FW UT 2814 2038 11352 304 1 (15,18)
jnh208 100 800 14 1 (76,119)
jnh302 100 900 63 2 (27,28) (98,208)
jnh310 100 900 184 2 (12,13) (90,188)
ezfact16 1 193 1113 203 1 (37,54)
ezfact16 2 193 1113 104 1 (32,41)
ezfact16 3 193 1113 207 1 (63,128)
3col40 5 3 80 346 4.64 1 (64,136)
fphp-012-010 120 1212 57 1 (120,670)
possesses one MUS that is composed of 41 clauses.
This MUS is in fact a strict inconsistent cover because
its removal restores the formula satisfiability. The
industrial-related formula term1_gr_rcs_w3 exhibits
a strict inconsistent cover made of 11 small MUSes.
Thanks to this result, we can deduce that all interpre-
tations falsify at least 11 clauses. Indeed, as shown in
Property 1 a strict inconsistent cover enables us to get
an lower-bound of unsatisfied clauses in a max-SAT
solution of an unsatisfiable instance. Indeed, the ex-
tracted MUSes do not share constraints and we know
that all interpretations falsify at least one clause per
MUS. Let us also note that inconsistent covers on fpga
formulas suggest the presence of a form of symmetry
in this type of instances.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a concept of
clauses that are critical with respect to a given interpre-
tation during a local search run. The main properties
of this concept have been analyzed formally. We have
shown that it plays a crucial role in a new heuristic-
based approach to approximate or compute MUSes.
Accordingly, our experimental results show the very
good performance of this new approach which tracks
MUSes according to the trace of a failed local search
run for consistency checking. We have also introduced
a strict inconsistent cover concept. This concept al-
lows us to avoid computing all MUSes when the goal is
to explain enough causes of unsatisfiability that would
allow the instance to regain satisfiability if they were
all repaired. Accordingly, our heuristic-based approach
has been extended to address the search for inconsis-
tent covers. Once again, the approach proves efficient
on many difficult benchmarks. In the future, we plan
to explore how the critical clause concept could be re-
fined in order to further improve the performance of
our algorithms.
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plete techniques thanks to local search. Annals of
Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 22:319–322,
1998.
[20] Y. Oh, M. Mneimneh, Z. Andraus, K. Sakallah, and
I. Markov. Amuse: a minimally-unsatisfiable subfor-
mula extractor. In Design Automation Conference
(DAC’04), pages 518–523, 2004.
[21] C. Papadimitriou and D. Wolfe. The complexity of
facets resolved. Journal of Computer and System Sci-
ences, 37(1):2–13, 1988.
[22] SATLIB. Benchmarks on SAT.
http://www.intellektik.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/
SATLIB/benchm.html.
[23] L. Zhang and S. Malik. Extracting small unsatisfiable
cores from unsatisfiable Boolean formula. In Interna-
tional Conference on Theory and Applications of Sat-
isfiability Testing (SAT’03), Portofino (Italy), 2003.
Annex: proofs
Proof of property 1 By definition, strict inconsistent
covers contain MUSes with empty intersections. Since
at least one clause per MUS is falsified under any in-
terpretation I, at least |IC| clauses are thus falsified
under I. 
Proof of property 2 If C is critical then for each literal
l of C, ∃ C ′ s.t. C ′ is once-satisfied w.r.t. I and l̄
belongs to C ′. C is falsified under I, thus l is false
under I and l̄ is true under I. l̄ is the only satisfied
literal of C ′, accordingly if the value of l is reversed
then C ′ becomes falsified. 
Proof of property 3 Any falsified clause under I belongs
to a MUS because I is optimal w.r.t. the number of
satisfied clauses and at least one clause of each MUS
cannot be satisfied. The fact that any falsified clause
under I is critical is proved thanks to Property 5 since
I is a global mimimum. I is optimal w.r.t. the number
of satisfied clauses, thus at most one clause per MUS
is falsified. Also, if one flip allows us to satisfy one
of theses clauses, another clause of the MUS becomes
falsified. Accordingly, at least one once-satisfied clause
linked to a falsified clause under I belongs to a MUS
of Σ. 
Proof of property 4 Let Γ be a MUS and C be a clause
s.t. C ∈ Γ. By definition of a MUS, Γ\C is satisfiable.
Let M be a model of Γ \ C. Let us prove that C is
critical w.r.t. M . First, C is falsified. Indeed, if C
is not falsified then Γ exhibits a model M . This is
impossible because Γ is a MUS. Second, C is critical.
Indeed, if any variable occurring in C is flipped w.r.t.
M , then at least one clause of Γ becomes falsified since
Γ is unsatisfiable. That means that this newly falsified
clause was once-satisfied and linked to C. Accordingly,
C is critical w.r.t. M . 
Proof of property 5 If a variable occurring in a falsified
clause w.r.t. a minimum is flipped, then this clause
is satisfied and at least one previously satisfied clause
becomes unsatisfied. That means that this new unsat-
isfied clause was once-satisfied. Accordingly, the initial
falsified clause was critical. 
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Abstract— In this paper we describe our solver for systems
of linear integer arithmetic logic. Such systems are commonly
used in design verification applications and are classified under
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problems. Recognizing the
fact that in many such applications the majority of atoms are
equalities or integer unit-two-variable inequalities (UTVPIs), we
present a framework that integrates specialized theory solvers
for those atoms within a SAT solver. The unique feature of our
strategy is its simultaneous adoption of both a congruence-closure
equality solver and a transitive-closure UTVPI solver to find a
satisfiable set of those atoms. A full-scale ILP solver is then
utilized to check the consistency of all integer constraints within
the solution. Other notable features of our solver include its
combined deduction and learning schemes that collectively make
our solver distinct among similar solvers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years there has been a noticeable surge in
the introduction and application of various logics to model
systems of integer constraints. Different design verification
problems are routinely cast in terms of logical problems whose
atoms are constraints over integer variables.
In this paper we briefly describe Ario, a solver for checking
the satisfiability of quantifier-free formulas in linear integer
arithmetic logic1. Ario essentially is able to deal with two
main logics: i) equality logic with successors and uninterpreted
functions (ESUF), whose atoms are in the form of ti = tj + c
where c ∈   and ti, tj are terms, that are recursively defined
to be either integer variables or applications of uninterpreted
functions over terms, and ii) linear integer arithmetic logic
(LIA) whose atoms are linear constraints over integer vari-
ables. We assume that ESUF and LIA atoms within the input
problem do not share variables; i.e. an equality over two
integer variables, ti = tj +c, is an ESUF atom only if ti and tj
are not present in any inequalities; otherwise it is replaced with
a conjunction of two LIA atoms: ti− tj ≤ c and tj − ti ≤ −c.
We additionally categorize LIA atoms into two types, each
to be treated differently: i) Unit-Two-Variable-Per-Inequality
(UTVPI) atoms in the form of aixi + ajxj ≤ b where xi, xj
are integer variables, ai, aj ∈ {0,±1} and b ∈  , and ii) non-
UTVPI atoms in the form of
∑n
i=1 aixi ≤ b where ai, b ∈  
and xi’s are integer variables.
Ario adopts a generic CNF SAT solver to reason about
and analyze the logical structure of the problem. Following
the DPLL framework, the SAT solver incrementally builds a
satisfiable set of atoms and utilizes specialized theory solvers
1For complete details on the overall algorithm of Ario and its different
techniques the reader is referred to [1] and [2].
Fig. 1. The organization of solving algorithms within the Ario solver
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to maintain the consistencies of the conjunctions of various
theory atoms within that solution. Upon activating ESUF or
UTVPI atoms, the consistencies of those atoms are incre-
mentally checked using, respectively, a congruence-closure or
a transitive-closure procedure. The overall consistency of all
LIA atoms is established after/if a satisfiable solution to the
rest of the problem is built.
Related Work: The idea of integrating different theory
solvers within a propositional SAT solver was first suggested
in [3] and then further improved in [4], [5], [6], [2]. Two of the
most common integration strategies employed in these solvers
include, i) the layered approach [5], based on invoking theory
solvers in the order of their solving capabilities, and ii) the
online [4] or DPLL(T) [6] approach, where a combined DPLL
reasoning and learning procedure is applied to all atoms and
the consistency of the theory atoms are maintained throughout
the SAT search. The latter is essentially a form of “early
pruning” as introduced in [3].
II. THE SOLVER ARCHITECTURE
The overall architecture of Ario is demonstrated in Figure
1. In this section we describe each of Ario’s theory solvers,
and the framework for utilizing these solvers within SAT.
A. Theory Solvers
The following three solving procedures are utilized in Ario,
each capable to decide the consistency of a conjunction of
specific theory atoms. Considering that the ESUF and UTVPI
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solvers are integrated within the SAT solver, their associated
algorithms are both incremental and backtrackable.
1) Solving Equalities with Successors and Uninterpreted
Functions (ESUF): This solver initially replaces all applica-
tions of the successor functions by simple addition of their
arguments with integer constants and subsequently adopts a
reimplementation of the congruence-closure algorithm of [7]
to solve the conjunction of ESUF atoms.
2) Solving UTVPI Constraints: Upon activating a UTVPI
atom by the SAT solver, that atom is added to a transitively-
closed and tightened set of constraints as in [8]. A conflict is
detected if a constraint of the form 0 ≤ −1 is implied.
3) Solving Integer Linear Constraints: This solver adopts
a generic Simplex/Branch-and-Bound methods to establish
the satisfiability of the integer constraints. Activated non-
UTVPI atoms together with only those UTVPI atoms that
share variables with them are solved with this solver [2].
B. Integration within SAT
In Ario we implemented a hybrid approach [1] to integrate
theory solvers within SAT. In this framework, similar to
early pruning approach of [3], those theory solvers that can
efficiently adapt to the DPLL SAT procedure are integrated
online and the rest are utilized in separate layers and are
only applied to complete SAT solutions. More specifically,
the ESUF and UTVPI solvers are integrated within SAT
while non-UTVPI constraints are solved in an offline layer
(as demonstrated in Figure 1 and further described in [2]). Our
hybrid method enables the solver to efficiently process ESUF
and UTVPI atoms and only check the consistency of hard non-
UTVPI integer constraints when it is absolutely necessary, i.e.
when a satisfiable assignment to Boolean, ESUF and UTVPI
atoms is found. Further enhancements due to adopting our
combined deduction and learning schemes are as follows.
1) Combined Deduction Scheme: Ario utilizes an inter-
logic deduction scheme [1] outside the theory solvers that
builds an implication graph taking into account all types of
atoms. Implications in this graph are both due to unit-clause-
propagation of the SAT solver and the linear combination of
integer constraints. In this scheme all possible non-negative
linear combinations of equality and UTVPI constraints are
generated and implied. Non-UTVPI constraints are only com-
bined with equality or UTVPI constraints if a variable could be
eliminated and they are not combined with other non-UTVPI
constraints. These combinations could generate new atoms
that are not present in the original formula to be added to
their respective theory solvers on the fly. This method enables
the solver to reason about theory atoms outside their specific
theory solvers and helps each solver within our framework to
prune infeasible solutions due to other types of theory atoms.
For further details, the reader is referred to [1].
2) Combined Learning Scheme: By analyzing the com-
bined deduction scheme at each conflict, this method learns
clauses in terms of different types of theory atoms. For
instance, if a conflict is detected among non-UTVPI atoms, the
combinations of non-UTVPI and UTVPI atoms are considered
to learn a clause in terms of only UTVPI atoms. This clause
can then be used in the online search to reduce the number of
calls to the costly ILP solver. This is further explained in [2].
III. THE SOLVER PERFORMANCE
Table I demonstrates a comparison on the number of
instances in various benchmark suites that Ario and each
of its competitors could solve within 600 seconds. For this
experiment, we used the benchmarks from SMT Library [9]
and compared Ario to MathSAT v3.3.1 (MSAT) [5], YICES
v0.1 [10] and BarceLogicTools (BCLT) [6]. All experiments
were conducted on an AMD Opteron 2.2GHz (8GB RAM)
machine.
TABLE I
COMPARING SOLVING METHODS WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT OF 600 SEC.
logic benchmark # of Number of instances solvedsuite inst’s Ario MSAT YICES BCLT
QF-LIA wisas 108 103 62 97 NA
QF-LIA CIRC 51 33 30 27 NA
QF-LIA fischer-fair 121 97 110 112 NA
QF-UFIDL uclid 47 44 38 41 45
QF-UFIDL pete 233 233 82 147 233
QF-UF EQs 152 109 99 106 115
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper we presented our Ario SAT solver for linear
integer arithmetic logic. Ario adopts a hybrid integration
approach, i.e. it applies the online integration strategy to check
the consistency of ESUF and UTVPI atoms within SAT and
the layered approach for non-UTVPI integer constraints. This
approach for categorizing integer constraints together with
our framework specifically adapt to applications in design
verification where the majority of integer constraints are either
equalities or UTVPIs2.
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Understanding the Dynamic Behaviour of
Modern DPLL SAT Solvers through Visual Analysis
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Despite the many recent improvements in the speed and robustness
of DPLL-based SAT solvers, we still lack a thorough understanding
of the working mechanisms and dynamic behaviour of these solvers
at run-time. In this paper, we present TIGERDISP, a tool designed
to allow researchers to visualize the dynamic behaviour of modern
DPLL solvers in terms of time-dependent metrics such as decision
depth, implications and learned conflict clauses. It is our belief that
inferences about dynamic behaviour can be drawn more easily by vi-
sual analysis than by purely aggregate post-execution metrics such as
total number of decisions/implications/conflicts. These inferences can
then be validated through detailed quantitative analysis on larger sets
of data. To this end, we have used TIGERDISP with the HAIFASAT
and MINISAT solvers and have generated a few specific inferences
about their relatively efficient and inefficient solving runs. We have
then tested one of these inferences through quantitative analysis on
a larger data set and have presented our findings in this paper. An
important application of TIGERDISP would be in the development of
a solver that employs adaptive algorithms. This is an area that has
intrigued researchers in the past, but has not seen significant results
for lack of a clear understanding as to what constitutes good progress
during the run of a SAT solver. With better knowledge of dynamic
behaviour, it is conceivable that an adaptive solver could be designed
such that it switches between several competitive heuristics at run-
time based on a quantitative analysis of its own dynamic behaviour.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite being one of the most exhaustively studied problems in
combinatorial search, there continue to be significant advances in
the field of Boolean Satisfiability. Even over the past five years, we
have seen improvements of orders of magnitude in the speed and
robustness of SAT solvers. Nonetheless, a thorough understanding of
the working mechanisms and behaviours of solvers at run-time is still
lacking. Our knowledge of the measure of the SAT solution process
is limited to post-execution analysis of net metrics. As such, today’s
SAT solver development roughly follows a three-stage process: an
algorithm is proposed, it is implemented in code and, finally, it
is tested and tuned against a mixture of industry-generated and
randomized inputs.
In this paper, we discuss our first attempts at gaining some insight
into the SAT solution process for DPLL-based solvers. In particular,
we present TIGERDISP, an interactive display tool for the visual
analysis of SAT solver performance. Our tool meaningfully displays
run-time metrics gathered at every iteration of the solution process,
allowing users to zoom in and examine a solver’s dynamic behaviour
at any granularity.
It is our belief that there is much to be gained from a better
understanding of the dynamic behaviour of modern solvers. First
off, if we can quantify relatively efficient and inefficient behaviour,
we can use this insight directly to develop faster solver heuristics.
Perhaps more exciting, however, is that if we can do this quantitative
analysis efficiently, we can develop adaptive solvers that dynamically
switch between different heuristics on the fly for increased robustness
and reduced mean execution time.
II. SAT SOLVERS
In this paper, we concern ourselves with modern Davis-Putnam-
Logemann-Loveland variants, specifically those that make use of
learned conflict clauses [1]. Although our display tool was designed
to be versatile, it has special features for the analysis of such solvers.
While developing and testing TIGERDISP, we have made use of the
HAIFASAT and MINISAT solvers – they were among the strongest
competitors in the SAT 2005 COMPETITION [2] [3] [4].
III. METRICS OF IMPORTANCE
It is our hope that a number of different SAT research groups may
use TIGERDISP to analyze the performance of their solvers and make
improvements to their heuristics. As such, our tool has been designed
with generality in mind and can be used to track a variety of run-
time metrics and compare them against those of any number of other
solvers.
In these early stages of our research, we have chosen to use
TIGERDISP to study three of the most basic metrics of any modern
DPLL solver: the decision depth, total number of implications and the
length and quantity of learned conflict clauses. We have also chosen
to track the number of cache misses as it is a good measure of the
general performance of any piece of modern software.
The magnitude of the depth is of interest because large depths
maintained for extended periods of time may indicate that a solver
is “trapped” in a search space with no solution. Since implications
are forced decisions, we monitor the implication depth for similar
reasons. Learned conflict clauses are also of great interest: they allow
solvers to avoid previous mistakes but, at the same time, scanning
through these clauses takes time. To this end, our tool records the
quantity of learned clauses in memory at each iteration – the point
at which the solver makes a new, unforced decision – and provides
a dynamic histogram of their sizes.
The tool takes metric dumps from different solvers and plots the
data sets against each other in a meaningful way. The dumps are flat
files generated by inserting simple metric outputting code throughout
the original solver source. In our trials, for example, a dump consists
of whitespace-delimited flat files containing a listing of the decision
depth, total number of implications, learned clause lengths and the
number of cache misses for every iteration of the solving process.
Solver execution with our metric monitoring averaged less than 0.5%
slower than execution without the additional code.
IV. TIGERDISP
The most recent version of our display tool is written in Java and
works across platforms. In laying out our tool, we were inspired by
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a Harvard student’s display project, “Idaho Tree Rings” [5]. Given
the object-oriented nature of our code, the display tool allows one to
compare any number of metrics for any number of different solvers.
In the case of a two-solver comparison, for example, one solver’s
metrics are displayed on the left and the corresponding metrics of
the other solver are displayed on the right. The vertical scale of any
pair of metrics from the two solvers is relative in order to allow for
meaningful comparison. The horizontal (time) scale is also the same;
this is achieved by simply cropping the metrics of the slower solver
that continue past the point of the first solution.
TIGERDISP is not a static graph plotter; rather, it is interactive tool
that allows users to dynamically track a variety of different solver
metrics. The tool’s waveform functionality allows the user to plot
metrics against iteration (decision) number or real time, and these
plots can be viewed at any granularity. The tool also allows the user to
display metrics in a histogram. The histogram changes as the mouse
is used to scan along the solution process. This allows the user to
view metrics in a histogram plot and monitor the changes to the
plot against iteration number or time. One can also use the tool to
zoom in and out and to examine the actual values of the metrics at
any point along the waveforms or histograms. The dynamic nature
of TIGERDISP can at best be weakly conveyed through the static
pictures available in a paper. Instead, we prefer that readers view
the detailed demonstration movie at: http://www.princeton.
edu/∼chaff/tigerdisp. TIGERDISP is available for download
from the same location.
V. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
Having developed TIGERDISP, we have entered the early analysis
phase of our research. To date, we have used the tool to analyze
a number of runs of the HAIFASAT and MINISAT solvers and have
generated a few specific inferences about their relatively efficient and
inefficient solving runs. While significantly more time is needed to
investigate these inferences, we have pursued one of our findings
in depth for the sake of illustration in this paper. Here, we take
an inference based on visual cues from TIGERDISP and perform
numerical analysis on a larger data set to test and possibly refine
the inference.
In unsatisfiable instances, we have observed that the HAIFASAT
solver consistently has very deep decision depths in the early stages
of the solution process and shallow depths for the remainder of the
process. In contrast, MINISAT maintains very shallow decision depths
for the entire solution process.
A solver’s decision depth waveform is indicative of its particular
approach to localizing its effort within a search space. As such,
we have hypothesized that these waveforms could be linked to the
relative efficiency of the two solvers. Through numerical analysis,
we have examined the average decision depths of the two solvers on
the final 80% of the duration of a run, for unsatisfiable instances.
(The exclusion of the first 20% allows us to ignore the initial spike
observed in HAIFASAT runs.)
We have not determined a clear relationship between these relative
averages and the relative performance of the two solvers; however,
we did make one interesting finding. In all unsatisfiable instances,
in the final 80% of the solving process HAIFASAT maintained a
greater average decision depth than MINISAT. The mean difference
of the average depths was a factor of approximately 2. So, while
our very early investigation into the relationship between average
decision depth and relative efficiency has not yielded striking results,
we have taken a visual inference and used it as the cue for numerical
analysis. This numerical analysis, in turn, has exposed an interesting
and consistent difference between the two solvers’ average decision
depths.
VI. NEXT STEPS
Our next steps involve running visual analysis with TIGERDISP on
a greater number of metric dumps from a greater number of solvers
and generating more specific inferences; these inferences can then be
further investigated through numerical analysis. In addition to a larger
set of dumps, we would like to monitor a broader spectrum of metrics.
It seems that there would also be a significant value in using the tool
to analyze different parameterizations of the same solver as this could
demonstrate a new and more efficient method for developers to tune
their solvers’ parameters.
An important application of TIGERDISP may be in the develop-
ment of a solver that employs adaptive algorithms. This is an area
that has intrigued researchers in the past, but has not seen significant
results for lack of a clear understanding as to what constitutes good
progress during the run of a SAT solver [6]. With a better knowledge
of dynamic behaviour, it is conceivable that an adaptive solver
could be designed such that it switches between several competitive
heuristics at run-time based on a quantitative analysis of its own
dynamic behaviour. Another possible design would involve running
a number of solvers in parallel threads and weighting the threads’
execution priority based on an analysis of their relative dynamic
efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper lays the groundwork for a new approach to SAT solver
analysis. Here, we present TIGERDISP, a tool designed to allow
researchers to visualize the dynamic behaviour of modern DPLL
solvers in terms of time-dependent metrics such as decision depth,
implications and learned clauses. It is our belief that inferences about
dynamic behaviour can be drawn more easily through visual analysis
than through purely numerical methods. These inferences can then
be validated through detailed quantitative analysis on larger sets of
data.
Our very early visual inferences have demonstrated interesting and
consistent differences between the HAIFASAT and MINISAT solvers.
Additionally, we have demonstrated that results from TIGERDISP can
be used to focus our quantitative efforts.
APPENDIX
Our observations are based on runs of HAIFASAT and MINISAT
with the SAT 2002 COMPETITION benchmarks: Aloul’s BART,
HOMER and LISA, Biere’s CMPADD and DINPHIL, Dellacherie’s IP,
Goldberg’s BMC2, Van Gelder’s ROPEBENCH and Velev’s FVP and
SSS [7].
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Over-Approximating Boolean Programs













Abstract— This paper describes a symbolic algorithm for over-
approximating reachability in Boolean programs with unbounded
thread creation. The fix-point is detected by projecting the state
of the threads to the globally visible parts, which are finite. Our
algorithm models recursion by over-approximating the call stack
that contains the return locations of recursive function calls,
as reachability is undecidable in this case. The algorithm may
obtain spurious counterexamples, which are removed iteratively
by means of an abstraction refinement loop. Experiments show
that the symbolic algorithm for unbounded thread creation scales
to large abstract models.
I. INTRODUCTION
All scalable symbolic model checkers for software are
currently based on counterexample-guided abstraction refine-
ment (CEGAR) (e.g., BLAST [1], SLAM [2], MAGIC [3],
SATABS [4], DIVER [5]). To date, none of these model check-
ers supports unbounded thread creation together with shared
memory cross-thread communication. This gap is not due to
lack of need: much of the software that these tools are used to
verify are actually shared memory concurrent programs with
unbounded thread creation. Static Driver Verifier (SDV) [2],
for example, is used to verify Windows device drivers—
which are tremendously concurrent pieces of software. SDV’s
analysis is unsound because it ignores the side-effects caused
by other threads.
The cause for this gap between the software model checkers
and the software that they are intended to verify is a technical
one: CEGAR is effective only if the underlying reachability
procedure is guaranteed to terminate—and terminate quickly.
When unbounded thread creation is added into the mixture,
today’s reachability engines often do not terminate.
We address this problem with a new symbolic model
checker for Boolean programs (the most common form of
abstractions used within CEGAR-based tools for software)
that supports unbounded thread creation while guaranteeing
termination. What we lose is precision—the Boolean program
checker may now return counterexamples that are spurious
within the abstraction itself. The experimental results show
that this is not a practical problem: the CEGAR refinement
mechanism can be adapted to remove these false counterex-
amples as well as the counterexamples that are spurious only
in the unabstracted software. Furthermore, the experimental
results demonstrate that the algorithm scales in practice to
large concurrent programs.
The contribution of this paper is contained in Sections III
and IV, namely an algorithm for reachability analysis of
programs with unbounded thread creation in Section III and
their symbolic simulation in Section IV. Experimental results
are discussed in Section V.
Related Work
Formal verification of multi-threaded programs is an area of
active research; see [6] for an excellent survey. The develop-
ment of static analysis tools for such programs is complicated
due to the fact that reachability for interprocedural programs
(that is, for programs that contain both communication and
data-flow structures) is undecidable [7].
Pushdown automata have been used as tools for analyz-
ing sequential programs with (recursive) procedures [8]. The
expressive power of pushdown systems is equivalent to that
of sequential programs with (possibly recursive) procedures
where all variables have a finite data type. MOPED [9] and
BEBOP [10], for example, are BDD-based symbolic model
checkers for this class of language. There has also been work
on pushdown automata with multiple stacks, e.g., see [11]. As
reachability is undecidable in this case, the existing implemen-
tations are not fully automated.
Unsound approaches have also proved successful in find-
ing bugs in concurrent programs. For example, Qadeer &
Rehof [12] note that many bugs can be found when the
analysis is limited to execution traces with only a small set of
context-switches. This analysis supports recursive programs.
Our approach complements these techniques because, while
they are unsound, they are able to analyze a larger set of
programs.
The class of programs considered in this paper can be
viewed as an instance of a parameterized system, i.e., a
system with a number of identical processes (threads in our
case). Many approaches to this problem have been developed
over the years, including the use of symbolic automata-based
techniques, network invariants, predicate abstraction or system
symmetry (see an excellent overview in [13]). Methods that are
most closely related to our work are based on abstraction (for
example, an extension of Murφ uses abstraction for replicated
identical components [14]). In contrast to our approach, many
of these methods are only partially automated, requiring at
least some human ingenuity to construct a process invariant
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or a closure process (for example, the TLPVS tool [15] is
based on manual theorem proving).
Henzinger et al. use predicate abstraction in order to con-
struct environment models from threads [16]. When combined
with a counter abstraction, an unbounded number of threads
can be supported. Flanagan and Qadeer propose to use the
idea of thread-states in order to obtain environment models
for loosely-coupled multi-threaded programs [17]. In contrast
to their algorithm, we address the spurious behavior intro-
duced by this over-approximation by (safely) restricting the
thread-states that are passed, and by an automatic refinement
procedure.
One can also model concurrent Boolean programs as a
set of rewriting rules and use rewriting techniques to prove
safety. For example, [18] computes abstractions of program
paths using the least solutions of a system of path language
constraints. At this time it is not clear how our work compares
to these techniques. One disadvantage of the term rewriting
approach is that it requires translating programs written in
general purpose languages into the term models. There are no
translation tools reported yet.
A number of tools for analysis of multi-threaded Java pro-
grams is available. While some of the tools compute abstract
models automatically, most perform only explicit state space
exploration. Representative examples of model checkers for
Java are [19] and JPF [20]. Yahav reports an implementation
of a Model Checker for Java with an unbounded number
of threads using three-valued logic [21]. Similarly to our
approach, an over-approximation is computed.
The reachability of concurrent programs with a restricted
form of recursion is shown to be decidable and implemented
in ZING [22]. Here, recursive functions are partitioned into
atomic transactions, which are only allowed to modify local
variables. ZING, however, suffers from scalability problems
since its approach flattens concurrent programs to sequential
programs to handle recursive procedures. BEACON [23] (an
explicit-state model checker for concurrent Boolean programs)
has similar scalability problems. Additionally, CEGAR-based
tools produce abstractions that make non-trivial use of under-
specified values. For this reason, explicit-state model checkers




The syntax of the control flow statements is derived from C,
and can be found in [10]. The syntax for expressions permits
the usual Boolean operators, and the following two extensions:
1) non-deterministic choice, and 2) next-state variables.
expression : expression ’ ∨ ’ expression
| expression ’ ∧ ’ expression
| ’¬’expression
| atom
atom : Identifier | Identifier ’′’ | ’ ?j ’
The stars denote non-deterministic choice symbols. If multi-
ple non-deterministic choices are to be used in one expression,
we number them ?1, ?2, . . .1. If an identifier is followed by a
prime, the identifier is to be evaluated in the next state.2
B. Formal Semantics
We extend the semantics of Boolean Programs [10] to
permit unbounded thread creation. Let Vg denote the set of
global variables. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
all threads have the same set of local variables Vl and the
same program code, i.e., there is only one set of program
locations L. We denote the program by P . A program with
threads that have different code can easily be transformed
into a program with identical threads. We denote the set of
variables by V = Vg
.
∪ Vl. We assume that a subset L ⊆ Vl
of the local variables is used for locking exclusively.3
Definition 1 (Explicit State): An explicit state η of a
Boolean program is a triple (n, pc,Ω), where n ∈ N is the
number of threads, pc : {1, . . . , n} 7→ L is the vector of
program locations, Ω : ({1, . . . , n} × Vl) ∪ Vg 7→ B is the
valuation of the program variables. We denote the set of
explicit states by S.
We denote the projection of a state η to the number of
running threads in that state by η.n, the projection from a
state to the values of the program counters by η.pc, and so
on. The value of the program counter of thread t ∈ {1, . . . , n}
is denoted by η.pc(t), the value of the local variable v ∈ Vl
of thread t is denoted by η.Ω(t, v).
Definition 2 (Thread State): The tuple (PC ,Ω) with PC ∈
L and Ω : V −→ B is called a thread state. It is a valuation of
the program counter, the local variables of a particular thread,
and the global shared variables. We use S̃ to denote the set of
thread states.
Thus, the thread state is the set of values that is visible to
a thread.
Definition 3 (µt): The thread state projection function µt :
S −→ S̃ takes a state η of the full state space and maps it to




η.Ω(v) : v ∈ Vg
η.Ω(t, v) : v ∈ Vl
Given a thread state η̃ ∈ S̃ and an expression e over the
variables V , we use Je , η̃K to denote the evaluation of e by
a thread in state η̃. Let e, e1, and e2 denote expressions, and
v ∈ V be a variable. Formally, Je , η̃K is defined recursively
as follows:
Je1 ∨ e2 , η̃K := Je1 , η̃K ∨ Je2 , η̃K
J¬e , η̃K := ¬Je , η̃K
Jv , η̃K := η̃.Ω(v)
1The schoose non-deterministic choice operator implemented by BEBOP
can be transformed into an expression that uses ?.
2Tools such as BEBOP expect the prime before the identifier.
3We use local variables instead of global variables for locking in order to
be able to identify the individual thread that holds a lock.
2
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The next-state identifiers (primed identifiers) refer to the
next thread state ζ̃ ∈ S̃. The semantics of expressions con-
taining such primed identifiers is defined using the evaluation
function Je , η̃ , ζ̃K. The definition of Je , η̃ , ζ̃K is identical to
the definition of Je , η̃K above, unless e is a primed identifier:
Jv′ , η̃ , ζ̃K := ζ̃.Ω(v)
The semantics of expressions containing non-deterministic
choice symbols is given by Je , η̃ , ζ̃ , ιK, where ι denotes the
valuation of the ? symbols. The definition is identical to the
definition above, unless e is ?j for some j:
J?j , η̃ , ζ̃ , ιK := ιj
For any function f : D → R and any d ∈ D, r ∈ R, we
define f [d/r] : D → R as follows:
f [d/r](x) =
{
r : d = x
f(x) : otherwise
As a shorthand, we write η̃ G= ζ̃ iff the values of the
global, i.e., shared variables in η̃ and ζ̃ are equal, i.e., ∀g ∈
Vg.Jg , η̃K = Jg , ζ̃K. Similarly, we write η̃
L= ζ̃ iff the values
of the local variables in η̃ and ζ̃ are equal.
Execution Semantics: We use η̃ −→ ζ̃ to denote the fact
that a transition from state η̃ is made to ζ̃ by executing the
statement η̃.PC . The relation η̃ −→ ζ̃ is defined by a case-split
on this instruction. The conditions for each case are shown in
Table I. The description of the semantics of the skip, goto,
assume, and constrained assignment statements are identical
to the description found in [24]. The definitions of lock and
unlock are straight-forward. Note that lock and unlock
are special cases of a constrained assignment.
We write l(η̃) ⊆ L := {l ∈ L | η̃.Ω(l)} for the set of locks
that are held in state η̃.
The semantics of the concurrent program is defined as
follows: Assume the scheduler picks a thread t ∈ {1, . . . , η.n}
to execute in state η. We use η −→t ζ to denote the fact that a
transition from state η is made to ζ by executing one statement
of thread t. The statement that is executed is P (η.pc(t)). The
relation η −→t ζ is defined by a case-split on this instruction.
For all instructions but start thread, we require that
• the number of threads does not change, i.e., ζ.n = η.n,
• thread t makes a transition, i.e., µt(η) −→ µt(ζ),
• and the values of local variables and the program counters
of the other threads j 6= t remain unchanged, i.e.,
µj(η)
L= µj(ζ) and ζ.pc(j) = η.pc(j),
• locks are held exclusively, i.e., l(µu(ζ)) ∩ l(µv(ζ)) = ∅
for all u 6= v.
If P (η.pc(t)) is start thread θ, we require that
• the number of threads increases by one, i.e., ζ.n = η.n+
1,
• the program counter of the new thread is θ, and the pro-
gram counter of thread t is η.pc(t)+1, i.e., ζ.pc(ζ.n) = θ
and ζ.pc(t) = η.pc(t) + 1,
• thread t makes a transition into both changed states, i.e.,
µt(η) −→ µt(ζ) and µt(η) −→ µζ.n(ζ), and
• the values of the local variables of the other threads j 6= t
and j 6= ζ.n remain unchanged, i.e., µj(η)
L= µj(ζ) and
ζ.pc(j) = η.pc(j).
Syntactic sugar such as if or while can be easily trans-
formed using goto and assume, as described in [24]. For
now, we assume that function calls can be inlined. We extend
our algorithm to support unbounded recursion in Section IV-B.
Finally, we write η −→ ζ if there exists a thread t ∈
{1, . . . , η.n} such that η −→t ζ. In this case, we say that
there is a transition from η to ζ, or that ζ is reachable from η
with one transition. Let S0 ⊆ S denote the set of initial states,
and let Si ⊆ S with i ∈ N denote the set of states reachable
in i or less transitions. The set of all reachable states is S∞.
The property we check is reachability of states with particular
program locations.
III. OVER-APPROXIMATION AND REFINEMENT
A. Over-approximating S∞
Finite-state model checking algorithms are based on fix-
point detection, that is, the model checker compares the new
set of states computed using the transition relation with the
states explored so far. The algorithm iterates until no new
states are discovered.
This basic idea can be applied to programs with unbounded
thread creation as well. For example, SPIN [25] permits
dynamic creation of new threads by means of Promela’s run
statement. However, SPIN assumes that the program only
creates a finite number of threads. If the thread creation is
not actually bounded, the state enumeration of SPIN never
terminates.
We propose an algorithm that does not restrict thread
creation to a finite number, i.e., we permit an infinite set S∞
while still guaranteeing termination. The classical fix-point
detection algorithm is not readily applicable for this case.
Definition 4 (µ∗): Let µ∗(η) denote the set of the thread
states µt(η) for any thread t. Let S′ ⊆ S be a set of states.
The thread-visible states are the states in S′ projected to the







The set of thread states reachable in i transitions is denoted
by S̃i := µ∗(Si) ⊆ S̃. We propose to compute an over-
approximation of S̃∞. This is sufficient to detect violations
of reachability properties that are expressed in terms of the
thread visible state4, e.g., assertions.
Definition 5 ( ): Let Ã ⊆ S̃ denote a set of thread states,
and ζ̃ ∈ S̃ denote a thread state. Let Ã  ζ̃ hold iff any of
the following two conditions holds:
1) there is η̃ ∈ Ã such that there is a transition from η̃ to
ζ̃, i.e., η̃ −→ ζ̃,
4Note that the property still may depend on the behavior of multiple threads,
due to the communication between the threads.
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P (η̃.PC ) PC Ω
skip PC ′ = PC + 1 Ω′ = Ω
goto θ1, . . . , θk
Wk
i=1 PC
′ = θi Ω′ = Ω
assume e PC ′ = PC + 1 Ω′ = Ω ∧ Je , η̃K = true
x1, . . . , xk := e1, . . . , ek
constrain e
PC ′ = PC + 1
∃ι. Ω′ = Ω [x1/Je1 , η̃ , ζ̃ , ιK]
. . . [xk/Jek , η̃ , ζ̃ , ιK] ∧ Je , η̃ , ζ̃ , ιK
start thread θ
PC ′ = PC + 1
∨PC ′ = θ Ω
′ = Ω
lock l PC ′ = PC + 1 Ω(l) = false ∧ Ω′ = Ω[l/true]
unlock l PC ′ = PC + 1 Ω(l) = true ∧ Ω′ = Ω[l/false]
TABLE I
CONDITIONS ON THE EXPLICIT THREAD STATE TRANSITION η̃ −→ ζ̃ WITH η̃ = (PC ,Ω) AND ζ̃ = (PC ′,Ω′), FOR VARIOUS STATEMENTS P (PC ),
WHERE θi ∈ L, e IS AN EXPRESSION AND l ∈ L.
2) or there exists η̃ ∈ Ã and another transition out of Ã
with a disjoint set of locks that changes the global state
of η̃ to that of ζ̃. Formally, we require ζ̃.PC = η̃.PC,
ζ̃
L= η̃ and there exist η̃′ ∈ Ã and ζ̃ ′ ∈ S̃ such that
a) η̃′ −→ ζ̃ ′ with η̃′
G
6= ζ̃ ′,
b) η̃′ G= η̃, and
c) ζ̃ ′ G= ζ̃,
d) l(η̃) ∩ l(η̃′) = ∅ and l(η̃) ∩ l(ζ̃ ′) = ∅.
This case captures the communication between two
threads.
We write η̃  ζ̃ instead of the more cumbersome {η̃} ζ̃.
Note that η̃  ζ̃ implies Ã ζ̃ for any Ã with η̃ ∈ Ã.
Let T̃ 0 := µ∗(S0) denote the set of initial thread states, and
T̃ i for i ∈ N be defined recursively as follows:
T̃ i := T̃ i−1 ∪ {ζ̃ | T̃ i−1  ζ̃}
The following claim holds by construction of  .
Theorem 1: For all i ∈ N0, the set T̃ i is an over-
approximation of the set of reachable thread states S̃i.
Proof: The claim is shown by induction on i. For i = 0,
the claim is trivial.
We show T̃ i ⊇ S̃i for the step from i − 1 to i as follows.
Let ζ̃ ∈ S̃i. By definition of S̃i, there is a full state ζ ∈ Si
and u ∈ {1, . . . , ζ.n} such that ζ̃ = µu(ζ). Furthermore, there
exists η ∈ Si−1 and t ∈ {1, . . . , η.n} such that η −→t ζ. Let η̃
be a shorthand for µu(η). Using the induction hypothesis, we
can conclude that µ∗(η) ⊆ T̃ i−1, and in particular, η̃ ∈ T̃ i−1.
If u = t, we have η̃ −→ ζ̃, which implies η̃  ζ̃ (case 1 of
Def. 5), and thus ζ̃ ∈ T̃ i, which concludes the claim.
If u 6= t, we make a case-split on the instruction P (η.pc(t)),
which is executed in the transition from η to ζ (Table I):
• If P (η.pc(t)) is skip, goto, or assume, only the PC
of thread t changes, and thus, ζ̃ = η̃, which implies ζ̃ ∈
T̃ i−1, and thus, ζ̃ ∈ T̃ i.
• If P (η.pc(t)) is start thread and u 6= ζ.n (i.e., u is
not the newly created thread), we also have ζ̃ = η̃, which
concludes the claim. If u = ζ.n, we have µt(η) −→ ζ̃,
which concludes the claim.
• If P (η.pc(t)) is x1, . . . , xk :=
e1, . . . , ek constrain e, let k = 1 without loss
// Input: Boolean Program P with locations L,
// bad location b ∈ L
UNBOUNDEDTHREADAPPROXIMATION(P, b)
1 T̃ :=µ∗(S0); // Initial States
2 while (true)
3 if (∃η̃ ∈ T̃ .η̃.PC = b) return “Error state found”;
4 F̃ :={ζ̃ ∈ S̃ | T̃  ζ̃};
5 if (F̃ ⊆ T̃ ) return “Property holds”;
6 T̃ :=T̃ ∪ F̃ ;
7 end
Fig. 1. High level description of the approximation algorithm for reachability
in Boolean programs with unbounded threads
of generality. If x1 ∈ Vl, only data local to thread t is
modified, and the claim is shown as in case of skip.
If x1 ∈ Vg , let v := ζ̃.Ω[x1] denote the value that is
assigned to x1 by thread t. The new thread state ζ̃ is equal
to η̃ up to the assignment to x1, i.e., ζ̃.PC = η̃.PC and
ζ̃.Ω = η̃.Ω[x1/v]. Also, µt(η)
G= η̃, and threads t and u
hold a disjoint set of locks in state η. We therefore have
η̃  ζ̃ using case 2 of Def. 5.
• The statements lock and unlock are special cases of
constrained assignments.
As the sequence T̃ 0, T̃ 1, . . . is monotonic and taken from
a finite set, it has a fixed-point, and thus, T̃∞ is easily com-
putable. The theorem above therefore gives rise to an algorithm
(Fig. 1). If the algorithm terminates with “Property holds”,
the property is guaranteed to hold on the Boolean program.
However, if an error state is found, there is no guarantee that
the state is actually reachable. A counterexample trace can be
computed by recording the one or two states that are used to
compute a new thread state.
To illustrate the benefit of condition 2d) in Def. 5, consider
the Boolean program in Fig. 2a, and assume a definition of 
without condition 2d). Suppose we start an unbounded number
of threads that execute f(). The set of reachable thread states
is shown in Fig. 2b. The lock protects the global variable, and
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Fig. 2. Boolean Program with critical section
thus, the assertion in L2 holds.
We denote a state by (PC, g, l). However, because
of {(L5,0,1),(L2,0,1)}  (L2,0,0) −→ (L3,0,0) and
{(L3,0,0),(L2,0,0)}  (L2,1,0), T̃∞ contains a state that
violates the assertion, and we obtain a spurious error trace.
Remark 1: As an additional optimization, we keep track
of whether a thread state was generated before or after a
start thread command. Thread states that are generated
before the execution of any start thread command need
not participate in case 2 of definition 5. This optimization
results in fewer spurious error traces, as the set of states of
the program reachable up to the first start tread command
is no longer over-approximated. This case is omitted from the
proof.
B. Refinement
The drawback of the over-approximation is that it may
produce additional spurious counterexamples. Thus, for reach-
ability properties ϕ, we may obtain M ′ 6|= ϕ even though
M |= ϕ holds. If the algorithm generates an error trace, the
error trace is simulated on the full model in order to rule out
spurious error traces due to the imprecision introduced by  .
Such a simulation corresponds to an incremental series of SAT
instances, and is commonly performed by program analysis
tools that implement abstraction refinement, e.g., SLAM and
BLAST.
If the error trace is spurious, the over-approximation is
refined. Note that we assume that this refinement is performed
outside of the model checker as part of an abstraction refine-
ment loop. Our algorithm may introduce spurious counterex-
amples due to the over-approximation caused by case 2 of
Def. 5. The refinement algorithms in the existing predicate
abstraction tools remove spurious traces by adding predicates
to the model. This refinement strategy is effective for the over-
approximation performed by our analysis algorithm, as the
additional variables split states into two or more states η̃, ζ̃
such that η̃
G
6= ζ̃, which violates condition 2 of Def. 5.
IV. SYMBOLIC SIMULATION
A. Symbolic State Representation
This section presents how thread states are represented
symbolically. It extends the algorithm described in [24] to
support an unbounded number of threads.
Definition 6: A symbolic formula is defined using the fol-
lowing syntax rules:
1) The Boolean constants true and false are formulae.
2) The non-deterministic choice identifiers ?1, ?2, . . . are
formulae.
3) If f1 and f2 are formulae, then f1∧f2, f1∨f2, and ¬f1
are formulae.
The set of such formulae is denoted by F .
A symbolic formula may evaluate to multiple values due
to the choice identifiers. As an example, the pair of formulae
〈?1, ?2 ∧¬?1〉 may evaluate to 〈0, 0〉, 〈1, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, but not to
〈1, 1〉. Given a particular valuation ι for the non-deterministic
choices ?i, we denote the value of a symbolic formula f as
JfKι, i.e., ι |= f ⇐⇒ JfKι = true.
We use these symbolic formulae in order to represent sets
of explicit thread states:
Definition 7: A symbolic thread state σ̃ is a triple
〈PC , ω, γ〉, with PC ∈ L, ω : V 7→ F , and γ ∈ F .
The first component of a symbolic thread state σ̃, namely
PC , is identical to the first component of an explicit thread
state (definition 2). The second component, called ω, is a
mapping from the set of variables into the set of formulae.
It denotes the symbolic valuation of the state variables. The
last component, called γ, is a formula that represents the guard
of the state symbolically, i.e., a constraint over the variables.
Note that the program counter is represented explicitly, while
the program variables are represented symbolically.
We can define the symbolic evaluation Je , σ̃ , τ̃K of an
expression e in the symbolic thread state σ̃ and a next state
τ̃ in analogy to the definition for explicit states. The set of
explicit thread states represented by a symbolic thread state σ̃
are those states η̃ ∈ S̃ that satisfy the following conditions:
• They have the same PC: η̃.n = σ̃.n ∧ η̃.PC = σ̃.PC
• There exists a valuation ι that satisfies the guard γ and
assigns values to the variables that match the values given
by η̃.Ω.
∃ι.ι |= γ ∧ ∀v ∈ V. Jv , η̃K = Jv , σ̃Kι (1)
Note that the set of explicit states corresponding to a
symbolic state is defined using a predicate in the parameter ι.
Therefore, we have a parametric representation of the state-
space. Parametric representations of sets of states have been
used in formal verification before, e.g., in [26], [27], [28], but
mostly in the context of hardware verification.
The construction of the symbolic thread states and the fixed-
point loop with fixed-point detection using QBF follows the
principle described in [24].
We also implement partial order reduction. In the context
of algorithm 1, this corresponds to strengthening  such that
transitions are only propagated to thread states ζ̃ that have a
program counter ζ̃.PC that points to an instruction that either
1) reads one of the global variables begin modified or 2) writes
a global variable.
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Fig. 3. Over-approximating a recursive call f(e1, e2) with thread creation
B. Recursive Functions
Reachability for programs with recursion and concurrency
(even with only two threads) is undecidable [7]. In order
to model recursive programs we further extend the idea of
conservative over-approximation.
Let f denote the function that is called, and let p1, . . . , pk ∈
Vl denote the parameters of the function. The expression ei is
passed as argument of the call for pi.
• As first step, an assignment p1, . . . , pk := e1, . . . , ek is
performed.
• For synchronization upon return of the function, we intro-
duce a new global variable ψ. An assignment statement
is inserted before the function call that sets ψ to zero.
• The function call is replaced by a start thread θ
command, where θ denotes the first program location of
f .
• After the function call, the statement ψ :=
0constrainψ is inserted. It sets ψ to false, but
waits for ψ to become true before doing so.
• When f returns (using return), it sets ψ to true. The
return values are passed by means of global variables.
The approximation of a recursive call f(e1, e2) using thread
creation is illustrated in Fig. 3.
This reduction is similar to an encoding of recursion com-
monly done in SPIN that uses a new channel for synchro-
nization. In contrast to this reduction used for SPIN, we use
a finite set of global variables for synchronization (one per
call site), and therefore loose precision. The termination of
the second recursion may synchronize with the call site of the
first recursion and so on.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented the technique described in this paper
in a tool called BOPPO. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no other model checker available for either Boolean programs
with unbounded thread creation or concurrent Boolean pro-
grams with recursion. An implementation based on symbolic
simulation has been compared to MOPED, SPIN, BEBOP,
and ZING in [24]. However, none of these model checkers
supports the class of programs the algorithm described in this
paper aims at, which prevents experimental comparison. We
make our implementation available to other researchers for
experimentation5.
5http://www.verify.ethz.ch/boppo/
The BOPPO is integrated as model checker for abstract
models into SATABS, which is an implementation of SAT-
based predicate abstraction [4], [29]. In this configuration, SA-
TABS can verify safety properties of programs with (possibly
unbounded) while loops that contain thread creating state-
ments, e.g., the pthread create() command. SATABS is
also available for download6.
The experiments have been performed on an Intel Xeon
Processor with 2.8 GHz running Linux. The results are sum-
marized in Table II. We use MiniSAT as our SAT-solver, and
Quantor as QBF solver for the fixed-point detection. The run-
time results are reported for our tool with symbolic partial
order reduction and without symbolic partial order reduction.
We also report the number of symbolic thread states that are
explored, i.e., |T̃ |. Note that one symbolic thread state typically
corresponds to many explicit thread states, in particular if non-
determinism is used heavily. On all experiments with non-
trivial run-time, the run-time is dominated by the QBF solver.
We focus on the evaluation of the scalability of the im-
plementation. We have two classes of benchmarks: artificial
ones to measure scalability (ART series), and benchmarks
extracted from the Apache httpd web-server package (AP
series). The ART-PC-n series benchmarks are scaled in the
number of program locations. Each benchmark generates
an unbounded number of threads (using an infinite loop
containing start thread). Each thread then executes n
non-deterministic assignments to global variables. The QBF
instances generated for the fixed-point detection contain a
number of quantified variables that is linear in n. The ART-
V-n series benchmarks are parameterized in the number of
variables, where n denotes the number of global (and thus,
also thread-visible) variables. The number of variables in the
QBF instances grows quadratically in n.
The APn series of benchmarks are extracted from an
ANSI-C program using SATABS. While the original pro-
gram generates a finite number of threads using the POSIX
pthread create command, the abstraction of the program
generates an unbounded number of threads. The POSIX
pthread mutex lock and unlock functions are mapped
to lock and unlock in the Boolean programs. The various
benchmarks correspond to different properties of the same
program.
Apache (like most other programs) does not use locking dur-
ing initialization, i.e., before it starts the worker threads. The
algorithm as described above results in states with inconsistent
global predicates, which produces a large number of spurious
counterexamples. For this benchmark, we therefore extend the
algorithm to distinguish two different types of thread states
using a flag as suggested in remark 1 above. The flag is
false in the initial state, and is set to true upon execution
of start thread. Case 2 of Def. 5 is changed such that
global data is only passed between thread states that have the
same value of the flag. After the initialization phase, most
writes to global data are protected by means of locks, which
6http://www.verify.ethz.ch/satabs/
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Without PO With PO
Benchmark Time #σ̃ Time #σ̃
ART-PC-10 6.0s 893 <0.1s 21
ART-PC-20 21.0s 2723 <0.1s 31
ART-PC-100 ? 0.2s 111
ART-PC-1000 ? 8.3s 1011
ART-V-10 17.2s 801 0.1s 29
ART-V-20 111.7s 2571 0.3s 49
ART-V-100 ? 5.3s 209
ART-V-1000 ? 3508.1s 2009
AP1 ? 242.7s 8009
AP2 ? 269.5s 10766
AP3 ? 288.9s 11422
AP4 ? 155.1s 5453
AP5 ? 1130.9s 43812
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF RESULTS: A STAR DENOTES THAT THE TWO HOUR TIMEOUT
WAS EXCEEDED. THE COLUMNS UNDER #σ̃ CONTAIN THE NUMBER OF
SYMBOLIC THREAD STATES.
prevents spurious error traces.
On the artificial examples, the regular refinement with WPs
works fine to eliminate the spurious CEs, as it adds more
Boolean variables, which make the states different (and only
states with equal values of the global variables participate in
case 2 of Def. 5).
VI. CONCLUSION
CEGAR-based symbolic model checkers have proven them-
selves tremendously useful for sequential programs. For
shared-memory concurrent software they have been effectively
useless. This is due to fact that the underlying tool that checks
the abstractions must always return an answer—something
that no tool has been able to guaranteed when applied to
abstractions that can support arbitrary thread creation. This
paper introduces a new symbolic model checker for software
abstractions (Boolean programs) that supports arbitrary thread
creation while guaranteeing termination. This checker can
potentially return spurious counterexamples, but it is always
able to produce one.
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Abstract— State exploration in directed software model check-
ing is guided using a heuristic function to move states near
errors to the front of the search queue. Distance heuristic
functions rank states based on the number of transitions needed
to move the current program state into an error location. Lack
of calling context information causes the heuristic function to
underestimate the true distance to the error; however, inlining
functions at call sites in the control flow graph to capture calling
context leads to an exponential growth in the computation. This
paper presents a new algorithm that implicitly inlines functions
at call sites to compute distance data with unbounded calling
context that is polynomial in the number of nodes in the control
flow graph. The new algorithm propagates distance data through
call sites during a depth-first traversal of the program. We show
in a series of benchmark examples that the new heuristic function
with unbounded distance data is more efficient than the same
heuristic function that inlines functions at their call sites up to
a certain depth.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-core processor design and hyper-threading create a
need for techniques to validate concurrent interactions in
threaded software artifacts. Traditional validation techniques
based on test vector generation generally break down in the
presence of concurrency since they cannot control scheduling
decisions imposed by the operating system when running
the input vectors. As a consequence, the validation is not
effective in discovering subtle race or deadlock conditions that
often lead to unexpected program behavior. Model checking
is particularly effective in finding errors in deep execution
traces because it considers all possible thread schedules in
its analysis. Model checking has the potential to aid software
validation if it can be effectively applied to real software
artifacts.
State explosion is inherent in model checking, and it is
especially problematic in software model checking because of
the size and complexity of typical software artifacts. The pro-
cess of model checking systematically explores the behavior
space of the program in some way. There are several different
tools and approaches to address the state explosion problem in
software model checking, [1]–[5], and the work in this paper
specifically focuses on directed model checking [6]–[8].
Directed model checking guides the search into areas of
the state space where errors are more likely to exist. It aims
to find a property violation before computation resources are
exhausted. Directed model checking uses a heuristic function
to rank successor states during state space exploration. The
search order follows the ranking of states on the search frontier
using a priority queue rather than a search stack. An accurate
heuristic function reduces the number of states generated
before error discovery without dramatically decreasing the
frequency of state generation.
Early heuristics use notions from circuit design technology
for computing the distance estimate. For example, hamming
distance heuristics use the explicit state representation to
estimate a bit-wise distance between the current state and an
error state [9]. Current heuristic functions for directed software
model checking are broadly classified into two categories:
property based heuristics and structural heuristics. A prop-
erty based heuristic function tries to estimate the number of
changes in the program values needed to violate a property,
while structural heuristics consider the structure of either the
actual program or its resulting transition system to compute
the heuristic estimate. Examples of property based heuristics
are in [10], [11]. The work in this paper focuses on structural
heuristics.
The notion of structural heuristics is introduced in [12].
The heuristics in [12] exploit the structural properties of
thread interdependencies specific to only Java programs to
find concurrency errors. Distance heuristic functions [13]–[15]
are structural heuristics that compute the minimal number of
transitions required to reach an error location from the current
state in the control flow representation of the artifact. These
heuristic functions have been shown to be effective in driving
threads into race and deadlock conditions.
The extended-FSM (EFSM) distance heuristic combines
statically computed distance estimates from the structure of
the software artifact with the dynamic call trace in the run-time
stack extracted from the state representation of the software
artifact to improve the accuracy of the heuristic values [15].
The heuristic function is based on the following notion: at a
given program location, the program is either going to reach
a return point for the callee without encountering an error
and return to the caller; or it encounters an error before it
reaches the return point and does not return to the caller.
The algorithm to compute the EFSM distance heuristic uses a
graph with bounded calling context to compute the distances
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Fig. 1. A program and analysis demonstrating underestimation in the
EFSM heuristic due to bounded calling context. (a) A program with a nested
call depth of four. (b) An one-bounded CFG for the program that inlines
procedures at call sites. (c) The run-time stack for a given state of the program.
in the forward direction. To build such a graph, procedures
are inlined at call sites up to the depth of the user specified
bound. Although the EFSM heuristic function reduces the
number of states before error discovery in various examples, it
is not an efficient heuristic function because the time required
to construct the bounded graph increases exponentially with
the bound; thus, the heuristic function does not scale well to
programs with deeply nested function calls where large bounds
are required for accurate heuristic estimates.
This paper presents a new full context aware (FCA) algo-
rithm that implicitly inlines functions at call sites to compute
distance data with unbounded calling context that is polyno-
mial in the number of nodes in the control flow graph (CFG)
for the software artifact. The new algorithm computes full
context information for non-recursive programs with resolved
function pointers, and works by propagating distance data
through call sites during a depth-first traversal of the program’s
CFG. We show, in a series of benchmark examples, that a new
heuristic function, e-FCA that is based on the EFSM heuristic
but uses the FCA for forward distance estimates, generates
fewer states and decreases total running time compared to the
EFSM heuristic function that uses the inlined bounded calling
context information [15].
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We demonstrate with an example how the accuracy of the
EFSM heuristic in [15] relies on the bounded calling context
used while computing the static shortest-path distances for
the forward analysis. A program with a maximum possible
call depth of four is presented in Fig. 1(a) where an error
location, 0b, is reachable from the main procedure only after
making a call to procedures x and y. Procedures x and y both
make calls to procedure f which in turn calls procedure g. In
procedure Extended FSM(pc, rstack)
1: d = 0, De = ∅
2: while (rstack) do
3: ret locs = get entries(rstack , k)
4: n = get node in k bounded CFG(pc, ret locs)
5: E = {FSM(n, ne)+d | ne ∈ Errors ∧ in scope(ne, n)}
6: De = De ∪ E
7: nend := return statement(n)
8: d = d + FSM(n, nend) + 1
9: pc = rstack .top()
10: rstack .pop()
11: return min(De)
Fig. 2. Pseudo-code for the EFSM algorithm.
our program, the EFSM heuristic function tries to accurately
estimate the minimal number of transitions required to reach
the error location from the current program location. For
example, from line 01 of main, it computes the number of
instructions that need to be executed in order for the program
state to reach the error location in line 0b of main. Ideally,
the heuristic computation needs to account for the fact that the
true execution flow of the program moves through procedures
x and y before reaching the error.
The EFSM heuristic inlines procedures at call sites up to
a bounded depth to capture partial context information. It
does this by constructing a k-bounded CFG in a depth-first
traversal of the program, where k is the specified bound. Each
node in a k-bounded CFG is a location in the program with
up to k entries for the partial call trace of length k used to
arrive at that location. A one-bounded CFG for the program
in Fig. 1(a) is shown in Fig. 1(b), where boxes represent
call sites, circle nodes are return points or arbitrary program
instructions, and the diamond shape nodes represent the error
locations in the artifact. Each node, regardless of its type, has
a program location identifier to map it back to the original
program followed by a return address indicated by the RA
label. There is a single return address in each node for this
example because the k-bound of the graph is one. Returning
to our example, procedures x, y, and f have enough context
information to be uniquely inlined at their call sites; however,
procedure g is not fully inlined at its call sites because unlike
procedure f that is called from two unique call sites: locations
03 and 05, while procedure g is invoked two times from the
same call site: location 07. In Fig. 1(b), the node q4, an rts
(return) instruction, is at program location 0a in procedure g.
The return instruction can transfer control to any node that is
at location 08 in procedure f. The edges from the q4 node
show that there are two possible return points: nodes q5 and
q10. Both are at location 08, and both are an invocation of f.
Without a k-bound of at least two, there is not enough context
to create a unique invocation in the graph of the partial call
trace, f→ g, for both the x and y originations. The missing
context leads to an underestimation of the final estimate in a
shortest-path analysis because the shortest-path analysis uses
the x invocation to get to procedure f but returns to the y
invocation.
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The EFSM heuristic function in [15] uses the calling context
in the run-time stack present in the state of the program
to recapture part of the missing calling context in the k-
bounded CFG. There is no additional overhead in maintaining
the run-time stack of the program because at any point in
the program, the model checker has a complete snapshot of
the actual state of the program including its entire run-time
stack. The concrete run-time stack reflects the complete call
trace from the top-most procedure of the artifact to the current
program location which can be used in conjunction with the k-
bounded graph to produce an accurate distance estimate. This
is done by unrolling the run-time stack, and at each stack
frame, considering the case that the program moves forward
to encounter an error without returning from the current stack
frame, or it returns from the current stack frame and then
moves forward to encounter an error. The heuristic function
minimizes over each of these scenarios as it moves through
stack frames.
In Fig. 1(c), we present an example of a run-time stack from
the concrete state of the program in the model checker. The
current stack frame is for procedure g shown at the bottom
of the run-time stack since it grows downward. The return
address for the current procedure in the run-time stack is
location 08 in procedure f. The current program location is
09 in the procedure g. The EFSM heuristic function, shown in
Fig. 2, takes the current program location (pc) and combines
it with the first k return locations (ret locs) from the run-
time stack (rstack ) to identify the node (n) corresponding
to the current program state in the k-bounded CFG (lines 3-
4). The corresponding node in the one-bounded graph for the
current program state of Fig. 1(b) is q3 since it is at program
location 09 with a return address of 08. The heuristic function
in Fig. 2 now computes a distance estimate in the forward
direction within the scope of the current stack frame (line
6). It requests a distance estimate on the k-bounded graph
to all possible errors (ne ∈ Errors) in the forward direction
using a shortest-path analysis (FSM(n, ne)) assuming the
current procedure does not return from the current stack frame
(in scope(ne, n) = true). In our example, the error is not
reachable from procedure g without moving through its return
point so the shortest-path analysis returns ∞. The heuristic
function in Fig. 2 then makes a note of this distance (line 6)
and then computes the shortest distance to the previous call
frame through the return statement of the current procedure
(lines 7-8). It finally simulates returning from the current call
frame by making the first return location its current program
location (line 9).
Continuing with the concrete example in Fig. 1(c), after
returning from procedure g, the EFSM heuristic function
combines the new current program location, now 08, and the
return location, 04, to find the next node in the k-bounded
CFG. This corresponds to node q5 in the one-bounded graph
in Fig. 1(b). The heuristic function requests another forward
estimate which is still ∞. It then considers the cost of returning
from the stack frame. The algorithm in Fig. 2 repeats this
process until it runs out of stack frames in the run-time
stack (line 2), and it then reports the distance estimate to
the nearest error computed during the analysis (line 11).
The key observation in this example is that the call site for
procedure g is resolved using the run-time stack, and the
EFSM heuristic reports the correct distance value from node
q3 to the error location. This does not, however, completely
remove the underestimation in other distance estimates.
When the program execution is at the topmost level of the
call structure or has a shallow call depth, the heuristic estimate
computation is reduced to a shortest-path analysis on the k-
bounded CFG. Returning to our example, suppose the concrete
state in the model checker has a single frame in the run-time
stack showing the current location to be node q0. A request for
the distance estimate in the forward direction returns a distance
of seven which is the shortest-path to the error node q12
from node q0 in the one-bounded CFG. The missing context
information at depths greater than one is needed to resolve the
unique call sites leading to node q4, and it causes the shortest-
path analysis to choose a path that is not consistent with the
actual program execution from node q0.
The cost of building the k-bounded graph is exponential in
the nested call depth due to inlining. The cost of doing the
shortest-path analysis is also very expensive since it is run
several times to account for the scoping check on the path to
the error. For the EFSM heuristic to be accurate, it needs full
calling context, but for it to be efficient in runtime, it needs a
small k-bound. The goal of this work is to produce an efficient
estimate in terms of its accuracy and computational overhead.
III. FULL CONTEXT AWARE (FCA) ALGORITHM
The FCA algorithm is an interprocedural control flow anal-
ysis technique that implicitly constructs call traces to compute
static lower-bounds on distance estimates to return locations of
the procedures and nearest error locations in a software artifact
using shortest-path analysis and depth-first traversal. The FCA
algorithm uses the reverse invocation order to summarize the
shortest-path analysis in all the callees of a given procedure.
It then propagates the summarized distance information of the
callees back to the given procedure. The input to the algorithm
is a set of CFGs with a single CFG for each method or
procedure in the artifact. Fig. 3(a) is an example of the input
for a program with two procedures main and sub1. Each
CFG has a single start node and end node. A call node is
represented as a box in the CFG. The label in the call node
identifies the start node for the target CFG of the call. The
diamond shape nodes represent error nodes in the program.
These are most often critical sections or assertion points in
the software artifact. We associate values with each CFG node
for the distance to the end node (dend) and the distance to the
nearest error node (derror).
The FCA algorithm uses a depth-first traversal to build
a distance matrix for a given CFG to use in a shortest-
path analysis to compute dend and derror for each node. We
associate with each individual CFG a distance matrix, L, that
is defined over the number of nodes in the CFG. L is initialized
with entries along the diagonal set to zero and all other entries
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Distance Matrix for main
m1 m2 m3 m4
m1 0 1 1 ∞
m2 ∞ 0 5 ∞
m3 1 ∞ 0 1
Shortest-path Analysis
m1 m2 m3 m4
m1 0 1 1 2
m2 6 0 5 6
















(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3. Execution of the FCA on a set of CFGs. (a) A set of two CFGs for a software artifact. (b) The CFG for sub1 annotated with dend and derror data.
(c) Distance matrix L for main before and after shortest-path analysis. (d) The CFG for main annotated with dend and derror data.
set to ∞. Edge costs in L are added as the depth-first traversal
moves through nodes in the CFG. The depth-first traversal
begins at the start node of the top-level method in the software
artifact. In our example, the traversal starts at node m1, updates
the (m1,m2) entry in L to add the cost of the m1 → m2
edge, and then visits m2. The distance between two immediate
successors in a CFG is one for all nodes except the successors
of call nodes. The distance to the immediate successor of a
call node needs to reflect the cost of moving through the target
CFG of the call.
The depth-first traversal moves to the start node of the
target CFG at a call node, and when the traversal returns,
it then explores the immediate successor of the call node in
the current CFG. The distance to the immediate successor
of the call node relies on the analysis of the target CFG to
account for the cost of moving through the target CFG without
encountering an error. The distance to the immediate successor
of the call node is the dend value stored in the start node of
its target CFG plus two: one to move to the start node of the
target CFG and one to return from the end node of the target
CFG. Fig. 3(b) shows the dend and derror values in the sub1
CFG when the traversal returns to m2 after analyzing sub1.
Recall that call node m2 points to the s1 start node. The dend
value for s1 is three. This reflects the number of program
steps required in sub1 to reach its s4 end node. The traversal
updates the (m2,m3) entry in L by setting the m2 → m3 edge
to five (three plus two), and continues the traversal by visiting
node m3. The top matrix in Fig. 3(c) is the final L matrix for
main. The matrix includes all the edges in the main CFG
with the cost of moving through sub1 included in the row
for m2. Note that the matrix excludes the row for m4 since
the end node has no successors in the traversal. The L matrix
provides the requisite data to derive dend and derror values for
the CFG nodes.
The FCA algorithm computes dend for each node in the
current CFG with a shortest-path analysis using the distance
matrix when the traversal is ready to backtrack out of the start
node. Recall that L only includes nodes in the immediate CFG
since call nodes move to the immediate successor in the CFG
with the cost of moving through the target CFG. The bottom
matrix in Fig. 3(c) is the final L matrix for main after the
shortest-path analysis. Each dend value for the CFG of main
is set to its corresponding entry in the m4 column of L after
the shortest-path analysis. This is the shortest-path through the
CFG to the end node m4 including the cost of function calls.
The nearest error distance values are computed by minimiz-
ing over distances to error locations in the current CFG and
distances to error locations reachable from the target CFGs of
call nodes. In the discussion, Nerror and Ncall denote the sets
of error locations and call nodes respectively for a given CFG.
We use the results of the shortest-path analysis in the distance
matrix, L, to compute distances to the nearest error location.
For convenience, a global array, Derror(n) is used to store the
distance to the nearest error, derror, for node n in a CFG. The






(L(n, nc) + Derror(n′start) + 1)(2)
derror = min(dlocal, dnonlocal) (3)
Derror(n) = derror (4)
where n is the current node being analyzed and a call node
nc points to the start node n′start of its target CFG.
The dlocal value in Equation 1 is the distance to the nearest
error in the immediate CFG. This error is reachable without
having to move into a different CFG through a call node. The
value is taken directly from the shortest-path analysis results
in the distance matrix (L(n, ne) is the shortest-path from node
n to node ne in the current CFG).
The dnonlocal value in Equation 2 is the distance to the
nearest error through a call node of the immediate CFG. This
error is only reachable by moving into a different CFG through
a call node. The equation computes the transitive distance of
first moving forward to the call node and then moving from
the start node of the target CFG to the error. In the equation for
the nc call node, n′start is the start node of its target CFG. The
value stored in Derror(n′start) is computed prior by virtue of
the depth-first traversal. The traversal only triggers the distance
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procedure compute distances(N,E, nstart, nend, Nerror, Ncall)
1: /∗ Visited is global variable initialized to ∅ ∗/
2: if nstart 6∈ Visited then
3: Visited = Visited ∪ {nstart}
4: /∗ L : N ×N → N ∪ {∞}, entries along the diagonal are set
to 0, while all other entries are set to ∞ ∗/
5: L = traverse CFG(nstart, Ncall, L)
6: L = compute all pairs shortest distance(L)
7: for each n ∈ N do
8: dend = L(n, nend)
9: /∗ Dend, a global array of size X is initialized to 0 ∗/
10: Dend(n) = dend
11: dlocal = minne∈Nerror(L(n, ne))
12: 〈N ′, E′, n′start, n′end, N ′error, N ′call〉 = Target(nk)
13: dnonlocal = minnk∈Ncall(L(n, nk) + derror(n
′
start) + 1)
14: derror = min(dlocal, dnonlocal)
15: /∗ Derror, a global array of size X is initialized to 0 ∗/
16: Derror(n) = derror
17: return
18:
procedure traverse CFG(nx, Ncall, L)
19: if nx ∈ Ncall then
20: 〈N ′, E′, n′start, n′end, N ′error, N ′call〉 = Target(nx)







22: dsucc = Dend(n′start) + 2
23: else
24: dsucc = 1
25: /∗ Conditional branches have multiple successors ∗/
26: for each n′x ∈ succ(nx) do
27: L(nx, n′x) = dsucc
28: L = traverse CFG(n′x, Ncall, L)
29: return L
Fig. 4. Pseudo-code for the FCA algorithm.
analysis when it is ready to backtrack out of a start node to
resolve call dependencies in the computation. The final derror
value for node n in Equation 3 is either local to the CFG or
reached through a call node in the CFG.
Fig. 3(d) shows the end results of the FCA algorithm for
main. Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(d) give the complete view of the
final analysis. For Fig. 3(d), the path to the end node for m1
bypasses the m2 call node for a distance of two, which is
the number of edges in the path m1 → m3 → m4. An error
location is only reachable through the target CFG of the call
node m2. The nearest error for m1 is three which represents
the path m1 → m2 → s1 → s2 in the CFGs. An error location
cannot be reached from node m4.
The FCA algorithm lower-bounds all distance estimates by
assuming shortest-paths through CFGs. From this, the derror
and dend data by themselves form an admissible and consistent
distance estimate similar to the finite state machine (FSM)
distance heuristic in [13]. Regardless of the true path of
execution, the length of that path is at least that of the shortest-
path through the CFG. An example is seen in Fig. 3(d) where
the algorithm bypasses the m2 call node to reach the m4
end node. If the true path of execution follows m2, then the
actual distance is strictly larger than the reported distance. This
lower-bound also appears in all iterative constructs of the CFG.
The pseudo-code for the FCA algorithm is
presented in Fig. 4. In Fig. 4, a CFG is a tuple
〈N,E, nstart, nend, Ncall, Nerror〉 where N is set of uniquely
labeled nodes, E ⊆ N × N is the set of edges, nstart ∈ N
is a unique start node, nend ∈ N is a unique end node,
Ncall ⊆ N is a set of call nodes, and Nerror ⊆ N is a set
of error nodes. Dend and Derror are global arrays that store
distances to the end node and nearest error node respectively
for X = |
⋃
1≤i≤m Ni| nodes where m is the number of
procedures in the artifact. Note that the derror and dend values
stored in Derror and Dend arrays are the same derror and dend
values annotated on the CFGs. The function Target takes a
call node as input and returns the target CFG of the call node.
Finally, the function succ(nx) = {ny ∈ N | (nx, ny) ∈ E},
which means the succ function returns a set containing all
the immediate successors of the input node, nx.
In Fig. 4, the compute distances function intializes a dis-
tance matrix L (line 4) for the input CFG and calls the
traverse CFG function (line 5). The traverse CFG function
uses a depth-first traversal to add edge costs between succes-
sors of the CFG in the distance matrix L (lines 26-28). If the
traversal encounters a call node (line 19), the algorithm makes
a mutually recursive call to compute distances with the target
CFG of the call node (line 21). When the execution returns, it
adds the edge cost to the immediate successor of the call node
taking into account the cost of moving through the target CFG
without encountering an error (line 22). For all other nodes,
the distance between two immediate successors in a CFG is
one (line 24). After the traversal of the CFG is done, the
algorithm returns the distance matrix L (line 29), and the flow
of execution returns to the compute distances function where
the FCA algorithm computes the all-pairs shortest-path on the
distance matrix L (line 6). For each node in the CFG, it adds
the corresponding dend and derror values to the global arrays
Dend and Derror (lines 7-16). The derror value is computed
by minimizing over distances to error locations in the current
CFG (dlocal) and distances to error locations reachable from
the target CFGs of call nodes (dnonlocal).
The intial traversal and the final algorithm to propagate the
dend and derror values are linear in the number of nodes in
the artifact since the traversal reuses the information from the
secondary analysis if it encounters the same CFG numerous
times from different call nodes in the artifact. The complexity
of the secondary analysis is O(X3), where X is the total
number of nodes in the artifact because an all-pairs shortest-
path algorithm is run once for every reachable CFG in the
artifact. Hence, the complexity of the FCA algorithm is
polynomial in time and space with regards to the total number
of nodes in the CFGs as a result of the shortest-path analysis.
IV. EFSM WITH FCA
The FCA is a forward analysis algorithm which is run
once statically. The FCA cannot resolve the non-determinism
arising from the end nodes in the CFGs of the program. For
example, in Fig. 1(a) there are two calls to procedure f. The
CFG of f does not contain any information about where the
flow of execution returns when it exits procedure f. The only
information present in the nodes of the CFGs are the distance
values to the end (dend) of the CFGs and the distance values
to error locations (derror) in the forward direction without
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Fig. 5. The CFGs for the program in Fig. 1(a) annotated with context
aware distances after running the FCA algorithm.
executing the end of the CFGs. We dynamically recreate the
call trace based on the values of the run-time stack like the
EFSM heuristic to compute true successors of end nodes for
a particular program execution path.
For the program shown in Fig. 1(a), the CFGs for each
procedure annotated with derror and dend values after execut-
ing the FCA computation are shown in Fig. 5. Now let us
consider a concrete example of how the EFSM is combined
with the FCA to compute accurate heuristic estimates. Suppose
the values on the return stack are: 〈x2,m2〉 where the x2 is the
first return location encountered on exiting the current stack
frame, and m2 is the next return location. The current location
of the program is f1 in procedure f. The heuristic function
in the EFSM requests a distance estimate to the error in the
forward direction without exiting from the current procedure.
Instead of computing this estimate on a k-bounded graph, it
now considers the derror value present on node f1. In Fig. 5,
we can see that the value of derror is ∞ for node f1 which
means the error is not reachable in the forward direction.
After noting the value of derror at node f1, the heuristic
function uses the value of dend to compute the distance to the
end node of procedure f. It requires this value to estimate the
distance to the previous call frame. The algorithm to compute
the heuristic estimate has an accumulator variable, path, that
keeps track of the cost incurred in backtracking through the
call frames. In Fig. 5 the value of dend is three; the heuristic
function adds one to it to account for the return and sets path
equal to four. Next, the heuristic simulates returning from the
current call frame by making the first value on the return stack,
x2, its current program location like the EFSM algorithm. The
value of derror on node x2 is ∞ showing that the error is still
not reachable. Since x2 is an end node, the value of dend is
zero, and the heuristic function increments path by one for
the return, changing the value of path to five. The heuristic
function repeats the process of unrolling the stack by moving
to node m2, where the value of derror is seven. It adds this
value to path to get the final value of twelve as the estimate of
the distance to the error. At all points of forward computation
to find the error location, and while going to the end node, the
heuristic function has access to unbounded context information
from the FCA algorithm resulting in a better lower-bound on
TABLE I
TIME TAKEN IN SECONDS FOR STATIC ANALYSIS
Name T M k FSM EFSM FCA
Hyman 2 3 1 0 3 0
Hyman 2 4 1 1 11 0
Hyman 2 5 1 1 27 0
D-phil 2 2 1 1 76 0
D-phil C 2 2 1 0 76 0
D-phil 2 3 1 1 146 0
D-phil C 2 3 1 0 147 0
D-phil 2 4 0 1 4 1
D-phil C 2 4 0 1 4 1
D-phil 2 5 0 2 7 1
D-phil C 2 5 0 2 7 1
Barbers 3 3 1 1 41 0
Barbers 3 4 0 1 3 1
Barbers 3 5 0 1 4 1
the true estimate of the distance to the error which is also
admissible and consistent.
To calculate the heuristic estimate for a concurrent program
with multiple threads, the approach presented in [13] computes
the distance to the nearest error location for each thread and
sums up the individual estimates to create a final heuristic
value. To ensure underestimation of the distance to the error,
we modify the number of individual estimates summed to-
gether based on the property being verified. For example, the
heuristic estimate for a mutex violation is the sum of distances
in two threads which have the shortest paths to the critical
section compared to all the other threads. Now, consider the
property which is a check to see if any thread reaches a certain
location in the program, like an assert statement. In such a
case, the heuristic estimate is the smallest distance in the set
of estimated distances from the current location to the desired
location for each thread. Another useful property checked
in concurrent programs is whether two or more threads are
deadlocked. In this case, we take the summation of the
distances from the current state to the error state for two or
more threads that can lead to a deadlock state. From this point
forward in the presentation we refer to the combination of the
FCA and EFSM approaches as the e-FCA heuristic function.
V. RESULTS
We implemented the e-FCA heuristic function in the gnu-
debugger based model checker Estes, [8], and executed it on a
benchmark set consisting of programs with concurrency errors.
The results show that the e-FCA heuristic reduces the total
number of states generated and also decreases the total running
time before error discovery compared to the FSM and EFSM
distance heuristics.
We focus specifically on three classical concurrency prob-
lems in our benchmark suite: Dining Philosophers,
Barbershop, and Hyman’s mutual exclusion
principle. The results presented are from a Pentium III
1.5 Ghz processor with 2 GB of RAM and are run on Estes,
with a 6.1.1 version of the gnu debugger, using the m68hc11
backend simulator. We report the wall clock time for the time
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TABLE II
A COMPARISON ACROSS DIFFERENT SEARCH TECHNIQUES
Name T M k Total States Generated Time taken in Seconds
DFS Rand FSM EFSM e-FCA DFS Rand FSM EFSM e-FCA
Hyman 2 3 1 6,478 15,800 10,227 7,160 3,817 3 9 4 6 1
Hyman 2 4 1 16,190 59,796 41,791 21,909 13,529 7 28 17 21 5
Hyman 2 5 1 40,471 91,947 123,743 59,951 38,745 17 42 49 56 16
D-phil 2 2 1 157,436 475,184 53,897 4,594 1,626 71 318 31 79 1
D-phil C 2 2 1 19,769 11,497 18,148 1036 415 12 10 14 77 0
D-phil 2 3 1 ∗ 452,092 54,725 13,830 3,816 ∗ 292 28 155 3
D-phil C 2 3 1 157,818 95,009 8,575 3,348 1,015 102 75 5 149 1
D-phil 2 4 0 ∗ 999,480 186,419 36,467 13,696 ∗ 730 113 27 8
D-phil C 2 4 0 548,127 173,494 42,107 10,224 3,655 299 159 31 12 3
D-phil 2 5 0 ∗ ∗ 334,198 400,474 55,876 ∗ ∗ 178 388 32
D-phil C 2 5 0 ∗ 370,656 861,319 142,350 14,755 ∗ 294 680 136 11
Barbers 3 3 1 ∗ 442,285 82,333 21,465 3,298 ∗ 282 41 14 2
Barbers 3 4 0 ∗ 939,828 73,940 75,635 13,118 ∗ 576 38 47 7
Barbers 3 5 0 ∗ ∗ 378,632 388,161 66,608 ∗ ∗ 237 252 38
taken to do the static analysis and for the total running time
of the program before error discovery, as well as the total
states generated before error discovery.
For the benchmarks, we add procedures containing nested
function calls that do not affect the property being verified
to the base implementation of the concurrent programs. We
then randomly insert calls to these procedures throughout the
programs to derive examples with varying call structures and
call depths in order to test the accuracy and efficiency of the
e-FCA in computing context aware distances. To measure the
accuracy of the e-FCA heuristic function we compare the
e-FCA to the shortest-path analysis (FSM) and the EFSM
distance heuristic. We also compare it with random search and
an exhaustive depth-first search (DFS). We use best-first search
rather than A∗ to decrease the number of states expanded
before error discovery; although best-first does not guarantee a
shortest error trace like the A∗ search. In our experiments, the
length of the error traces generated by the best-first search
are comparable to that of A∗. The results of the analyses
are shown in Table I, Table II and Table III. In Table I
and Table II the first column (Name), shows the concurrent
program being verified; if the program is model checked at
the C-level, where a single C instruction is considered atomic,
a letter C is appended to the end of the program name.
Otherwise, the program is model checked at the assembly-
level where a single assembly-level instruction is considered
atomic. The next column (T) indicates the number of threads
in the program, the column (M) shows the maximum possible
call depth of the program, and the column (k) is the value of
the bound picked for the EFSM heuristic.
The static analysis time reported in Table I is the time
taken in seconds during the period after the execution of the
program starts and before the model checking run begins. The
FCA analysis takes negligible amount of time. The average
time taken by the FCA to complete static analysis (0.65 secs)
is less than the average time (1 secs) taken by the FSM,
even though the FSM does not consider calling context of
the program at all. As we increase the k-bound for the EFSM
distance heuristic, the cost to construct the inlined graph and
do a shortest path analysis for checking whether the error
is in scope grows exponentially. The high overhead of static
analysis with larger k-bounds forces us to pick a bound of
either one or zero for the EFSM distance heuristic in order to
finish static analysis within a few minutes. In spite of picking
low bounds of k for the EFSM computation, the time taken
by EFSM to complete static analysis is significantly higher
compared to the FCA. Note that even with a bound of zero,
the EFSM dynamically recreates the call trace of the program;
hence, it has more context than the FSM distance heuristic.
For each model, we report the total number of states
enumerated before finding the error state and total running
time to find the error in Table II. The ‘∗’ symbol in Table II
shows that after generating a million states, the error state was
still not found, and at that point, the search was terminated.
For the random search, the heuristic value is set to a random
value and the numbers reported for the total number of states
and total running time numbers are averaged over 10 model
checking runs.
The e-FCA gains a significant reduction in total states gener-
ated compared to the other heuristics and search techniques as
shown on the left side of Table II. In Table II, we can see that
DFS, an exhaustive search is mostly ineffective in finding the
error. In seven out of fourteen examples it is unable to find
the error within a million states; however, sometimes DFS
happens to find the error quickly by chance as seen in the
Hyman examples. In some cases, the EFSM generates more
states than the FSM distance heuristic before finding the error.
Our experiments with different k-bounds show that for some
programs, the improvement in error discovery by the EFSM
heuristic with increasing context is not always monotonic. For
such programs, the EFSM heuristic does not perform well until
the context information reaches a certain threshold.
The e-FCA also obtains a significant decrease in the total
running time compared to the other search techniques as
shown on the right side of Table II. The state reduction
achieved by the EFSM is not enough to compensate for the
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TABLE III
SCALABILITY ACROSS DIFFERENT THREADS
Depth = 2 Depth = 5 Depth = 9
T States Time States Time States Time
5 814 1 7,064 5 92,434 71
9 1,070 1 7,320 6 93,230 82
11 1,196 1 7,446 11 93,356 144
15 1,448 1 7,698 12 93,608 158
18 1,641 1 7,891 12 93,801 165
20 1,767 2 8,071 13 93,927 173
25 2,086 3 8,336 15 94,246 187
30 2,401 3 8,970 18 94,561 204
40 3,040 4 9,603 22 92,500 233
51 3,736 8 10,306 30 95,896 311
high cost of static analysis causing its total running time to in-
crease dramatically compared to the e-FCA. While computing
the heuristic estimate, the EFSM faces an additional overhead
cost of extracting the call trace in the run-time stack from the
start of the program to its current point. The e-FCA faces the
same overhead of extracting the run-time stack; however, this
cost is very effectively mitigated by the significant reduction
in the states generated and low cost of static analysis resulting
in a substantial decrease in the total running time of the e-FCA
before error discovery.
We test the scalability of the e-FCA heuristic function
by instrumenting our implementation of the barbershop
problem to allow a variable number of threads (between 5
and 51). Additionally, we implement three versions of the
problem with varying maximum possible call depths of two,
five, and nine. The total number of states and total running
time before error discovery for these examples are presented
in Table III. The first column (T) in Table III indicates the
number of threads created for the particular example. From
the barbershop example, it seems that the e-FCA scales to
multiple threads with a high degree of nested function calls.
DFS and random search do not find the error in a million states
for even the smallest model. The FSM distance heuristic and
EFSM distance heuristic, with small k-bounds, do not find
the error in a million states for most of the models. With a
slightly higher k-bound the EFSM heuristic does not finish
static analysis in 1 hour for any of the examples.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present the FCA algorithm that computes
full context aware distances for a CFG in a non-recursive
program with resolved function pointers by implicitly inlining
function calls. It propagates context information through call
nodes, start nodes, and end nodes of the CFG and annotates
the nodes in the CFG with context sensitive distances to end
nodes and error locations in the forward direction. We then
present a new heuristic function, e-FCA which combines the
unbounded distance data computed by the FCA algorithm with
the dynamic recreation of the run-time stack from the EFSM
heuristic function. The e-FCA heuristic function computes
more accurate heuristic estimates compared to other distance
heuristic functions.
In some cases, the e-FCA heuristic function underestimates
the true distance to the error locations because it does not
consider the feasibility of the execution paths. Resolving the
feasiblity of all execution paths is not possible statically;
however, while model checking, as the variables are assigned
dynamic values, we can determine the infeasible execution
paths. In future work we plan on pruning these infeasi-
ble execution paths before computing the heuristic estimate
to overcome the underestimation arising due to the path-
insensitive computation of the e-FCA.
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Abstract. Synchronous Data Flow Graphs (SDFGs) have proven
to be suitable for specifying and analyzing streaming applications
that run on single- or multi-processor platforms. Streaming appli-
cations essentially continue their execution indefinitely. Therefore,
one of the key properties of an SDFG is liveness, i.e., whether all
parts of the SDFG can run infinitely often. Another elementary
requirement is whether an implementation of an SDFG is feasi-
ble using a limited amount of memory. In this paper, we study
two interpretations of this property, called boundedness and strict
boundedness, that were either already introduced in the SDFG lit-
erature or studied for other models. A third and new definition is
introduced, namely self-timed boundedness, which is very impor-
tant to SDFGs, because self-timed execution results in the maxi-
mal throughput of an SDFG. Necessary and sufficient conditions
for liveness in combination with all variants of boundedness are
given, as well as algorithms for checking those conditions. As
a by-product, we obtain an algorithm to compute the maximal
achievable throughput of an SDFG that relaxes the requirement
of strong connectedness in earlier work on throughput analysis.
1 Introduction
Synchronous Data Flow Graphs (SDFGs, see [13]), also
known as weighted Marked Graphs in Petri-net theory, are
used widely in modelling and analyzing data flow appli-
cations. They are often used for modelling DSP applica-
tions [3, 19] and for designing concurrent multimedia ap-
plications implemented on multi-processor systems-on-chip
[17]. The model is suitable for realizing a system with
predictable performance properties as several analysis tech-
niques like throughput analysis exist [8].
An SDFG is a graph with actors as vertices and chan-
nels as edges. Actors represent basic parts of an application
which need to be executed. Channels represent data depen-
dencies between actors. Execution of an actor is designated
by an actor firing. Each actor generates a fixed number of
tokens when it fires. These are stored in the channels with
unlimited capacities. An execution of an SDFG is a se-
quence of actor firings which respects data dependencies.
The exact order of actor firings is not determined. Conse-
quently, several executions exist for an SDFG. Because of
the usage of SDFGs for modelling streaming applications,
only those SDFGs which have executions in which all ac-
tors are fired infinitely often are of interest. This property
of SDFGs is called liveness. Furthermore, only executions
∗This work was supported by the Dutch Science Foundation NWO,
project 612.064.206, PROMES, and the EU, project IST-004042, Betsy.
that require a finite amount of storage for the channels are
of interest. This paper formally studies three different inter-
pretations of this second property, all in combination with
liveness.
The paper investigates two known interpretations,
namely boundedness (whether there exists a bounded ex-
ecution of an SDFG) and strict boundedness (whether all
executions are bounded). We prove necessary and sufficient
conditions guaranteeing that an SDFG is live and (strictly)
bounded. For strict boundedness, these conditions follow
immediately from a similar result known for Petri nets.
The natural way of executing an SDFG in which all ac-
tors fire as soon as they can fire, is called self-timed ex-
ecution. This execution is important since it leads to the
maximal obtainable throughput of an SDFG [19]. Because
of the importance of self-timed execution of SDFGs and
its applications in the context of multi-processor systems,
a new notion of boundedness, namely self-timed bound-
edness is introduced. This notion requires that self-timed
execution of SDFGs is bounded. Necessary and sufficient
conditions for the liveness and self-timed boundedness of
SDFGs are proved. These conditions heavily depend on the
throughput of actors (average number of firings of an actor
per time unit). Existing techniques for throughput calcula-
tion only work for strongly connected SDFGs [6, 8]. We
propose an algorithm that determines the liveness and self-
timed boundedness of an SDFG and at the same time ex-
tends throughput analysis to arbitrary SDFGs. The concept
of self-timed boundedness and the results proven for this
notion are the main contribution of this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
formally introduces SDFGs to allow studying liveness and
boundedness in a rigorous way. Sections 3 and 4 present re-
sults for liveness and (strict) boundedness. Section 5 iden-
tifies conditions for self-timed boundedness of SDFGs and
presents an algorithm for verifying the combination of live-
ness and this type of boundedness. Section 6 discusses re-
lated work, while Section 7 summarizes the conclusions.
Proofs are omitted and can be found in [9].
2 Synchronous Data Flow Graphs
2.1 Basic Definitions
This section formally defines SDFGs and some of their
basic properties. Let IN0 = {0, 1, . . .} (and IN = IN0 \
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Figure 1. An example timed SDFG Gex .
{0}) denote the (positive) natural numbers. The following
definition captures the structure of an SDFG.
Definition 1 [Synchronous Data Flow Graph (SDFG)] An
SDFG is a pair (A, C), where A denotes the set of actors
and C ⊆ A2×IN2 the set of channels. Each (s, d, p, c) ∈ C
denotes that actor d depends on actor s, where p and c are
the production and consumption rates of tokens of s and d,
respectively. The predecessors of a in Pred(a) = {s ∈
A | (s, a, p, c) ∈ C} are those actors on which a depends.
The channels between a and its predecessors are referred
to as the input channels of a, denoted by IC(a). Similarly,
the successors of a in Succ(a) = {d ∈ A | (a, d, p, c) ∈
C} are those actors that depend on a. The output channels
(channels between a and its successors) of a are denoted
by OC(a). We call a channel from an actor a to itself a
self-loop channel. We denote the set of self-loop channels
of an actor a by SLC(a) = IC(a) ∩ OC(a). An SDFG
in which all production and consumption rates are one is
called a Homogeneous SDFG (HSDFG).
Figure 1 shows a simple example of an SDFG. Actors are
labeled with their names and execution times (introduced
later). Channels are labeled with production and consump-
tion rates. The black dots are tokens. To capture the execu-
tion of an SDFG, we define the channel state of an SDFG
as the distribution of tokens over its channels.
Definition 2 [Channel State] A channel state of an SDFG
(A, C) is a function S : C → IN0 that returns the number
of tokens stored in each channel. Each SDFG has an ini-
tial channel state S0 denoting the number of tokens that are
initially stored in the channels.
An execution of an SDFG is defined based on the firings of
its actors, which may lead to changes in the channel state.
Definition 3 [Firing] Let a ∈ A be an actor of an SDFG
(A, C). Actor a is said to be enabled in channel state S
in case S(e) ≥ c for all input channels e = (s, a, p, c)
in IC(a). If a is enabled in Si and it fires, the result-
ing channel state Si+1 is defined by Si+1(e) = Si(e) − c
for each input channel e = (s, a, p, c) in IC(a)\SLC(a),
Si+1(e) = Si(e)+p for each output channel e = (a, d, p, c)
in OC(a)\SLC(a), Si+1(e) = Si(e) + p− c for each self-
loop channel e = (a, a, p, c) ∈ SLC(a), and Si+1(e) =
Si(e) for all channels e /∈ IC(a) ∪OC(a).
Definition 4 [Execution and Maximal Execution] Let S0
denote the initial channel state of an SDFG (A, C). An
execution σ of (A, C) is a (finite or infinite) sequence of
channel states S0, S1 . . . such that Si+1 is the result of fir-
ing an enabled actor in Si for all i ≥ 0. An execution is
maximal if and only if it is finite with no actors enabled in
the final channel state, or if it is infinite.
Not all SDFGs are considered to be useful in practice. One
normally seeks a system that is deadlock-free or live.
Definition 5 [Deadlock and Liveness] An SDFG has a
deadlock if and only if it has a maximal execution of finite
length. An SDFG is live if and only if it has an execution in
which all actors fire infinitely often.
It is known [11] that the execution of an SDFG is deter-
minate, which means that the order of execution does not
affect the states that can eventually be reached. Thus, if one
execution of an SDFG deadlocks, then all executions dead-
lock. The example SDFG Gex is live.
2.2 Timed SDFGs
For performance analysis of streaming applications, an
SDFG is often extended with time.
Definition 6 [Execution Time] An execution time models
the execution duration of actors for SDFGs. In an SDFG
(A, C), the execution time is a function E : A→ IQ+0 ∪{∞}
that assigns to each actor the amount of time it takes to fire,
where IQ+0 ∪{∞} is the set of positive rational numbers plus
0 and∞. For a ∈ A, E(a) is referred to as the execution
time of a.
Definition 7 [Timed SDFG] A timed SDFG is a triple
(A, C, E) denoting an SDFG (A, C) with execution time E.
The infinite execution times are used lateron to model dead-
locks. Normally, SDFGs do not have infinite actor execu-
tion times.
Notice that actor firings in a timed SDFG are not atomic.
Firing an actor now takes time. To define the state of a timed
SDFG, we assume that all changes in the number of tokens
on all channels of an actor happen at the end of its firing.
Definition 8 [Timed State] A state of a timed SDFG
(A, C, E) is a pair (S, τ), where S is a channel state and
τ ∈ IQ+0 is the accumulated time. The initial state of
(A, C, E) is given by the initial channel state S0 and the
start time of the system τ0 = 0.
Definition 9 [Timed Execution] An execution of a
timed SDFG (A, C, E) is a sequence of timed states
(S0, τ0), (S1, τ1), . . ., where τi+1 ≥ τi. Each two consecu-
tive states (Si+1, τi+1) and (Si, τi) are the same except that
an actor a which started its firing at τi+1 − E(a) finishes
its firing at τi+1. Si+1 is related to Si in precisely the same
way as defined in Definition 3.
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Figure 2. Self-timed execution of Gex .
We denote the number of completed firings of an actor a ∈
A which occurred up to time τ by Fa,τ .
Among all timed executions there are some of special
interest. A timed execution for which the firing of an actor
always starts as soon as possible is called a self-timed exe-
cution. Self-timed executions are important in the context
of performance analysis because they imply obtaining the
maximal attainable throughput [19].
Definition 10 [Self-timed Execution] A timed execution is
called self-timed if and only if it is maximal and all actors
start their firing as soon as they are enabled.
If two or more actors complete their firing at some point
in time in a self-timed execution, the order of their appear-
ance in the execution is not determined. In other words, any
permutation of such actor firings results in a self-timed exe-
cution. Thus, the number of self-timed executions is larger
than one in such cases. Note that in all self-timed executions
the start and end times of firings of all actors are equal. Also
the channels states after completion of all actor firings that
can complete at a certain point in time are the same in all
self-timed executions.
Figure 2 illustrates a self-timed execution of the exam-
ple SDFG Gex of Figure 1. The state contains a channel
component with the distribution of tokens over the channels
a-a, a-b, b-c, c-b, respectively, and a time component. In the
depicted cycle, the time component is denoted symbolically
to emphasize that the behavior repeats itself every six time
units, after some initial transient phase.
2.3 Structural Properties
The directed graph of an SDFG has some structural prop-
erties that are relevant for deciding boundedness. This pa-
per assumes connected SDFGs for which the directed graph
consists of one component. SDFGs consisting of multiple
components can be considered as a set of single-component
SDFGs, which can be analyzed separately.
A well known stronger form of connectivity is given by
the following two definitions.
Definition 11 [Path and Cycle] A directed path p is a se-
quence of actors a1, a2 . . . al such that ai+1 ∈ Succ(ai) for
all 1 ≤ i < l. Path p is simple iff ai 6= aj for all i 6= j. If
a1 = al and l ≥ 2, then p is said to be a cycle.
Definition 12 [Strongly Connected SDFG] An SDFG is
strongly connected iff there exists a directed path from any
actor to any other actor. Any subgraph of an SDFG which
is strongly connected is called a strongly connected compo-
nent (SCC, for short). An SCC κ is maximal iff there is no
SCC κ′ where κ is a strict subgraph of κ′.
Another structural property of SDFGs concerns the corre-
spondence between production and consumption rates.
Definition 13 [Consistency and Balance Equations] A rep-
etition vector for an SDFG (A, C) is a function γ : A →
IN0 such that for every (s, d, p, c) ∈ C, the equation
pγ(s) = cγ(d) holds. These equations are called bal-
ance equations. Repetition vector γ is called non-trivial iff
γ(a) > 0 for all a ∈ A. If a non-trivial repetition vector ex-
ists, the SDFG is called consistent. The smallest non-trivial
repetition vector of a consistent SDFG is referred to as the
repetition vector.
Note that the definitions in this subsection carry over to
timed SDFGs in a straightforward way. Timed SDFG Gex
is consistent with repetition vector (a 7→ 3, b 7→ 3, c 7→ 2).
2.4 Throughput of Timed SDFGs
In this section the throughput of timed SDFGs is defined,
and the relation between the execution of an SDFG and its
throughput is explained.
Definition 14 [Throughput] The throughput Th(a) of an
actor a for a self-timed execution of a timed SDFG
(A, C, E) is defined as the average number of firings of a













where γ is the repetition vector of (A, C, E). That is, the
throughput of G is the minimal actor throughput normalized
by the repetition vector.
We define the local throughput of an actor as the throughput
of that actor in a self-timed execution where non-self-loop
input channels are removed; in other words, the throughput
of an actor when it does not need to wait for data from other
actors.
Definition 15 [Local Throughput] The local throughput
LTh(a) of an actor a for a self-timed execution of a timed
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If an actor has a self-loop channel with a lower production
rate than consumption rate or insufficient tokens for an ini-
tial firing, its local throughput is zero, i.e., it deadlocks at
some point in time. Otherwise, the local throughput is deter-
mined by the self-loop channels with equal production and
consumption rates. If there are no such channels, i.e., there
are no self-loop channels or all self-loop channels have a
higher production than consumption rate, local throughput
is by definition infinite.
In a self-timed execution of a timed SDFG, there is al-
ways a time τp after which only a repetitive pattern of actor
firings occurs (when ignoring the order among actor firing
completions occurring at the same moment in time) [8, 1].
The self-timed execution from the beginning up to time τp
is called the transient phase, and thereafter is addressed as
the periodic phase. Figure 2 illustrates this fact. Thus, the
throughput of an arbitrary actor a in the self-timed execu-
tion can be calculated by counting the number of occur-
rences of firings of a in one period divided by the amount
of time that the period takes. The firings of a in one period
can be spread over the period, but the number of firings of
one actor in one period is always fixed.
Consider again SDFG Gex of Figure 1. The local
throughput of actor a is 12 , whereas it is ∞ for b and c.









3 , respectively. The graph throughput Th(Gex ) is
determined by actor a (with repetition-vector entry 3) and
is equal to ( 36 )/3 =
1
6 . This illustrates that the periodic be-
havior of the graph as a whole needs 6 time units per period.
2.5 Boundedness Definitions
Different useful notions of boundedness can be defined
for SDFGs. To enable identifying these forms, we first de-
fine boundedness for a given execution.
Definition 16 [Bounded Channel and Bounded Execution]
Let σ = S0, S1, . . . be an execution of an SDFG (A, C).
We call a channel ch bounded under σ iff there exists some
B ∈ IN such that Si(ch) ≤ B for all i ≥ 0. If all channels
of the SDFG are bounded under σ then σ is bounded.
Definition 16 carries over to timed executions in a straight-
forward way. Now, we give a definition for the boundedness
of an SDFG which intuitively means that it can be imple-
mented using a finite amount of memory.
Definition 17 [Bounded SDFG] A (timed) SDFG is called
bounded iff there exists a bounded maximal execution. It is
unbounded otherwise.
A stronger form of boundedness is strict boundedness.
Definition 18 [Strictly Bounded Channel and Strictly
Bounded SDFG] A channel is strictly bounded iff it is
bounded under all executions. A (timed) SDFG is called
strictly bounded iff all of its channels are strictly bounded.
Note that any strictly bounded SDFG is also bounded. We
finally define another form of boundedness, which only
considers self-timed executions of timed SDFGs.
Definition 19 [Self-timed Bounded SDFG] A timed SDFG
is self-timed bounded iff all self-timed executions are
bounded. A channel in a timed SDFG is self-timed bounded
iff it is bounded in all self-timed executions.
All self-timed bounded SDFGs are bounded but not neces-
sarily strictly bounded. Running example Gex is not strictly
bounded because a can be fired indefinitely without firing b
and c. However, it is self-timed bounded, as Figure 2 illus-
trates. It is not difficult to construct bounded SDFGs that
are not self-timed bounded. If the execution times of actors
b and c in Gex are changed to 3, for example, then the SDFG
remains bounded but it is no longer self-timed bounded.
These examples show that the notion of self-timed bounded-
ness does not coincide with other notions of boundedness.
Given the importance of self-timed execution, it is worth
investigating this notion in some detail.
3 Boundedness
In this section, we study necessary and sufficient condi-
tions under which an SDFG is live and bounded.
Theorem 20 A live SDFG G = (A, C) is bounded iff it is
consistent.
Theorem 20 states the consistency of an SDFG as a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for boundedness of live SD-
FGs. If a subgraph of an SDFG deadlocks (which means
that the SDFG is not live) then the consistency of an SDFG
is not sufficient for boundedness. For example, consider
Gex of Figure 1 without the initial token in the c-b chan-
nel. Execution times may be ignored. The resulting SDFG
is consistent but not bounded. The SCC of the graph that
consists of actors b and c deadlocks after the first firing of
both actors. However, actor a can continue its firing, which
leads to an unbounded channel between a and b.
Proposition 21 [20] A strongly connected SDFG is live iff
it is deadlock-free.
The definition of liveness states that a live SDFG has an
execution in which all actors fire infinitely often. If a live
SDFG is strongly connected, then all actors fire infinitely
often in all maximal executions.
Lemma 22 If one SCC in an SDFG G deadlocks then ei-
ther G deadlocks or it is unbounded.
This lemma implies that a deadlock-free and bounded
SDFG is live.
Corollary 23 An SDFG is live and bounded iff it is
deadlock-free and bounded.
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The following theorem follows from Theorem 20, Proposi-
tion 21, Lemma 22, and Corollary 23.
Theorem 24 An SDFG is live and bounded iff it is consis-
tent and all its SCCs are deadlock-free.
The example SDFG Gex is live and bounded because it is
consistent and all its SCCs are deadlock-free.
Next, we give an algorithm to check liveness and bound-
edness of an SDFG.
Algorithm isLive&Bounded(G)
Input: A connected (timed) SDFG G
Output: “live and bounded” or “either deadlock or un-
bounded”
1. if G is inconsistent
2. then return “either deadlock or unbounded”
3. for each maximal SCC S in G
4. do if S deadlocks
5. then return “either deadlock or unbounded”
6. return “live and bounded”
Consistency of SDFGs can be verified efficiently as ex-
plained in [3]. Maximal SCCs of a graph can also be com-
puted efficiently [5]. Algorithms for detecting deadlock for
consistent strongly connected SDFGs that are efficient in
practice are given in [12, 8].
4 Strict Boundedness
This section identifies sufficient and necessary condi-
tions for the liveness and strict boundedness of an SDFG.
Theorem 25 [20, Theorem 4.11] A live (timed) SDFG is
strictly bounded iff it is consistent and strongly connected.
This theorem in combination with Proposition 21 implies
the following theorem.
Theorem 26 An SDFG is live and strictly bounded iff it is
deadlock-free, consistent and strongly connected.
So the algorithm for checking liveness and strict bounded-
ness first checks whether the SDFG is strongly connected
and consistent, and then whether it is deadlock-free using
the algorithms from [5, 3, 8, 12]. The example of Figure 1
is not strictly bounded because it is not strongly connected.
5 Self-timed Boundedness
In this section, we investigate the liveness and self-timed
boundedness of timed SDFGs. A self-timed execution of
a live and self-timed bounded SDFG uses a finite amount
of memory and all actors fire infinitely often in such an ex-
ecution. Necessary and sufficient conditions for liveness
and self-timed boundedness are given, and an algorithm for
checking these conditions.
5.1 Some Basic Properties
Self-timed boundedness has a strong relationship with
the throughput of an SDFG. In this subsection, some prop-
erties for the throughput as well as the relation between
boundedness and throughput of timed SDFGs are given.
The throughput of an actor is only determined by the
throughput of its predecessors and its local throughput.
Lemma 27 The throughput of an actor b ∈ A of a timed
SDFG G = (A, C, E) satisfies the equation






The throughput of actor b of Gex , for example, is 12 , because
its predecessor a has that throughput, the rates of channel a-
b are 1 and its local throughput is∞.
Corollary 28 If actors a, b ∈ A of an SDFG G are con-
nected by a channel (a, b, p, c) then Th(b) ≤ (p/c)Th(a).
After having illustrated the factors that are involved in cal-
culating the throughput of an actor, we now show that the
only case that a channel is not self-timed bounded, is when
the production of tokens into one channel is larger than the
consumption of tokens out of that channel.
Lemma 29 SDFG (A, C, E) is self-timed bounded iff
Th(b) ≥ (p/c)Th(a) for every channel (a, b, p, c) ∈ C.
The next proposition gives necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for self-timed boundedness of a live strongly con-
nected SDFG.
Proposition 30 A live and strongly connected SDFG G is
self-timed bounded iff it is consistent.
Lemmas 31 and 32 and Proposition 33 prove some use-
ful properties about the relation between the throughput
of various actors. Lemma 31, which follows immediately
from Corollary 28 and Lemma 29, shows the relation be-
tween producer and consumer actors of an arbitrary self-
timed bounded channel. Lemma 32 shows the relation be-
tween the actor throughputs for any two actors in an SCC
of an SDFG. Proposition 33 gives the relation between the
throughput of two arbitrary actors in consistent self-timed
bounded or strongly connected SDFGs.
Lemma 31 If a channel (a, b, p, c) connecting a and b is
self-timed bounded then Th(b) = (p/c)Th(a).
Lemma 32 If a and b are two actors of an SCC of a con-
sistent SDFG with repetition vector γ, then Th(a)/γ(a) =
Th(b)/γ(b).
Proposition 33 If a and b are two actors of a consistent
self-timed bounded or strongly connected SDFG G with
repetition vector γ then Th(a)/γ(a) = Th(b)/γ(b).
This proposition shows that for consistent self-timed
bounded or strongly connected SDFGs the throughput as
defined in Definition 14 can be calculated via an arbitrary
actor without explicitly computing the minimum.
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5.2 Reduction to an HSDFG
In this section, we propose a method for reducing a
consistent SDFG G to an HSDFG GH which preserves
(non-)liveness and self-timed (un)boundedness of G. In
GH , every actor has a self-loop channel with one initial to-
ken, rates of all channels are one (i.e., it is an HSDFG), and,
ignoring self-loops, it is acyclic. Because of these simple
properties, we use the reduced graph for verifying the live-
ness and self-timed boundedness of the original SDFG. The
reduction also preserves throughput which means our algo-
rithm also provides the throughput of the original SDFG G.
The reduction uses the notion of local throughput of an
SCC of an SDFG, and it is illustrated in Figure 3 which
provides the reduced graph for the running example.
Definition 34 [Local Throughput of an SCC] The local
throughput LTh(κ) of an SCC κ = (Aκ, Cκ, Eκ) in a con-
sistent SDFG G = (A, C, E) with repetition vector γ is
defined as the actor throughput of an arbitrary actor a ∈ Aκ
when all input channels from A\Aκ to Aκ are removed, di-
vided by γ(a).







Figure 3. The reduced HSDFG for Gex .
Definition 35 [Reduced Graph] Let a consistent SDFG
G = (A, C, E) contain n maximal SCCs κ1 =
(Aκ1 , Cκ1 , Eκ1), . . . , κn = (Aκn , Cκn , Eκn). Suppose γ
is the repetition vector of G. We define the reduced SDFG
GH = (AH , CH , EH) as follows: AH = {xi|1 ≤ i ≤ n}
(which means one actor for each maximal SCC in G); CH
contains a channel (xi, xj , pγ(a), cγ(b)) for every channel
(a, b, p, c) ∈ C where a ∈ Aκi , b ∈ Aκj , i 6= j; CH also
contains self-loop channels (xi, xi, 1, 1) for every actor; the
execution time EH (xi) equals 1/LTh(κi) if κi does not
deadlock and∞ if it does. According to the balance equa-
tions we know that for each channel in the original graph
(a, b, p, c), pγ(a) = cγ(b). Thus, the production and con-
sumption rates for every channel in CH are equal. There-
fore, we can simplify the reduced G by setting all rates of all
channels in CH to one. Consequently, we obtain an HSDFG
as the result. Finally, every self-loop channel in GH con-
tains one initial token, and all the other channels are empty.
Since the HSDFG resulting from the reduction is acyclic
when ignoring self-loops, the preservation of throughput,
(non-)liveness and self-timed (un-)boundedness that we are
aiming at, is independent of the number of initial tokens
on the non-self-loop channels. Hence, we choose to leave
those channels empty.
Consider the reduced graph shown in Figure 3. The orig-
inal graph Gex has two maximal strongly connected com-
ponents, containing actor a, and actors b and c, respectively.
These SCCs are reduced to actors x1 and x2. Since actor a
has throughput 12 and repetition-vector entry 3, the execu-
tion time of x1 is set to 6, illustrating that 3 firings of a
take 6 time units. Considering the other SCC in isolation,
it can be verified that one period of this SCC containing 3
firings of b and 2 of c consists of 4 time units. Given the
repetition vector of Gex and Definition 34, this gives a local
throughput of 14 and an execution time of 4 for x2.
The following proposition shows the relation between
the throughput of actors in a maximal SCC of an SDFG
and the throughput of the actor corresponding to that SCC
in the reduced SDFG.
Proposition 36 Let GH be the reduced SDFG of a consis-
tent timed SDFG G with repetition vector γ. If a maximal
SCC κ = (Aκ, Cκ, Eκ) in G is replaced by actor x in GH ,
then for any a ∈ Aκ, Th(a) = γ(a)Th(x).
It is easy to verify that Proposition 36 holds for the run-
ning example. Consider for instance actor x2 of the re-
duced graph. Its throughput in the reduced graph is fully
determined by the throughput of x1 and becomes there-





Th(c) = 2( 16 ) =
1
3 , which corresponds to the throughput
values for b and c computed at the end of Section 2.4.
The next corollary follows from the definition of
throughput, the observation that all repetition-vector entries
of an HSDFG are always one, and Propositions 33 and 36.
Corollary 37 The throughput of a consistent self-timed
bounded SDFG is equal to the throughput of its reduced
graph.
The reduction also preserves self-timed (un-)boundedness.
Theorem 38 A consistent timed SDFG is self-timed
bounded iff its reduced graph is self-timed bounded.
Proposition 36 implies that non-zero throughput (i.e.,
(non-)liveness) is preserved.
Corollary 39 A consistent timed SDFG is live iff its re-
duced graph is live.
5.3 Verifying Self-timed Boundedness
This section introduces an algorithm that determines
whether an SDFG is live and self-timed bounded. The fol-
lowing theorem follows from the results obtained so far.
Theorem 40 A timed SDFG G is live and self-timed
bounded iff isLive&SelftimedBounded (G) returns “yes”.
Algorithm isLive&SelftimedBounded(G=(A, C, E))
Input: A connected timed SDFG G
Output: “yes, Th(G)” if self-timed bounded and live, “no”
otherwise
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1. if not isLive&Bounded(G)
2. then return “no”
3. GH = (AH , CH , EH)←reduce(G)
4. AL[1..|AH |]←topologicalSort(GH)
5. if |AH | = 1
6. then return “yes, 1
EH(AL[1])
”
7. for i←1 to |AH |
8. do AL[i].Th ← 1
EH(AL[i])
9. if Pred(AL[i]) = {AL[i]} and AL[i].Th =∞
10. then return “no”
11. maxPTh ← 0
12. for each j ∈ Pred(AL[i])\{AL[i]}
13. do AL[i].Th ←min(AL[i].Th ,AL[j].Th)
14. maxPTh ←max(maxPTh ,AL[j].Th)
15. if maxPTh > AL[i].Th
16. then return “no”
17. return “yes, AL[1].Th”
The algorithm works in two steps. The first step checks the
liveness and boundedness (as defined by Definition 17) of
the graph by calling algorithm isLive&Bounded (lines 1 and
2). If the graph is not live and bounded, it cannot be live and
self-timed bounded. The second step concerns determining
whether the reduced HSDFG is self-timed bounded (lines 3
to 17).
If isLive&Bounded returns “yes”, we know that the
SDFG is consistent. Then, line 3 of the algorithm reduces
the SDFG according to Definition 35 and stores the result
in GH . Note that the reduction requires throughput calcula-
tions for all SCCs. For efficiency reasons, these throughput
calculations can be delayed till the algorithm really needs
this information. Calculations may then be avoided if the
algorithm returns “no” early. We have not made this ex-
plicit in the algorithm. Since G is at this point known to
be live and consistent, by Corollary 39, also GH is live. It
remains to determine self-timed (un-)boundedness.
Ignoring self-loops, GH is acyclic. Line 4 topologically
sorts the actors of GH , and stores them in array AL, so
that the predecessors of an actor AL[i] are only among the
AL[j] for j ≤ i. If GH contains only one actor, then G
is strongly connected, and hence, by Proposition 30, self-
timed bounded, and the algorithm terminates. Based on
Corollary 37, it returns the local throughput of the only ac-
tor of GH as the throughput of G. Note that every actor in
a reduced graph has a self-loop channel with one token on
it, so this value is equal to 1/EH(AL[1]). Also note that
EH(AL[1]), and EH(AL[i]) in general, may be 0. In this
case, we assume that 1/EH(AL[i]) is equal to∞.
Each iteration of the loop of lines 7 to 16 starts by cal-
culating the local throughput of each actor AL[i], 1 ≤ i ≤
|AH |, storing the result in AL[i].Th. In case of detecting a
source actor (an actor without any input channel except its
self-loop channel) with an infinite throughput, the algorithm
returns “no”, because this implies that its output channels
are unbounded. The loop continues by setting maxPTh to
zero. This variable is a temporary variable for storing the
maximum throughput of the predecessors of actor AL[i] in
iteration i. In the loop of lines 12 to 14, the minimum be-
tween the local throughput of actor AL[i] and the minimum
throughput of its predecessors is assigned to AL[i].Th . This
value, according to Lemma 27, is the throughput of the ac-
tor AL[i]. Note that since the actors are topologically sorted
in AL, the throughput of all predecessors has already been
calculated. The maximum throughput of the predecessors
of actor AL[i] is assigned to maxPTh .
The test of line 15 checks whether the maximum
throughput of predecessors of actor AL[i] (excluding AL[i])
is greater than the throughput of actor AL[i] itself. In case it
is, according to Lemma 29 at least one channel connecting
a predecessor of actor AL[i] to AL[i] is unbounded.
If the algorithm reaches line 17, then no unbounded
channel has been detected, and the graph is live and self-
timed bounded. According to Corollary 37 and the fact
that the reduced SDFG is an HSDFG with all repetition-
vector entries one, the value of AL[i].Th for all actors
AL[i] ∈ AH is equal to the throughput of G. The al-
gorithm returns AL[1].Th . The emphasis of algorithm is-
Live&SelftimedBounded is on verifying liveness and self-
timed boundedness of an SDFG, so it returns as soon as it
detects that the graph is not live or not self-timed bounded.
It can be easily adapted to compute the throughput for SD-
FGs which are not self-timed bounded as well.
6 Related Work
There are interesting similarities between SDFGs and
Petri nets. In particular, there is a straightforward transla-
tion from SDFGs to a subclass of Petri nets, called weighted
Marked Graphs and vice versa, where actors are transitions,
and channels are places. Marked Graphs, also called T-
Graphs are known to be the subclass of Petri nets that is
most amenable to rigorous analysis. Thus, it makes sense
to compare the results obtained in this paper with the corre-
sponding results in the literature concerning Petri nets. We
studied liveness in combination with three different defini-
tions of boundedness (Definitions 17, 18 and 19) for (timed)
SDFGs.
We do not know of any related results for boundedness
as defined by Definition 17. The only result we know for
this type of boundedness is in [16] which only introduces
it without providing necessary and sufficient conditions, as
we do.
For strict boundedness in the sense of Definition 18, the
problem has been studied from different viewpoints in the
Petri-net literature (see for an overview [7, 15]). In particu-
lar, [20] gives necessary and sufficient conditions for strict
boundedness of live weighted Marked Graphs (our Theo-
rem 25). Strict boundedness is also the only kind of bound-
edness which has been investigated formally in the litera-
ture on SDFGs themselves; Karp and Miller in their sem-
inal paper [11] introduced computation graphs, which are
slightly more general than SDFGs. They proved necessary
and sufficient conditions for liveness and strict boundedness
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in their model. Their results as well as those in [20] corre-
spond to those presented in this paper.
Our third definition of boundedness, self-timed bounded-
ness (see Definition 19) is defined on timed SDFGs. There-
fore, we need to compare it with time-enabled Petri nets.
Petri nets have been extended with quantitative time in dif-
ferent ways, by adding timing information to places, transi-
tions and/or tokens (see [4] for a survey). The timed Petri
net model that comes closest to timed SDFGs is the “time
Petri net” model originally defined by [14]. This exten-
sion of Petri nets associates a duration (delay) and a dead-
line to transitions. We are not aware of any study of the
self-timed boundedness problem for the subclass of time
Marked Graphs. In [18], the liveness and strict bounded-
ness problem for time Petri nets is studied but only some
sufficient conditions are given. These conditions guaran-
tee that once a time Petri net satisfies certain syntactic con-
straints, it is live and strictly bounded if the underlying un-
timed Petri net is live and strictly bounded. Unfortunately,
the results of [18] cannot be applied in our setting since the
syntactic constraints require the absence of either duration
or deadline both of which are necessary for translation of
timed SDFGs to time Petri nets. [10] proves a general un-
decidability result for strict boundedness of time Petri net of
[14]. However, in [2], two sufficient conditions are given for
strict boundedness of time Petri nets. We are not aware of
any result about self-timed boundedness as defined in Def-
inition 19. To the best of our knowledge, both the concept
and the derived results are novel.
7 Conclusions
We have studied the liveness and boundedness of Syn-
chronous Data Flow Graphs, which are also known as
weighted Marked Graphs in the Petri-net literature. Live-
ness and boundedness is a prerequisite of any meaningful
SDFG model of a streaming multi-media application. Two
known notions of boundedness, namely boundedness and
strict boundedness, have been studied rigorously, and in
particular necessary and sufficient conditions for liveness
in combination with these two types of boundedness have
been given. For strict boundedness, these conditions were
already known from the Petri-net literature. Furthermore, a
new notion, self-timed boundedness, was introduced. Self-
timed boundedness checks whether self-timed execution of
an SDFG is bounded. A self-timed execution yields the
maximum throughput for an SDFG. Necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for self-timed boundedness and liveness
have been proven. An algorithm for checking these con-
ditions was presented. Besides, existing throughput analy-
sis techniques, which are only valid for strongly connected
graphs, are extended to arbitrary consistent SDFGs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The behavior of embedded hardware and software systems
is determined by at least three dimensions: control flow, data
aspects, and real-time requirements. To specify the different
dimensions of a system with the best-suited techniques, the
formal language CSP-OZ-DC [1] integrates Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP) [2], Object-Z (OZ) [3], and Dura-
tion Calculus (DC) [4] into a declarative formalism equipped
with a unified and compositional semantics. In this paper, we
provide evidence that CSP-OZ-DC is a convenient language
for modeling systems of industrial relevance. To this end, we
examine the emergency message handling in the European
Train Control System (ETCS) [5] as a case study with uninter-
preted constants and infinite data domains. We automatically
verify that our model ensures real-time safety properties,
which crucially depend on the system’s data handling.
Related work on ETCS case studies focuses on stochastic
examinations of the communication reliability [6], [7]. The
components’ data aspects are neglected, though.
II. A CSP-OZ-DC MODEL OF THE ETCS
In this section, we introduce the case study and present its
CSP-OZ-DC model in more detail.
The ETCS [5] aims at replacing national train control
systems with the goal of ensuring cross-border interoperability
and improving railway safety as well as track utilization. In the
final ETCS implementation level, trains communicate over a
radio connection with radio block centers (RBCs). Controlling
the traffic in well-defined areas, the RBCs grant movement
authorities to trains. In order to increase the traffic density,
movement authorities are given up to a position—called limit
of authority (LOA)—closely behind the preceding train. In
case of an accident, the train control system has to stop all
trains safely. Focusing on the emergency message handling,
we ensure in our case study that the trains never collide.
In our CSP-OZ-DC model the case study’s components are
specified in an object-oriented way using classes. To give an
idea of both the specification language and the case study, we
introduce the class Train in more detail. Every CSP-OZ-DC
class comprises an interface part defining typed channels that
can be used for the inter-class communication.
This work was partly supported by the German Research Council (DFG)
as part of the Transregional Collaborative Research Center “Automatic Ver-
ification and Analysis of Complex Systems” (SFB/TR 14 AVACS) and the
Graduate School “TrustSoft” (GRK 1076/1).
Train(ID : TrainID)
chan send, receive : [m : Message, id : TrainID]
chan computeSBI : [loa, sbi : Position]
local chan selectSpeed, applyEB, applySB · · ·
The interface part of the class Train declares the channels
send and receive for communication with the RBC. These
channels carry two values indicating the kind of message
and the ID of the sending train. In addition, we define the
channel computeSBI carrying two position values. It computes
the service brake intervention limit (SBI), i.e., the last position
on the track the train has to apply the service brakes to halt
before reaching the LOA. If the train exceeds this point the
emergency brakes have to be used. The remaining channels
(speed or brake instructions) are declared as local.
The external and internal behavior of CSP-OZ-DC com-
ponents is described with CSP processes [2]. The processes
communicate by sending data values over channels, respecting
the channel declarations in the interface part. We call the
occurrence of a communication an event. The process Run in
the CSP part of Train determines a train’s running behavior.
Run
c
= updatePosition.ID?pos → getLOA.ID?loa
→ computeSBI!loa?sbi
→ if sbi ≤ pos
then applySB → selectSpeed → Run
else releaseSB → selectSpeed → Run
It states that every updatePosition event is followed by a
getLOA event that updates the LOA, the position up to which
the train may proceed without reaching the preceding train.
The next permitted event, computeSBI, takes the new LOA
as argument and computes the SBI. If the current position
of the train is already beyond the SBI the train has to brake
down. To this end, it selects a new speed value. The process
Run is interleaved with a process HandleEM implementing the
response of the train to emergency warnings.
Data aspects are specified with the object-oriented language
Object-Z (OZ) [3]. The OZ part of every class consists of three
kinds of schemata. The state schema defines the attributes
of the class together with invariants restricting their values.
The state schema of Train defines amongst others the current
position and the SBI as attributes:
position : Position
sbi : Position, · · ·
position < sbi
com computeSBI
∆(sbi) loa?, sbi! : Position
sbi! = sbi′ =
loa? − StopDist
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An initial schema (not depicted here) constrains the attributes’
initial values. Operation schemata associated with channels
specify data changes that are performed at the moment the CSP
part communicates over the channel. The operation schema
for computeSBI contains a ∆ expression indicating that the sbi
attribute is changed by this schema. The input loa? is provided
by the environment and contains the LOA position. The new
value for sbi is represented by the primed variable sbi′, the
return value by sbi!. These values are calculated depending on
loa? and the distance StopDist the train needs to stop when
exceeding the SBI.
We use an uninterpreted constant for the distance StopDist,
i.e., this value is restricted by constraints, but not defined
explicitly. Furthermore, our case study comprises variables
of infinite data types like position and speed. We model the
domains as reals: Position == R, Speed == R+. The values
of these variables are also transferred via channels.
Real-time constraints are described using the dense real-
time logic DC [4]. Since we aim at automatic verification, we
use the subclass of counterexample-trace formulae [1].
¬(true ;  receive.warning.ID ; 0.5 <  ∧  applyEB)
· · ·
The given DC formula states that after receiving a warning
event () we do not allow an interval greater than 0.5 time
units (0.5 < ) to follow without () an applyEB event.
III. VERIFICATION OF THE CASE STUDY
The formal semantics of CSP-OZ-DC is given in terms of
timed automata extended with data variables, so-called phase
event automata (PEA). Each part of a CSP-OZ-DC specifica-
tion is translated into a single PEA [1]. A distinguished parallel
composition is defined for PEA such that they synchronize on
both events and data variables. This operation allows for a
compositional semantics and it guarantees that once a safety
property holds for one PEA it also holds for every parallel
composition with this PEA.
In order to check a (safety) property given as DC formula
for a CSP-OZ-DC model, we use the automata theoretic
approach of Vardi and Wolper [8]. We first compute the PEA
semantics of the model. The given DC formula, that has to be
a counterexample-trace formula, is automatically transformed
(the tool is available on [9]) into a set of test automata, i.e.,
PEA with distinguished bad states. The model satisfies the
formula on an interval iff a bad state is reachable in the parallel
composition of the PEA semantics and the test automata
(cf. [10]). To cope with infinite data types and uninterpreted
constants, we apply the abstraction refinement model checker
ARMC [11] to check reachability in the product automaton.
Our aim is to ensure that two trains never collide. We
express this property in the DC formula ¬(true ;position1 >
position2 − Length). It shows that the property crucially
depends on the trains’ data behavior. The model of the full
case study is too large to verify the property in a single
step. However, we benefit from the compositionality of the
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS (ATHLON XP 2200+, 512 MB RAM)
Task Locs Trans Vars Preds Abstr Refs TA ARMC
Run 178 6196 31 46 347 22 24.6 1556
Delivery 1 122 18757 122 472 2198 420 50 86874
Delivery 2 14 366 14 9 29 8 2.7 13.9
Delivery 3 17 173 10 9 27 5 2.2 1.9
Braking 1 44 240 17 6 61 5 3 5.1
Braking 2 172 1643 33 9 157 7 9 35.3
CSP-OZ-DC semantics and verify local properties for the par-
allel components of our model. The compositional semantics
ensures that those properties hold for the entire system.
Table I gives a subset of our experimental results for a range
of verification tasks. It lists the numbers of program locations
(Locs), transitions (Trans), variables (Vars), predicates gener-
ated by ARMC (Preds), abstract states (Abstr), refinements
loops (Refs), runtimes in seconds for generating test automata
and parallel product (TA), and for model checking (ARMC).
For instance, we consider the running behavior of the train in
isolation and verify the safety property stated above, assuming
that the first train does not apply the emergency brakes. To this
end, we take only those PEA into account that influence the
running behavior, i.e., the automata for the subprocess Run
together with the appropriate automata for the OZ and the DC
part. The result of this verification task is listed as “Run” in
Table I. The table additionally lists the remaining verification
tasks for the decomposition of our safety property.
From our case study, we experienced that decomposition of
models as well as properties is necessary to handle industrial-
scale systems. Therefore, the key prerequisite in our verifi-
cation approach is the compositional semantics preserving the
subcomponents’ properties for the full system. Our results also
demonstrate that the automata theoretic approach presented
here is well-suited to check large-scale models (>18000 tran-
sitions) having infinite data types and uninterpreted constants.
This is important for properties that cannot be decomposed
further and depend on a number of components. The separate
modeling of control flow, data part, and real-time requirements
helped us handle the complexity of our case study.
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Abstract— We illustrate how to employ metacircular as-
sume/guarantee reasoning to reduce the verification complexity
of finite instances of protocols for safety, using nothing more than
an explicit state model checker. The formal underpinnings of our
method are based on establishing a simulation relation between
the given protocol M , and several overapproximations thereof,
M̃1, . . . , M̃k . Each M̃i simulates M , and represents one “view” of
it. The M̃is depend on each other both to define the abstractions
as well as to justify them. We show that in case of our hierarchical
coherence protocol, its designer could easily construct each of
the M̃i in a counterexample guided manner. This approach is
practical, considerably reduces the verification complexity, and
has been successfully applied to a complex hierarchical multicore
cache coherence protocol which could not be verified through
traditional model checking.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dream of parameterized infinite-state verification of pro-
tocols for assertions written in expressive property languages
such as CTL* are commonly held, and even demonstrated on
actual protocols. However, highly complex industrial cache
coherence protocols are the other extreme: they are so complex
that one would be lucky to model check even small instances
consisting of only a few caching agents for safety properties.
With the imminence of multicore chips, the situation is ex-
pected to become worse, as multiple clusters of caching agents
will interact through a second level of protocols, which will
also be complex. The combined state space of protocols at
various caching levels is astronomical. While one may attempt
to separately verify each level and somehow “glue” together
the results, discovering suitable formal arguments supporting
the gluing step can, in fact, be an equally complex task. This
paper addresses the following problems, making the indicated
contributions:
• There is no public domain hierarchical cache coherence
protocol of reasonable complexity to employ as a verification
benchmark. In response to this problem, we developed a
complex hierarchical protocol under the supervision of an
industrial expert to ensure that our assumptions are realistic.
Our protocol adapts the FLASH [1] protocol with MESI [2]
features to manage caching within a cluster (consisting of
two cache agents and the associated local directory), and
adapts the DASH [3] protocol also with MESI features to
manage coherence among three clusters. Figure 1 shows our
verification model. It consists of a home cluster, h, and two
identical remote clusters, r1 and r2, namely M = (h ‖ r1 ‖
This work was supported in part by SRC Contract 2005-TJ-1318.
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Fig. 1. A 2-level hierarchical cache coherence protocol.
r2). Written in Murphi [4], the model [5] has about 3, 000 lines
of code, and has the kind of complex scenarios that industrial
protocols being designed today have.
• After removing many shallow bugs from M through non-
exhaustive safety model checking, we failed to show the set of
cache coherence properties φcoh on M , due to state explosion,
after 161, 876, 000 of states. Our main contribution in this
paper is a novel solution to this verification problem, adapting
many ideas from a recently proposed assume/guarantee (A/G)
approach. This A/G approach was first proposed in [6], but
employed for parameterized verification in that work. Our
method works as follows.
1. A set of abstracted protocols, M̃1, . . . , M̃k, are con-
structed from M by simply projecting out (unconstrain-
ing) selected global variables, and correspondingly over-
approximating the protocol rules.1 Different variables
are projected out for each Mi, and therefore, each M̃i
presents a different overapproximated view of M .
2. Upon model checking each M̃i with respect to φcoh
and a set of non-interference lemmas (initially an empty
set), there are three outcomes possible: the verification
succeeds: M can then be claimed to satisfy φcoh; a
genuine counterexample is generated: the designer cor-
rects M and iterates; a counterexample infeasible in M is
generated: the designer strengthens some of the guards in
M̃i, and also adds a corresponding verification obligation
(sometimes called noninterference lemma) to one of the
M̃1, . . . , M̃k, and the whole process is repeated.
Applying this procedure to our example protocol M , the above
process generates three abstracted protocols, M̃1, M̃2 and
M̃3 (M̃2 and M̃3 are the same as explained in Section III).
A genuine bug was found in M , and corrected. Thereafter,
1Murphi is a rule-based system, in which a transition relation is represented
as: rule “name′′ guard → action;.
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10 iterations were applied to both M̃1 and M̃2 to eliminate
infeasible counterexamples. In the end, model checking was
able to verify M̃1 and M̃2 with the same resources, over three
and seven hours respectively2.
• The refinement process discussed for M̃1 and M̃2 only
requires modest manual effort, with each guard strengthen-
ing condition corresponding to a reasonably natural designer
insight. Also, all noninterference lemmas can be obtained from
the strengthening conditions, and hence the soundness of our
method is assured (formally proved in Section IV).
• Our technique can be employed using any safety model
checker.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents an overview and some features of the 2-level MESI
protocol. Section III presents the generation of the M̃is, and
Section IV describes the construction of the noninterference
lemmas and guard-strengthening. Related work and conclud-
ing remarks follow.
II. BENCHMARK HIERARCHICAL COHERENCE PROTOCOLS
Our benchmark hierarchical coherence protocol is derived
by combining features from the FLASH and DASH protocols.
Such a protocol is realistic, as DASH was originally developed
for managing coherence across many clusters. It also renders
our hierarchical protocol easy to understand for researchers
who might want to attack this verification challenge problem.
One address is modeled in our protocol, as is typical in
model-checking based verification for coherence. As shown
in Figure 1, the protocol is composed of three NUMA (Non-
Uniform Memory Access) clusters: one home cluster and two
identical remote clusters. Each cluster has two symmetric L1
caches, an L2 cache and a local directory. “RAC” is the
communication controller with other clusters and the global
directory. The main memory in reality is attached to every
cluster. The fact there is only one memory is a consequence
of the 1-address abstraction of our protocol. Finally, the global
directory is to manage data copies on the three clusters.
In the 2-level hierarchy, the level-1 protocol is used within
a cluster, i.e. the two L1 caches and the L2 cache in Figure 1.
It tracks which line is cached in what state at which agent(s).
The FLASH protocol is adapted to model this level and keep
data copies within a cluster consistent. The level-2 protocol is
used among clusters, tracking caching status in cluster level.
The DASH protocol is adapted to keep clusters consistent.
Also,
• For each cache line, if it is cached in an agent then it must
also be cached in the local directory of the agent, i.e. the
inclusive property;
• Both levels use MESI, supporting explicit write-back and
silent-drop3
2These large run-times are due to the relatively complex nature of the
protocol compared to many traditional academic benchmarks. Also, no hash
compaction was used, as the in-house 64-bit version of Murphi we employed
has not been tested under hash compaction.
3Silent-drop in MESI protocols means a cache may discard a non-Modified
line at any time, changing to the Invalid state without informing the local or
global directory.
• Both levels use non-FIFO network ordering (this, according
to our industrial expert, is a desirable feature of modern
protocols).
In the process of developing our hierarchical protocol, we
discovered that it was not simply a matter of adapting FLASH
and DASH to support MESI states and silent-drops, as such
combinations can easily lead to livelocks. One such scenario is
the following. Agent-1 of cluster-1 first requests an exclusive
copy and gets granted. As a result, a subsequent request from
the rest of the system to the same line will be forwarded to
agent-1. At this time, if agent-1 has silently dropped the cache
line, it will NACK the forwarded request. Because the local
directory of agent-1 has no information about the silent-drop
happening in agent-1, and it is not safe to use the data copy
in the local directory to reply (e.g. write-back from agent-
1 is on the way), cluster-1 will keep forwarding following
requests to agent-1 and agent-1 will keep NACKing. This
results in a livelock. We solved this livelock problem by
making write-back a blocking operation and adding another
NACKing message indicating silent-drops, as detailed in [5].
  ProcState: record
     -- B1 agents in the cluster
     Proc :   array [NODE] of NODE_STATE;
     -- B2 network channels used in the cluster
     UniMsg:  array [NODE_L2] of UNI_MSG;
     InvMsg:  array [NODE_L2] of INV_MSG;
     WbMsg:   WB_MSG;
     ShWbMsg: SHWB_MSG;
     NakcMsg: NAKC_MSG;
     -- local dir for the cluster
     L2: record
         -- B3.1 used only by level-1 protocol
         pending:    boolean;
         ShrSet:      array [NODE] of boolean;
         InvCnt:     CacheCnt;
         HeadPtr:    NODE_L2;
         ReqId:      NODE;
         ReqCluster: Procss;
         ReqType:    boolean;
         isRetired:  boolean;
         ifHoldMsg:  boolean;
         -- B3.2 used by both levels
         State:     L2State;
         Data:      Datas;
         Dirty:     boolean;
         OnlyCopy:  boolean;
         Gblock_WB: boolean;
     end;
     -- B4 comm. controller with other clusters and global dir
     RAC: record
         State:    RACState;
         InvCnt:  ClusterCnt;
     end;
  end;
ABSProcState: record
      L2: record
-- B3.2
          State:     L2State;
          Data:      Datas;
          Dirty:     boolean;
          OnlyCopy:  boolean;
          Gblock_WB: boolean;
      end;
 -- B4
      RAC: record
          State:    RACState;
          InvCnt:  ClusterCnt;
      end;
  end;
Fig. 2. The concrete and abstract structures in Murphi, representing a cluster
in the hierarchical protocol.
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Our hierarchical coherence protocol coded in Murphi in-
cludes all the control logic and data coherence invariants that
FLASH and DASH have. In Figure 2, we present the data
structure representing a cluster in the hierarchical protocol, the
record “ProcState”. It contains five blocks of information: (B1)
number “NODE” of agents in a cluster, (B2) a set of network
channels used inside a cluster, (B3.1) & (B3.2) the local
directory, and (B4) a controller to communicate with other
clusters and the global directory. In these five blocks, the level-
1 protocol (used within a cluster) only involves the first four
blocks, i.e. blocks B1, B2, B3.1 and B3.2, and the level-2
protocol (used among clusters) only involves blocks B3.2 and
B4. We also present the data structure of an abstracted cluster
in Figure 2, the record “ABSProcsState”, as it will be used
quite often in the rest of the paper. An abstracted cluster only
contains blocks B3.2 and B4.
III. BUILDING ABSTRACTED PROTOCOLS
Our hierarchical protocol proved to be very complex such
that after 161, 876, 000 states, the model checking failed due
to state explosion. This is not surprising, considering the
multiplicative effect of having three instances of coherence
protocols running concurrently. We believe that all hierarchical
(e.g., multicore) coherence protocols will state explode in
this manner. This section describes how our initial abstracted
models M̃1, M̃2 and M̃3 were obtained. Due to the symmetry
between the two remote clusters, M̃2 is actually the same with
M̃3. So only M̃1 and M̃2 will be discussed in the rest of the
paper.
L2 Cache +














part of Local Dir
RAC
Fig. 3. The abstracted protocol M̃1
A. Building the abstract models
Figure 3 intuitively depicts the abstracted protocol M̃1,
which retains the home cluster intact, while abstracting the
two remote clusters (contrast with Figure 1). The abstracted
protocol M̃2 is very similar to M̃1, except that it retains one
remote cluster concretely and abstracts the other remote cluster
as well as the home cluster. The derivation of M̃1 and M̃2 from
M involves the variable abstraction and the corresponding
transition relation and invariant abstraction described next.
Specifically, in M , “Home” is the singleton set containing
the home cluster and “Rmt” is the set containing the remote
clusters 4. “Procss” is their union, and the clusters are declared
as “Procs:”
HomeCnt: 1;




Procss: union {Home, Rmt};
Procs: array [Procss] of ProcState
Now, let us consider the state declarations of clusters in
M̃1 (first half of Figure 4) and M̃2 (second half of Figure 4).
In M̃1, the home cluster will still be declared as “ProcState,”
while the remote clusters will be declared as “ABSProcState,”
the data structure only containing part of the local directory
and the communication controller of a cluster. M̃2 is similar.
 -- clusters in  M1
  HomeCnt: 1;
  RmtCnt:  2;
  Home:    scalarset(HomeCnt);
  Rmt:     scalarset(RmtCnt);
  Procss:  union {Home, Rmt};
  Procs:    array [Home] of ProcState;
  ABSProcs: array [Rmt] of ABSProcState;
  -- clusters in  M2
  HomeCnt:  1;
  RmtCnt_1: 1;
  RmtCnt_2: 1;
  Home:     scalarset(HomeCnt);
  Rmt_1:    scalarset(RmtCnt_1);
  Rmt_2:    scalarset(RmtCnt_2);
  Procs:   array [Rmt_1] of ProcState;
  ABSHome: array [Home] of ABSProcState;
  ABSRmt:  array [Rmt_2] of ABSProcState;
Fig. 4. Declaration of clusters in M̃1 and M̃2
For each transition (TR) in M , a set of corresponding TRs
are constructed in M̃1 and M̃2. These could be automatically
generated, and we have described the procedure for M̃1 in the
appendix (the procedure for M̃2 is similar). We consider the
rules one at a time in M . For every rule “guard → action”,
for any assignment of the form v := E in action , (i) if v is
a variable that has been eliminated (abstracted away), then
the whole assignment is eliminated, (ii) else if E contains
even one variable that has been abstracted away, we replace
E with a non-deterministic selection over the type of E. If a
sub-expression in guard contains any variable that has been
abstracted away, the sub-expression turns into true.
IV. VERIFYING THE HIERARCHICAL PROTOCOL
This section presents details of the refinement process and
the soundness of our approach.
A. Counterexamples, lemmas, and guard-strengthening
Figure 5 shows the process of how the refinement is applied
on M̃1, M̃2 and M (if it is buggy): When M̃1 is model checked
using Murphi with respect to φcoh, if a genuine bug is detected,
the designer corrects and reiterates. Assume that the error is
a false alarm, and involves rulep “gp → ap” of M̃1. The
corresponding rule in M is then located; assume it is “Gp →
Ap”. Then, based on the expression Gp, we manually derive
another expression ip which only contains the variables used
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in the level-2 protocol, i.e. variables in blocks B3.2 and B4 in
a cluster, the global directory, and the set of network channels
used among clusters. We will discuss how such an expression
ip can be derived from Gp in a detailed example in the next
section.
Now we add a new verification obligation (noninterference
lemma) “Gp ⇒ ip” to M̃2, and at the same time strengthen
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Fig. 5. Counterexample-guided metacircular refinement.
It is perhaps surprising that the noninterference lemma is
added as a verification obligation in M̃2, while the consequent
of this lemma, ip, is used in M̃1. This is because according
to the abstraction procedure in Section III, we know that the
bogus error in M̃1 is introduced by the overapproximation on
the remote clusters. In particular, Gp contains some remote
cluster details, however they are abstracted away in gp. So
the noninterference lemma Gp ⇒ ip can only be checked in
M̃2 where all the state elements present in Gp are available.
A similar process can be applied while refining M̃2, as also
shown in Figure 5. Essentially, for each noninterference lemma
L, it suffices to prove L in any of the abstracted models. The
question of in which abstracted model to prove L is determined
by which abstracted model has enough details for L to be
proved.
B. A detailed example of refinement
One counterexample encountered in M̃1 is as follows: after
the startstate rule is fired (e.g. the state is just initialized), Rule
“L2 Recv NAKC Nakc” in M̃1 is fired and the first statement
in the action – the assertion – is violated. This rule is shown
in the second half of Figure 6, and the corresponding rule in
M is also shown in the first half of the figure.
Consider the condition under which this rule can be enabled
in the hierarchical protocol M . Figure 7 shows an example
scenario: The remote cluster “p” initially holds an exclusive
copy in the agent “src,” another remote cluster “aux” request-
ing for an exclusive copy (step 1 and 2) is forwarded by the
global directory to the remote cluster “p” (step 3), and because
the local directory of “p” indicates that the agent “src” holds
the exclusive copy, “p” will forward the request to “src” (step
  ruleset p: Rmt; aux: Rmt do
  rule "L2_Recv_NAKC_Nakc"
      true
  ==>
  begin
      assert (GUniMsg[aux].Cmd = RDX_RAC&
              GUniMsg[aux].Cluster = p);
      undefine GUniMsg[aux];
      GUniMsg[aux].Cmd := NAK;
      GNakcMsg.Cmd := GNAKC_Nakc;
      GNakcMsg.Cluster := p;
  endrule;
  endruleset;
  ruleset p: Rmt; src: NODE do
  rule "L2_Recv_NAKC_Nakc"
      Procs[p].NakcMsg.Cmd = NAKC_Nakc &
      Procs[p].NakcMsg.Aux = L2 &
      Procs[p].L2.ReqType = false
  ==>
  var aux: Rmt;
  begin
      assert (Procs[p].L2.pending = true);
      Procs[p].L2.pending := false;
      assert(!isundefined(Procs[p].L2.ReqCluster));
      aux := Procs[p].L2.ReqCluster;
      assert (Procs[p].L2.ifHoldMsg = true);
      Procs[p].L2.ifHoldMsg := false;
      assert (GUniMsg[aux].Cmd = RDX_RAC &
              GUniMsg[aux].Cluster = p);
      undefine GUniMsg[aux];
      GUniMsg[aux].Cmd := NAK;
      GNakcMsg.Cmd := GNAKC_Nakc;
      GNakcMsg.Cluster := p;
      undefine Procs[p].L2.ReqCluster;
      undefine Procs[p].L2.ReqType;
      undefine Procs[p].NakcMsg;
      Procs[p].NakcMsg.Cmd := NAKC_None;
  endrule;
  endruleset;




Fig. 6. Rule “L2 Recv NAKC Nakc” in M and M̃1.
4.1); concurrently, “src” silently drops the copy (step 4.2). So
in receiving the forwarded request from the local directory,
“src” NACKs the request (step 5).
“src”: E
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Fig. 7. A scenario which can enable “L2 Recv NAKC Nakc” in M .
Obviously, we can see that the violation in M̃1 is a bogus
error. The reason is because the guard condition of Rule
“L2 Recv NAKC Nakc” is abstracted to “true”, which is
overly approximated compared with that in M . Figure 8
shows the solution we used to overcome this violation: a
new lemma “Lemma-7-A2” is added to M̃2, and the con-
sequent of this lemma is used to strengthen the guard of
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“L2 Recv NAKC Nakc” in M̃1.
   ruleset p: Rmt; aux: Procss do
   rule "L2_Recv_NAKC_Nakc"
       true &
       -- Lemma-7-A2
       ABSProcs[p].L2.State = Excl &
       ABSProcs[p].RAC.State = Inval &
       ABSProcs[p].L2.Gblock_WB = false &
       GUniMsg[aux].Cmd = RDX_RAC &
       GUniMsg[aux].Cluster = p
   ==>
   begin
       ...
   end;
   invariant "Lemma-7-A2"
   forall p: Rmt do
       Procs[p].NakcMsg.Cmd = NAKC_Nakc &
       Procs[p].NakcMsg.Aux = L2 &
       Procs[p].L2.ReqType = false
   ->
       Procs[p].L2.State = Excl &
       Procs[p].RAC.State = Inval &
       Procs[p].L2.Gblock_WB = false &
       exists aux: Procss do
         GUniMsg[aux].Cmd = RDX_RAC &
         GUniMsg[aux].Cluster = p  end
   end;
Guard strengthening in   using lemma-7-A2





Fig. 8. New “Lemma-7-A2” of M̃2 and guard-strengthening in M̃1.
Intuitively, the newly added lemma tries to mimic the level-
2 protocol state from the available level-1 protocol state. In
the example of Figure 8, “Lemma-7-A2” says when the local
directory of a remote cluster receives “NAKC Nakc” and this
negative reply is for a forwarded request from another remote
cluster, i.e. “Procs[p].NakcMsg.Aux = L2”, then part of the
level-2 state must be as follows – the remote cluster “p” is in
Exclusive state, its communication controller is free, it is not
blocked on write-back, and there exists another remote cluster
“aux” requesting an exclusive copy.
C. Refinement results
In the refinement process, we found a real bug in M . The
scenario corresponding to the real bug in M is similar to that in
Figure 7. Initially, a cluster called p holds an exclusive copy in
the agent src; (S1) p receives a forwarded request from another
cluster aux, for an exclusive copy; (S2) p then forwards the
request to src, the owner agent of p. (S3) Concurrently, src
updates the cache line and (S4) writes back the dirty line to
p; (S5) therefore, upon receiving the forwarded request, src
will NACK it. (S6) When p receives the write-back data and
then (S7) receives the NACKed reply from src, p will (S8.1)
reply positively to aux with a data, also (S8.2) send a message
to the global directory notifying that aux is now the exclusive
owner.
In (S8.1) of the above scenario, the cluster p should indicate
whether the data supplied to aux is dirty or not, because this
data is not sent to the global directory in (S8.2). If there is no
such indication, then aux, when it receives the data, can set
the state of the data to Exclusive. This permits aux to later
silently drop the cache line. This, in effect, throws away the
only copy of the (most recently modified) data, violating the
coherence protocol.
We eliminated this bug in M by attaching a dirty tag to
the reply message in (S8.1). Correspondingly, M̃1 and M̃2
are updated for this modification. After that, we also added
10 new noninterference lemmas to M̃1 and M̃2 individually.
The following describes the 10 new noninterference lem-
mas5 added to M̃1 and M̃2 after the above bug was corrected.
Step 1: In M̃1, a short counterexample is encountered, which
violates the assertion that when a cluster receives a write-back
from an agent, the cluster must be in Exclusive state. This
violation is introduced in M̃1 because the guard condition of
receiving write-back in remote clusters is abstracted to “true”.
Correspondingly, two similar counterexamples are encountered
in M̃2, with the same violation on the abstracted home cluster
and the abstracted remote cluster. One lemma is added to M̃2,
and its consequent is used in M̃1 and M̃2. Another lemma
is added to M̃1, but used in M̃2, both asserting that when
a cluster receives a write-back request, the cluster must be
Exclusive.
Steps 2,3,6,7: Similar to step 7, which is already discussed in
Section IV-B.
Step 4: Three short counterexamples are encountered in M̃1
and M̃2, violating an invariant that when a cluster is dirty or
Exclusive, other clusters must be Invalid for the same cache
line. The fix asserts that when a cluster receives a shared write-
back request from an agent, then that agent must be Exclusive.
Step 5: Three counterexample are encountered in M̃1 and
M̃2, violating the assertion of an impossible branch in the
hierarchical protocol M (“assert false”). The fix involves
asserting that: if there is a state s in which (i) a cluster receives
a NACK reply indicating the silent dropping of a line by an
agent, and (ii) when such NACK arrives, the exclusive owner
pointer is pointing neither at the local directory nor at the
agent sending the NACK, then s is impossible.
Step 8: Three rather long counterexamples are encountered
in M̃1 and M̃2, violating the invariant that when a cluster is
waiting for invalidation acknowledgments and another cluster
is Shared for the line, then there must exist an invalidation
request being sent to the second cluster. A similar fix is
applied, asserting that when the owner pointer of a cluster
is the local directory, the cluster must be either Exclusive or
Shared.
Step 9: Three counterexamples are encountered in M̃1 and
M̃2, violating the invariant that when the global directory is not
Exclusive, the main memory data should be the same with the
current value of the cache line in the system. A similar fix is
applied, asserting that when a cluster receives a shared request
from a second cluster, the first cluster must be Exclusive.
Step 10: Three counterexamples are encountered, violating
the assertion that when an exclusive request is granted, the
reply should also contain the data. A similar fix as in Step 9
is applied.
After Step 10, all counterexamples disappear. Model check-
ing on M̃1 results in 31, 919, 219 states using three hours, and
5These 10 refinement steps are listed only to give the reader a detailed
glimpse at the nature of the errors and their strengthening conditions. The
details are not important to follow.
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78, 689, 678 states for M̃2 using seven hours, both with the
same resources.
D. A theorem justifying metacircular reasoning
The intuitive reason for the soundness of this approach is
the following inductive argument. The verification obligations
such as Gp ⇒ ip that are added to each of the abstract models
M̃i are, of course, checked at the initial state. This implies
that when Gp is true (the corresponding rule is enabled), ip is
implied. In other words, we never be underapproximating the
state space if ip is used to strengthen Gp. Since the valuations
of the variables in M̃1 and M̃2 are the same as that in M ,
strengthening an abstracted version of Gp with ip (which is
what we do in our refinement method) is also sound. Now,
since this check is done at every step, we ensure that the entire
reachable state space is an overapproximation.
More formally, in [6], a theory was developed based on the
classical notion of simulation proofs [7]. This theory was used
to justify metacircular reasoning in parameterized verification
of cache coherence protocols. However, the theory itself does
not depend on any parameterized verification features. We
summarize the main theorem of [6] as follows (we retain the
equation and theorem numbers used in that paper):
Theorem 3. Suppose M is a state transition system (STS):
M = (S, I, T ), where S is the set of states, I ⊆ S is the set
of initial states, T ⊆ S × S is the set of transition relations,
and R(M) is the set of reachable states of M . Also suppose V
is a set of “views” on M , {fv : v ∈ V } is a set of functions
that create each view abstraction over the states in M , and
{M̃v : v ∈ V } is the corresponding set of abstracted STS. Let
f (respectively f−1) be obtained by lifting fv (respectively
f−1v ) over tuples of abstract states. If there exists an abstract
system which is a product STS, M̃ = Πv∈V M̃v, where M̃v =
(S̃v , Ĩv, T̃v) for v ∈ V , then if for each v ∈ V :
(7) ∀s ∈ I : fv(s) ∈ Ĩv
(8) ∀(s, s′) ∈ T : (∀u ∈ V : fu ∈ R(M̃v)) ⇒ fv(s, s′) ∈ M̃v
then (f−1(R(M̃ )), f) is a simulation from M to M̃ and:
(9) ∀s ∈ R(M) : (∀v ∈ V : fv(s) ∈ R(M̃v))
While space does not permit a detailed explanation, we can
actually explain these results quite well using our hierarchical
protocol M . It is easy to see that each state s in M can be
represented as a state vector
s = [〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.1, r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
where 〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉 and 〈r2.1, r2.2〉 are the state
components over the home cluster, remote-1 and remote-
2 clusters. Moreover, h.1, r1.1, r2.1 correspond to the
blocks B1, B2 and B3.1 in ProcState of Figure 2, and
h.2, r1.2, r2.2 corresponds to the blocks B3.2 and B4
in ProcState. gs is the rest of information in s, including
the global directory and the network channels used among
clusters. Now we discuss three abstractions in this section,
M̃1, M̃2 and M̃3, as was the case in our discussions in
Section III. We can have the following theorem and equations
in our framework. All numberings now carry a prime.
Theorem 3’. If f1, f2, f3 are three abstract functions s.t.
(7’)
∀s ∈ I and
s = [〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.1, r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
⇒
fi(s) ∈ Ĩi, i ∈ [1..3], where
f1(s) = [〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
f2(s) = [〈h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
f3(s) = [〈h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.1, r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
(8’)
∀(s, s′) ∈ T : fi(s) ∈ R(M̃i), i ∈ [1..3] and
s = [〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.1, r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
s′ = [〈h.1′, h.2′〉, 〈r1.1′, r1.2′〉, 〈r2.1′, r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
⇒
fi(s, s
′) ∈ T̃i, i ∈ [1..3], where
f1(s
′) = [〈h.1′, h.2′〉, 〈r1.2′〉, 〈r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
f2(s
′) = [〈h.2′〉, 〈r1.1′, r1.2′〉, 〈r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
f3(s
′) = [〈h.2′〉, 〈r1.2′〉, 〈r2.1′, r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
then all the invariants in M̃1, M̃2 and M̃3 are valid in M ,
including the coherence properties. 
The fact that Theorem 3’ is indeed a theorem follows from
the fact that the antecedents of Theorem 3’ are stronger than
the antecedents used in Theorem 3.
1) Applying the theorem: Now we prove that the abstracted
protocols M̃1, M̃2 and M̃3 (M̃3 is the same with M̃2 for our
hierarchical protocol M ) indeed satisfy the conditions (7’)
and (8’). This will then allow us to conclude that the cache
coherence properties in the abstracted protocols also hold in
the original hierarchical protocol. We will, therefore, focus
only on (8’), as the proof of satisfaction of (7’) is much
simpler.
Proof:
From a simple induction, we have
(9)’
∀s ∈ R(M),
s = [〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.1, r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
⇒
f1(s) = [〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
f2(s) = [〈h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
f3(s) = [〈h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.1, r2.2〉, 〈gs〉]
Now, consider any state transition (s, s′) in the hierarchical
protocol M . Assume that s′ is obtained by firing a rule in M ,
“R : g → a”. From Section III-A, we know there exists one
rule corresponding to R in each of M̃1, M̃2, and M̃3. These
are: in M̃1 “R1 : g1 → a1 ′′; in M̃2 ′′R2 : g2 → a2 ′′, and
in M̃3 ′′R3 : g3 → a3 ′′.
Also, the guard expression g of R can belong to only one of
the following four cases. This is because any level-1 protocol
details can only be visible to the level-2 protocol in the same
cluster:
1. g only involves variables in 〈h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉
2. g only involves 〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉
3. g only involves 〈h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉
4. g only involves 〈h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.1, r2.2〉, 〈gs〉
We now analyze each case to see that (8’) is indeed satisfied.
Case 1. g only involves 〈h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉 (i.e. does
not refer to any “inner” state components).
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From Section III-A, we know that g1 = g2 = g3 = g, also
because
f1(s), f2(s), f3(s) and s hold the same values over vari-
ables in 〈h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉
So f1(s), f2(s), f3(s) are enabled at R1, R2, R3 individually;
from Section III-A we also know that the action ai ’s in rule
Ri’s, have the exact updates over variables in fi(s), i ∈ [1..3],
as the action of the hierarchical protocol, a in R does. So
• a1(f1(s)) = [〈h.1
′, h.2′〉, 〈r1.2′〉, 〈r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
= f1(s
′)
• a2(f2(s)) = [〈h.2
′〉, 〈r1.1′, r1.2′〉, 〈r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
= f2(s
′)
• a3(f3(s)) = [〈h.2
′〉, 〈r1.2′〉, 〈r2.1′, r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
= f3(s
′)
Case 2. g only involves 〈h.1, h.2〉,〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉,〈gs〉 (i.e. g
refers to some “inner” state components of the home cluster)
On one side, for R1 in M̃1, based on Section III-A,
– g1 = g
– a1 , the action of R1 in M̃1, has the exact updates
over the variables in 〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉
as a, the action of R in M does;
So f1(s) is enabled at R1, and
– a1(f1(s)) = [〈h.1′, h.2′〉, 〈r1.2′〉, 〈r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
= f1(s
′)
On the other side, for R2 in M̃2, based on Section III-A,
g2 only involves variables in
〈h.2〉,〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉,〈gs〉, and all the sub-expressions
in g2 involving any of these variables are exactly
the same as the sub-expressions in g , so g ⇒ g2; or
a new lemma is added and guard-strengthening is
applied such that
∗ g2 = g20 ∧ GuardSstrength
∗ We do know that g ⇒ g20
∗ GuardSstrength only involves variables in
〈h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉
∗ g ⇒ GuardSstrength (this follows from the non-
interference lemma being established)
Please note that the above reasoning does not depend
on whether the new lemma was added into M̃1, M̃2
or M̃3. The only property that matters is that for each
variable in 〈h.1, h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.1, r2.2〉, 〈gs〉,
it has the same value (if exists) in s, f1(s), f2(s) and
f3(s), which has already been stated in (9’).
Again, because the variables in f2(s) have the same
values over 〈h.2〉, 〈r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉 with s, so
∗ f2(s) ⇒ g20
∗ f2(s) ⇒ GuardSstrength
That is, f2(s) is enabled at R2. Based on Section III-
A, we know that the action a2 in rule R2 of
M̃2, has the exact updates over state components
〈h.2〉, 〈r1.1, r1.2〉, 〈r2.2〉, 〈gs〉 as a, the action of R
in M does. So
– a2(f2(s)) = [〈h.2′〉, 〈r1.1′, r1.2′〉, 〈r2.2′〉, 〈gs′〉]
= f2(s
′)
Similarly, the result holds for f3: a3(f3(s)) = f3(s′).
Case 3& 4. These two cases can be proved similarly. 
The above proof justifies that the coherence properties in
the abstracted protocols M̃1, M̃2 and M̃3 also hold in the
hierarchical protocol M . Moreover, according to Section III-
A, we know that every invariant in M is covered by invariants
in M̃1 and M̃2. So, it follows that once M̃1 and M̃2 are
model checked to be coherent, the hierarchical protocol is also
coherent.6
V. RELATED WORK
This paper owes most of its intellectual debts to the work
in [6] on verifying parameterized cache coherence protocols,
and McMillan’s work on compositional model checking [8].
The abstractions we used, the reliance on circular reasoning,
and the counterexample-guided discovery of noninterference
lemmas are all deeply influenced by their work. In addition to
all our contributions pointed out earlier, we have two method-
ological contributions: Firstly, we find a way to naturally
abstract a 2-level hierarchical cache coherence protocol into a
few far simpler protocols. Secondly, the refinement process
on the abstracted protocols is straightforward to conduct,
including the noninterference lemmas. Finally, based on a
theorem in [6], we have formally verified that our abstraction
method is sound and complete.
McMillan [9] also modeled a 2-level MSI coherence proto-
col, based on the Gigamax distributed multiprocessor. In his
protocol, bus-snooping is used in both levels. SMV [9] was
used to check two clusters each having six processors with
safety and liveness properties. Compared to our hierarchical
protocol, the Gigamax model is much simpler.
Lahiri and Bryant in [10] use predicate abstraction to
automatically construct quantified invariants. Their abstraction
is similar with ours: for each concrete state, the abstraction
maps it into multiple abstract states each of which corresponds
to subranges of a set of universally quantified variables.
Overapproximation ensures that the soundness of properties in
the abstracted system guarantee the soundness in the concrete
system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Hierarchical cache coherence protocol verification is a chal-
lenging problem, as these protocols have many more protocol
corner cases than non-hierarchical protocols, and have too
many reachable states. In this paper, we propose a method to
abstract a 2-level hierarchical coherence protocol into a few
far simpler and tractable protocols. By verifying these simpler
protocols, the correctness of the hierarchical protocol follows
through the refinement theorem, also presented in this paper.
Our success with the complex 2-level MESI hierarchical pro-
tocol developed in consultation with an industrial coherence
protocol designer leads us to believe that other hierarchical
coherence protocols – including snoopy, directory-based, ring
interconnect based, as well as token-coherence based protocols
– can be similarly verified.z Protocols with more than two
6The process of refinement will, of course, terminate because in the
extreme case, we may end up describing the original protocol M through
the noninterference lemmas! This extreme is not expected in practice.
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levels (again common in large shared memory machines) also
appear entirely amenable to our approach.
We plan to mechanize our method as much as possible.
After the designer picks the variables to be projected out,
constructing the initial abstract protocols could be automated.
Identifying the noninterference lemmas will, in general, force
the designer to understand their protocol - albeit in a localized
manner in response to the counterexamples. It would also be
interesting to exploit the fact that the two abstract protocols
have a common subset of transitions, e.g. the level-1 protocol
which only involves the agents and the local directory within
a cluster. Extending our approach for non-inclusive cache
coherence protocols is also in progress.
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APPENDIX
PROCEDURE FOR ABSTRACTING THE TRANSITION
RELATION
We only present the procedure to construct the transition
relations for M̃1 in the following, as the procedure for M̃2
is very similar. Our procedure is described in the context of
Murphi, but the ideas are broadly applicable. We denote the
set of variables which are abstracted away in M̃1 by D .
1) Pre-processing:
a) If there exists a ruleset parameter whose range is
over all the clusters in M , i.e. “Procss”, divide the
rule into two rules with the same guard and action:
one rule with the parameter only over the home
cluster (“Home”), and the other with the parameter
over the remote clusters (“Rmt”).
b) If there exists any conditional statements, i.e. ifstmt
or switchstmt, in the action of a rule, divide the rule
into several sub-rules such that each sub-rule cov-
ers one branch of the conditional statement and the
sub-rule does not contain conditional statements
anymore. The guard of the sub-rule is the logic
“∧” of the original rule guard and the conditional
expr(s) for that branch. The action is composed by
the statements inside the branch and the rest of
statements in the original rule action.
2) For each rule with ruleset parameters only over the
home cluster, do nothing for the rule.
3) For each rule with ruleset parameters over the remote
clusters, or without parameters
a) If there exists any ruleset parameters over D ,
remove such parameters.
b) For the rule guard, replace “Procs[]” over remote
clusters with “ABSProcs[]”, i.e. replacing concrete
clusters with abstract clusters; if there exists any
boolean sub-expr involving “forall” or “exists”
with parameters over all the clusters, replace the
sub-expr with two “∧” sub-exprs: one with the
parameter over the home cluster, and the other with
the parameter over the remote clusters; if there
exists any boolean sub-expr involving variables in
D , replace the sub-expr with “true”.
c) For each statement in the rule action, replace
“Procs[]” over remote clusters with “ABSProcs[]”,
i) assignment: if the designator involves any vari-
able in D , remove the assignment; otherwise,
for the expr to be assigned to the designator, if
there exists any sub-expr involving variables in
D , replace the sub-expr with a nondeterministic
value in the type of the sub-expr.
ii) forstmt: if the quantifier in the forstmt ranges
over all the clusters, divide the forstmt into two
forstmts: one with the quantifier on the home
cluster, and the other on the remote clusters;
if the quantifier involves any variable in D ,
remove the forstmt; for each statement inside
the forstmt, goto 3(c).
iii) whilestmt: for the condition expr in the
whilestmt, if there exists any sub-expr involv-
ing variables in D , replace the sub-expr with
“true”; for each statement inside the whilestmt,
goto 3(c).
iv) aliasstmt: if there exists any variable decla-
ration involving variables in D , remove the
declaration.
v) proccall: if there exists any parameter in the
proccall involving variables in D , replace the
parameter with a nondeterministic value; for
each statement in the procedure, goto 3(c).
vi) clearstmt, putstmt, errorstmt: if the stmt in-
volves variables in D , remove the stmt.
vii) assertstmt: for the expr inside assertstmt, if
there exists any sub-expr involving variables in
D , replace the sub-expr with “true”.
viii) returnstmt: for the expr in the returnstmt, if
there exists any sub-expr involving variables in
D , replace the sub-expr with a nondeterministic
value in the type of the sub-expr.
Proceedings of the Formal Methods in Computer Aided Design (FMCAD'06)
0-7695-2707-8/06 $20.00  © 2006
Advanced Unbounded Model Checking Based on
AIGs, BDD Sweeping, And Quantifier Scheduling
Florian Pigorsch, Christoph Scholl, and Stefan Disch
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Informatik,
D-79110 Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
Email: {pigorsch, scholl, disch}@informatik.uni-freiburg.de
Abstract— In this paper we present a complete method for
verifying properties expressed in the temporal logic CTL. In con-
trast to the majority of verification methods presented in recent
years, we support unbounded model checking based on symbolic
representations of characteristic functions. Among others, our
method is based on an advanced And-Inverter Graph (AIG)
implementation, quantifier scheduling, and BDD sweeping. For
several examples, our method outperforms BDD based symbolic
model checking by orders of magnitude. However, our approach
is also able to produce competitive results for cases where BDD
are known to perform well.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given a sequential circuit and properties in some temporal
logic like CTL or LTL, model checking is a method for
verifying these properties [1], [2]. In the early nineties, by
introducing symbolic model checking, Burch et al. substan-
tially extended the class of systems which can be verified
[3], [4]. In symbolic model checking binary decision diagrams
(BDDs) [5] are used both for state set representation and for
state traversal. Sets of states are represented by characteristic
functions which in turn are represented by BDDs.
However, in the last few years SAT based techniques like
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [6], [7] have been attracting
much interest, since industrial needs ask for methods avoiding
the well known memory explosion problem which may occur
during symbolic model checking of large circuits. BMC ap-
plied to certain properties (invariants or, more generally, LTL
formulas) ‘unfolds’ the transition relation for k steps in order
to find counterexamples. If no counterexample of length k is
found, then k is increased and BMC is used again. For proving
properties using BMC a suitable upper bound on k is needed.
In the case of invariants, e.g., the search for counterexamples
can be stopped, when k equals the diameter of the system, i.e.,
the maximum length of all shortest paths between states in the
system. Then, BMC ends up with a proof of the property.
Unfortunately, computing diameters of large systems turns
out to be hard. The problem may be reduced to the validity
check of a quantified Boolean formula (QBF) with alternating
existential and universal quantifiers [6]. Since this check is
usually hard for large systems, BMC is mostly used as an
incomplete method for finding errors in practice.1
In this paper, we present a complete method for verifying
properties expressed in the temporal logic CTL. Our method is
1Another possibility consists in increasing k up to the length of the longest
simple path between two states [8]. Whereas it is easier to determine the length
of the longest simple path than to determine the diameter of the system, the
longest simple path may be exponentially longer than the diameter. If this is
the case, unfolding the transition relation for such a large number of steps
will be prohibitive.
based on a symbolic representation of sets of states. However,
our symbolic representation relies on And-Inverter Graphs
(AIGs) [9], [10] instead of BDDs. So far, And-Inverter Graphs
have been successfully applied in combinational equivalence
checking [9], [10] and in BMC for simplifying representations
of transition relations [11]. Basically, they are Boolean circuits
which consist of AND gates and inverters only. In contrast
to BDDs, AIGs do not provide canonical representations of
Boolean functions. Since we do not need canonical repre-
sentations for representing sets of states, we are able to
avoid memory blow-ups during the construction of (canonical)
BDDs. On the other hand, checks for satisfiability or validity,
which are needed during the model checking process, do not
come for free as for BDDs, because there are different AIG
representations for constants 0 and 1.
In order to obtain as much sharing of subcircuits as possible
we make use of a special version of AIGs, the so-called
functionally reduced AIGs (FRAIGs) which were introduced
by Mishchenko et al. [12] in the context of logic synthesis,
technology mapping and combinational equivalence checking.
Like general AIGs, FRAIGs still form non-canonical repre-
sentations of Boolean functions, but they have the additional
property that they do not contain any pair of functionally
equivalent nodes. This invariant is maintained during con-
struction of FRAIGs by using a SAT solver. In addition, the
construction of FRAIGs is assisted by functional simulation
in order to avoid unnecessary SAT checks for pairs of nodes
for which already simulation is able to prove non-equivalence.
Similar ideas for compressing AIG representations using ‘SAT
sweeping’ and functional simulation can be also found in [11].
The most difficult step during model checking using
FRAIGs is the elimination of existential quantifiers. As in
[13], [14], [15] existential quantifiers ∃xf are eliminated by
replacing them by f |x=0 +f |x=1. Of course, in the worst case
the elimination of one quantifier may double the size of the
representation. Although it is not very likely that this worst
case behavior can be avoided in random examples (since SAT
checking is NP hard), we show in our experimental results
that we succeed in limiting the increase in size by several
measures including a clever choice of the order of quantifi-
cations (‘quantifier scheduling’). Interestingly, in contrast to
a widespread belief [16], [17], [18] our results prove that –
for our approach – quantifier elimination by a circuit-based
computation of f |x=0 +f |x=1 is not restricted to models with
a small number of inputs (which have to be quantified during
symbolic model checking). Our novel method for quantifier
scheduling is based on estimations on the AIG sizes of
the results after performing quantifier elimination. In Section
V we motivate the importance of quantifier scheduling by
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giving an example and we describe the approach in more
detail. Note that our way of eliminating quantifiers (∃xf =
f |x=0 +f |x=1) also motivated the use of functionally reduced
AIGs (FRAIGs) instead of ‘standard’ AIGs: Since a trivial
implementation of quantifying several input variables would
lead to an exponential growth of the representation, we need
the more aggressive form of enforcing sharing of subcircuits
which is provided by FRAIGs.
Other techniques for limiting the sizes of our representations
of state sets are node selection heuristics and BDD sweeping:
• Whenever a new node is inserted into our FRAIG rep-
resentation, we check whether there is already a node
in the representation which is functionally equivalent to
this new node (using SAT combined with simulation).
If there is already a functionally equivalent node, we
keep only one representation for the function and replace
the representation of one node by the other (this is in
contrast to [12] where various representations of the same
function are kept for technology mapping purposes). In
order to keep the overall size of the representation small
we have to select carefully which representation is kept
(see Section IV).
• BDD sweeping is known from combinational equivalence
checking [9], [10] and builds BDDs for AIG nodes
starting at the primary inputs until a certain node limit is
reached. BDD sweeping is used there from time to time
in order to identify equivalent nodes in the AIG. Since we
are using SAT for maintaining the FRAIG invariant we do
not need BDD sweeping with this objective. In contrast
to the traditional use of BDD sweeping we make use of
BDD sweeping in the cone of selected output functions
of our FRAIG representation in order to compute smaller
AIG representations. After one step of BDD sweeping
we check whether our FRAIG representations decrease in
size when parts of the FRAIG representation are replaced
by subgraphs which are structurally equivalent to the
BDDs computed during BDD sweeping.
Interpolation based model checking [17] is related to our
approach in the sense that it also provides a method for
unbounded model checking. In contrast to our approach [17]
does not handle CTL properties, but invariants, and it does
not use exact image computations, but overapproximations
by so-called Craig interpolants. Due to the overapproximated
image computation the method of [17] needs to be applied
iteratively on unfoldings of the transition relation for an
increasing number of steps (as in Bounded Model Checking).
Our method does not need several unfoldings, but it can be
used in standard symbolic model checking just replacing BDD
representations for state sets by AIG based representations.
Other related approaches perform quantifier elimination by
using a SAT solver for enumerating all satisfying assignments
of a given function [16], [19]. During the enumeration process
disjunctions of cubes (or conjunctions of clauses) are collected
leading to a two-level representation of the result of the
quantification. Characteristic functions for sets of states and
transition relations are expressed in conjunctive normal form
(CNF) limiting the method to functions having efficient two-
level representations. The idea of SAT-based quantifier elimi-
nation was refined in [18]. Whereas this method is still based
on enumerations of satisfying assignments of a function f ,
disjunctions of cubes are replaced by disjunctions of cofactors
of the function f .
The following novel contributions are introduced by our
approach:
• We developed methods for quantifier scheduling which
are especially tailored towards our state set represen-
tations using FRAIGs. We can show that a proper
scheduling of quantifications can lead from exponential
representations to representations of linear size.
• The size of the FRAIG representations is limited by
heuristics for node selection when functionally equivalent
nodes are identified.
• We are using BDD sweeping as a method for non-local
logic optimization of our FRAIG representations. BDD
sweeping is controlled by heuristics based on the size of
the AIG representations and on the success of previous
runs of BDD sweeping.
We applied our representations of state sets and of tran-
sition functions to CTL model checking. We are using a
standard CTL model checking algorithm based on symbolic
representations of state sets. However, we make use of degrees
of freedom in CTL model checking by preferring operations
which are beneficial for our representation (see also Section
II).
Our experimental results prove the efficiency of our ap-
proach. For several examples, our method outperforms BDD
based symbolic model checking by orders of magnitude. How-
ever, note that our approach is also able to produce competitive
results for cases where BDDs are known to perform well
(which was not observed for approaches [13], [14], e.g.). We
show in detail how our concepts such as quantifier scheduling,
node selection heuristics and BDD sweeping as a non-local
optimization step contribute to the success of our experiments.
The paper is structured as follows: We begin with a brief
review of CTL model checking in Section II. Then we describe
both And-Inverter Graphs (AIGs) in general and the special
version of AIGs we use as a data structure for model checking
(Section III). In Section IV we describe our heuristics for node
selection and in Section V we present our method for quantifier
scheduling. AIG compression techniques by BDD sweeping
are given in Section VI. After presenting experimental results
in Section VII we give some conclusions and future directions
in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use our FRAIG representation in the context of symbolic
model checking [3], [4].
Symbolic model checking is applied to Kripke structures
(which may be derived from sequential circuits) on the one
hand and to a formula of a temporal logic (in our case CTL
(Computation Tree Logic)) on the other hand.
An essential step in the recursive evaluation of CTL formu-
las is the preimage computation which computes for a set of
states Sat(φ) the set of states Sat(EXφ) with at least one
successor in Sat(φ):
χSat(EXφ)(~q, ~x) := ∃~q ′∃~x ′
(





(~q ′, ~x ′)
)
(1)
(As usual χM means the characteristic function of set M ,
~x represents the current input variables, ~q the current state
variables, ~q ′ the next state variables, and ~x ′ the next input
variables. χR represents the transition relation of the Kripke
structure.)
It is well known that the same formula can also be computed
based on transition functions δi of the sequential circuit instead
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of the transition relation R:






(~q, ~x, ~x ′)
)
(2)
In our implementation of the model checking procedure we
always prefer Equation (2) over Equation (1), since the
substitution operation is easy in the AIG context and can
be performed in parallel for several substitutions. Although
we use sophisticated methods to prevent memory blow-ups
due to quantification, in principle quantification needs special
attention, since quantifying a single variable has the risk of
doubling the size of the representation. If not needed, we
do not take this risk and we avoid the additional effort of
preventing the representation from increasing.
III. AND-INVERTER GRAPHS
Recently, And-Inverter Graphs (AIGs) [9], [10] enjoy a
widespread application in combinational equivalence checking
and Bounded Model Checking (BMC). They are simply a
special kind of directed acyclic graphs representing boolean
functions. There are three types of nodes: and nodes with
two outgoing edges, modeling the Boolean conjunction of
the functions represented by the two edges, variable nodes
with no outgoing edges but labelled with a variable name,
representing boolean variables, and a special terminal node
with no outgoing edges, forming the constant 0 function.
The edges of an AIG may contain negation marks that
denote complementation.
Constructing AIGs using one level structural hashing [10]
assures that we do not have two different nodes with the same
pair of successors.
A. Functionally Reduced And-Inverter Graphs
AIG representations of Boolean functions are not canonical
– for each Boolean function there exist many structurally
different AIGs. Actually an AIG may contain functionally
redundant nodes, i.e., nodes which are roots of structurally
different subgraphs representing the same functions.
Redundant nodes lead to two problems: On the one hand,
the graph structure is inefficient. Redundant nodes could be
merged to reduce the graph size. On the other, checking the
equivalence of two nodes needs additional effort.
To address these problems Mishchenko et al. [12] intro-
duced the notion of functionally reduced AIGs (FRAIGs).
The main idea is to check for equivalent nodes using SAT-
based equivalence checking techniques while constructing an
AIG and to merge them immediately. (In a similar approach
Kuehlmann [11] uses ‘SAT sweeping’ from time to time
in order to remove functionally equivalent nodes in AIGs
which were not reduced immediately during construction.)
This approach establishes the functional reduction property:
There will not be any two nodes in an FRAIG representing
the same Boolean function (and there will not be a pair of
nodes where one represents the complement of the Boolean
function represented by the other).
B. An AIG Package for Model Checking
Since we use our AIG package for state set representations
in CTL model checking, we have different requirements
























simulation vector size (in 32 bit words)
adaptive simulation
random simulation
Fig. 1. Impact of adaptive simulation (picojava/icu benchmark)
checking. In this section we have a brief look at the key
features of our package.
Apart from standard Boolean operations which are trans-
lated into AND operations and / or complementations we
have to support substitution and existential quantification.
Substitution of variables by functions is basically reduced to
replacements of inputs of an AIG by subgraphs representing
these functions and it can be easily performed for several
variables in parallel. Existential quantification ∃xf is reduced
to f |x=0+f |x=1 (with optimizations described in the following
sections).
Whereas in combinational equivalence checking only inser-
tion of nodes has to be supported, we need efficient methods
for the deletion of nodes. Nodes have to be deleted when
certain state set representations are not needed any longer
during the model checking procedure and when functionally
equivalent nodes are merged into one representation. The hash
table we use for one-level structural hashing (applied as a
fast technique for detecting isomorphic AIG nodes) permits
lookups in constant time. We have enriched the data structure
by adding linked lists to each AIG node chaining all hash
table entries affected by this node. This allows for the fast
deletion of all occurrences of a node from the hash table
without inspecting all table entries.
To maintain the functional reduction property, we use a
simulation guided, SAT based equivalence checking method
known from the BMC and combinational equivalence checking
domains as proposed in [11], [12]. The idea is to avoid pow-
erful methods for easy problems: If for a given pair of nodes
simulation is already able to prove non-equivalence, more time
consuming SAT checks are not needed. The simulation vectors
are initially random, but they are updated using feedback from
satisfied SAT instances. Always maintaining a fixed number of
simulation vectors we use a simple FIFO replacement method
when new vectors are inserted. Figure 1 shows the impact
of different simulation vector sizes and the use of learned
simulation vectors in a typical model checking run. Depending
on the size of the simulation vectors used, the dashed line
shows the run times for the complete model checking run,
when the learning of distinguishing simulation vectors from
satisfied SAT instances is turned off. The solid line shows
the same run times for the case that learning is turned on.
At least for the smaller sizes of simulation vectors learning
leads to considerable improvements of run times. Obviously,
by learning we obtain ‘good’ simulation vectors which are
able to prevent time consuming SAT checks during future node
insertions.
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Additional features of our AIG package which are used dur-
ing model checking are node selection, quantifier scheduling,
and BDD sweeping. They will be described in the following
three sections.
IV. NODE SELECTION IN CASE OF EQUIVALENCE
When constructing a new node in an AIG, one will often
encounter the situation that the current AIG already contains a
functionally equivalent node which is the root of a structurally
different subgraph. Since the functional reduction invariant
must be maintained, only one of the two nodes can be kept
and the other one needs to be removed from the AIG. Unlike
the approach in [12] where the already existing AIG node is
kept and all equivalent nodes are stored in a list of possible
structural representations for later technology mapping, our
AIG package tries to keep the memory consumption as low
as possible and thus destroys redundant nodes. This strategy
is vital for a successful employment of AIGs in the model
checking domain.
The question is whether to preserve the old, existing node
or the newly created one. We use two different heuristics to
conquer the problem:
• hkeep. We always keep the old node and discard the new
node. The drawback of this trivial method is the possible
rejection of more efficient structural representations.
• hsize. We keep the node that structurally depends on
less variables. If the nodes have equal support sizes, we
consider the subgraphs (cones) rooted by the two nodes
and select the node which has a smaller cone. 2
In our experiments (see Section VII) we will show that the
naive node selection heuristics hkeep may result in high and
even unmanageable node counts, while the more advanced one
is able to reduce the AIGs to reasonable sizes.3
V. QUANTIFIER SCHEDULING
During model checking we eliminate existential quantifiers
∃xf by replacing them by f |x=0+f |x=1. In the worst case this
elimination may double the size of the representation. Thus,
after an existential quantification of a series of variables the
size of the representation may potentially show an exponential
blow-up. In this section we will present a heuristic method
which aims at limiting this (potential) increase in size by
a clever choice of the order of quantifications (‘quantifier
scheduling’).
A. A Motivating Example
First of all, we give a motivating example which shows that
the order of quantifications may be essential for avoiding mem-
ory blow-ups. Consider a simple carry ripple adder which com-
putes the sum (sn, . . . , s0) for two operands (an−1, . . . , a0)
and (bn−1, . . . , b0). Now we want to compute the set of
2It is easy to see that hsize never replaces a node k by another node k′
having k in its cone (which would create a loop in the AIG).
3In the case the used heuristics suggest to keep the old node, the only thing
to do is to delete the new node. But if the new node is selected, we use a
technique similar to implementation techniques known from BDD packages:
All edges of the AIG pointing to the old node must be modified to reference
the new node. Since the data structure used in our AIG package does not
provide an efficient method for finding all predecessors of a node, we need
to use a more subtle replacement method: we actually transfer the data of the
new node object into the old node object and then delete the new node. By
doing this no edge has to be touched.
inputs (bn−1, . . . , b0) with the property that there is an input







i.e. with sn = 0 and sn−1 = 1. The problem may be solved
by computing a symbolic (BDD or AIG based) representation
of sn ·sn−1 based on the carry ripple circuit and by computing
the existential quantification ∃an−1 . . .∃a0sn ·sn−1. The result
of the quantification is a representation of a characteristic
function for the set of inputs (bn−1, . . . , b0) fulfilling the
given property. Since it is easy to see that this set of in-
puts is equal to IBn, the final result has to be equal to 1.
Now we consider the two extreme cases for the order of
quantification: The first order UP is (a0, . . . , an−1) (i.e. we
start with the quantification of the least significant bit) and
the second order DOWN is (an−1, . . . a0) starting with the
quantification of the most significant bit. Remember that we
reduce quantification wrt. one variable to the disjunction of
positive and negative cofactors. Figure 2.(1) shows the result
of the quantification wrt. the first variable a0 of order UP
(for simplicity applied to the given carry ripple circuit, not to
the corresponding AIG, which has roughly the same structure).
The illustration shows that the propagation of constants 0 and 1
for the negative and the positive cofactor wrt. a0 already stops
at bit position 1 and no subcircuit sharing can be observed in
the remaining circuit. Thus, the size of the circuit is almost
doubled by quantification.
However, if we quantify variable an−1 first, we obtain the
situation shown in Figure 2.(2). In this case most parts of
the circuit are shared between the positive and the negative
cofactor. Since we use FRAIGs which identify functionally
equivalent nodes, the corresponding FRAIG also shows this
sharing. The duplication of the number of nodes as observed
in the previous case can not be seen here. The effect shown
above continues during the following quantifications according
to the orders UP and DOWN : As shown in Table I for the
example of a 14-bit-adder, we observe an exponential blow-
up of AIG nodes during quantification according to order
UP , whereas the number of AIG nodes is monotonically
decreasing for quantification order DOWN . (Note that BDD
sweeping described in the next section was not used in this
experiment.) Altogether our example shows that there may
be an exponential gap wrt. AIG sizes between good and
bad orders of quantification. So we have a strong need for
heuristics computing good quantification orders.
B. A Heuristic Approach to Quantifier Scheduling
Here we present a method for quantifier scheduling which is
especially tailored towards our state set representations using
FRAIGs. Our greedy method is based on estimations on the
sizes of the results after performing quantifier elimination.
Before performing a quantification ∃xf = f |x=0 + f |x=1 for
some variable x and some function f represented by a FRAIG,
we compute an estimate on the FRAIG size of the final result:
• In a first step we consider the subgraph of the AIG
representing f and for each ε ∈ {0, 1} we determine
by two traversals of this subgraph the set Rε of nodes
which are not removed by propagation of constant ε.
• In a second step we compute an estimate for the node
sharing between the representations of the positive and
the negative cofactor: If a node k which occurs both in
R0 and R1 is not connected to variable x by a path in
the AIG graph, then it does not depend on x and thus the
nodes corresponding to k in the representation of f |x=0
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(1) Quantification wrt. a0 (2) Quantification wrt. an-1
Fig. 2. sn · sn−1 after (1) quantification of a0 and (2) quantification of an−1.
TABLE I
14-BIT-ADDER, FUNCTION s14 · s13 : NUMBER OF AIG NODES AFTER QUANTIFICATIONS OF SINGLE VARIABLES ai , ORDERS UP AND DOWN
Quant. Nr. orig. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
UP 111 105 106 115 140 197 318 567 1072 2089 4130 8219 16404 32781 1
DOWN 111 105 99 93 87 81 75 69 63 57 51 45 39 33 1
and f |x=1 are the same (due to the functional reduction
property). So the set R0,1 of all such nodes is our estimate
for the set of nodes shared between f |x=0 and f |x=1.4
• Finally, our estimate for the size of f |x=0 + f |x=1 is
1 + |R0|+ |R1| − |R0,1|.
For reasons of efficiency our estimate does not consider node
sharing between nodes for both cofactors on the one hand and
nodes which are not in the subgraph representing f on the
other hand. Additionally, possible restructuring of the AIG
during node insertion (see Sections IV and VI) is not taken
into account. However, as shown by experimental results, our
heuristic estimate seems to be reasonable for computing a
good order for quantification: Whenever a number of variables
x1, . . . , xn has to be quantified for a function f , we compute
for each xi our estimate of the size of ∃xif and (greedily)
start with quantification of the variable with smallest cost.
Then the method is repeated to determine the next variable
to be quantified and so on.
We would like to point out that in the case of our mo-
tivating example from above our heuristic method leads to
quantification order DOWN which produces a monotonically
decreasing number of AIG nodes, whereas unfavorable orders
like the order UP shown above lead to an exponential peak
size in the number of AIG nodes before the final result 1 is
computed.
VI. BDD SWEEPING
BDD sweeping [20], [9], [10] is a well-known technique
from the domain of combinational equivalence checking
(CEC). It builds BDDs for AIG nodes starting at the primary
inputs until a certain node limit is reached. Whereas in
[20], [9], [10] BDD sweeping is used in order to identify
functionally equivalent nodes in the AIG, this is not needed
in our case, since we always maintain the functional reduction
property using SAT as described in Section III. Here we use
BDD sweeping as a means for non-local optimizations of our
AIG representations. However, for reasons of efficiency both
the number of BDD sweepings and the cost of a single BDD
sweeping have to be limited.
From time to time, after certain operations of the AIG
package, BDD sweeping is applied to the cone of the cor-
responding result. BDD sweeping builds a BDD for the cone
4Situations where a node does not functionally depend on a variable x,
but is (structurally) connected to x, may be possible in AIGs due to non-
canonicity. However they are neglected for reasons of efficiency.
of the given AIG node starting from the variable nodes and
using AND and NOT operations. Variable reordering applied
by the BDD package automatically tries to find an optimal
variable order in terms of BDD node count. If BDD sweeping
is able to compute the BDD for the given AIG node, then
we check whether it makes sense to replace the cone of the
AIG node by an AIG which is structurally equivalent to the
BDD. Here we exploit the fact that any BDD node can be
interpreted as a multiplexer, which can be transformed into
an AIG with exactly three AIG nodes. Thus, if the size of
the generated BDD is smaller than one third of the size of
the given cone, we create an AIG from the BDD structure by
recursively transforming the BDD nodes to their three-node
AIG representation. When inserting this new AIG into the AIG
package, node selection heuristics as described in Section IV
are used as usual with the additional effect that subgraphs
of the new AIG may be replaced by smaller (functional
equivalent) representations which are already present in the
existing AIG graph.
In order to limit the cost of a single BDD sweeping we use
a variable BDD limit. Whenever the number of nodes in the
BDD package is larger than BDD limit, the BDD construction
is aborted.
In order to limit the number of BDD sweepings, we decided
to confine BDD sweeping to the results of cofactor operations
which occur during existential quantification, since existential
quantification of a variable is the only operation that has the
risk of doubling the size of the representation. Moreover, BDD
sweeping is not applied after all cofactor operations, but only
after a small fraction of cofactor operations controlled by
sophisticated heuristics based on the sizes of the results and
the success of previous BDD sweepings. To avoid unnecessary
BDD sweepings, BDD sweeping is only applied, if the AIG
size of the current operation is larger than a some variable
AIG limit. AIG limit is initialized to a certain constant (100 in
our current implementation) and it evolves as follows:
• If a BDD is successfully built within the node limit
BDD limit, but it is not used in the AIG due to its
size, AIG limit is multiplied by a certain factor f1 > 1
(f1 = 1.2 in our current implementation ).
• If the BDD construction is aborted, since BDD limit is
exceeded, AIG limit is multiplied by some larger factor
f2 > 1 (f2 = 4 in our current implementation).
• If a BDD is successfully built and a structural equivalent
AIG is inserted into the AIG package, then AIG limit is
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operations (quantifications, substitutions, ...)
FRAIG (with functional reduction)
plain AIG (without functional reduction)
Fig. 3. Impact of functional reduction (picojava/icu).
set to the size of the resulting AIG.
• Whenever BDD sweeping is not applied, since AIG limit
is too large, AIG limit is decreased by multiplication
with 1 − f3 · ( 12 )
abort, where f3 is a small constant
(0 < f3 < 1) and abort is the number of times the BDD
construction is aborted due to an exceeded node limit (in
our implementation we used f3 = 0.01).
The presented heuristics ensure that unsuccessful BDD sweep-
ing runs result in fewer BDD sweeping runs in the future.
The variable BDD limit for aborting BDD constructions has
to be high enough to allow for BDD variable reordering and
is set to max(100 · AIG limit, 106) in our implementation.
Whenever BDD sweeping is aborted, it ends up with a
number of BDDs for AIG nodes in the considered cone, since
it computes BDDs beginning with the input variables of the
cone. The procedure described above can be easily extended
by making use of the BDDs computed so far. However, this
feature is not yet realized in our prototype implementation.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We performed a number of experiments for evaluating our
approach which we called ‘AIG-MC’. The examples AM2910,
Coherence, DAIO, Picojava/ICU, Viper, and Barrelshifter are
taken from the VIS Verification Benchmark set [21].5 For each
benchmark we checked all CTL formulas provided in the
VIS Verification Benchmark set. We randomly selected the
benchmarks from the set of those benchmarks in the VIS
Verification Benchmark set which have CTL specifications.
Since the prototype implementation of our model checker is
currently not yet able to read the benchmark format used in
VIS, we had to translate the hierarchical and multi-valued
models into flat, binary encoded models. This included a
manual adaption of the CTL formulas to the new binary
encoding variables.6 Moreover, we used a pipelined ALU
(‘PALU’) similar to the one presented in [3]. The pipelined
ALU includes 16 registers, a combinational adder, a combina-
tional multiplier, and bitwise operations.7 As in [3] the inputs
to the ALU are instruction codes containing a specification of
the operation, the source registers and the destination register.
For the pipelined ALU we checked the CTL formula φ =
AG
(′′R2 :=R0⊕R1′′ → ((AX)2R0+(AX)2R1≡(AX)3R2))
5The number of registers in the barrelshifter was increased from 4 to 10.
6The complete set of benchmarks is provided in [22].
7The bit width of all operations and registers for palu12,4 is 12, for palu14,4
14 and for palu16,4 16, respectively.
TABLE II
NODE SELECTION HEURISTICS IN AIG-MC
benchmark (ctls) hkeep hsize
nodes time nodes repl. time
am2910 (1-3,5-6) 5354 5.9 2129 232 0.9
barrel10,4 (1) 5918 39.6 5918 0 37.2
coherence (1,7) 1310 0.3 1303 20 0.3
daio (1-4) 50862 10680.9 17069 13078 245.0
decay11 15578 33.6 15578 1 33.7
palu12,4 (xor) 3802 2.1 3802 216 1.9
palu14,4 (xor) 4654 2.7 4654 252 2.6
palu16,4 (xor) 5586 3.6 5586 288 3.3
picojava/icu (1) 23924 21.6 10650 937 8.5
viper (1-3) 15975 7.7 15970 69 11.7
(similar to formula (1) from [3]).8 The benchmarks named
‘decayn’ contain registers of bit widths n and they compute
decaying sums of sequences of inputs according to the formula
registernew = d registerold2 e+ input.
9
Note that the barrelshifter example used here is different
from the barrelshifter example given in [13], [14]. The exam-
ples in [13], [14] do not contain inputs, and thus, quantification
is not needed during the fixed point computation of the model
checking procedure (see Section II, equation (2)). We did not
compare our results to the results from [13], [14], since our
goal was to prove that we are able to handle quantification
as well. In this sense our experiments show that the objection
raised by McMillan ([17], Section 1.1) ‘because of the expense
of quantifier elimination, this approach is limited to models
with a small number of inputs (typically zero or one)’ does
not apply to our approach.
All experiments were performed on a 2 GHz Dual-Opteron
workstation running Debian Linux. We used a timeout of 12
CPU hours.
First of all we demonstrate the effect of functional reduction
by means of a typical example in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 shows
the number of AIG nodes which are needed during model
checking of the picojava/icu benchmark. In this experiment we
turned off quantifier scheduling and BDD sweeping in order to
concentrate on the effect of functional reduction. The numbers
of AIG nodes were recorded after each quantification of a
variable and after each substitution, thus the x-axis represents
the ongoing progress of the model checking procedure. The
numbers of nodes are presented with a logarithmic scale. The
dashed line shows the number of nodes which are needed
when functional reduction using SAT is turned off, the solid
line shows the number of nodes of our FRAIG package using
SAT based functional reduction. The example clearly shows
that functional reduction is essential for the success in this
kind of applications. An AIG package only using structural
hashing is not able to provide sufficient compaction. For this
reason we always consider results using our FRAIG package
with SAT based functional reduction in the following.
In the first experiment we evaluated the effect of our node
selection heuristics from Section IV. Table II lists the peak
node counts and run times in CPU seconds for the two differ-
ent proposed node selection heuristics: the naive method hkeep
(always keeping the already existing node) and hsize. For
hsize Table II also reports the numbers of node replacement
8Given an exor operation in the instruction register the formula basically
checks whether the contents of the destination register in three steps are the
same as the or operation of the contents of the operand registers in two
steps. This would be true for an or operation in the instruction register, but
is obviously not true for the exor operation.
9The property asks whether there is a sequence of inputs such that for the
binary number R in the register 2n−1 ≤ R < 2n.
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TABLE III
AIG-MC W/O, WITH QUANT. SCHEDULING, BDD-MC, VIS
w/o quant. sched. quant. sched. BDD-MC VIS
benchmark ctl nodes time nodes time time time
am2910 1 1132 0.2 1132 0.2 1.5 3.2
2 1143 0.3 1143 0.3 1.5 3.2
3 1605 0.8 1650 0.7 1.5 3.2
4 16039 91.9 13818 51.2 9.0 5.5
5 1977 1.1 1880 1.6 1.5 3.2
6 1205 0.3 1181 0.3 1.5 0.8
barrel10,4 1 5918 50.3 5918 51.2 >12h >12h
coherence 1 1303 0.3 1303 0.3 0.2 0.4
2 43285 334.3 49010 172.4 1.0 0.4
3 11744 22.3 10001 13.6 1.4 0.4
4 25190 72.6 18781 41.7 1.6 0.4
5 18590 40.5 7895 7.2 2.1 0.5
6 23814 176.4 25298 88.3 0.8 0.4
7 1303 0.3 1303 0.3 0.2 0.4
8 101185 609.8 42042 151.6 37.8 0.4
9 18590 33.1 7895 5.0 1.6 0.4
daio 1 996 0.6 996 0.6 0.1 0.3
2 996 0.8 996 0.8 0.2 0.4
3 1768 1.4 1768 1.4 0.3 0.4
4 996 0.8 996 0.8 0.2 0.4
decay32 1 1901 6.3 718 1.2 0.5 0.0
decay48 1 2814 30.3 1070 4.0 2.8 0.2
decay64 1 3736 83.0 1422 9.8 21.1 0.3
palu12,4 xor 3802 153.4 3832 76.2 >12h >12h
palu14,4 xor 4654 59.0 4684 119.4 >12h >12h
palu16,4 xor 5586 1062.6 5616 91.1 >12h >12h
picojava/icu 1 8144 6.6 2869 5.0 1.0 2.0
viper 1 15757 3.1 15757 3.0 43.4 75.0
2 15757 6.7 15757 6.1 43.3 73.0
3 15757 3.1 15757 3.0 43.3 74.1
TABLE IV
DETAILED RESULTS FOR AIG-MC
bdd sweeping sat
benchmark applic. succ. limit applic. equiv
am2910 0.06% 59.80% 0% 5.00% 45.58%
barrel10,4 0.01% 0% 100% 1.90% 42.51%
coherence 0.02% 74.06% 0.37% 0.97% 69.47%
decay32 0.39% 11.11% 0% 37.00% 4.65%
decay48 0.26% 9.09% 0% 55.09% 2.40%
decay64 0.20% 7.69% 0% 72.36% 1.50%
daio 0.12% 98.13% 0% 11.11% 93.99%
palu12,4 0.03% 12.5% 62.5% 1.48% 74.07%
palu14,4 0.02% 12.5% 62.5% 1.28% 76.92%
palu16,4 0.02% 12.5% 62.5% 1.12% 78.28%
picojava/icu 0.07% 33.33% 0% 5.06% 31.47%
viper 0.01% 33.33% 0% 4.56% 60.49%
steps. The numbers for each benchmark are averaged over
all different CTL formulas. In this experiment we turned off
BDD sweeping, because the naive method hkeep would never
use the results of BDD sweeping. (Thus the results would be
biased towards hsize, since it can exploit BDD sweeping whilst
hkeep does not profit from it.) In the comparison we omitted
the results for formula 4 of example ‘AM2910’ and formulas
2-6 and 8-9 of example ‘Coherence’, since the computation
did not finish for hkeep within our limit on CPU time. (For
formulas 2-6 and 8-9 of ‘Coherence’ the computation without
BDD sweeping did not finish for hsize as well, i.e., BDD
sweeping is essential for success with this benchmark (see
also experiments of Table III).)
The results clearly show that the node selection heuristics
are of great importance for obtaining good results: The heuris-
tics hsize lead to a considerable decrease in peak node counts.
The most impressive examples are AM2910 and DAIO where
the peak number of AIG nodes for the naive method are by a
factor of 2.5 and 3.0 higher than for hsize. Not only the node
counts, but also the run times are greatly reduced by hsize,
in the case of Picojava from 21.6 CPU seconds with hkeep to
8.5 CPU seconds with hsize, in the case of DAIO even from
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Fig. 4. Example decayn with and without quantifier scheduling, run times.
Since the node selection heuristics hsize seems to be the best
choice, we always use this method in the following.
In the following experiments we consider our method with
BDD sweeping turned on. In the second experiment shown in
Table III we evaluated the effect of quantifier scheduling and
in the third experiment also shown in this table we compared
our results to a BDD based version of our model checker and
to the BDD based model checker VIS 2.1 [21]. We ran VIS
using dynamic variable ordering with the sifting heuristics,
don’t care optimization via reachability analysis was turned
off.10
For the different benchmarks and CTL formulas columns
3 and 4 show the peak node counts and run times for
the unmodified quantification order (‘w/o quant. sched.’) and
columns 5 and 6 give the same results for our quantifier
scheduling heuristics from Section V. It can be observed that
quantifier scheduling improves the peak node counts in most
cases; for Coherence, formula 8, e.g., by a factor of 2.4, for
decay64 by a factor of 2.6, for Picojava, by a factor of 2.8.
The run times are always better or at least in the same range,
for example Coherence, formula 8, run times are even reduced
from 10.2 CPU minutes to 2.5 CPU minutes.11
In Fig. 4 we consider benchmark decayn and have a closer
look at the effect of quantifier scheduling: In this case we
turned off BDD sweeping in order to perform a separate
analysis of the effect of quantifier scheduling: Fig. 4 gives the
CPU times for decayn with increasing bit width n both for
the version without quantifier scheduling (dashed line) and for
the version with quantifier scheduling (solid line) (presented
with a logarithmic scale). The experiment shows that without
quantifier scheduling the run times grow exponentially with
increasing bit width rendering completion of model checking
for larger bit widths impossible. (The peak numbers of nodes
are not presented here, but they show the same exponential
growth.) With quantifier scheduling we observe only a mod-
erate growth of node counts and run times.12
10For all experiments considered here the default option of performing a
reachability analysis before backward model checking gave inferior results.
For benchmark am2910 we even observed timeouts (larger than 12 CPU hours)
for 5 out of 6 CTL formulas when reachability analysis was turned on.
11For examples palun,4 the run times are somewhat misleading (increase
of run times for palu14,4 by a factor of 2.0, decrease of run times even by
a factor of 11.7 for palu16,4 for the version with quantifier scheduling): A
more detailed analysis showed that the run times are almost exclusively due
to unsuccessful runs of BDD sweeping (not leading to node replacements in
the AIG). Without BDD sweeping the run times remain in the range of a few
seconds.
12In Table III quantifier scheduling outperforms the version without quanti-
fier scheduling for decay32, decay48, and decay64, but an exponential growth
of node counts and run times is not observed. In this experiment BDD
sweeping was turned on and it was able to prevent the exponential growth.
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The last two columns of Table III give a comparison of
our results to our own model checker BDD-MC with FRAIGs
replaced by BDDs and to the BDD based model checker VIS,
respectively. For barrel10,4, palu12,4, palu14,4, and palu16,4
neither BDD-MC nor VIS were able to provide a result within
the CPU limit of 12 CPU hours. However, these examples did
not form a problem for our model checker AIG-MC and we
could solve them within a few seconds (see column 6 of Table
III).
In contrast, for the remaining benchmarks taken from the
VIS Benchmark set as well as for decayn, BDDs are known to
perform well and these examples could be solved quickly by
VIS. Even for this class of examples our approach finished
in shorter time in 10 out of 26 cases and also for the
remaining cases we could observe that our approach succeeded
in producing competitive results within a few seconds.
For completeness we give some more details for our exper-
iments with BDD sweeping and quantifier scheduling turned
on in Table IV. Here again the numbers are averaged over
all formulas. Column 2 shows the number of applications of
BDD sweeping divided by the total number of attempts to
insert a node into the AIG. Column 3 shows the numbers of
successful applications of BDD sweeping (i.e. the numbers
of BDD sweepings where the results are really used in the
AIG package) divided by the total number of BDD sweepings.
And finally, column 4 shows the numbers of aborted BDD
sweepings (due to exceeded node limits) divided by the total
number of BDD sweepings. BDD sweeping is only applied
from time to time in all cases and in cases where BDD
sweeping is not very successful (especially for examples
‘Barrel’ and ‘PALU’) our heuristics from Section VI work
in the sense that unsuccessful BDD sweeping runs result in
fewer BDD sweeping runs in the future. Column 5 shows the
number of SAT checks divided by the total number of attempts
to insert a node into the AIG, column 6 shows the fraction of
SAT checks which lead to the result that the compared nodes
are functionally equivalent. Although we always maintain the
functional reduction property of our FRAIGs, the results show
that the assistance of SAT by simulation and structural hashing
as described in Section III-B assures that SAT is applied only
for a small fraction of all node insertions. Moreover, the high
percentage of SAT checks proving functional equivalence of
two nodes shows the effectiveness of simulation in avoiding
unnecessary SAT checks for nodes which are not equivalent.13
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented an approach to unbounded model checking
based on And-Inverter Graphs as a representation of charac-
teristic functions. Several methods such as functional reduction
using simulation assisted SAT checks, node selection heuris-
tics, quantifier scheduling, and BDD sweeping contribute to
the success of our approach. For many examples, our method
outperforms BDD based symbolic model checking by orders
of magnitude, whereas it is still able to produce competitive
results for cases where BDD are known to perform well. Al-
though the experimental results for our current implementation
already appear to be impressive, we believe that there remains
room for improvement of the heuristics presented in Sections
13Benchmarks decayn form an exception to this observation: In this case
there are many nodes in the representation which are ‘almost equivalent’,
so that simulation with a fixed number of simulation vectors is not very
effective in distinguishing between them, leading to a number of SAT checks
not proving functional equivalence.
IV, V, and VI. Certainly, our prototype implementation will
also profit from the integration of a number of interesting ideas
recently developed for optimizing AIG representations such
as DAG-aware circuit compression [23], [24] and advanced
rewriting methods [15], [24]. In the future we will investigate
whether methods for structural SAT solving [9] will be useful
in our context and we will explore whether it sometimes makes
sense to switch to lazy methods for AIG compression instead
of our eager one.
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Symmetry Reduction for STE Model Checking
Ashish Darbari





Abstract— In spite of the tremendous success of STE model
checking one cannot verify circuits with arbitrary large number
of state holding elements. In this paper we present a methodology
of symmetry reduction for STE model checking, using a novel set
of STE inference rules. For symmetric circuit models these rules
provide a very effective reduction strategy. When used as tactics,
rules help decompose a given STE property to a set containing
several classes of equivalent STE properties. A representative
from each equivalence class is picked and verified using an STE
simulator, and the correctness of the entire class of assertions is
deduced, using a theorem that we provide. Finally inference rules
are used in the forward direction to deduce the overall statement
of correctness. Our experiments on verifying arbitrarily large
CAMs and circuits with multiple CAMs, show that these can be
verified using a fixed, small number of BDD variables.
I. INTRODUCTION
Symbolic trajectory evaluation — STE in short, has been
successfully applied in several large scale circuit verification
tasks [1], [8], [14], however by itself it is not sufficient,
specially when verifying circuits with a large number of
state holding elements like memories [11]. It is also the
case that memory based circuits intrinsically have plenty of
structural symmetry and intuition suggests that this could be
an important domain specific attribute, that can be used for
STE property reduction.
There are two challenges involved in achieving an efficient
solution to the problem of symmetry reduction. First is the
discovery of symmetry in the circuit, and secondly to work
out the methodology of computing the reductions in properties
and circuit models. In a recent work [4] we proposed that
if the representation of the circuit model is lifted higher to
encapsulate the structural, symmetry-rich information, then
the discovery of symmetry reduces to type checking. In this
paper we address the second challenge which is to design
and implement a methodology of computing reductions. We
will assume that circuits are modelled using the methodology
proposed in [4].
II. OVERVIEW OF REDUCTION
The reduction approach presented in this paper, is centered
around the use of a novel set of STE inference rules, and
observing that symmetry in circuit models is mirrored by
symmetry in STE properties. Together the two give us a sound
methodology for enabling symmetry based reduction for STE
model checking. Figure 1 shows the overview of the symmetry
based reduction methodology.
The question we ask in a typical property verification task,
is whether or not the FSM satisfies (|=) the STE property.
Rather than trying to feed the STE property directly in an
STE simulator1 to verify it, we decompose the property using
the STE inference rules into smaller properties. The reduced
STE properties are then partitioned into different equivalence
classes, and one representative from each equivalence class
is fed into an STE simulator for explicit STE simulations.
The partitioning of the properties is based on identifying the
names of circuit nodes that belong to a bus in the symmetric
inputs, and using these nodes as a basis to perform clustering
of decomposed STE properties into equivalence classes.
Symmetry in circuit models is mirrored by symmetry in STE
properties. This is formalised by a soundness theorem, which
is then used to justify the existence of the correctness of the
whole class of equivalent STE properties from the correctness
of one of its member. Once this is achieved, all we need to do
then is to use the STE inference rules in the forward direction
and compose the overall statement of correctness about the
original STE property. Since the complexity of STE model
checking relies on the property, rather than the model, reducing
property, reduces the circuit model.
III. STE THEORY AND SYMMETRY
In this section we present a brief introduction of STE model
checking, and formalise the relation between symmetry in
circuit models and the logic of STE.
A. STE — a brief introduction
STE [13] is a model checking technique that combines the
ideas of ternary modelling with symbolic simulation. Sym-
bolic trajectory evaluation employs a ternary circuit state
model, in which the usual binary values 0 and 1 are augmented
with a third value X that stands for an unknown. To represent
this mathematically, we introduce a partial order relation v,
with X v 0 and X v 1. The relation orders values by
information content: X stands for a value about which we
know nothing, and so is ordered below the specific values 0
and 1. We can turn the set of ternary values into a complete
lattice where every element has a join or a least-upper bound
(t), and a meet or a greatest-lower bound (u), by adding an
artificial element - > (called ‘top’) to get the set of circuit
1We use the STE simulator in Forte.
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Fig. 1. Overview of symmetry reduction methodology
node values {0, 1,X,>}. The idea of dual-rail encoding is
used to denote the four lattice values, by having the concept
of a high-rail and a low-rail. Whenever a lattice value is 1 the
high rail will take on a Boolean T and the low rail a Boolean
F . If the lattice value is 0 the high and low rail are just the
inverse of the case for 1. Similarly the other lattice values are
defined [10], [13].
In STE, circuit models are represented by a next-state
function from lattice states to lattice states. This is also
known as an excitation function, and is constructed on-the-fly
during simulation, from the netlist description of the circuit.
Specifications in STE, take the form of what are known as
symbolic trajectory formulas. Formally, we define the syntax
of formulas [10], [13] as follows:
Definition 1. Syntax of STE formulas
f
4= n is 0 - node n has value 0
| n is 1 - node n has value 1
| f1 and f2 - conjunction of formulas
| f when G - f is asserted only when G is true
| Nf - f holds in the next time step
where f1 and f2 range over formulas, n ∈ string ranges over
the nodes of the circuit, and G is a propositional formula over
Boolean variables (i.e. a Boolean ‘function’) called a guard.
The advantage of using a Boolean expression is in specifying
conveniently many different operating conditions in a compact
form. The various guards that occur in a trajectory formula
can have variables in common, so this mechanism gives STE
the expressive power needed to represent interdependencies
among node values. For example, we can associate an arbitrary
propositional formula G with a node using the construct ‘n is
G’ defined by
n is G
4= ((n is 1) when G) and ((n is 0) when ¬G)
We also use a convenient form of expressing the temporal
formula, by using from and to functions. If f is a trajectory
formula, without the N operator, and we want to express that
f holds from time i to j, we can do it by using the following
representation [7]:
f from i to j 4= Nif and Ni+1f and . . . and Nj−1f
where the convention is that N0f = f . Semantics of trajectory
formulas is usually given with respect to an assignment φ of
Boolean truth-values to the variables that appear in the guards
of the formula.
Definition 2. Semantics of STE formulas
(φ, σ) |= n is 0 0 v σ 0 n
(φ, σ) |= n is 1 1 v σ 0 n
(φ, σ) |= f1 and f2 (φ, σ) |= f1 ∧ (φ, σ) |= f2
(φ, σ) |= f when G (φ |= G) ⊃ (φ, σ) |= f
(φ, σ) |= Nf (φ, σ1) |= f
where φ |= P means the assignment of truth-values given by φ
satisfies the formula P . The formal definition of φ |= P is the
usual definition for the semantics of propositional formulas.
The notation σ1 denotes the sequence shifted forward by one
time point.
The key feature of STE logic is that for any trajectory
formula f and assignment φ, there exists a unique weakest
sequence that satisfies f . This sequence is called the defining
sequence for f and is written [f ]φ. It is defined recursively as
follows:
Definition 3. Defining Sequence
[m is 0]φ t n 4= if (m=n) ∧ (t=0) then 0 else X
[m is 1]φ t n 4= if (m=n) ∧ (t=0) then 1 else X
[f1 and f2]φ t n
4= ([f1]φ t n) t ([f2]φ t n)
[f when G]φ t n 4= if (φ |= G) then ([f ]φ t n) else X
[Nf ]φ t n 4= if (t 6=0) then ([f ]φ (t−1) n) else X
Defining trajectory of a formula is its defining sequence
with the added constraints on state transitions imposed by the
circuit model M.
Definition 4. Defining Trajectory
[[ f ]] φ M 0 n 4= [f ]φ 0 n
[[ f ]] φ M t n 4= [f ]φ t n t M ( [[ f ]] φ M (t−1)) n
Verification takes place by testing the validity of an asser-
tion or property, of the form (A⇒C), where both A and C are
trajectory formulas. At the heart of STE model checking is an
efficient implementation algorithm given by Theorem 1, that
relies on the calculation of finite weakest sequences (defining
sequence) and trajectories (defining trajectory) of the formulas,
and comparing them (via the lattice ordering v), point-wise
for all nodes in C, up to the depth of the next-time operators
in C.
Theorem 1. STE implementation algorithm
M |= A ⇒ C 4= ∀t n. [C]φ t n v [[ A ]] φ M t n
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In the above theorem, the model is denoted by M. The
defining sequence is denoted by [C]φ and defining trajectory
by [[ A ]] φ. Time is denoted by t, nodes by n and φ denotes the
assignment of Boolean values to the variables that appear in
the guard of the formula. Much of the debugging power of
STE comes from the key observation that it is not necessary
to supply φ in advance; instead the comparison is computed
symbolically to give a constraint on φ, and represents precisely
the conditions under which A ⇒ C is true for the circuit.
B. Symmetry in circuit models and STE
We want to relate symmetries of the three-valued STE
model to the STE property reduction. We are interested in
the symmetries that arise due to permutations within the input
and output groups of wires in each circuit. Every permutation
can be defined in terms of a composition of swap operations.
We therefore formalise the concept of permutation on states
and sequences in terms of a swap operation on states and
sequences respectively. Below, we provide the definition of
these functions.
Definition 5. Permutation on lattice states
applys π s
4= λ n. s(π n)
Definition 6. Permutation on lattice sequences
applyσ π σ
4= λ t n. σ t (π n)
Just as the swap function on node names can be composed
serially to obtain arbitrary permutations on nodes, we com-
pose the function (applys π) and (applyσ π), with different
underlying swaps given by π to obtain permutations on states
and sequences respectively.
Every circuit model has some inputs that will contribute to
the symmetry of the circuit, we call these symmetric inputs.
Those inputs that do not have any role in the symmetry are
called non-symmetric inputs. All these inputs and the output
may contain several groups of wires, which in electrical terms
is known as a bus. Symmetry generating permutations are
applied to buses in the symmetric inputs and outputs. Since
state is defined to be a function from node names to lattice
values, applying permutations on the wires (node name) in a
bus has an effect of permuting the state of the circuit.
One useful property of a swap function is that if the swap
function exchanges a node ′′a′′ with ′′b′′ then applying the
same swap on ′′b′′ will give ′′a′′. This is formalised below, by
the predicate is swap.
Definition 7. Property of swap
is swap π
4= ∀a b. (π (a) = b) ⊃ (π (b) = a)
We now present a formal definition of symmetry for STE
models. The symbol χ denotes that the symmetry is for a
three-valued logic containing Xs. Circuit models are denoted
by M, and s denotes the lattice valued states.
Definition 8. Symmetry of STE models
Symχ M π
4= ∀s. applys π (M s) = M (applys π s)
The above definition captures the intuition that if the be-
haviour of the circuit given by its model remains independent
under permutation of its input and output states, then the
circuit is said to have symmetry.
Generally, STE is all about evaluating sequences of states.
Thus we need to know what happens to the information
ordering preservation of two sequences if a permutation is
applied on the sequences. The answer to this is in Lemma 1,
which says that the information ordering is preserved under
permutation of sequences.
Lemma 1. Information ordering is preserved under permuta-
tion of sequences
∀π. is swap π ⊃
∀σ1 σ2.
∀t n. (σ1 t n v σ2 t n
=
(applyσ π σ1) t n v (applyσ π σ2) t n)
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows from the definition
of applyσ , information ordering on sequences v, and the fact
that π is a swap.
Now we define an application of permutation on a trajectory
formula. The definition is by recursion on the structure of the
formula.
Definition 9. Permutation on formulas
applyf π (n is 0)
4= (π n) is 0
applyf π (n is 1)
4= (π n) is 1
applyf π (f1 and f2)
4= (applyf π f1) and (applyf π f2)
applyf π (f when G)
4= (applyf π f) when G
applyf π (N f)
4= N (applyf π f)
Note that π is a swap on node names, and (applyf π)
is composed for each underlying π to generate a complete
permutation of any trajectory formula.
We now present an equivalence of applying permutations on
a defining sequence of a formula and computing the defining
sequence of the permutation of a formula. This is a vital
instrument in establishing the concept, that permuting nodes
in the formulas to generate new formulas will generate an
equivalent defining sequence.
Lemma 2. Permutation on the defining sequence and trajec-
tory formulas
∀π. is swap π ⊃
∀f φ t n. (applyσ π [f ]φ t n = [applyf π f ]φ t n)
We would like to prove a similar result about defining
trajectory and trajectory formulas. Defining trajectories are
sequences of states that the circuit evolves into, given a stimuli
and the behaviour of the circuit model. Thus the role of circuit
model becomes significant here. In order to ensure that the
effect of permutation on the defining trajectory, is same as
the effect of applying the permutation on the formula, and
then computing the defining trajectory, we have to ensure that
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the circuit model has symmetry. This is formally stated in the
lemma below.
Lemma 3. Permutation on the defining trajectory and trajec-
tory formulas
∀π. is swap π ⊃
∀M. Symχ M π ⊃
∀f φ t n. (applyσ π [[ f ]] φM t n =
[[ applyf π f ]] φM t n)
The theorem that encapsulates the relation between sym-
metric circuit models and the correctness results of symmetric
STE properties is presented below.
Theorem 1. Soundness Theorem
∀π. is swap π ⊃
∀M. Symχ M π ⊃
∀A C. (M |= A ⇒ C =
M |= (applyf π A) ⇒ (applyf π C))
This theorem is the most important result of this section. By
using this theorem we explicitly verify one representative STE
assertion from an equivalence class, and deduce the existence
of the correctness of the entire class for symmetric circuits.
For proofs of the above lemmas and the soundness theorem,
please refer to [11]. We have mechanised the proofs in the
theorem prover HOL 4.
IV. STE INFERENCE RULES
In this section, we present the STE inference rules, and their
proofs. Some of these rules, require the circuit model to be
monotonic. Circuit models are represented as FSMs in Forte,
and they are monotonic. We will use these inference rules to
decompose the STE properties and re-use them in the reverse
direction to re-compose smaller verification results.
The usage of STE inference rules for property decompo-
sition is not new. Some of the rules that have been used
in the past [7], [14] for decomposition include the rules on
Reflexivity, Conjunction, Transitivity, Antecedent Strengthen-
ing 1 and Consequent Weakening 1. These are shown below.
However, the rules we provide, not only help in decomposing
the property into several smaller properties, but also expose
the symmetric STE properties, to allow easy clustering.
Reflexivity
M |= A ⇒ A
Conjunction
M |= A1 ⇒ B1 M |= A2 ⇒ B2
M |= (A1 and A2) ⇒ (B1 and B2)
Transitivity
M |= A ⇒ B M |= B ⇒ C
M |= A ⇒ C
Antecedent Strengthening 1
M |= A′ ⇒ C [A′]φ v [A]φ
M |= A ⇒ C
Consequent Weakening 1
M |= A ⇒ C ′ [C]φ v [C ′]φ
M |= A ⇒ C
We have extended the language of the STE inference rules
by adding a layer of propositional logic on top of the language
of the STE. This is done by providing a rule that enables us
to transform a property with the guards in the consequent of
a property, to another equivalent property where the guards
can be pushed out as an implication. This is given by the rule
known as Constraint Implication 1 shown below.
The reason for doing this, is an observation that many STE
properties we encounter during the verification of symmetric
circuits, can be effectively decomposed, by targeting the
decomposition of the Boolean guards and trajectory formulas.
The inference system looks at the structure of both the Boolean
expressions, and the trajectory formulas, and works simultane-
ously to reduce both of them. It is done easily when the guards
are pushed out of the trajectory formula. The decomposition of
guards and the formulas in this manner has not been exploited
in the past with STE model checking.
Constraint Implication 1
M |= A ⇒ (C when G)
G ⊃ (M |= A ⇒ C)
Proof: The proof takes place by a case split on the Boolean
guard G. When G is true, the premise of the rule reduces to
M |= (A ⇒ C), from the definition of the STE implementa-
tion algorithm. Thus the conclusion of the rule holds. When
G is false the rule holds immediately.
The other direction is the one in which the assumption of
a Boolean implication can be pushed inside the syntax of the
STE property. This is given by the rule Constraint Implication
2 (Constr Impl 2).
Constraint Implication 2
G ⊃ (M |= A ⇒ C)
M |= A ⇒ (C when G)
Proof: By doing a case split on the Boolean guard G, we dis-
charge the case when G is true, by using the definition of the
STE implementation algorithm, and the case when G is false,
follows by using the definition of the STE implementation,
and observing that ∀a.X v a.
The following rule allows a property with a conjunctive
Boolean assumption to be decomposed into smaller properties
with the smaller individual conjuncts. This rule called Guard
Conjunction (Grd Conj) turns out to be very useful for
proving STE properties as we will show when we present the
examples.
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Guard Conjunction
G1 ⊃ (M |= A ⇒ C) G2 ⊃ (M |= B ⇒ D)
(G1 ∧G2) ⊃ (M |= (A and B) ⇒ (C and D))
Proof: The proof follows easily from the assumptions, and the
Conjunction rule of inference.
The next rule appears to be the dual of the Guard Con-
junction rule, but it is more subtle. This is because the
assumption in the consequent of the rule is a disjunction, and
the consequent of the STE property has only one formula C.
What this rule attempts to capture is that if we can verify two
STE properties against a given circuit model, with separate
antecedents and separate Boolean assumptions, but identical
consequent, then we can do a disjunction of the Boolean
assumptions and the conjunction of the antecedents of the two
STE properties to deduce that the resulting STE property is
satisfied by the circuit model. This rule known as the Guard
Disjunction (Grd Disj), becomes very useful in decomposing
properties that have a Boolean disjunction in the guard of the
STE formula. These are also some of the more notoriously
difficult properties to verify, because of the disjunction in the
Boolean guard.
Guard Disjunction
G1 ⊃ (M |= A ⇒ C) G2 ⊃ (M |= B ⇒ C)
G1 ∨G2 ⊃ (M |= (A and B) ⇒ C)
Proof: Assuming G1 holds, the conclusion of the rule follows
from the premise, and using the fact that for monotonic circuit
models, ∀MAB.(∀t n. [[ A ]] φM t n v [[ A and B ]] φM t n).
Assuming G2 holds, the conclusion follows again, using the
same argument as in the case when G1 was true.
The last rule we present here is known as the Cut. This
rule enables the verification of a given STE property with
conjunctive Boolean guards to be done by decomposing the
property verification into two parts, in a way that we verify
an intermediate property using an intermediate formula, and a
part of the Boolean guards of the original STE property, then
use this intermediate formula together with the other half of the
original antecedent, to verify the property with the consequent
of the original STE property, under the presence of the other
Boolean conjunct.
Cut
G1 ⊃ (M |= A1 ⇒ B1) G2 ⊃ (M |= (B1 and A2) ⇒ C)
(G1 ∧G2) ⊃ (M |= (A1 and A2) ⇒ C)
Proof: From the Conjunction rule of inference, we get:
M |= (A1 and B1) ⊃ (M |= A2 ⇒A2) ⊃ (M |= (A1 and
A2) ⇒ (B1 and A2)). From the Reflexivity rule of inference
we know that M |= A2 ⇒ A2. Together with the premise,
using the modus ponen, we get M |= (A1 andA2) ⇒ (B1 and
A2). Using the Transitivity rule, on this and the assumptions,
we obtain the conclusion.
Antecedent Strengthening 2
G ⊃ (M |= A′ ⇒ C) [A′]φ v [A]φ
G ⊃ (M |= A ⇒ C)
Proof: The proof follows easily from Antecedent Strengthen-
ing 1 and the assumptions.
Consequent Weakening 2
G ⊃ (M |= A ⇒ C ′) [C]φ v [C ′]φ
G ⊃ (M |= A ⇒ C)
Proof: The proof follows easily from Consequent Weakening
1, and the assumptions.
We have implemented the proofs of all the inference rules
in HOL.















Fig. 2. A unit-delay 2-bit comparator
The comparator circuit in Figure 2, has symmetry across its
two input buses and the output. We can swap ′′a′′0 with
′′a′′1
and ′′b′′0 with
′′b′′1 and the output with itself, and the behaviour
of the circuit will not change. This is the property that we will
exploit in the verification of the STE property.
The property we wish to verify for the comparator is given
by the following:
Comp |= (′′a′′0 is a0) and (′′b′′0 is b0) and
(′′a′′1 is a1) and (
′′b′′1 is b1)
⇒ N((′′out′′ is 1) when
((a0 = b0) ∧ (a1 = b1))) and
N((′′out′′ is 0) when
(¬(a0 = b0) ∨ (¬(a1 = b1))))
The above property can be decomposed using the Conjunc-
tion rule into the following two cases:
I. Equality case
Comp |= (′′a′′0 is a0) and (′′b′′0 is b0) and
(′′a′′1 is a1) and (
′′b′′1 is b1)
⇒ N((′′out′′ is 1) when
((a0 = b0) ∧ (a1 = b1)))
II. Inequality case
Comp |= (′′a′′0 is a0) and (′′b′′0 is b0) and
(′′a′′1 is a1) and (
′′b′′1 is b1)
⇒ N((′′out′′ is 0) when
(¬(a0 = b0) ∨ (¬(a1 = b1))))
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We will show how to verify the equality case first. The
verification strategy relies on the inference rules. We explain
the steps below. We will use the Cut rule to partition the
verification of a property into two cases, which rely on
an intermediate trajectory formula. Below these intermediate
formulas are given by B0 and B1. Other trajectory formulas
describing parts of the antecedent and the consequent of the
given property are defined.
let B0 = (′′i′′0 is 1)
let B1 = (′′i′′1 is 1)
let A0 = (′′a′′0 is a0) and (
′′b′′0 is b0)
let A1 = (′′a′′1 is a1) and (
′′b′′1 is b1)
let G0 = (a0 = b0)
let G1 = (a1 = b1)
let C ′ = (′′o′′ is 1)
let C = N(′′out′′ is 1)
Here is how the verification will proceed once the trajectory
formulas have been defined. It begins by carrying out an
STE run verifying the weaker property i.e., the result of
bitwise comparison of the values at nodes ′′a′′0 and
′′b′′0 is
1, if the values are equal. This run requires two symbolic
variables a0 and b0. By symmetry, it can be concluded by
using Theorem 1 that the other part of the bitwise comparison
circuitry is also correct. Then Constraint Implication rules
transform the properties such that the guards are moved out
of the consequent of the properties and a Guard Conjunction
rule is used to stitch the correctness results of the two bitwise
comparison cases. Then assuming that all inputs to the And
gate of the comparator are 1, we check if the output is
1. This run basically uses the intermediate formulas in the
antecedent and carries out the scalar simulation in Forte.
Another straightforward scalar run is carried out to check if the
output value appears at ′′out′′ one time point later than ′′o′′.
Finally by virtue of Transitivity rule and the Cut, we deduce
the correctness property we started out to do. The property is
finally transformed using the Constraint Implication 2 rule, to
transform it to exactly the property we wanted to verify in the
first instance. All the steps are outlined below:
1. Comp |= A0 ⇒ (B0 when G0) (STE run)
2. Comp |= A1 ⇒ (B1 when G1) (Symmetry)
3. G0 ⊃ (Comp |= A0 ⇒ B0) (Constr Impl 1)
4. G1 ⊃ (Comp |= A1 ⇒ B1) (Constr Impl 1)
5. (G0 ∧ G1) ⊃
(Comp |= (A0 and A1)
⇒ (B0 and B1)) (Grd Conj)
6. Comp |= (B0 and B1) ⇒ C ′ (STE run)
7. Comp |= C ′ ⇒ C (STE run)
8. Comp |= (B0 and B1) ⇒ C (Trans on 6 and 7)
9. (G0 ∧ G1) ⊃
(Comp |= (A0 and A1) ⇒ C) (Cut on 5 and 8)
10. Comp |= (A0 and A1) ⇒
(C when (G0 ∧G1)) (Constr Impl 2)
Replacing the values of A0, A1, C, G0 and G1 we can see
that we have verified the equality case. Now we will show
how to verify the inequality case. The formulas A0 and A1
remain the same, but we redefine C ′, C, and the guards G0
and G1.
let C ′ = (′′o′′ is 0)
let C = N(′′out′′ is 0)
let G0 = ¬(a0 = b0)
let G1 = ¬(a1 = b1)
Now we proceed as follows:
1. Comp |= A0 ⇒ (C ′ when G0) (STE run)
2. Comp |= A1 ⇒ (C ′ when G1) (Symmetry)
3. G0 ⊃ (Comp |= A0 ⇒ C ′) (Constr Impl 1)
4. G1 ⊃ (Comp |= A1 ⇒ C ′) (Constr Impl 1)
5. (G0 ∨ G1) ⊃
(Comp |= ((A0 and A1) ⇒ C ′)) (Grd Disj 3, 4)
6. Comp |= C ′ ⇒ C (STE run)
7. (G0 ∨ G1) ⊃
(Comp |= ((A0 and A1) ⇒ C)) (Cut)
Thus the number of variables required in any STE run is 2.
By using inference rules we are able to decompose the prop-
erties effectively, and using symmetry collapses the number
of explicit cases to verify to just one, and that case needs
2 variables. Thus variables required for verifying an n-bit
comparator remains fixed at 2 and not 2n. So BDDs always
stay small and verification complexity remains constant with
respect to BDD size.
VI. A CIRCUIT WITH MULTIPLE CAMS — CASE STUDY
Our final case study is that of a circuit that contains two
CAMs. We call the circuit model cam xor. The property we
wish to verify about this circuit is that the incoming tag can
only be found in at most one CAM. If a tag is found in
more than one CAM, hit (out) stays low. Figure 3 shows the
circuit. Circuits with multiple CAMs are abundantly found in
caches. The associativity in a cache determines the number of
CAMs used in the cache, and the number of comparators used
in parallel for comparing the incoming tag address with the
stored tags in different CAMs. The principle we illustrate in
the verification of the circuit in this section, can be applied to
the verification of a cache.
For the sake of simplicity in illustration, we consider the
case with two lines in each CAM, and the tag width being
two bits, and we leave out the associated data part of the
CAMs. This is sufficient to show the principle involved in
the verification using symmetry. Any larger circuit can be
verified using exactly the same principle. There is symmetry
amongst tag and data bits in the CAM. The symmetry in tag
bits is useful for collapsing the set of verification runs for tag
comparison properties. This is because comparators that have
symmetry, are used in this circuit, and therefore we re-use the
correctness results from the comparator verification case here.
The symmetry in data bits is useful for collapsing the case
of verifying correct data read/write property. However, due
to the lack of space we do not show the verification of that
property here. The interested reader is encouraged to see [5].
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Fig. 3. A circuit with two CAMs, showing the tag comparison circuitry, the
incoming tags match at most one line in the CAM, and hit rises only if the
tag is found in at most one of the CAMs but not both. We consider the case
of two lines in each CAM, with two bit wide tags in this example. Stored
tags for the first CAM are denoted by T , and for the second CAM by the
letter U . The subscript (0 or 1) denotes which line in the CAM (1st or 2nd)
the tags are stored. Circuits like these, where an incoming tag is compared in
parallel with tags in multiple CAMs appear in all modern day set-associative
caches.
We assume the existence of symbolic (BDD) variables for the
tag and data lines. We state the basic antecedent assertion that
assigns the symbolic incoming tag values to the incoming tag
nodes. When the tagen signal is low, new tags are written
into the CAM, and when the tagen signal is high, tags can
be read out from the CAM lines. For the sake of simplicity of
presentation here, we have left out the tag enable signal from
the figure.
// tag enabled and incoming tags take symbolic values
let base ant = (((′′Tag[0]′′ is Tag0)
and (′′Tag[1]′′ is Tag1)) from 0 to 2)
and (′′tagen′′ is F from 0 to 1) and
(′′tagen′′ is T from 1 to 2)
We then provide the trajectory formulas stating that the first
and second lines in each CAM are populated with symbolic
tag values.
// populate the 1st line of the 1st CAM
let A0 = (((′′T0[0]′′ is t00) and
(′′T0[1]′′ is t01)) from 0 to 2) and base ant
// populate the 2nd line of the 1st CAM
let B0 = (((′′T1[0]′′ is t10) and
(′′T1[1]′′ is t11)) from 0 to 2) and base ant
Similarly, the first and the second lines of the second CAM
are populated with symbolic values.
// populate the 1st line of the 2nd CAM
let A1 = (((′′U0[0]′′ is u00) and
(′′U0[1]′′ is u01)) from 0 to 2) and base ant
// populate the 2nd line of the 2nd CAM
let B1 = (((′′U1[0]′′ is u10) and
(′′U1[1]′′ is u11)) from 0 to 2) and base ant
We then define the trajectory formulas that state the desired
consequent of the property, that the hit was found in the first
and the second CAMs.
// hit found in the 1st CAM
let C0 = ′′hit′′0 is T from 1 to 2
// hit found in the 2nd CAM
let C1 = ′′hit′′1 is T from 1 to 2
Similarly we can define the formulas that state that the hit was
not found in the first and the second CAM.
// hit not found in the 1st CAM
let D0 = ′′hit′′0 is F from 1 to 2
// hit not found in the 2nd CAM
let D1 = ′′hit′′1 is F from 1 to 2
We also provide the formulas that state where in each CAM
the hit was found. To save space, we only show the formulas
for the first CAM.
// hit not found at 1st line of 1st CAM
let D00 = ′′hit0[0]
′′ is F from 1 to 2
// hit not found at 2nd line of 1st CAM
let D01 = ′′hit0[1]
′′ is F from 1 to 2
The following Boolean formulas state where the incoming tags
match the stored tags of the CAM lines. We use the letter G
to denote the Boolean formulas that state that the tags match
at the lines of the first CAM, while we use the letter H to
denote the Boolean formula that states that tags match at the
lines of the second CAM. The suffixes distinguish the line in
each CAM, where the tags are found (0 for the first CAM and
1 for the second CAM).
// tags match at 1st line of 1st CAM
let G0 = (Tag0 = t00) ∧ (Tag1 = t01)
// tags match at 2nd line of 1st CAM
let G1 = (Tag0 = t10) ∧ (Tag1 = t11)
// tags match at 1st line of 2nd CAM
let H0 = (Tag0 = u00) ∧ (Tag1 = u01)
// tags match at 2nd line of 2nd CAM
let H1 = (Tag0 = u10) ∧ (Tag1 = u11)
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The verification of the property involves using some verifica-
tion results for a CAM. The property we are looking to verify
for a CAM is that if the incoming tags match at any line in
the CAM then the hit from the CAM rises, and if the tags
don’t match at any line, then the hit stays low. We assume the
invariant that the tags match at most one line in the CAM. We
will show the steps involved in verifying this property below.
A. Verifying the hit circuitry of the CAM
One of the desired properties we wish to verify for a CAM,
is that if the incoming tags match at any of the lines in the
CAM, then a hit signal should be flagged at the output of the
CAM. This is done by checking the value of the hit output in
the CAM. It is flagged as high if the match was found, else it
stays low. We show the verification steps for this property for
the 1st CAM, and the same steps are used for the verification
of the property for the 2nd CAM, so shall not be shown here.
Since the tag comparison circuitry uses the comparator circuit
we showed earlier, we can re-use the verification results for
the comparator here. We refer to the verification strategy used
for the comparator verification earlier as the Comp result, in
the sequel below. We will first show the verification of the
property that states that the hit rises if there is a match in the
first CAM. This is shown in Steps 1-3 below.
1. G0 ⊃ (cam xor |= (A0 ⇒ C0) (Comp result)
2. G1 ⊃ (cam xor |= (B0 ⇒ C0) (Comp result)
3. (G0 ∨G1) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and B0) ⇒ C0) (Grd Disj)
If the incoming tags don’t match at any line in the first
CAM, then the hit stays low. The verification of this property
is shown in the following steps. We use the correctness
result of the comparator for inequality case, and do a Guard
Conjunction to obtain Step 4.
4. (¬G0 ∧ ¬G1) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and B0) ⇒ (D00 and D01))
Then a scalar run is done to verify the property that if the hit
from both the lines from the first CAM is low, then the hit
from the first CAM stays low.
5. cam xor |= (D00 and D01) ⇒ D0
Finally we do a Cut on Step 4 and 5 to obtain the correctness
of the property that says that if the match was not found in
any line of the first CAM then the hit from that CAM stays
low.
6. (¬G0 ∧ ¬G1) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and B0) ⇒ D0)
The property verification for the other CAM can be done by
repeating the above steps. Once we have verified the properties
for both the CAMs, we are now ready to verify the property
that the hit can at most be found in one of the CAMs. We
show the steps involved in verifying this property using the
verification results for individual CAMs shown above, and
using STE runs and inference rules. We shall refer to the
verification results for the individual CAM as the CAM result,
when we show the steps below.
7. (H0 ∨H1) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A1 and B1) ⇒ C1) (CAM result)
8. (¬H0 ∧ ¬H1) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A1 and B1) ⇒ D1) (CAM result)
9. cam xor |= (C0 and C1)
⇒ (′′out′′ is F ) (scalar run)
10. (G0 ∨G1) ∧ (H0 ∨H1) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and A1) and
(B0 and B1)
⇒ (C0 and C1)) (Grd Conj 3, 7)
11. (G0 ∨G1) ∧ (H0 ∨H1) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and A1) and
(B0 and B1)
⇒ (′′out′′ is F ) (Cut 9, 10)
12. ((¬G0 ∧ ¬G1) ∧ (H0 ∨H1)) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and A1) and
(B0 and B1)
⇒ (D0 and C1)) (Grd Conj 6, 7)
13. ((¬H0 ∧ ¬H1) ∧ (G0 ∨G1)) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and A1) and
(B0 and B1)
⇒ (D1 and C0)) (Grd Conj 3, 8)
14. cam xor |= (D0 and C1) ⇒
(′′out′′ is T ) (scalar run)
15. cam xor |= (D1 and C0) ⇒
(′′out′′ is T ) (scalar run)
16. ((¬G0 ∧ ¬G1) ∧ (H0 ∨H1)) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and A1) and
(B0 and B1)
⇒ (′′out′′ is T )) (Cut 12, 14)
17. ((¬H0 ∧ ¬H1) ∧ (G0 ∨G1)) ⊃
(cam xor |= (A0 and A1) and
(B0 and B1)
⇒ (′′out′′ is T )) (Cut 13, 15)
Property (11), (16) and (17) are the properties we had set out to
verify, and we verify these using only two BDD variables. This
is because we need only two variables for verifying an m−bit
comparator, and since symmetry in the circuit with multiple
CAMs is due to the symmetry in comparators, one condenses
the requirement of variables for explicit verification runs for
this circuit, to the requirement for the explicit verification runs
for the comparator circuit.
VII. RELATED WORK
Several researchers in the past [2], [3], [6], [9], [11] have
investigated the usage of symmetry for performing reductions
for model checking. The work that comes closest to ours is
Pandey’s [11], [12]. In [11], he used symmetry reduction for
verifying SRAMs. The exact number of variables required in
the verification was not reported, however verification memory
used was shown. Comparing that to the number of variables
we used in verifying SRAMs, we perform slightly better
(for details see [5]). This is due to the fact that we use
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symmetry and symbolic indexing both, whereas Pandey has
used only symmetries for SRAM verification. For CAMs,
Pandey et al. [12] used symbolic indexing, and reported
logarithmic reduction in the number of variables required.
By using symmetries for CAMs and CAM like circuits like
the one we showed in this paper, we only need a fixed
small number of BDD variables. Our approach relies on using
property decomposition rules where the amount of time used
in verification is linear with respect to the tag width, number
of CAM lines and the number of CAMs. A key distinguishing
factor between Pandey’s work and our’s is the way symmetries
are discovered in the circuit models. Whereas Pandey had
used NP-complete sub-graph isomorphism based techniques to
discover symmetries in transistor level netlist representation of
models, we capture symmetries in the structure of the model
at the time of design, and later infer their presence by type
checking [4], [5]. The idea of using special types to record
symmetries in systems was advocated by Ip and Dill [3]. They
used Murphi, a guarded command language with scalarsets,
to model their system and used symmetry reduction for
verification of several cache-coherence protocols. McMillan
also used type based inference for symmetry detection [9].
He used refinement relations to decompose the verification
problem into smaller runs, and subsequently used symmetry
reduction together with other reduction techniques such as path
splitting and data type reduction. Clarke et al. [2] investigated
the idea of using symmetries for reduction of state spaces
in model checking. Their solution is applicable for both the
cases, when the transition relation is provided explicitly in
terms of states, and when it is given symbolically as a BDD.
They show that for CTL∗ and Mu-calculus, model checking
of the original model can be reduced to the problem of model
checking a smaller model which is a quotient of the original
one. The quotient is obtained by taking an intersection of
the symmetries of the model and the properties. This idea
was also used by Emerson and Sistla [6]. who describe a
method of exploiting symmetry based reduction for CTL∗
model checking. Symmetry in models was read directly from
the program source by monitoring the process indices, whereas
symmetry amongst properties was identified by manual in-
spection. In a recent work, Sistla and Godefroid [15] provide
further extensions to this approach, by using guarded annotated
quotient structures thus enabling symmetries to be identified
for states that are variable-value pairs besides process indices.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a reduction methodology for STE model
checking that exploits the symmetry in circuit and uses a novel
set of inference rules for property decomposition, in a way
that the BDD variable requirement is reduced to a constant
number variables for CAMs and CAM like circuits. The rules
are generic, and they can be used in the verification of non-
symmetric systems as well. Using inference rules effectively
requires manual inspection at the moment. In the future, we
would like to use these rules to be used for automatic property
decomposition in a manner that reveals the symmetry amongst
properties. We showed that the new set of inference rules is
sound, however we did not discuss the completeness issues,
future work should look into that.
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Abstract— Recent years have seen a proliferation of 3-valued
models for capturing abstractions of systems, since these enable
verifying both universal and existential properties. Reasoning
about such systems is either inexpensive and imprecise (compo-
sitional checking), or expensive and precise (thorough checking).
In this paper, we prove that thorough and compositional checks
for temporal formulas in their disjunctive forms coincide, which
leads to an effective procedure for thorough checking of a variety
of abstract models and the entire µ-calculus.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a proliferation of approaches to
capturing abstract models using rich formalisms that enable
reasoning about arbitrary temporal properties. Examples of
such formalisms include Partial Kripke Structures (PKSs) [1],
Mixed Transition Systems (MixTSs) [2], [3], Hyper-Transition
Systems (HTSs) [4], [5], [6], etc. Model checking over these is
either conclusive, i.e., the property of interest can be proven
or refuted, or inconclusive, denoted maybe, indicating that the
abstract model needs to be refined.
Two distinct 3-valued semantics of temporal logic are used
over these abstract models. One is compositional, in which
the value of a property is computed from the values of its
subproperties (as in classical model checking), and the other
one is thorough [1]. The latter assigns maybe to a property
only if there is a pair of concretizations of the abstract model
such that the property holds in one and fails in the other.
In general, model checking with thorough semantics is more
expensive than compositional model checking – EXPTIME-
complete for CTL, LTL and µ-calculus (Lµ) [7]. Thorough
semantics, however, is more conclusive than compositional.
For example, consider the program P shown in Figure 1(b),
where x and y are integer variables and x, y = e1, e2
indicates that x and y are simultaneously assigned e1 and e2,
respectively. A PKS M , shown in Figure 1(c), is an abstraction
of P w.r.t. predicates p (meaning “x is odd”), and q, (meaning
“y is odd”). The CTL formula ϕ = AGq∧A[pU¬q] evaluates
to maybe on M under compositional semantics and to false
under thorough, since every refinement of M refutes ϕ.
For the purpose of effective reasoning about abstract
models, it is important to enable thorough-quality analy-
sis using (compositional) 3-valued model checking. Specif-
ically, we aim to identify classes of temporal formulas
whose compositional model checking is as precise as thor-
ough. Otherwise, we want to transform the formulas into
equivalent ones (in classical logic), for which composi-
tional checking yields the most precise answer. For exam-
ple, we would transform the formula AGq ∧ A[pU¬q] into
A[p ∧ q U false], that is unsatisfiable (over total models) and
thus always false. [9], [8] refer to this process as semantic
minimization, and the formulas for which thorough and com-
positional semantics coincide as self-minimizing.
This paper addresses thorough checking of Lµ formulas
over various abstract models with 3-valued semantics follow-
ing the algorithm in Figure 1(a). This algorithm consists of
three main steps: (1) (compositional) model checking of ϕ over
an abstract model M (e.g.,[1], [2], [5]), (2) checking if ϕ is
self-minimizing, and (3) computing semantic minimization of
ϕ, and then model checking the resulting formula. Computing
semantic minimization is the most expensive part and is at least
as hard as thorough checking [8]. Therefore, it is important to
identify as many self-minimizing formulas as possible in step
(2), and avoid step (3).
In [8] and [10], it was shown that positive/monotone tem-
poral formulas, i.e., the ones that do not include both p and
¬p, are self-minimizing over abstract models described as
PKSs. This self-minimization check, however, is not robust
for more expressive abstraction modelling formalisms such as
HTSs. For example, consider an abstraction of program P ,
described as an HTS H , shown in Figure 1(d). Based on the
3-valued semantics of Lµ over HTSs, the monotone formula
AGp ∧ AGq evaluates to maybe over H [5], [4]. However,
this formula is false by thorough checking, because every
concretization of H refutes either AGp or AGq.
In this paper, we extend step (2) of the thorough checking al-
gorithm by proving that the disjunctive and conjunctive normal
forms of Lµ defined in [11] are self-minimizing over abstract
models described as HTSs. We focus on HTSs because other
3-valued abstraction formalisms can be translated to them
without loss of precision, but not the other way around [4].
Godefroid and Huth [8] proved that monotone disjunctive Lµ
formulas without greatest fixpoints are self-minimizing for
PKSs, and pointed out that by a naive inductive proof the self-
minimization of greatest fixpoint disjunctive formulas cannot
be shown. We improve on this result by using an automata
intersection game inspired by [12], to show that the disjunctive
and conjunctive normal forms of Lµ with greatest fixpoint
are self-minimizing over HTSs. Our result yields a simple
syntactic check for identifying self-minimizing formulas over
HTSs and can be used along with the monotonicity condition
for PKSs and MixTSs.
Our result further provides an alternative semantic min-
imization procedure for step (3) of the algorithm, via the
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(a)
THOROUGHCHECK(M , ϕ)
(1): if (v := MODELCHECK(M , ϕ)) 6= maybe
return v
(2): if ISSELFMINIMIZING(M , ϕ)
return maybe
(3): return MODELCHECK(M , SEMANTICMINIMIZATION(ϕ))
(b)
P::
int x, y = 1, 1;
int t;
x, y = t, t+1;






















Fig. 1. (a) A sketch of an algorithm for thorough checking. A simple program P (adapted from [8]) (b) and its abstractions described as: (c) a PKS M ; and
(d) an HTS H .
tableau-based translation of Janin and Walukiewicz [11].
Godefroid and Huth [8] proved that Lµ formulas are closed
under semantic minimization, i.e., every Lµ formula can be
translated to an equivalent Lµ formula (in classical logic), for
which compositional checking yields the most precise answer.
The translation, however, is complicated and includes several
steps: transforming Lµ formulas to non-deterministic tree
automata, making non-deterministic tree automata 3-valued,
and translating back these automata to Lµ. Our semantic min-
imization procedure is more straightforward and only uses the
simple tableau-based construction described in [11]. Finally,
we show that our semantic minimization procedure can be
extended to abstract models described as PKSs and MixTSs,
thus providing a general SEMANTICMINIMIZATION() subroutine for
the algorithm in Figure 1(a).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
outlines some preliminaries. Section III defines an automata in-
tersection game inspired by the abstraction framework in [12].
This game is used in Section IV to prove the main result of the
paper which establishes a connection between self-minimizing
formulas over HTSs and disjunctive/conjunctive forms of
Lµ. Section V provides a complete algorithm for thorough
checking of Lµ over arbitrary abstract models including PKSs,
MixTSs, and HTSs, and discusses the complexity of this
algorithm. In Section VI, we present some self-minimizing
fragments of CTL for HTSs. We further discuss our work and
compare it to related work in Section VII. Section VIII con-
cludes the paper. Proofs for the major theorems are available
in the extended version of this paper [13].
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide background on modelling
formalisms, temporal logics, refinement relation, and compo-
sitional and thorough semantics.
3-valued logic. We denote by 3 the 3-valued Kleene logic [14]
with elements true (t), false (f), and maybe (m). The truth
ordering ≤ of this logic is defined as f ≤ m ≤ t, and negation
as ¬t = f and ¬m = m. An additional ordering  relates
values based on the amount of information: m  t and m  f,
so that m represents the least amount of information.
Models. In what follows, we introduce different modelling
formalisms that are used in this paper.
A Kripke structure (KS) is a tuple K = (Σ, s0, R, L,AP ),
where Σ is a set of states, s0 ∈ Σ is the initial state, R ⊆ Σ×Σ
is a transition relation, AP is the set of atomic propositions,
and L : Σ→ 2AP is a labelling function. We assume KSs are
total, i.e., R is left-total.
A Partial Kripke Structure (PKS) [1] is a KS whose la-
belling function L is 3-valued, i.e., L : Σ→ 3AP . Figure 1(c)
illustrates a PKS, where propositions p and q are m in state s1.
An Mixed Transition System (MixTS) [2], [3] is a tuple
(Σ, s0, R
must, Rmay, L,AP ), where Σ is a set of states, s0 ∈
Σ is the initial state, Rmust ⊆ Σ × Σ and Rmay ⊆ Σ × Σ
are must and may transition relations, respectively, AP is the
set of atomic propositions, and L : Σ → 3AP is a 3-valued
labelling function.
A hyper-transition system (HTS) [4], [5], [6] is a tuple
H = (Σ, s0, R
must, Rmay, L,AP ), where Rmust ⊆ Σ×P(Σ)
and Rmay ⊆ Σ × Σ are must and may transition relations,
respectively, L : Σ → 2AP is a 2-valued labelling function,
and Σ, s0 and AP are defined as above. Intuitively, an HTS is
a MixTS with a 2-valued labelling function and must hyper-
transitions. We assume HTSs and MixTSs are total, i.e., Rmay
is left-total. Figure 1(d) illustrates an HTS, where must and
may transitions are represented as solid and dashed arrows,
respectively. Throughout this paper, we often write relations
as functions: for instance, Rmay(s) is the set {s′ | (s, s′) ∈
Rmay}.
An HTS H is concrete if for every s, s′ ∈ Σ, we have
s′ ∈ Rmay(s) ⇔ {s′} ∈ Rmust(s). For every KS K =
(Σ, s0, R, L,AP ), there is an equivalent concrete HTS HK =
(Σ, s0, R
must, Rmay, L,AP ), where Rmay = R and s′ ∈
R(s)⇔ {s′} ∈ Rmust(s) for every s, s′ ∈ Σ.
Temporal logics. Temporal properties are specified in the
propositional µ-calculus Lµ [15].
Definition 1: Let Var be a set of fixpoint variables, and
AP be a set of atomic propositions. The logic Lµ(AP ) is the
set of formulas generated by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= true | p | Z | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | EXϕ | µZ · ϕ(Z)
where p ∈ AP , Z ∈ Var , and ϕ(Z) is syntactically monotone
in Z.
The derived connectives are defined as follows:
ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 = ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)
AXϕ = ¬EX¬ϕ
νZ · ϕ(Z) = ¬µZ · ¬ϕ(¬Z)
Any Lµ formula can be transformed into an equivalent
formula in which negations are applied only to atomic propo-
sitions. Such formulas are said to be in negation normal form
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||true||>e = Σ
||true||⊥e = ∅
||p||>e = {s | p ∈ L(s)}





||ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2||>e = ||ϕ1||>e ∩ ||ϕ2||>e
||ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2||⊥e = ||ϕ1||⊥e ∪ ||ϕ2||⊥e
||EXϕ||>e = ex(||ϕ||>e)
||EXϕ||⊥e = ax(||ϕ||⊥e)
||µZ · ϕ||>e =
T
{S ⊆ Σ | ||ϕ||>e[Z → S] ⊆ S}
||µZ · ϕ||⊥e =
S
{S ⊆ Σ | S ⊆ ||ϕ||⊥e[Z → S]}
Fig. 2. The semantics of Lµ.
(NNF). An Lµ formula ϕ is universal (resp. existential) if
NNF(ϕ) does not contain any EX (resp. AX) operators. We
write ϕ∀ (resp. ϕ∃) to denote a universal (resp. existential) for-
mula, and write ϕprop when ϕ is a propositional formula, i.e.,
when ϕ consists only of literals, conjunctions and disjunctions.
Definition 2: [5] Let H be an HTS, ϕ be an Lµ formula,
and e : Var → P(Σ) be an environment. We denote by
||ϕ||H>e the set of states in H that satisfy ϕ, and by ||ϕ||H⊥e the
set of states in H that refute ϕ. The sets ||ϕ||>e and ||ϕ||⊥e are
defined in Figure 2, where ex(S) = {s | ∃S ′ ∈ Rmust(s) · S′ ⊆
S} and ax(S) = {s | ∀s′ ∈ Rmay(s) · s′ ∈ S}.
For a closed Lµ formula ϕ, ||ϕ||Hλ e1 = ||ϕ||Hλ e2 for any e1
and e2 and λ ∈ {>,⊥}. Thus, e can be safely dropped when ϕ
is closed. We also omit H when it is clear from the context.
Since KSs are special cases of HTSs, the above semantics
applies to them as well.
In this paper, we often express temporal formulas in the
computation tree logic CTL [16] whose syntax is defined w.r.t.
a set AP of atomic propositions as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | EXϕ | AXϕ | E[ϕUϕ] |
A[ϕUϕ] | E[ϕŨϕ] | A[ϕŨϕ]
where p ∈ AP . The operators AU and EU are universal and
existential until operators, respectively; and operators EŨ and
AŨ are their duals, respectively. Other CTL operators can be
defined from these:
AGϕ = A[falseŨϕ] EGϕ = E[falseŨϕ]
AFϕ = A[trueUϕ] EFϕ = E[trueUϕ]
CTL has a fixpoint characterization which provides a
straightforward procedure for translating CTL to Lµ. Thus,
the semantics of CTL over HTSs follows from Definition 2.
3-valued compositional semantics. An HTS H is consis-
tent [4] if for every s ∈ Σ and S ∈ Rmust(s), S∩Rmay(s) 6=
∅. Therefore, for every consistent HTS H and ϕ ∈ Lµ,
||ϕ||>∩||ϕ||⊥ = ∅, i.e., a consistent H does not satisfy ϕ∧¬ϕ.
The semantics of Lµ over a consistent HTS H can be
described as a 3-valued function ||.||H
3
: Lµ × Σ → 3. We
write ||ϕ||H
3
(s) = t if s ∈ ||ϕ||H> , ||ϕ||H3 (s) = f if s ∈ ||ϕ||H⊥ ,
and ||ϕ||H
3
(s) = m otherwise. The value of ϕ in H , denoted
||ϕ||H
3
, is defined as ||ϕ||H
3
(s0), where s0 is the initial state of
H . To disambiguate from an alternative semantics presented
later, we refer to this 3-valued semantics of Lµ over HTSs as
compositional.
Refinement relation. Models with 3-valued semantics are
compared using ordering relations known as refinement re-
lations [17].
Definition 3: [5] Let H1 and H2 be HTSs. A refinement
relation ρ ⊆ Σ1 × Σ2 is the largest relation where ρ(s, t) iff
1) L1(s) = L2(t),
2) ∀S ⊆ Σ1 ·Rmust1 (s, S) ⇒ ∃T ⊆ Σ2 ·Rmust2 (t, T )∧ ρ̂(S, T ),
3) ∀t′ ∈ Σ2 · Rmay2 (t, t′) ⇒ ∃s′ ∈ Σ1 · R
may
1
(s, s′) ∧ ρ(s′, t′),
where ρ̂(S, T )⇔ ∀t′ ∈ T · ∃s′ ∈ S · ρ(s′, t′).
We say H2 refines H1 and write H1  H2, if there is









initial states of H1 and H2, respectively.
Refinement preserves Lµ formulas [5], i.e., if H1  H2, then
for every ϕ ∈ Lµ, ||ϕ||H13  ||ϕ||
H2
3
. Refinement can relate
HTSs to KSs as well. Recall that every KS K is equivalent
to a concrete HTS HK . We say that a KS K refines an HTS
H , denoted H  K, iff H  HK . For an HTS H , let C[H]
denote the set of completions of H , that is, the set of all KSs
that refine H .
Thorough semantics and semantic minimization. Thorough
semantics of Lµ over HTSs is defined w.r.t. the completions
of HTSs: A formula ϕ is true in H under thorough semantics,
written ||ϕ||Ht = t, if it is true in all completions of H; it is
false in H , written ||ϕ||Ht = f, if it is false in all completions
of H , and it is maybe in H , written ||ϕ||Ht = m, otherwise [1].
Thorough semantics is more precise than compositional
semantics [1]. That is, ||ϕ||H
3
 ||ϕ||Ht for every HTS H and
Lµ formula ϕ. A formula ϕ is a positive semantic minimization
of a formula ϕ′ if for every HTS H , ||ϕ′||Ht = t⇔ ||ϕ||H3 = t,
and is a negative semantic minimization of ϕ′ if for every
HTS H , ||ϕ′||Ht = f ⇔ ||ϕ||H3 = f. Further, a formula ϕ
is called positively self-minimizing when it is its own positive
semantic minimization, and is negatively self-minimizing when
it is its own negative semantic minimization. A formula that
is both positively and negatively self-minimizing is called
semantically self-minimizing or self-minimizing for short. For
instance, AGp ∧ AGq is not negatively self-minimizing, be-
cause for the HTS H in Figure 1(d), ||AGp∧AGq||H
3
= m and
||AGp∧AGq||Ht = f. As we show later in the paper, AG(p∧q)
is a negative semantic minimization of AGp ∧ AGq. Dually,
EF (p∨q) is a positive semantic minimization of EFp∨EFq.
Since thorough semantics is defined in terms of completions
of HTSs, it is desirable to define self-minimizing formulas in
the same terms, via an equivalent definition, as done below.
Definition 4: An Lµ formula ϕ is negatively self-
minimizing if for every HTS H , ||ϕ||H
3
6= f ⇒ ∃K ∈
C[H] · K |= ϕ, and is positively self-minimizing if for every
HTS H , ||ϕ||H
3
6= t⇒ ∃K ∈ C[H] ·K |= ¬ϕ.
Our definitions for positive and negative semantic minimiza-
tion are, respectively, the same as those for pessimistic and
optimistic semantic minimization in [8].
III. AN AUTOMATA INTERSECTION GAME
In this section, we define an automata intersection game in-
spired by the automata-based abstraction framework proposed
in [12]. In this framework, both temporal formulas and abstract
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models are represented as finite automata. For a formula ϕ,
the language of its corresponding automaton Aϕ is the set
of KSs satisfying ϕ, i.e., K ∈ L(Aϕ) iff K |= ϕ. For an
abstract model H , the language of its corresponding automaton
AH is the set of completions of H , i.e., C[H] = L(AH).
Viewing formulas and abstract models as automata allows
us to uniformly define both (thorough) model checking and
refinement checking as automata language inclusion. That is,
H |= ϕ iff L(AH) ⊆ L(Aϕ) (model checking), and H1  H2
iff L(AH1) ⊆ L(AH2) (refinement checking) [12].
The class of automata used in [12] is known as µ-
automata [11]. These automata, although very similar to non-
deterministic tree automata (e.g., [18]), are more appropriate
for working with branching time logics, because they precisely
capture Lµ over transition systems with unbounded branch-
ing. We use a simplified definition of µ-automata adapted
from [11], [12].
Definition 5: [11], [12] A µ-automaton is a tuple
A = (Q,B, q0, CH,BR,L,Ω, AP ), where Q is a non-empty,
countable set of states called choice states; B is a countable
set of states, disjoint from Q, called branch states; q0 ∈ Q
is the initial state; CH ⊆ Q × B is a choice relation, from
choice states to branch states; BR ⊆ B × Q is a transition
relation, from branch states to choice states; L : B → 2AP is
a labelling function mapping each branch state to a subset of
atomic propositions in AP ; and Ω : Q → N is an indexing
function, defining a parity acceptance condition.
Unless stated otherwise, “automata” and “µ-automata” are
used interchangeably in the rest of the paper. Given an infinite
tree T rooted at r0, a tree run of an automaton A on T is an
infinite tree T ′ whose root is labelled with (r0, q0). Every
node of T ′ is labelled with either a pair (r, q) or (r, b), where
r is a node from T , and q and b are respectively choice and
branch states of A. Every node (r, q) has at least one child
node (r, b), where b ∈ CH(q) and the labelling of b matches
that of r. For every node (r, b) and every child r′ of r in T ,
there exists a child (r′, q′) of (r, b) s.t. q′ ∈ BR(b). For every
node (r, b) and every q′′ ∈ BR(b), there exists a child (r′′, q′′)
of (r, b) s.t. r′′ is a child of r in T . A tree run T ′ is accepting
if on every infinite path π of T ′, the least value of Ω(q), for
the choice states q that appear infinitely often on π, is even.
An input tree T is accepted by A if there is some tree run
of A on T that is accepting. The language of an automaton
is the set of trees it accepts. For example, the language of
the automaton shown in Figure 3(b) is the set of all infinite
trees whose nodes are labelled by {p, q} or {p,¬q}. Input
trees for µ-automata have arbitrary branching degrees and are
not necessarily binary. For a more detailed treatment of µ-
automata, reader can refer to [12]. We give a translation from
HTSs to automata as follows.
Definition 6: Let H = (Σ, s0, Rmust, Rmay, L,AP )
be an HTS. The automaton associated with H , AH =
(Q,B, q0, CH,BR,L
′,Ω, AP ), has choice states Q = {qi |
si ∈ Σ}, branch states B = {bi,S | si ∈ Σ, S ⊆ Rmay(si)},
and the initial state q0 that corresponds to s0. The labelling of
a branch state bi,S is the labelling of si in H , i.e., L′(bi,S) =
L(si). The indexing function assigns 0 to every choice state,
making all choice states accepting. The transition relations are:
CH = {(qi, bi,S) | ∀S
′ ∈ Rmust(si) · S
′ ∩ S 6= ∅} and
BR = {(bi,S , qj) | sj ∈ S}.
For example, the translation AH of the HTS H in Fig-
ure 1(d) is shown in Figure 3(a). For every abstract model H ,
L(AH) should be equal to C[H]. For a consistent HTS H , all
of whose completions are expressible as KSs, our translation
in Definition 6 guarantees that L(AH) = C[H].
Theorem 1: Let H be a consistent HTS with the additional
requirement that for every s ∈ Σ and every S ∈ Rmust(s),
we have S ⊆ Rmay(s). Then, L(AH) = C[H].
The proof of Theorem 1 is similar to that of Lemma 1 in [12].
In [12], a game-based simulation over automata has been
defined as a sufficient condition for language inclusion, i.e.,
if A1 is simulated by A2, then L(A1) ⊆ L(A2). We adapt
the definition of automata simulation from [12] to define an
automata intersection game. We prove that the existence of
a winning strategy for this game is a sufficient condition for
non-emptiness of L(A1) ∩ L(A2). Each play in an automata
intersection game is a sequence of pairs of states of the same
type. Here, being of the same type means that both states are
either choice states or branch states. A pair of choice (resp.
branch) states is called a choice (resp. branch) configuration.
At a choice configuration (q1, q2), only Player I can move,
choosing one branch state in CH(q1) and one in CH(q2) that
match on labels. Player I’s goal is to find a common path that
is accepted by both A1 and A2. At a branch configuration
(b1, b2), Player II moves first and chooses any side, b1 or b2,
and any successor of that side. Player I has to respond with a
successor of the other side. Intuitively, Player I wins the play
if Player II cannot steer it onto a path which is not accepted
by either of the automata.









)-game is defined as follows:





2) (Choice) In a choice configuration (q1, q2) ∈ Q1 ×Q2,
Player I chooses b1 in CH1(q1) and b2 in CH2(q2). The
play continues from configuration (b1, b2).
3) (Branch) In a branch configuration (b1, b2) ∈ B1 ×B2,
the play can proceed in one of the following ways:
a) The play ends and is a win for Player I if L1(b1) =
L2(b2); it is a win for Player II otherwise.
b) Player II chooses a ‘side’ i ∈ {1, 2}, and a choice
state qi in BRi(bi); Player I must respond with a
choice state qj in BRj(bj) from the other side j.
The play continues from the configuration (q1, q2).
If a finite play ends by rule 3a, the winner is as specified in
that rule1. For an infinite play π and i ∈ {1, 2}, let proj i(π)
be the infinite sequence from Qωi obtained by projecting the
choice configurations of π onto component i. Then, π is a win
1Since KSs are assumed to be total, we do not deal with finite plays in
this paper. Thus, condition 3a in Definition 7 only ensures that if an infinite
play π is won by Player I, then for every branch configuration (b1, b2) on π,
L1(b1) = L2(b2).
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(π) satisfy the acceptance
conditions for A1 and A2, respectively.
We say that there is an intersection relation u between A1






Theorem 2: A1 u A2 implies L(A1) ∩ L(A2) 6= ∅.
By Definition 4, a formula ϕ is negatively self-minimizing
if for every HTS H over which ϕ is non-false, there is a
completion satisfying ϕ. In automata-theoretic terms, some
completion of H satisfying ϕ exists iff L(AH) ∩ L(Aϕ) 6= ∅.
The following theorem shows that finding a winning strategy
for the intersection game between an HTS automaton and a
formula automaton is sufficient to show self-minimization.
Theorem 3: An Lµ formula ϕ is negatively self-
minimizing if for every HTS H , ||ϕ||H
3
6= f ⇒ AH uAϕ, and
is positively self-minimizing if for every HTS H , ||ϕ||H
3
6=
t⇒ AH u A¬ϕ.
This theorem follows from Theorem 2 and Definition 4. We
use it in the next section to prove the main result of the paper.
IV. DISJUNCTIVE/CONJUNCTIVE Lµ AND
SELF-MINIMIZATION
In this section, we introduce disjunctive Lµ and its dual,
conjunctive Lµ, defined in [11], and prove that Lµ formulas in
disjunctive and conjunctive forms are, respectively, negatively
and positively self-minimizing.
We start by noting that arbitrary Lµ formulas may not
be self-minimizing. For instance, HTS H in Figure 1(d)
has completions that satisfy either AGp or AGq, but there
is no completion satisfying AGp ∧ AGq. Thus, we cannot
inductively prove that formulas of the form ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 are nega-
tively self-minimizing (or ϕ1∨ϕ2 positively self-minimizing).
Intuitively, this is the same reason why satisfiability of ϕ1∧ϕ2
cannot be proven by structural induction. [11] proposes a
syntactic form of Lµ formulas, referred to as disjunctive Lµ,
for which satisfiability can be proven inductively. The analogy
between identifying negatively self-minimizing formulas and
the satisfiability problem suggests that disjunctive Lµ may be
negatively self-minimizing. We prove this below.





ψ∈Γ ψ. Disjunctive Lµ,
denoted L∨µ , is the set of formulas generated by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | Z | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn | σ(Z) · ϕ(Z)
where p ∈ AP , Z ∈ Var and σ ∈ {µ, ν}; and for σ(Z)·ϕ(Z),
Z occurs in ϕ(Z) only positively, and does not occur in any
context Z ∧ψ or ψ ∧Z for some ψ; ϕ1 ∧ . . .∧ϕn (n > 1) is
a special conjunction: every ϕi is either a literal (p or ¬p) or
a formula of a form ref(Γ) for a finite set Γ of L∨µ formulas,
and at most one of the ϕi is of the form ref(Γ). Dually,
we define conjunctive Lµ, denoted L∧µ , consisting of all Lµ
formula ϕ where NNF(¬ϕ) ∈ L∨µ .
Every ϕ ∈ L∨µ can be linearly translated to a µ-automaton
Aϕ so that K ∈ L(Aϕ) iff K |= ϕ [11]. For example,
a µ-automaton AAGp corresponding to AGp is shown in
Figure 3(b) 2. Let K be a KS over AP = {p, q}. K satisfies
AGp iff all its states are labelled with {p, q} or {p,¬q}, i.e.,
unfolding K from its initial state results in an infinite tree, all
of whose nodes, are labelled with {p, q} or {p,¬q}. Hence,
the tree is accepted by AAGp, and so is K.
The formula AG(p ∧ q) = νZ · p ∧ q ∧AXZ is in L∨µ , but
AGp ∧AGq is not, because the conjunction is not special. A
non-disjunctive formula such as AGp ∧ AGq would be first
written in its disjunctive form, AG(p∧ q), and then translated
to a µ-automaton. Automaton AAG(p∧q) is exactly the same
as AAGp but without branch state b1.
Theorem 4: Every closed L∨µ formula is negatively self-
minimizing.
Using Definition 4, we can show by structural induction that
every L∨µ formula except the greatest fixpoint is negatively
self-minimizing [8]. As argued in [8], a naive proof does not
work for the greatest fixpoint formulas: Let ϕ′ = νZ · ϕ(Z)
and ||ϕ′||H
3
6= f. By the semantics of the greatest fixpoint,
||ϕi(t)||H
3
6= f for every i > 0. By inductive hypothesis, for
every i there is a completion Ki of H that satisfies ϕi(t).
While the sequence of ϕi(t) converges to the fixpoint ϕ′ on
H , it is not clear whether the sequence of Ki converges to a
completion of H satisfying ϕ′.
In our proof, we use the automata intersection game intro-
duced in Section III. Instead of explicitly constructing a KS
K ∈ C[H] satisfying ϕ′, we prove that such a completion
exists by showing a winning strategy of Player I for the game
AH uAϕ′ . We sketch the proof and illustrate it by an example
that uses a greatest fixpoint operator.
By inductive hypothesis, Player I has a winning strategy T i
for AH u Aϕi(t) for every i. For a large enough i, we can
convert T i to a winning strategy T for AH uAϕ′ : Automaton
Aϕi(t) is a finite chain of unfoldings of Aϕ′ , i.e., there is a
morphism h which partially maps states of Aϕi(t) to those of
Aϕ′ . We apply h to T i to obtain T .
For example, let ϕ′ = AGp = νZ · p ∧ AXZ. For this
formula, ϕ(Z) = p ∧ AXZ. Consider automata AAGp and
Aϕ4(t) shown in Figure 3(b) and (c) respectively. The mapping
h is defined as follows: choice state qϕ4(t) is mapped to qAGp,
choice states qϕi(t) to qZ for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, and branch states
bl,i to bl for l ∈ {0, 1} and 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. State qt and its
corresponding branch states are left unmapped.
The winning strategy T i is a function that for a choice
configuration, returns a branch configuration, and for a branch
configuration and a choice of Player II from either side, returns
a choice state from the opposite side. We call two choice
(branch) configurations (s1, s2) and (s1, s′2) indistinguishable
by h if h(s2) = h(s′2). For convenience, we extend h to pairs
(s1, s2) of states, where s1 is in AH and s2 is in Aϕi(t) by
letting h(s1, s2) = (s1, h(s2)). We define a strategy function
T for Player I in the game AH u Aϕ′ as follows:
(i) For every choice configuration (q1, q2), let




)) for some q′
2
in Aϕi(t),
2In contrast to [12], [11], we assume that KSs are total. Therefore, every
branch state in AAGp has at least one successor.
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Fig. 3. Examples of automata, winning strategies, and semantic tableau: (a) automaton AH corresponding to HTS H in Figure 1(d); (b) automaton AAGp;
(c) automaton Aϕ4(t); (d) winning strategy T 4 for AH uAϕ4(t); (e) winning strategy T for AH uAAGp; (f) the tableau associated to AGp∧AGq [11];
and (g) extracting the disjunctive form of AGp ∧ AGq from its tableau by the procedure of [11].
where q2 = h(q′2);
(ii) For every branch configuration (b1, b2) and every








(iii) For every branch configuration (b1, b2) and every














) and b2 = h(b′2).
We first show that T is a function. Since unfoldings of
Aϕi(t) are isomorphic, there is some T i s.t. for every two
choice (branch) configurations indistinguishable by h, T i re-
turns configurations indistinguishable by h as well. That is, T i





∈ h−1(q2), making T a function.
Since h is undefined for qt, to ensure that T is a valid
strategy, we need to show that in the case (ii) above, there is
always a b′
2
where T i(b1, b′2, q1) 6= qt. Since Aϕ′ and AH are
finite, such b′
2
∈ h−1(b2) is found for a large enough i,
Strategy T as defined above is a valid strategy function for
Player I in the game AH uAϕ′ . Note that T is undefined for
the inputs for which T i modulo h is undefined. It remains to
show that T is winning. Let π be any play produced by T .
Play π is an infinite sequence of configurations. Automata AH
and Aϕ′ are finite. Thus, there must be a configuration (q1, q2)
repeated infinitely often in π. We map π back through h−1,
and distinguish two cases: (1) π is mapped back to a play π′
generated by T i s.t. infinitely many occurrences of (q1, q2) are
mapped to a single configuration (q1, q′2 6= qt) in π′. Since T i
is a winning strategy for Player I, π′ is won by Player I. Since
h preserves parity of state indices, π is won by Player I in T
as well. (2) π is mapped back to a prefix of some π′ generated
by T i s.t. infinitely many pairs of consecutive occurrences of








). These two configurations
are different; but since they are indistinguishable by h, they
have to belong to two different unfoldings in the chain Aϕi(t).
Passing between unfoldings requires going through some state
of the form qϕj(t) for some j < i. Since h(qϕj(t)) = qZ , there
is an occurrence of (q, qZ) for some state q of AH between
two consecutive occurrences of (q1, q2) in π. Thus, π satisfies
the acceptance conditions of both AH and Aϕ′ and as such, is
a play won by Player I. This happens for every play generated
by strategy T , and hence, strategy T is winning for Player I.
A winning strategy for AH u Aϕ4(t), denoted T 4, and
its translation T by h are shown in Figures 3(d) and (e),
respectively. For this example, unfolding automaton Aϕ(t)
four times is enough, because the only play produced by T 4
(shown in Figure 3(d)) visits two configurations (q3, qϕ2(t))
and (q3, qϕ(t)) indistinguishable by h.
The following holds by duality to Theorem 4.
Theorem 5: Every closed L∧µ formula is positively self-
minimizing.
Theorems 4 and 5 provide sufficient syntactic checks for
identifying self-minimizing Lµ formulas that can be used in
step (2) of the algorithm in Figure 1(a). Note that Theorems 4
and 5 only hold for HTSs, but not for PKSs or MixTSs. For
example, p∧¬p is in L∨µ , but is not negatively self-minimizing
over such models. Consider a model M with a single state in
which proposition p is maybe. In M , p ∧ ¬p is maybe, but
this formula is false in any completion of M . In Section V,
we show that by syntactically modifying disjunctive and
conjunctive Lµ formulas, these formulas become negatively
and positively self-minimizing over PKSs and MixTSs.
V. THOROUGH CHECKING ALGORITHM
In this section, we complete the thorough checking al-
gorithm shown in Figure 1(a) by describing its subroutines
ISSELFMINIMIZING() and SEMANTICMINIMIZATION(). Since we want
this algorithm to work for arbitrary abstract models described
as PKSs, MixTSs, or HTSs, we first need to show how dis-
junctive (resp. conjunctive) formulas can be made negatively
(resp. positively) self-minimizing over these models.
Theorem 6: Let ϕ be a closed L∨µ formula s.t. for every
special conjunction ψ = ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn in ϕ, there are no
literals ψi and ψj (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n) where ψi = ¬ψj . Then, ϕ is
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THOROUGHCHECK(M , ϕ)
1: if (v: = MODELCHECK(M , ϕ)) 6= maybe
2: return v
3: if ISSELFMINIMIZING(M , ϕ)
4: return maybe
5: v := MODELCHECK(M , SEMANTICMINIMIZATION(ϕ))
6: if (v = false) return false
7: v := MODELCHECK(M , ¬(SEMANTICMINIMIZATION(NNF(¬ϕ))))
8: if (v = true) return true
9: return maybe
ISSELFMINIMIZING(M , ϕ)
10: if M is a PKS or an MixTS and ϕ is monotone
11: return true






15: convert ϕ to its disjunctive form ϕ∨
16: replace all special conjunctions in ϕ∨ containing p and ¬p with false
17: return ϕ∨
Fig. 4. The thorough checking algorithm.
negatively self-minimizing over abstract models described as
HTSs, PKSs, or MixTSs.
The above theorem can be proven using the same argument
as Theorem 4. The proof of Theorem 4 fails for MixTSs and
PKSs, when some special conjunction in ϕ is of the form
p∧¬p∧ . . .∧ϕn, but Theorem 6 explicitly excludes this case,
and hence, remains valid. Similarly, conjunctive formulas can
be made positively self-minimizing for PKSs and MixTSs with
a condition dual to that in Theorem 6.
The complete thorough checking algorithm is shown in
Figure 4: THOROUGHCHECK() takes an abstract model M , de-
scribed as an HTS, PKS or MixTS, and an Lµ formula ϕ,
and returns the result of thorough checking ϕ over M . In
THOROUGHCHECK(), semantic minimization is carried out in two
steps: On line 5, ϕ is converted to its negative, and on line 7, to
its positive semantic minimization formula. If model checking
the negative semantic minimization returns false, ϕ is false by
thorough checking, too; and if model checking the positive
semantic minimization returns true, ϕ is true by thorough
checking, as well.
If the model is a PKS or an MixTS, self-minimization
follows from the monotonicity of ϕ, and so does the check in
line 10 [8], [10]. Otherwise, we check whether ϕ ∈ L∨µ ∩ L∧µ
which, by our Theorems 4 and 5, guarantees self-minimization.
In SEMANTICMINIMIZATION(), ϕ is first converted to its disjunc-
tive form ϕ∨ by the tableau-based conversion in [11]. Then,
any special conjunction in ϕ containing two literals p and ¬p is
replaced with false. This ensures that ϕ∨ satisfies the condition
in Theorem 6. Therefore, when passed ϕ (resp. NNF(¬ϕ)) as a
parameter, SEMANTICMINIMIZATION() computes a negative (resp.
positive) semantic minimization of ϕ.
To illustrate the algorithm, recall the formula ϕ = AGq ∧
A[pU¬q] from Section I. By compositional semantics, ϕ is
maybe over both PKS M in Figure 1(c) and HTS H in
Figure 1(d). Since ϕ is non-monotone and non-disjunctive, it
is not self-minimizing for either M or H . SEMANTICMINIMIZA-
TION() computes ϕ’s negative semantic minimization by first
converting it into a disjunctive form ϕ∨ = µZ ·(q∧AXAGq∧
¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q ∧ AXZ), and then replacing the first conjunct
with false. The result is the formula µZ · false∨(p∧q∧AXZ)
which is false over both M and H , meaning that ϕ is false by
thorough checking over both models. On the other hand, the
formula AGp ∧ AGq is monotone and thus self-minimizing
for M . However, this formula is not disjunctive and thus
not self-minimizing for H . SEMANTICMINIMIZATION() computes a
negative semantic minimization of this formula by converting
it to its disjunctive form AG(p∧q) which turns out to be false
over H . This shows that AGp ∧ AGq is false by thorough
checking over H .
Complexity. Let ϕ ∈ Lµ and M be an abstract model. The
complexity of ISSELFMINIMIZING(M , ϕ) is linear in the size of ϕ,
and that of MODELCHECK(M , ϕ) is O((|ϕ| · |M |)bd/2c+1), where
d is the alternation depth of ϕ [19]. Thus, for the class of self-
minimizing formulas, the running time of THOROUGHCHECK(M ,
ϕ) is the same as that of compositional model checking, i.e.,
O((|ϕ| · |M |)bd/2c+1).
The complexity of SEMANTICMINIMIZATION(ϕ), i.e., the com-
plexity of converting an Lµ formula ϕ to its disjunctive ϕ∨
or conjunctive ϕ∧ form, is O(2O(|ϕ|)), producing formulas
of size O(2O(|ϕ|)) [11]. Therefore, for formulas requiring se-
mantic minimization, the running time of THOROUGHCHECK(M ,
ϕ) is O((2O(|ϕ|) · |M |)bd/2c+1), where d is the maximum
of the alternation depths of ϕ∨ and ϕ∧. When ϕ∨ and
ϕ∧ are alternation-free, i.e., d = 0, the complexity of
THOROUGHCHECK(M , ϕ) becomes linear in the size of the ab-
stract model, making the procedure efficient. However, we
leave to future work the study of the relationships between
the alternation depths of ϕ∨ and ϕ∧ and that of ϕ.
VI. SELF-MINIMIZATION FOR CTL
In Section IV, we gave sufficient syntactic conditions for
identifying self-minimizing Lµ formulas. Since CTL is used
more often than Lµ in practice, it is useful to identify
self-minimizing fragments of CTL as well. We do so by
constructing grammars that generate positively/negatively self-
minimizing CTL formulas.
[8] gives two grammars for negatively/positively self-
minimizing formulas. Using our results on self-minimization
checks of disjunctive/conjunctive Lµ, we extend these gram-
mars as shown in Figure 5: ϕneg generates negatively and
ϕpos generates positively self-minimizing formulas. The new
constructs A[ϕpropUϕneg ] and A[ϕneg Ũϕprop] added to the
ϕneg grammar include formulas such as AGp and A[pUq] that
are negatively self-minimizing by Theorem 4. The construct
E[ϕposUϕprop] added to the ϕpos grammar includes, for in-
stance, EFp that is positively self-minimizing by Theorem 5.
Clearly, these grammars still do not capture the entire CTL
which is not surprising because CTL is not closed under
semantic minimization [8].
The notion of self-minimization in our grammars works
only for HTSs. For example, ϕneg can generate p∧¬p which
is not positively self-minimizing for either PKSs or MixTSs.
To extend our grammars to these formalisms, we could restrict
the grammar rules as in [9], [8] for propositional formulas, so
that they do not produce non-monotone formulas.
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Fig. 5. The grammar ϕneg (resp. ϕpos ) generates negatively (resp. positively)
self-minimizing subsets of CTL: Γneg (resp. Γpos ) is a finite set of formulas
generated by ϕneg (resp. ϕpos ), and dref is the dual of the operator ref.
VII. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
The problem of thorough checking for propositional logic
was considered by [9] which proposed an efficient BDD-
based algorithm for semantic minimization of propositional
formulas. [1], [7] studied complexities and lower bounds for
thorough checking of various temporal logics. [10] proposed
self-minimizing checks for CTL, and [8] extended those
checks to Lµ, and further, studied semantic minimization of
various temporal logics.
In [8], a series of conversions between tree-automata and
Lµ formulas is used to show that a semantic minimization
of an Lµ formula can be computed in exponential time.
This approach is hard to implement because it uses non-
deterministic tree automata whose states have unbounded
arities. The method proposed in [11] for translating an Lµ
formula to its disjunctive form has the same complexity but
is easier to implement, because it uses µ-automata instead– in
this kind of automata, the number of successors of each state
can be obtained from the structure of the formula.
As an example, the process of transforming AGp∧AGq into
its disjunctive form AG(p∧ q) was illustrated in Figures 3(e)
and (f). The tableau for AGp∧AGq, constructed based on the
Lµ proof rules of [11], is shown in Figure 3(e). The disjunctive
form of AGp ∧AGq is constructed by traversing this tableau
from its leaves to the top and labelling each node with a
formula according to the procedure of [20] (see Figure 3(f)).
Similar tableau methods were used in [21] for automata-based
model checking of formulas whose conjunctions are restricted
to having at most one conjunct with fixpoint variables.
In our paper, we only considered HTSs with 2-valued labels.
This is in contrast to the HTSs in [4], [5] where states have
3-valued labels. Following [12], HTSs with 3-valued labels
can be translated to ours. If the resulting HTSs satisfy the
conditions in Theorem 1, then our results apply to the more
general HTSs of [4], [5] as well.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proved that disjunctive Lµ and conjunctive
Lµ are, respectively, negatively and positively self-minimizing
over HTSs. We base our proof on an automata intersection
game. Our results provide a simple syntactic check for identi-
fying self-minimizing formulas. For such formulas, thorough
checking is as cheap as compositional model checking. We
also proposed an algorithm for semantic minimization of Lµ
and showed that its complexity is linear in the size of abstract
models for Lµ formulas with alternation-free disjunctive and
conjunctive forms.
In [7], it was shown that the complexity of thorough check-
ing for the class of persistence properties [22], i.e., properties
recognizable by co-Buchi automata, is also linear in the size
of the abstract model. Studying the relationships between
persistence properties and Lµ formulas with alternation-free
disjunctive and conjunctive forms is left for future work.
Dams and Namjoshi [12] envisioned that viewing abstract
models as µ-automata can open up many important connec-
tions between abstraction and automata theory. We believe that
our work establishes one such connection, paving the way for
further research on automata-based approaches to abstraction.
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Abstract— We present an approach to automatic synthesis of
specifications given in Linear Time Logic. The approach is based
on a translation through universal co-Büchi tree automata and
alternating weak tree automata [1]. By careful optimization of
all intermediate automata, we achieve a major improvement in
performance.
We present several optimization techniques for alternating tree
automata, including a game-based approximation to language
emptiness and a simulation-based optimization. Furthermore,
we use an incremental algorithm to compute the emptiness of
nondeterministic Büchi tree automata. All our optimizations are
computed in time polynomial in the size of the automaton on
which they are computed.
We have applied our implementation to several examples
and show a significant improvement over the straightforward
implementation. Although our examples are still small, this work
constitutes the first implementation of a synthesis algorithm for
full LTL. We believe that the optimizations discussed here form
an important step towards making LTL synthesis practical.
I. INTRODUCTION
Writing both a specification and an implementation and
subsequently checking whether the latter satisfies the former
seems wasteful. A much more attractive approach would be to
automatically construct the implementation from the specifi-
cation, leaving the designer with only the task of ensuring that
the specification describes the intended behavior. The benefit
is even more pronounced when one takes into effect the cost
for debugging the manual implementation, and of redesigning
it when the specification changes.
LTL synthesis was proposed in [2]. The key to the solution
is the observation that a program with input signals I and
output signals O can be seen as a complete Σ-labeled D-tree
with Σ = 2O and D = 2I : the label of node t ∈ D∗ gives
the output after input sequence t. The solution proposed in
[2] is to build a nondeterministic Büchi word automaton for
the specification and then to convert this automaton to a de-
terministic Rabin automaton that recognizes all complete trees
satisfying the specification. A witness to the nonemptiness of
the automaton is an implementation of the specification. A
specification is called realizable if such an implementation
exists.
There are two reasons that this approach has not been fol-
lowed by an implementation. The first reason is that synthesis
of LTL properties is 2EXPTIME-complete [3]. The second is
that the solution uses an intricate determinization construction
[4] that is hard to implement and very hard to optimize.
The first reason should not prevent one from implementing
the approach. After all, the bound is a lower bound and a
manual implementation is also subject to it. (Cf. [5].) Thus,
This work was supported in part by the European Commission under
contract 507219 (Prosyd).
the worst case complexity of verifying the specification on
a manual implementation is also 2EXPTIME in terms of the
(full) specification. In combination with the second reason,
however, the argument gains strength. For many specifications,
a doubly-exponential blow up is not necessary, but can only be
avoided through careful use of optimization techniques, which
is hard to achieve in combination with Safra’s algorithm.
Kupferman and Vardi [1] recently proposed an alternative
to this approach. Starting from a specification ϕ over they
generate, through the nondeterministic Büchi word automaton
for ¬ϕ, a universal co-Büchi tree automaton that accepts all
trees satisfying ϕ. From this automaton they construct an al-
ternating weak tree automaton accepting at least one (regular)
tree satisfying ϕ (or none, if ϕ is not realizable). Finally, the
alternating automaton is converted to a nondeterministic Büchi
tree automaton with the same language. A witness for the
nonemptiness of this automaton is an implementation of ϕ.
The approach is applicable to any linear logic that is closed
under negation and can be compiled to nondeterministic Büchi
word automaton.
This approach allows for optimizations at all steps. First of
all, to generate the nondeterministic Büchi word automaton,
we use the optimizations present in Wring [6]. The conversion
to the universal co-Büchi tree automaton is relatively simple. If
we consider the universal co-Büchi tree automaton as a game
between the environment (which drives I) and the system
(which drives O), states that are winning for the environment
represent unrealizable specifications and can be removed. On
the weak alternating tree automaton that is created next,
we can perform the same optimization. Furthermore, we
extend the concept of simulation to alternating tree automata
and use it to optimize the automaton. Next,we compute the
states of the nondeterministic automaton in a breadth-first
manner and compute the game at every step. Thus, we may
avoid expanding many of the states of the nondeterministic
automaton. Finally, we use a simulation-based optimization
to minimize the size of the resulting finite state machine.
As suggested in [1], we perform the construction of the
weak alternating automaton and the nondeterministic Büchi
automaton incrementally. We build an increasingly large part
of the weak alternating automaton and reuse results obtained
using the smaller automata for the larger ones.
Our tool, Lily (Linear Logic Synthesizer), takes as input an
LTL formula and a partition of the atomic propositions into
input and output signals. If the specification is realizable, it
delivers a Verilog file as output. We present an experimental
evaluation of our implementation in Section V. Previous work
on LTL synthesis focuses on restricted subsets of LTL [7], [8],
[9]. Our implementation is the first to handle the complete
language. It does not impose any syntactic requirements on
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the specification.
The flow of the paper is as follows. In the next section,
we will introduce the necessary concepts. In Section III we
describe a game-based and a simulation-based optimization
that can be used on any tree automaton. In Section IV, we
recall the construction of Kupferman and Vardi [1] and discuss
how it can be implemented efficiently. We show experimental
results and conclude in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We assume that the reader is familiar with the µ-calculus
and linear time temporal logic (LTL). (See [10].) We will use
LTL to specify the behavior of a system. Properties will use
the set I∪O of atomic propositions, where I and O are disjoint
sets denoting the input and output signals, respectively.
A Σ-labeled D-tree is a tuple (T, τ) such that T ⊆ D∗ is
prefix-closed and τ : T → Σ. The tree is complete if T = D∗.
The set of all Σ-labeled D-trees is denoted by TΣ,D.
We will use Σ-labeledD-trees to model programs with input
alphabet D and output alphabet Σ. In order to establish a
link with the specification, we will assume that D = 2I and
Σ = 2O. Thus, a path of a Σ-labeled D-tree can be seen as a
word over (Σ∪D)ω : we merge the label of the node with the
direction edge following it in the path. Given a word language
L ∈ (Σ ∪D)ω , let Λ(L) ⊆ TΣ,D be the set of trees T such
that all paths of T are in L. For a word automaton A we will
write Λ(A) for Λ(L(A)). Similarly, we will write Λ(ϕ) for
the set of trees T such that every path of T satisfies the LTL
formula ϕ.
A Moore machine with output alphabet Σ and input alphabet
D is a tuple M = (Σ, D, S, s0, f, g) such that S is a finite
set of states, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, f : S × D → S is
the transition function, and g : S → Σ is the output function.
We extend f to the domain S × Σ∗ in the usual way. The
input/output language of M is L(M) = {π ∈ (Σ∪D)ω | π =
(σ0 ∪ d0, σ1 ∪ d1, . . . ), σi = g(f(q0, d0...di−1))}.
Every Moore machine corresponds to a complete Σ-labeled
D-tree for which every node t ∈ D∗ is labeled with
g(f(q0, t)). Thus, every tree language L ⊆ TΣ,D defines a
set M(L) of Moore machines: those machines M for which
Λ(L(M)) ∈ L. (Note that not every tree can be defined by a
Moore machine and thus there are tree languages L for which⋃
{Λ(L(M)) |M ∈ M(L)} 6= L.)
An alternating tree automaton for Σ-labeled D-trees is a
tuple A = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α) such that Q is a finite set of
states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, δ : Q× Σ → 22
D×Q
is the
transition relation (an element C ∈ 2D×Q is a transition) and
α ⊆ Q is the acceptance condition. We denote by Aq , for
q ∈ Q, the automaton A with the initial state q.
A run (R, ρ) of A on a Σ-labeled D-tree (T, τ) is a T ×Q-
labeled N-tree satisfying the following constraints:
1) ρ(ε) = (ε, q0).
2) If r ∈ R is labeled (t, q), then there is a set
{(d1, q1), . . . , (dk, qk)} ∈ δ(q, τ(t)) such that r has k
children labeled (t · d1, q1), . . . , (t · dk, qk).
Intuitively, the nodes of the run on a tree T are labeled
with pairs (t, q) meaning that A is in state q in node t of T .
Because A is alternating, for a given t there can be multiple
qi and nodes labeled (t, qi) in R. The automaton starts at
the root node in state q0. If it is in state q in node t of T ,
and t is labeled σ, then δ(q, σ) tells A what to do next. The
automaton can nondeterministically choose a transition C ∈
δ(q, σ). Then, for all (d′, q′) ∈ C, A moves to node t · d′ in
state q′. (The transition relation δ(q, σ) can be considered as
a DNF formula over D×Q.) Note that there are no runs with
a node (t, q) for which δ(q, τ(t)) = ∅. On the other hand, a
run that visits a node t needs not visit all of its children; there
are no restrictions on the subtrees rooted in a node that is not
visited. In particular, a node (t, q) such that δ(q, τ(t)) = {∅}
does not have any children and there are no restrictions on the
subtree rooted in t.
We have two acceptance conditions: Büchi and co-Büchi. A
run (R, ρ) of a Büchi (co-Büchi) automaton is accepting if all
infinite paths of (R, ρ) have infinitely many states in α (only
finitely many states in α, resp.). The language L(A) of A is
the set of trees for which there exists an accepting run.
An alternating tree automaton induces a graph. The states
of the automaton are the nodes of the graph and there is an
edge from q to q′ if (d′, q′) occurs in δ(q, σ) for some σ ∈ Σ
and d′ ∈ D. A Büchi automaton is weak if each strongly
connected component (SCC) contains either only states in α
or only states not in α.
An automaton is universal if |δ(q, σ)| = 1. A universal
automaton has at most one run for a given input. An automaton
is nondeterministic if for all q ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σ, C ∈ δ(q, σ) and
(di, qi), (dj , qj) ∈ C we have di = dj implies qi = qj . That
is, the automaton can only send one copy in each direction
and every run is isomorphic to the input tree. An automaton
is deterministic if it is both universal and nondeterministic.
An automaton is a word automaton if |D| = 1. In that case,
we can leave out D altogether.
We will abbreviate alternating/nondeterministic/universal/
deterministic Büchi/co-Büchi/weak tree/word automaton as a
three letter acronym: A/N/U/D B/C/W T/W.
III. SIMPLIFYING TREE AUTOMATA
In this section we discuss two optimizations that can be
used for any tree automaton.
A. Simplification Using Games
We define a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for
language emptiness of Aq . Our heuristic views the alternating
automaton as a game which is played in rounds. In each round,
starting at a state q, the protagonist decides the label σ ∈ Σ
and a set C ⊆ δ(q, σ) and the antagonist chooses a pair
(d, q′) ∈ C. The next round starts in q′. If δ(q, σ) or C are
empty the play is finite and the player who has to choose
from an empty set loses the game. If a play is infinite the
winner is determined by the acceptance condition. For an ABT
(ACT), the protagonist wins the play if the play visits the set
of accepting states α infinitely often (only finitely often, resp.).
A strategy s maps a finite sequence of states q0, . . . , qk to a
set C ⊆ δ(qk, σ) for some a label σ ∈ Σ. A play q1, q2, . . .
adheres to a strategy s if for every k, s(q0, . . . , qk) = C
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implies that there is a pair (d, qk+1) ∈ C. The game Aq is
won (and q is winning) if there is a strategy such that all
plays starting at q that adhere to the strategy are won. The set
of all winning states is the winning region.
If the game is lost, L(Aq) is empty. In the case of an NBT
or NCT the converse holds as well, but in the alternating case
it does not: A counterexample is a word automaton such that
(1) δ(q0, σ) = q1∧q2 for all σ, (2) L(Aq1)∩L(Aq2) = ∅, and
(3) the games Aq1 and Aq2 are won. (Computing a necessary
and sufficient condition in polynomial time is not possible
as it would give us an EXPTIME algorithm for deciding
realizability.)
The game is computed as follows. For S ⊆ Q, let
〈P〉X (S) = {q | ∃σ ∈ Σ, C ∈ δ(q, σ)∀(d, q′) ∈ C : q′ ∈ S},
WB(S) = νY. 〈P〉X (µZ. Y ∧ (S ∨ 〈P〉X Z)), and
WC(S) = µY. 〈P〉X (νZ. Y ∨ (S ∧ 〈P〉X Z)).
In an ABT (ACT) with acceptance condition α, we can discard
the states outside of WB(α) (WC(α), resp.).
Theorem 1: Given an ABT (ACT) A = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α),
let W = WB(α). (W = WC(α), resp.) If q0 ∈ W , let the
ABT (ACT) A′ = (Σ, D,Q′, q0, δ′, α′) with Q′ = Q ∩ W ,
α′ = α ∩W , and δ′(q, σ) = {C ∈ δ(q, σ) | ∀(d, q′) ∈ C, q ∈
W}. If q0 /∈ W , let A′ consist of a single non-accepting state.
We have L(Aq) = L(A′q) for all q ∈ Q′ and thus L(A) =
L(A′). 
B. Simplification Using Simulation Relations
The second optimization uses (direct) simulation minimiza-
tion on alternating tree automata. Our construction generalizes
that for alternating word automata [11], [12], [13].
Let A = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α) be an ABT. The direct sim-
ulation relation  ⊆ Q × Q is the largest relation such
that u  v implies that (1) u ∈ α → v ∈ α and (2)
∀σ ∈ Σ, Cu ∈ δ(u, σ) ∃Cv ∈ δ(v, σ) ∀d′ ∈ D, (d′, v′) ∈
Cv ∃(d′, u′) ∈ Cu : u′  v′.
If u  v, we say that u is simulated by v. If additionally,
u  v, we say that u and v are simulation equivalent, denoted
u ≃ v.
Lemma 2: If u  v then L(Au) ⊆ L(Av). 
The following theorems are tree-automaton variants of those
presented in [13] for optimizing alternating word automata.
The first theorem allows us to restrict the state space of an
ABT to a set of representatives of every equivalence class
under ≃.
Theorem 3: Let A = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α) be an ABT, let
u, v ∈ Q, and suppose u ≃ v. Let A′ = (Σ, D,Q \
{u}, q′0, δ
′, α), where q′0 = v if q0 = u and q
′
0 = q0 otherwise,
and δ′ is obtained from δ by replacing u by v everywhere.
Then, L(A) = L(A′). 
The following two theorems allow us to simplify the transition
relation of an ABT. The first theorem tells us that we can drop
states from a transition if they are not minimal with respect
to the simulation relation and the second theorem tells us that
we can drop entire transitions if there are other transitions that
allow for a larger language.
Theorem 4: Let A = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α) be an ABT. For
C ⊆ D × Q, let C′ = {(d, u) ∈ C | ¬∃v : v 6= u, v 
u, (d, v) ∈ C}. Let A′ = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ′, α), where for all
q and σ we have δ′(q, σ) = {C′ | C ∈ δ(q, σ)}. We have
L(A) = L(A′). 
Theorem 5: Let A = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α) be an ABT. Sup-
pose C,C′ ∈ δ(q, σ), C 6= C′, and for all d and (d, q′) ∈
C′ there is a (d, q) ∈ C such that q  q′. Let A =
(Σ, D,Q, q0, δ′, α) be an ABT for which δ′ equals δ except
that δ′(q, σ) = δ(q, σ) \ C. We have L(A) = L(A′). 
We can simplify an ABT by repeated application of the
last two theorems and removal of states that are no longer
reachable from the initial state. The simulation relation can
be computed in polynomial time, as can the optimizations.
(Application of the theorems does not alter the simulation
relation.)
IV. OPTIMIZATIONS FOR SYNTHESIS
A. Synthesis Algorithm
The goal of synthesis is to find a Moore machine M
implementing an LTL specification ϕ (or to prove that no
such M exists). Our approach follows that of [1], introducing
optimizations that make synthesis much more efficient. The
flow is as follows.
1) Construct an NBW ANBW with L(ANBW) = {w ∈ (Σ ∪
D)ω | w 6|= ϕ}. Let n′ be the number of states of ANBW.
Note that in the worst case n′ is exponential in |ϕ| [14].
2) Construct a UCT AUCT with L(AUCT) =
TΣ,D \ Λ(ANBW) = Λ(ϕ). Let n be the number of
states of AUCT; we have n ≤ n′,
3) Perform the following steps for increasing k, starting with
k = 0.
a) Construct an AWT AAWTk such that L(AAWTk) ⊆
L(AUCT) and AAWTk has at most n · k states.
b) Construct an NBT ANBTk such that L(ANBTk) =
L(AAWTk); ANBTk has at most (k + 1)2n states.
c) Check for the nonemptiness of L(ANBTk). If the lan-
guage is nonempty, proceed to Step 4.
d) If k = 2n2n+2, stop: ϕ is not realizable. Otherwise,
proceed with the next iteration of the loop. (The bound
on k follows from [15].)
4) Compute a witness for the nonemptiness of ANBTk and
convert it to a Moore machine.
If the UCT constructed in Step 2 is weak, synthesis is much
simpler: we complement the acceptance condition of AUCT
turning it into a UWT, a special case of an AWT. Then, we
convert the UWT into an NBT ANBT as in Step 3b. If L(ANBT)
is nonempty, the witness is a Moore machine satisfying ϕ, if
it is empty, ϕ in unrealizable. In this case, we avoid increasing
k and the size of the NBT is at most 22n.
It turns out that in practice, for realizable specifications, the
algorithm terminates with very small k, often around three.
It should be noted that it is virtually impossible to prove the
specification unrealizable using this approach, because of the
high bound on k. The one exception is if the UCT is weak,
because in that case we avoid the dependence on k altogether,
as explained above.
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Fig. 1. NBW for ¬ϕ = G(F(timer)) ∧ F(light ∧ (¬light R¬timer))
Fig. 2. UCT for ϕ = G(F(timer)) → G(light → (light U timer))
In the following, we will describe the individual steps,
discuss the optimizations that we use at every step, and show
how to reuse information gained in one iteration of the loop
for the following iterations.
B. NBW & UCT
We use Wring [6] to construct a nondeterministic general-
ized Büchi automaton for the negation of the specification. We
then use the classic counting construction and the optimiza-
tions available in Wring to obtain a small NBW ANBW with
L(ANBW) = (D ∪ Σ)ω \ L(ϕ).
We construct a UCT AUCT over Σ-labeled D-trees with
L(AUCT) = Λ((Σ ∪D)ω \ L(ANBW)).
Definition 6: [1] Given an NBW ANBW =
(Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α), let UCT AUCT = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ′, α),
with for every q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ
δ′(q, σ) =
{




We have L(AUCT) = TΣ,D \ Λ(ANBW).
We can reduce the size of L(AUCT) using game-based
simulation and Theorem 1. Optimizing the UCT reduces the
time spent optimizing the AWT and, most importantly, it
may make the UCT weak, which means that we avoid the
expensive construction of the AWT discussed in the next
section. Because the UCT is small in comparison to the AWT
and the NBT, optimization comes at a small cost.
Specifications are often of the form ϕ→ ψ, where ϕ is an
assumption on the environment and ψ describes the allowed
behavior of the system. When the system assertion ψ has been
violated, it may still be possible to satisfy the specification by
a violation of the environment assumption. However, since the
system cannot control the environment, states that check that
ϕ is violated once the system assertion ψ has been violated
are not necessary. Such states, among others, are removed by
the game-based optimization.
Example 7: Let ϕ = GF timer → G(light →
(light U timer)). This formula is part of the specification of
a traffic light controller and states that if the timer signal is
set regularly, the light does not make a transition to zero unless
the timer is high. The atomic propositions are partitioned into
I = {timer} and O = {light}. Fig. 1 shows a minimal NBW
ANBW accepting all words in ¬ϕ. The edges in the figure (and
in the implementation) are labeled with cubes over the set of
atomic propositions I∪O. (A cube is a conjunct consisting of
possibly negated atomic propositions.) An edge labeled with
the cube c summarizes a set of edges, each labeled with a
letter w ⊆ I ∪O that is compatible with c.
The UCT AUCT that accepts all 2O-labeled 2I -trees not in
T (ANBW) is shown in Fig. 2. Circles denote states and boxes
denote transitions. We label edges starting at circles with cubes
over O (Σ = 2O)) and edges from boxes with cubes over I
(D = 2I ). The transition corresponding to a box C consists
of all pairs (d, q) for which there is an edge from C to q such
that d satisfies the label on the edge. In particular, if d satisfies
none of the labels, the branch in direction d is finite, e.g., in
state n2 with light=0 and timer=1. Recall that finite branches
are accepting.
Even though the NBW is optimized, the UCT is not
minimal: The tree languages L(AUCTn3) and L(AUCTn4) are
empty. Our algorithm finds both states and replaces them by
transitions to false, removing the part of AUCT to the right
of the dashed line. Note that the optimizations cause the
automaton to become weak. 
C. AWT
From the automaton AUCT we construct an AWT AAWTk
such that L(AAWTk) ⊆ L(AUCT)
Definition 8: [1] Let AUCT = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α), let n =
|Q| and let k ∈ N. Let [k] denote {0, . . . , k}. We construct
AAWTk = (Σ, D,Q′, q′0, δ
′, α′) with
Q′ = {(q, i) ∈ Q× [k] | q /∈ α or i is even},
q′0 = (q0, k),
δ′((q, i), σ) =
{
{(d1, (q1, i1)), . . . , (dk, (qk, ik))} |
{(d1, q1), . . . , (dk, qk)} ∈ δ(q, σ),
i1, . . . , ik ∈ [i], ∀j : (qj , ij) ∈ Q′
}
α′ = Q× {1, 3, . . . , 2k − 1}.
We call i the rank of an AWT state (q, i). 
If k = 2nn+2 we have L(AAWTk) = ∅ implies L(AUCT) = ∅
[1], [15].
We improve this construction in three ways: by using games,
by merging directions, and by using simulation relations.
1) Game Simulation: We can use Theorem 1 to remove
states from AAWTk.
Example 9: Consider the UCT in Fig. 3 and the correspond-
ing AWT in Fig. 4, using k = 5. The UCT (an artificial
example) has been optimized using the techniques discussed
in Section IV-B, and the AWT has been optimized in three
ways: We have removed states that are not reachable from the
initial state, we have merged directions, and we have removed
edges. (The last two optimizations are explained in the next
subsections). Still, there is ample room for improvement of
the AWT.
Application of Theorem 1 removes the 12 states below the
dashed line on the bottom left and the incident edges. This is a
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Fig. 3. UCT that requires rank 5. Edges that are not shown (for instance
from n4 with label ¬a) correspond to labels that are not allowed.
Fig. 4. AWT for UCT in Figure 3.
typical situation: each UCT state has an associated minimum
rank. 
It should be noted that AAWTk has a layered structure: there
are no states with rank j with a transition back to a state with
a rank i > j. Furthermore, AAWTk+1 consists of AAWTk plus
one layer of states with rank k + 1. This implies that game
information computed for AAWTk can be reused for AAWTk+1.
A play is won (lost) in AAWTk+1 if it reaches a states that is
won (lost) in AAWTk. Furthermore, if (q, j) is won, then so
is (q, i) for i > j when i is odd or j is even, which allows
us to reuse some of the information computed for states with
rank k when adding states with rank k+1. This follows from
the fact that (q, i) simulates (q, j), as will be discussed in
Subsection IV-C.3.
2) Merging Directions: Note that δ′ may be drastically
larger than δ: a single transition C ∈ δ(q, σ) yields i|C|
transitions out of state (q, i) ∈ Q′. However, it turns out that
it is not necessary to include conjuncts that send a copy to
a (q, j) and (q, j′) for j 6= j′. This is fortunate because it
allows us to treat edges labeled with cubes over I as if they
were labeled with directions.
Theorem 10: Let A′′AWTk = (Σ, D,Q
′, q′0, δ
′′, α′) be as in
Definition 8, but with
δ′′((q, i), σ) = {C ∈ δ′((q, i), σ) |
∀(d, (q, j)), (d′, (q, j′)) ∈ C, we have j = j′}.
We have L(A′′AWTk) = L(AAWTk). 
Proof: Because δ′′(q, σ) ⊆ δ′(q, σ), any tree accepted
by A′′AWTk is also accepted by AAWTk.
Let R be a run of AAWTk, we will build a run R
′′ of A′′AWTk.
Run R′′ is isomorphic to R, using a bijection that maps node v
of R to node v′′ of R′′. Run R′′ has the same labels as R with
the following exception. If node v in R is labeled (t, (q, i))
and has children (t′, (q′, i′)) and (t′′, (q′, i′′)) with i′ > i′′,
then the corresponding children of node v′′ of R′′ are labeled
(t′, (q′, i′)) and (t′′, (q′, i′)).
Because in AAWTk state (q′, i′) has all transitions that
(q′, i′′) has, R′′ is a run of AAWTk, and because it satisfies
the extra condition on δ′′ it is also a run of A′′AWTk. If R is
accepting, then every infinite path π in R gets stuck in an
odd rank w from some level l onwards. So starting from l, all
children of nodes on π have rank at most w. That implies that
the nodes on π in R′′ have rank w starting at rank l+1 at the
latest. Thus, π is still accepting, and since π is arbitrary, R′′
is accepting as well.
This theorem is key to an efficient implementation as it
allows us to represent a set of pairs {(d1, q), . . . , (dk, q)}
as ({d1, . . . , dk}, q) whenever {d1, . . . , dk} can efficiently be
represented by a cube over the input signals I .
3) Simulation minimization: We compute the simulation
relation on AAWTk and use Theorems 3, 4, and 5 to optimize
the automaton. We would like to point out one optimization
in particular.
Lemma 11: For (q, i), (q, j) ∈ Q′ with i ≥ j such that i is
odd or j is even, we have (q, i)  (q, j). 
Thus, for any σ, if i is even, we can remove all transitions
C ∈ δ((q, i), σ) that include a pair (q′, j) for j ≤ i− 2. If i
is odd we can additionally remove all transitions that contain
a pair (q′, j) with q /∈ α and j = i − 1. That is, odd states
become deterministic and for even states there are at most two
alternatives to choose from.
Theorem 12: Let A′AWTk = (Σ, D,Q
′, q′0, δ
′′, α′) as in
Definition 8, but with
δ′′((q, i), σ) =
{
C ∈ δ(q, σ) | ∀(d′, (q′, i′)) ∈ C :
i′ ∈ {i− 1, i}, (i is even ∨ q′ ∈ α ∨ i′ = i),
∀(d′′, (q′, i′′)) ∈ C : i′ = i′′}.
then L(A′AWTk) = L(AAWTk). 
Example 13: States (n4, 4), (n5, 4), and (n5, 3) (top right)
are simulation equivalent with (n4, 2), (n5, 2), and (n5, 1),
respectively. Using Theorem 3, we can remove states (n4, 4),
(n5, 4), and (n5, 3), and redirect incoming edges to equivalent
states.
Furthermore, the previous removal of the states on the
bottom left implies that (n3, 4)  (n3, 3). Since (n2, 4) has
identical transitions to (n3, 4) and (n3, 3), Theorem 5 allows
us to remove the transition to (n3, 4). Thus, (n3, 4) becomes
unreachable and can be removed. The same holds for (n5, 2)
for a similar reason. (This optimization also allows us to
remove states (n4, 4), (n5, 4), and (n5, 3), but Theorem 5 is
not in general stronger than Theorem 3.)
The optimization of the edges due to Theorem 12 is already
shown in Fig. 4. Consider, for instance, the transition from
(n2, 4) to (n3, 4).
Altogether, we have reduced the number of states in the
AWT from 22 to 5. The removal of edges is equally important
as it reduces nondeterminism and makes the translation to an
NBT more efficient. 
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D. NBT
The next step is to translate AAWTk to an NBT ANBTk with
the same language. Assume that AAWTk = (Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α).
We first need some additional notation. For S ⊆ Q and σ ∈ Σ
let
sat(S, σ) = {C ∈ 2D×Q | C is a minimal set such that
∀q ∈ S ∃Cq ∈ δ(q, σ) : Cq ⊆ C}.
For (S,O) ∈ 2Q × 2Q, let
sat((S,O), σ) = {(S′, O′) ∈ 2Q × 2Q |
S′ ∈ sat(S, σ), O′ ∈ sat(O, σ), O′ ⊆ S′}.
Furthermore, let Sd = {s | (d, s) ∈ S}, let Od = {s | (d, s) ∈
O}. Let CN (S,O) = {(d, (Sd, Od \ α)) | d ∈ D} and let
C∅(S) = {(d, (Sd, Sd \ α)) | d ∈ D}.
Definition 14: [1], [16] Let ANBTk = (Σ, D, 2Q ×
2Q\α, ({q0}, ∅), δ′, 2Q × ∅) with
δ′((S,O), σ) =
{
{CN (S′, O′) | (S′, O′) ∈ sat((S,O), σ)} if O′ 6= ∅
{C∅(S′) | S′ ∈ sat(S, σ)} otherwise

We have L(ANBTk) = L(AAWTk).
We improve this construction in three ways. First, we make
use of the simulation relation on the AWT to reduce the size
of the NBT. Second, we remove inconsistent states, and third,
we compute the NBT on the fly.
1) Simulation-Based Optimization: We can use the simula-
tion relation that we have computed on AAWTk to approximate
the simulation relation on ANBTk. This is a simple extension
of Fritz’ result for word automata [17].
Given a direct simulation relation AWT for AAWTk, we
define the simulation relation ′ ⊆ Q′ ×Q′ on ANBTk as
(S1, O1) ′ (S2, O2) iff
∀q2 ∈ S2 ∃q1 ∈ S1 : q1 AWT q2 ∧ (q2 ∈ O2 → q1 ∈ O1).
Note that ′ is a subset of the full (direct) simulation relation
on ANBTk and thus, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 15: (S1, O1) ′ (S2, O2) implies L(A(S1,O1)) ⊆
L(A(S2,O2)). 
In particular, for a state (S,O) ∈ Q′, if q, q′ ∈ S, q AWT q′,
and q′ ∈ O → q ∈ O, then (S,O) ≃ (S\{q′}, O\{q′}). Thus,
by Theorem 3, we can remove q′ from such sets. Likewise,
if ANBTk contains two simulation equivalent states (S,O) and
(S′, O′) we keep only one (preferring the one with smaller
cardinality). Finally, we can use Theorem 5 to remove states
that have a simulating sibling.
2) Removing Inconsistent States: In [1], it is shown that
it is not necessary to include states (S,O) such that (q, i)
and (q, j) ∈ S with i 6= j. This implies that we can use the
following optimization.
Theorem 16: Let A′NBTk = (Σ, D,Q
′′, ({q0}, ∅), δ′′, 2Q×∅)
be as in Definition 14, with Q′′ = Q\{(S,O) | ∃(q, i), (q, j) ∈
S : i 6= j}. The transition relation δ′′ is obtained from δ′
by replacing, for all C ∈ δ′(q, σ) and all (S,O) ∈ C, state
(S,O) by (S′, O′) where S′ is obtained from S by removing
all states (q, j) with j not minimal and O′ is obtained from O
by replacing (q, j) ∈ O by (q, j′) if (q, j) /∈ S′ and (q, j) ∈
S′.
We have L(A′NBTk) = L(ANBT). 
This is an important theorem as it reduces the number of
states in the NBT to (k+ 1)2n instead of 2nk, where n is the
number of states in AUCT.
3) On-the-Fly Computation: Suppose ANBTk =
(Σ, D,Q, q0, δ, α). Instead of building ANBTk in full, we
construct an NBT A′NBT[k] = (Σ, D,Q
′, q0, δ
′, α ∩ Q′) such
that q0 ∈ Q′ ⊆ Q and for q ∈ Q′, either δ′(q, σ) = δ(q, σ) for
all σ or δ′(q, σ) = ∅ for all σ. Thus, L(A′NBTk) ⊆ L(ANBTk).
If L(A′NBTk) 6= ∅, the witness of nonemptiness of L(A
′
NBTk)
is a witness of nonemptiness of L(ANBTk). Otherwise, we
select a state q ∈ Q′ with δ′(q, σ) = ∅ and expand it, setting
δ′(q, σ) = δ(q, σ), introducing the necessary states to Q′.
Our current heuristic expands states in a breadth first
manner, which is quite effective. It may be beneficial to expand
certain state first, say states with a low cardinality or with high
ranks.
E. Moore Machine
We use the game defined in Section III-A to compute
language emptiness on the ANBTk. Since ANBTk is nondeter-
ministic, all states in the winning region have a nonempty
language. If the initial state is in the winning region, the
language of ANBTk is not empty and we extract a witness.
Since ANBTk is a subset of ANBTk+1, we can reuse all results
obtained when computing language emptiness on ANBTk to
compute language emptiness on ANBTk+1.
Moreover, it follows from Miyano and Hayashi’s construc-
tion that if L(A(S,O)) 6= ∅ and S ⊆ S′, then L(A(S
′,O′)) 6= ∅.
We may use this fact to further speed up the computation
of language emptiness, and especially to reuse information
obtained computing language emptiness on ANBTk for larger
k.
A witness for nonemptiness corresponds to a winning
attractor strategy [18]. The winning strategy follows the µ-
iterations of the final ν-computation of WB(α): From a state
q 6∈ α we go to a state q′ from which the protagonist can force
a shorter path to an accepting state. In an accepting state we
move back to an arbitrary state in the winning region.
If a strategy exists, it corresponds to a complete Σ-labeled
D-tree and thus to a Moore machine M . The states of M are
the states of ANBTk that are reachable when the strategy is
followed, and the edges are given by the strategy.
To minimize the strategy, we compute the simulation re-
lation and apply Theorem 3, which is equivalent to using
the classical FSM minimization algorithm [19]. Thus, the
optimized strategy is guaranteed to be minimal with respect
to its given I/O language. The output of our tool is a state
machine described in Verilog that implements this strategy.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our tool, Lily1, is an implementation of the synthesis
algorithm and the optimizations described in this paper. It is
1http://www.ist.tugraz.at/staff/jobstmann/lily/
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assign hl = (state == 0);




always @(posedge clk) begin
case(state)
0: begin
if (timer==0) state = 0;
if (timer==1 && car==1) state = 1;
if (car==0) state = 0;
end
1: begin
if (timer==1) state = 0;





Fig. 5. Generated design for a simple traffic light
implemented on top of Wring [6], [20] and written in Perl.
We have run our experiments on a Linux machine with a 2.8
GHz Pentium 4 CPU and 2 GB of RAM.
Example 17: Consider the following formula.
GF timer →
(
G(hl → (hl U timer)) ∧ G(fl → (fl U timer))∧
G(¬hl ∨ ¬fl) ∧ G(car → F¬car ∨ fl) ∧ G F hl∧
G(hl → (hl W car))
)
.
The formula specifies a small traffic light system consisting
of two lights. The highway light is green iff hl = true, and
similarly for the crossing farm road and fl . Signals hl and fl
form the output. The input signal car indicates that a car is
waiting at the farm road and timer represents the expiration
of a timer. The specification assumes that the timer expires
regularly. It requires that a green light stay green until the
timer expires. Furthermore, one of the lights must always be
red, every car at the farm road is eventually allowed to drive
on (unless it disappears), the highway light is regularly set
to green, and it does not become red until there is a car that
wants to cross the highway. The specification is realizable and
the design generated by Lily is shown in Figure 5. 
We show the effectiveness of the various optimizations by
synthesizing 20 handwritten formulas, mostly different arbiters
and some traffic light controllers. Our examples are small, but
we show a significant improvement over the straightforward
implementation.
For realizable formulas, we have verified the output of our
tool with a model checker. We can verify that a formula
is unrealizable by synthesizing an environment that forces
the specification to be violated. Since a system is a Moore
machine, an environment is a Mealy machine. Note that ϕ
can be realized by a Mealy machine iff ϕ′ can be realized by
a Moore machine, where ϕ′ is obtained from ϕ by replacing
all occurences of an output o by X o. This means that we can
apply our approach to check that the environment is realizable.
We show our results in Table I. (The specification in
example 17 has number 9.) In the column labeled T,B,AP,
we provide the number of temporal operators, the number of
Boolean operators, and the number of atomic propositions in
the formula. We also give the strength in Column strength
and the number of states and edges of the optimized NBW in
Column NBW using the format states(edges).
The next six columns report time used with different com-
binations of optimizations. We write “> mem” if the run has
exceeded the memory limit and “> 3600s” if it did not finish
within one hour.
In Column Plain we give the time using only one op-
timization: transitions from a state with rank i go only to
states with ranks i − 1 and i − 2, not to smaller ranks.
Without this optimization, synthesis is impossible on most
examples. Column Plain+dm shows the time used if we
apply Theorem 10, which allows us to merge directions. In
Column UCT+dm, we give the time usage of runs in which
we applied game optimization (Theorem 1) on the UCT and
we merged the directions. We show the results for applying
all the optimizations suggested in Section IV-C on the AWT
in Column AWT+dm. Column UCT+dm shows the time used
if we apply the NBT optimizations and merge directions.
In the Column All we give the results for combining all
optimizations. For realizable formulas, the number of states
and edges of the design generated during those runs is given
in the column labeled with Witness. We write n.r. if a formula
is not realizable. The generated designs are minimized as
described in Section IV-E.
In Column NBT-all we give the size (states(edges)) of the
NBT using all optimizations. In contrast, in Column NBT-
plain+dm, we show the size of the NBTs generated by the
runs where we used only direction merging.
Our examples show that if the NBW for ¬ϕ is strong and we
have to construct the AWT, the straightforward implementation
often fails to complete. (See Column Plain.) Five examples
exceed the memory limit due to the expensive construction
of the transition relation of the AWT. The optimizations due
to Theorem 10, which allows us to merge directions, are
necessary to overcome this limit. (See Column Plain+dm.)
If we optimize the UCT according to Theorem 1, we speed
up about half of the examples by a factor of two or more.
(Compare Column Plain+dm and UCT+dm, e.g., Line 2,3,
or 9). The game based minimization is very effective if the
formula or part of it is not realizable and is very cheap to
compute. In particular for Examples 3 the difference is huge
because the language of the optimized UCT is empty.
None of the optimizations on the AWT was very effective
on their own. For example we still had two timeouts with
game based optimization. The same holds for simulation
based optimization. Further simplification of δ′ according
to Theorem 12 resulted in one timeout. Nevertheless, these
optimizations are very efficient when combined as can be seen
in Column AWT+dm.
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TABLE I
No T,B,AP Strength NBW Plain Plain+dm UCT+dm AWT+dm NBT+dm All NBT-plain+dm NBT-all Witness
1 12,5,4 weak 8(14) 2.94 s 1.96 s 0.71 s 0.73 s 2.53 s 0.38 s 48(192) 0(0) n. r.
2 6,3,4 strong 7(15) > mem 1689.13 s 575.70 s 2.20 s 2.43 s 1.25 s 3943(973764) 6(28) 2(3)
3 4,4,4 strong 12(44) > mem > mem 3.73 s >3600 s > 3600 s 3.95 s - 0(0) n. r.
4 9,5,4 strong 6(11) 12.90 s 3.14 s 2.63 s 0.61 s 0.74 s 0.66 s 95(1104) 8(37) 6(11)
5 9,6,4 weak 7(19) 0.61 s 0.62 s 0.68 s 0.64 s 0.62 s 0.69 s 14(65) 14(65) 10(25)
6 15,12,4 weak 9(30) 3.43 s 2.94 s 3.01 s 2.97 s 3.26 s 3.15 s 58(502) 58(502) 43(145)
7 13,5,5 strong 7(15) 69.14 s 20.07 s 12.83 s 1.23 s 3.42 s 1.24 s 384(9564) 26(164) 15(31)
8 20,9,7 strong 9(22) > 3600 s 258.81 s 294.29 s 6.41 s 13.32 s 5.98 s 1810(75264) 80(811) 41(109)
9 11,9,4 strong 9(19) > mem 113.08 s 9.29 s 14.90 s 5.57 s 8.90 s 1079(81700) 101(840) 2(5)
10 12,5,4 weak 8(12) 3.64 s 1.28 s 0.62 s 0.70 s 1.31 s 0.35 s 28(116) 0(0) n. r.
11 23,21,5 strong 24(90) > mem > mem > 3600 s 17.57 s 94.29 s 15.91 s - 31(167) 6(13)
12 40,24,8 weak 14(84) 201.18 s 219.38 s 58.82 s 61.02 s 37.95 s 32.41 s 251(88016) 26(456) 5(41)
13 10,9,4 strong 24(134) > mem > 3600 s > 3600 s 522.21 s > 3600 s 46.37 s 360(440093) 23(127) 17(75)
14 14,9,4 weak 13(34) 7.15 s 6.09 s 4.08 s 4.44 s 4.54 s 2.39 s 82(730) 21(92) 7(22)
15 16,10,10 weak 24(68) 90.63 s 68.49 s 13.60 s 13.10 s 17.00 s 8.29 s 618(8326) 27(142) n. r.
16 16,13,4 weak 18(50) 8.65 s 6.33 s 6.45 s 7.23 s 7.71 s 3.93 s 142(1492) 17(112) 8(31)
17 19,13,4 weak 25(69) 24.52 s 21.88 s 11.28 s 12.97 s 14.46 s 8.18 s 368(3716) 25(162) 12(54)
18 16,17,4 weak 17(45) 11.14 s 9.14 s 4.58 s 5.51 s 6.05 s 4.14 s 118(730) 13(53) 8(23)
19 28,14,9 strong 11(30) > mem > mem > 3600 s 72.78 s 483.38 s 39.26 s 755(83106) 242(3834) 124(444)
20 8,6,2 strong 7(14) 3.21 s 2.98 s 1.24 s 1.13 s 0.82 s 0.73 s 112(1187) 5(10) 2(3)
The simulation-based optimizations for the NBT (explained
in Section IV-D) typically reduce the size of the resulting NBT
between 60% and 90%. For example, in Example 9 the size
of the NBT is reduced from about 1000 states to 300. For this
example, the on-the-fly game computation further reduces the
number of NBT-states to about 100. Only in the small exam-
ples is the entire state space of the NBT needed to compute
a witness. (Cf. Column NBT-plain+dm,NBT-all,Witness).
In our examples, the UCT optimizations were crucial once
to turn a strong UCT into a weak one (in this case with an
empty language). In all other cases, they are outperformed by
the AWT optimizations. The results of the NBT optimization
are mixed: they can fail (Example 3 and 13) or perform better
than any other optimization (Example 9 and 12). The combi-
nation of all optimizations is needed to finish all examples.
VI. SUMMARY
The paper described the first implementation of a synthesis
tool for full LTL. We have presented a set of optimizations
for tree automata and have shown how these make a major
difference in the efficiency of the implementation.
Further work is concerned with further increases in effi-
ciency, debugging of specifications (especially of unrealizable
ones), and with ways to effectively combine specifications with
hand-written HDL code.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Orna
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Abstract— The IEEE standard Property Specification Lan-
guage (PSL) allows to express all ω-regular properties mixing
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) with Sequential Extended Regular
Expressions (SEREs), and is increasingly used in many phases
of the hardware design cycle, from specification to verification.
Many verification engines are able to manipulate Nondeter-
ministic Büchi Automata (NBA), that can represent ω-regular
properties. Thus, the ability to convert PSL into NBA is an
important enabling factor for the reuse of a large wealth of
verification tools.
Recent works propose a two-step conversion from PSL to NBA:
first, the PSL property is encoded into an Alternating Büchi
Automaton (ABA); then, the ABA is converted into an NBA with
variants of Miyano-Hayashi’s construction. These approaches are
problematic in practice: in fact, they are often unable to carry
out the conversion in acceptable time, even for PSL specifications
of moderate size.
In this paper, we propose a modular encoding of PSL into
symbolically represented NBA. We convert a PSL property into
a normal form that separates the LTL and the SERE components.
Each of these components can be processed separately, so that the
NBA corresponding to the original PSL property is presented in
the form of an implicit product, delaying composition until search
time.
Our approach has two other advantages: first, we can leverage
mature techniques for the LTL components; second, we leverage
the particular form of the PSL components that appear in the
normal form to improve over the general translation.
The transformation is proved correct. A thorough experimen-
tal analysis over large sets of paradigmatic properties (from
patterns of properties commonly used in practice) shows that
our approach drastically reduces the construction time of the
symbolic NBA, and positively affects the overall verification time.
I. INTRODUCTION
The IEEE standard Property Specification Language
PSL [1] is increasingly used as means to capture requirements
on the behavior of a design, such as assumptions about the
environment in which the design is expected to operate, inter-
nal behavioral requirements, and further constraints that arise
during the design process from specification to verification.
The most important fragment of PSL combines Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) [2] with Sequential Extended Regular
Expressions (SERE), a variant of classical regular expres-
sions [1]. This combination results in ω-regular expressiveness,
and enables to express many properties of practical interest in
a compact and readable way.
Currently, most verification engines are able to manipulate
Nondeterministic Büchi Automata (NBAs), thus allowing for
the verification of all ω-regular properties. However, only few
model checkers are able to deal with PSL, and those who
do cover only a subset of the language. Thus, the ability to
convert PSL into NBA would be an important enabling factor
for the reuse of a large wealth of verification tools.
The translation of LTL augmented with regular expressions
into NBA is exponential in the size of the input formula (see,
e.g., [3]). In addition, SEREs extend regular expressions with
the intersection operation, at the cost of an exponential blow-
up. Thus, the translation of PSL may become a bottleneck
even for real practical examples.
Following state-of-the-art techniques in LTL compilation
[4], [5], recent approaches to PSL model checking [6], [7]
tackle the translation into NBA in two steps. First, the PSL
formula is encoded into an Alternating Büchi Automaton
(ABA) [6]. The encoding builds a unique, monolithic ABA.
Then, the monolithic ABA is converted into an NBA with
variants of Miyano-Hayashi’s construction (MH) [8] that, for
an ABA of n states, generates an NBA of O(3n) states. In [9],
a symbolic encoding of the NBA corresponding to the ABA
of the PSL property is proposed. The authors of [7] exploit
the fact that ABAs obtained from PSL are “weak” (see [10])
to directly define a symbolic encoding of the ABA. Both
approaches try to limit the encoding size (delaying the ex-
plosion until search time). However, the explicit manipulation
and optimization of the ABA is in practice a bottleneck: these
approaches are often unable to carry out the conversion in
acceptable time, even for PSL specifications of moderate size.
In this paper, we propose a modular direct encoding of
PSL into a symbolically represented NBA without generating
any explicit ABA. Our approach builds on the following main
ideas.
First, we turn the PSL formula into a normal form, that we
named Suffix Operator Normal Form (SONF). This normal
form separates the SERE components and the LTL com-
ponents. This makes the approach modular, i.e. rather than
constructing a monolithic automaton we generate it in the
form of an implicit product, thus delaying composition until
search time. In addition, the two components can be encoded
separately: the encoding of the LTL components can rely on
mature techniques [4], [11], [12]; the PSL components can be
encoded by any standard conversion to NBA. The resulting
overall automaton is also more compact since it is the implicit
synchronous composition of smaller automata.
Second, the interface between SERE and LTL is normalized,
so that only specific PSL patterns, that we call Suffix Operator
Subformulas, are possible. This allows us to define optimized
encoding techniques specific to each of the patterns in order
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to translate efficiently the Suffix Operator Subformulas into
NBAs.
We prove that our transformation is correct, and evaluate
our approach in the NUSMV model checker [13], with a thor-
ough experimental analysis over large sets of PSL properties,
generated from paradigmatic patterns of properties commonly
used in practice [14]. This analysis shows that our approach
dramatically reduces the construction time of the symbolic
NBA. In addition, an evaluation on verification and language
emptiness problems, using both BDDs and SAT, shows that our
approach can positively affect the overall verification time.
A similar approach has been independently proposed in
[15], where a PSL formula is translated into a tester, a finite-
state machine that monitors if the suffix of the processed word
satisfies the formula. The translation is bottom-up and com-
positional: each subformula is translated into an automaton
which is then symbolically encoded using a boolean variable
to monitor its satisfiability. The inductive step is very similar to
our basic rule for SONF reduction. However, we do not build
an automaton for every subformula, but we simply separate
the LTL part from the SERE part and we leave the freedom
to use different translation for each part; moreover, we use
different optimized compilation for the suffix conjunction and
the suffix implication.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we present
the syntax and semantics of PSL, and some background on
automata. In Section III we overview the monolithic approach,
and discuss its inadequacies. In Section IV we define the
Suffix Operator Normal form, and in Section V we discuss
the encoding, and we show how to exploit the structure of
the SONF to generate NBAs. In Sections V-B.1 and V-B.2,
we describe the optimized translations for Suffix Operator
Subformulas. In Section VI we experimentally evaluate our
approach. Finally, in Section VII we draw some conclusions
and discuss directions for future research.
The proofs of the main theorems and additional experimen-
tal results are reported in [16].
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
A. The property specification language PSL
PSL is a very rich language [1]. We consider the subset
of PSL that combines Linear Temporal Logic [2] (LTL) and
Sequential Extended Regular Expressions (SERE), a variant
of classical regular expressions [1]. This subset provides ω-
regular expressiveness, it is the mostly used in practice and
constitutes the core of the PSL temporal layer [1]. We will
not deal with PSL “clocked” expression that are not part of
the core since any clocked expression can be rewritten into
an equivalent un-clocked one. The same applies for the PSL
“abort” operator that can be efficiently rewritten into pure LTL
as shown in [17].
In the following, we assume as given a set AP of atomic
propositions that intuitively represent the states of the system
under verification. Let Σ := 2AP be the alphabet of the
languages defined by the system and the properties. Let A ⊇
AP be a superset of atomic formulas1. Let ΣA := 2A be
the alphabet related to A. Given a generic set V , we denote
with B+(V ) the set of Boolean formulas obtained by applying
only disjunction (∨) and conjunction (∧) to elements in V ∪
{true, false}; with B∨(V ) the set of Boolean formulas obtained
by applying only disjunction ∨ to elements in V ∪{true, false};
and with B¬(V ) the set of Boolean formulas obtained by
applying disjunction, conjunction and negation (¬) to elements
in V ∪ {true, false}.
We denote a letter from a given alphabet Σ by `, a word
from Σ by v or w, and the concatenation of v and w by vw.
We denote with |w | the length of word w. A finite word
w = `0`1 . . . `n has length n+ 1, an infinite word has length
ω. For i < |w| we use wi to denote the (i+ 1)th letter of w,
and we denote with wi.. the suffix of w starting at wi. When
i ≤ j ≤ |w| , we denote with wi..j the finite sequence of letters
starting from wi and ending in wj : wi..j := wiwi+1 . . . wj .
SEREs are the PSL version of regular expressions. In
particular, they extend the standard regular expressions with
language intersection. This allows for a greater succinctness,
but it implies a possible exponential blow-up in the conversion
to automata. Formally,
Definition 1 (SEREs syntax):
• if b is Boolean expression, then b is a SERE;
• if r is a SERE, then r[*] is a SERE;
• if r1 and r2 are SEREs, then the following are SEREs
r1 ; r2 r1 : r2 r1 | r2
r1 & r2 r1 && r2
SEREs can be concatenated with the operators ; and : , the
former for the consecutive concatenation of two sequences, the
latter for one-state overlapping concatenation. The conjunction
operators & and && can be used to specify overlapping
sequences, the latter for length-matching sequences. Disjunc-
tion can be specified using the | operator. The [*] operator
specifies finite consecutive repetitions.
The semantics of SEREs is formally defined over finite
words using, as the base case the semantics of Boolean
expressions over letters in Σ, denoted with |=B hereafter.
Definition 2 (SEREs semantics): Given a Boolean expres-
sion b, a SERE r, and a finite word w, we define the satisfac-
tion relation w |≡ r as follows:
• w |≡ b iff |w| = 1 and w0 |=B b
• w |≡ r1 ; r2 iff ∃w1, w2 s.t. w = w1w2, w1 |≡ r1, w2 |≡ r2
• w |≡ r1 : r2 iff ∃w1, w2, ` s.t. w = w1`w2, w1` |≡ r1,
`w2 |≡ r2
• w |≡ r1 | r2 iff w |≡ r1 or w |≡ r2
• w |≡ r1 & r2 iff
– w |≡ r1 and ∃w1, w2 s.t. w = w1w2, w1 |≡ r2, or
– w |≡ r2 and ∃w1, w2 s.t. w = w1w2, w1 |≡ r1
• w |≡ r1 && r2 iff ∃w1, w2 s.t. w = w1w2, w1 |≡ r1,
w1 |≡ r2
1We rewrite formulas by introducing new atoms. You can think of these
fresh atoms as the existentially quantified propositions of QLTL [18]. Thus,
their role is similar to the labels in standard CNF-ization of SAT instances.
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• w |≡ r[*] iff |w | = 0 or ∃w1, w2 s.t. |w1 | 6= 0, w =
w1w2, w1 |≡ r, w2 |≡ r[*]
In the definition of the PSL syntax, for technical reasons, we
introduce the “releases” operator (that is the dual of the “until”
operator), and also we introduce the “suffix conjunction”
connective as a dual of the suffix implication. Moreover, we
consider only the strong version of all the operators (the weak
operators can be rewritten in terms of the strong ones [1]).
Definition 3 (PSL syntax): We define the PSL formulas
over A, as follows:
• if p ∈ A, p is a PSL formula;
• if φ1 and φ2 are PSL formulas, then ¬φ1, φ1∧φ2, φ1∨φ2
are PSL formulas;
• if φ1 and φ2 are PSL formulas, then X φ1, φ1 U φ2,
φ1 R φ2 are PSL formulas;
• if r is a SERE and φ is a PSL formulas, then r ♦→ φ
and r |→ φ are PSL formulas;
• if r is a SERE, then r is a PSL formula.
The X (“next-time”), the U (“until”), and the R (“releases”)
operators are called temporal operators. We call the ♦→
(“suffix conjunction”), and the |→ (“suffix implication”),
suffix operators. Notice that, the r not occurring in the left
side of a suffix operator is the strong version of a SERE (r! in
the PSL notation). In the following, we will consider such r as
an abbreviation for r ♦→ true [1], [6]. We also use G φ as an
abbreviation for false R φ. LTL can be seen as a subset of PSL
in which the suffix operators and the SEREs are suppressed.
We interpret PSL expressions over infinite words, and we
consider only the strong semantics of PSL [1] (though our
approach can be easily extended to deal also with the weak
semantics).
Definition 4 (PSL semantics): Let w ∈ Σω.
• w |= p iff w0 |=B p;
• w |= ¬φ iff w 6|= φ;
• w |= φ∧ ψ iff w |= φ and w |= ψ;
• w |= φ∨ ψ iff either w |= φ or w |= ψ;
• w |= X φ iff |w| > 1 and w1.. |= φ;
• w |= φ U ψ iff, for some j ≥ 0, wj.. |= ψ and, for all
0 ≤ k < j, wk.. |= φ;
• w |= φ R ψ iff, for all j ≥ 0, either wj.. |= ψ or, for
some 0 ≤ k < j, wk.. |= φ;
• w |= r ♦→ φ iff, for some j ≥ 0, w0..j |≡ r and wj.. |= φ;
• w |= r |→ φ iff, for all j ≥ 0, if w0..j |≡ r, then wj.. |= φ.
Notice that we can build Boolean expressions by means of
atomic formulas and Boolean connectives.
Definition 5 (language of PSL formulas): The language of
a PSL formula φ over the alphabet ΣA is defined as follows:
LA(φ) := {w ∈ Σ
ω
A | w |= φ}
The language accepted by φ is defined as follows:
L(φ) := {w ∈ Σω | for some v ∈ LA(φ),
vi ∩AP = wi for all i ≥ 0}
B. Automata
Definition 6 (NFA): A Non-deterministic Finite-state Au-
tomaton (NFA) is a tuple A = 〈A, Q, q0, ρ, F 〉, where
• A is the set of atoms;
• Q is a set of states;
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state;
• ρ : Q× ΣA → 2
Q is the transition function;
• F ⊆ Q is the set of final states.
A run of an NFA A over the finite word w = `0, `1, ..., `n ∈
Σ∗A is a finite sequence of states π = q0, q1, ..., qn such that,
for 0 ≤ i < n, qi+1 ∈ ρ(qi, `i), and qn ∈ F .
Definition 7 (NFA language): The language LA(A) of an
NFA A related to the alphabet ΣA is the set of words w such
that there exists a run of A over w.
L(A) := {w ∈ Σ∗ | for some v ∈ LA(A),
vi ∩ AP = wi for all i ≥ 0}
Definition 8 (DFA): A Deterministic Finite-state Automa-
ton (DFA) is an NFA A = 〈A, Q, q0, ρ, F 〉 such that, for all
q ∈ Q and ` ∈ ΣA, |ρ(q, `)| ≤ 1.
Definition 9: A (Non-)Deterministic Finite-state Automa-
ton is complete iff for all q ∈ Q, for all ` ∈ ΣA, |ρ(q, `)| ≥ 1.
SERE, NFA and DFA have the same expressive power. In
particular, the following theorems are relevant.
Theorem 1: Fer every SERE r, there exists a complete NFA
Ar such that L(Ar) = L(r) and |Ar| = |r| if r does not
contain the && operator, |Ar| = 2O(|r|) otherwise.
Theorem 2: Given an NFA A, we can build a DFA A′ such
that L(A′) = L(A) and |A′| = 2O(|A|).
Definition 10 (ABA): An Alternating Büchi Automaton
(ABA) over infinite words is a tuple A = 〈A, Q,Q0, ρ, F 〉,
where
• A is the set of atoms;
• Q is a finite nonempty set of states;
• Q0 ⊆ Q is the set of initial states;
• ρ : Q× ΣA → B
+(Q) is the transition function;
• F ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states.
A run of an ABA on an infinite word w is a (possibly infinite)
Q-labeled tree τ = (T , L) such that L(ε) ∈ Q0 and for every
node t ∈ T , t has at most |Q| children and, if t is at the i-th
level of τ , L(t) = q, and the children of t are t1, ..., tk, then
L(t1), ..., L(tk) satisfy ρ(q, wi). A run tree τ is accepting if
every branch has infinite depth and features infinitely many
labels in F .
Definition 11 (NBA): A Non-deterministic Büchi Automa-
ton (NBA) is the tuple A = 〈A, Q,Q0, ρ, F 〉, where
• A is the set of atoms building the labels;
• Q is a set of states;
• Q0 ⊆ Q is the set of initial states;
• ρ : Q× ΣA → 2
Q is the transition function;
• F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
A run of an NBA A over the infinite word w = `0, `1, ... ∈ ΣωA
is an infinite sequence of states π = q0, q1, ... starting from
some q0 ∈ Q0 such that, for all i ≥ 0, qi+1 ∈ ρ(qi, `i), and
qi ∈ F for infinitely many i.
The runs of an NBA can be seen as trees with a single
branch. Hence the accepting condition collapses to require that
a run is accepting if it features infinitely many occurrences of
states in F .
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Definition 12 (ABA and NBA language): The language
LA(A) of an ABA or NBA A related to the alphabet ΣA is
the set of words w such that there exists a run of A over w.
The language of A is defined as follows:
L(A) := {w ∈ Σω | for some v ∈ LA(A),
vi ∩AP = wi for all i ≥ 0}
For any Alternating Büchi Automaton A, there exists a
Nondeterministic Büchi Automaton B accepting the same
language. Given an ABA A, the algorithm of [8] produces an
NBA B such that with the same language. In the following,
we rely on a simplified version [19]:
Theorem 3 (From ABA to NBA): For any ABA A there ex-
ists an NBA B such that L(B) = L(A). Given A =
〈A, Q,Q0, ρ, F 〉, B is defined as B = 〈A, QB , Q0B , ρB , FB〉,
where:
• QB = {(L,R)|L ∈ 2
Q, R ∈ 2Q\F }
• Q0B = Q0 × ∅
• if R 6= ∅, then ρB((L,R), `) = {(L′, R′ \ F ) | L′ |=⋂
q∈L ρ(q, `), R
′ ⊆ L′, R′ |=
⋂
q∈R ρ(q, `)}
if R = ∅, then ρB((L,R), `) = {(L′, L′ \ F ) | L′ |=⋂
q∈L ρ(q, `)}
• FB = 2
Q × {∅}
C. Fair Transition Systems
In the following, in order to simplify the presentation, we
introduce the notion of Fair Transition System [20].
Definition 13: A fair transition system (FTS) is a tuple S =
〈V,A, T, I, F 〉, where V is a finite set of state variables, A
is a finite set of input variables, T ∈ B¬(V ∪ A ∪ V ′) is
the transition relation (V ′ is the set of primed versions of
variables in V ), I ∈ B¬(V ) specifies the set of initial states,
and F ∈ B¬(V ) specifies the acceptance condition.
An FTS S = 〈Vs,A, Ts, Is, Fs〉 defines an NBA A as
follows: A = 〈A, 2Vs , Q0, ρ, F 〉, where Q0 is defined by Is,
ρ(q, `) = {q′ | (q, `, q′) |= T}, and F = {q | q |= Fs}. Thus,
we can speak of a run of an FTS and the language of an FTS
as if it were an NBA.
Using FTS instead of NBA further stresses the fact that our
encoding is symbolic and does not imply the construction of
any explicit NBA.
III. MONOLITHIC ENCODING OF PSL INTO NBA
In this section, we recall the state-of-the-art techniques to
compile PSL formulas into automata. More details can be
found in [6].
The translation proceeds bottom-up: it builds the automata
corresponding to the SEREs and combine them with the
temporal and the suffix operators. The resulting automaton is
an ABA which is then translated into an NBA by the Miyano-
Hayashi (MH) algorithm [8].
Thus, the basic step of the overall translation is the com-
pilation of SEREs into NFAs. Concatenation ( ; , : ) and
union ( | ) are translated linearly in the standard way [21].
Instead, the intersection operators ( & , && ) allow for a greater
succinctness but imply a potential blow-up in the translation.
The complexity stems from the difficulty of codifying the
fact that two automata must synchronize on the end of the
words that are accepted [22], [23]. [6] takes the conjunction
of the two automata and removes the subsequent alternation
by means of a subset construction.
Pure LTL formulas can be translated easily into a fragment
of ABA, called linear weak ABA [4], [24]. This translation can
be extended to handle automata as leaves of the LTL formulas,
instead of the propositional atoms, yielding a general ABA.
Finally, the suffix operators are handled so that the NFA
of the left-side SERE is combined with the ABA of the
right-side PSL formula. In the case of a suffix implication,
we require that every finite prefix satisfying the SERE is
followed by a suffix satisfying the PSL formula; this requires
a determinization and completion of the NFA. In the case of
a suffix conjunction, there must exist a finite prefix satisfying
the SERE followed by a suffix satisfying the PSL formula; this
requires a fairness condition for the fulfillment of the prefix.
The bottom-up construction ends up into a monolithic ABA
that encodes the language of the input PSL formula. The
alternation is then removed by means of an exponential subset
construction. A further quadratic blow up is necessary to
handle the fairness condition [8]. It is possible to use a
symbolic version of MH [9], so that the potential explosion is
delayed at run time.
Remark 1: We can identify two main approaches to LTL
compilation into NBA: on one hand, syntactic compilers
(such as ltl2smv [25]) translate the LTL formula directly
into a linear size FTS by introducing one variable for each
subformula; on the other hand, semantic compilers (such as
Wring [11]) translate the formula into an intermediate explicit
representation, which is optimized and then symbolically rep-
resented by means of a logarithmic encoding. [12] showed that
the latter approach usually performs better in terms of verifica-
tion time. Its main drawback is that the automata optimization
are often so expensive that the compilation time may result in a
bottleneck. The monolithic approach described in this Section
extends the semantic compilation of LTL preventing the use
of different encodings for the different classes of subformulas.
Moreover, it implies an explicit automaton construction that
one may wish to avoid. As a further point, the classic syntactic
compilation of [25] can be seen as a linear encoding of
the corresponding alternating automaton. The main difference
with MH stands in the fairness manipulation: if the input
formula contains n U -subformulas, the classic construction
produces n fairness constraints that result in n inner fixpoint
computations at search time; on the opposite, MH produces
only one fairness constraint but it must introduce n symbolic
variables to keep track of which U -subformulas must be
fulfilled. We are not aware of any comparison between the
two approaches.
IV. SUFFIX OPERATOR NORMAL FORM FOR PSL
In this section we define the Suffix Operator Normal Form
(SONF) for PSL. The first step is to extend the Negative
Normal Form (standard for LTL) to the case of PSL.
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Definition 14 (NNF): A PSL formula is in negated normal
form (NNF) iff all the negations occur only in front of
propositions.
Lemma 1 (NNF-ization): A PSL formula φ can always be
reduced to an equivalent NNF N (φ).
Proof: Each of the following transformations preserves
the language.
• N (¬p) := ¬p,
• N (¬(φ1 ∨ φ2)) := N (¬φ1)∧ N (¬φ2),
• N (¬(φ1 ∧ φ2)) := N (¬φ1)∨ N (¬φ2),
• N (¬(φ1 U φ2)) := N (¬φ1) R N (¬φ2),
• N (¬(φ1 R φ2)) := N (¬φ1) U N (¬φ2),
• N (¬(r ♦→ φ1)) := r |→ N (¬φ1),
• N (¬(r |→ φ1)) := r ♦→ N (¬φ1).
We now provide a set of rewriting rules to convert the
formula in a normal form named Suffix Operator Normal









G (pjI → (rj ?→ p
j
F ))




Given a formula φ, the rewriting rules build φ′, adding new
atoms while preserving the language so that a model of φ′
restricted to the original set of atomic propositions is a model
of φ. For every subformula of φ of the form r ♦→ ψ (resp.,
r |→ ψ), we introduce two new atoms: Pr ♦→ ψ (resp., Pr |→ ψ)
and Pψ. We define the following rewriting rules:
Definition 15:
φ[r ♦→ ψ] ⇒ φ[Pr ♦→ ψ]∧
G (Pr ♦→ ψ → (r ♦→ Pψ))∧
G (Pψ → ψ) (1)
φ[r |→ ψ] ⇒ φ[Pr |→ ψ]∧
G (Pr |→ ψ → (r |→ Pψ))∧
G (Pψ → ψ) (2)
where φ[ψ]⇒ φ[P ] means that we substitute every occurrence
of ψ in φ with P . Intuitively, we substitute the suffix operator
r ?→ ψ with the corresponding activation predicate Pr ?→ ψ,
and we add two global formulas at top-level: the first states
that Pr ?→ ψ always triggers r ?→ Pψ; the second states that
Pψ always triggers ψ.
Example 1: The SONF of F G (a[*] ; b |→ F c) is
F G (p1) ∧ G (p1 → a[*] ; b |→ p2) ∧ G (p2 → F c).
Notice that |φ′| = O(|φ|). It is easy to see that the rewriting
procedure terminates and always produces the same formula
(modulo renaming). The following theorem guarantees the
correctness of the rewriting rules.
Theorem 4: Let φ be a PSL formula over A and ψ a PSL
subformula of φ that occurs only positively in φ. If
φ′ := φ[P/ψ]∧ G (P → ψ).
then L(φ) = L(φ′).
V. A MODULAR TRANSLATION FROM PSL TO NBA
A. The Overall Approach
Algorithm 1 depicts the pseudo code of the ModPsl2Ba
procedure for translating PSL to NBA in a modular manner.
ModPsl2Ba relies on two building blocks, Psl2Ba and
Ltl2Ba. Psl2Ba is the procedure described in Section III,
that builds an automaton from a PSL formula; Ltl2Ba is a
procedure that builds an NBA automaton from an LTL formula
(for instance [25]).
The ModPsl2Ba procedure improves over Psl2Ba by
transforming the PSL formula into an equivalent one in SONF.
The Sonf procedure generates the SONF of a formula φ, thus
decomposing it into subformulas according to their nature.This
normalization is then exploited in two ways: first, we keep the
resulting NBA partitioned (rather than monolithic); second,
we call the tableau constructor Ltl2Ba, that is optimized for
LTL, on the LTL part.
ModPsl2Ba(φ)
input : φ the PSL input formula
output : a set S of NBAs;




/* φ′ is in the form ΨLTL ∧ ΨPSL */
for ψ ∈ ΨLTL do
A := Ltl2Ba(ψ);
S := S ∪ {A};
end
for ψ ∈ ΨPSL do
A := Psl2Ba(ψ);
S := S ∪ {A};
end
return Send
Algorithm 1: Modular translation.
Intuitively, the approach can be seen as a way to decompose
the property in small pieces, apply to each piece the most
effective encoding, and then gluing together the results by
synchronous composition.
We remark that the result of the translation is a set of
implicitly synchronized NBAs, while the approach described
in III returns a single NBA. This enables a greater effi-
ciency since we can exploit standard techniques of conjunctive
partitioning in model checking [26]. It also allows multiple
fairness conditions, which may improve the verification time
by decomposing the fixpoint computation in smaller ones.
B. Encoding Suffix Operator Subformulas
Algorithm 1 can be further optimized. In fact, we notice that
the expressions in ΨPSL contain exactly two specific patterns:
namely, G (PI → (r ♦→ PF )) and G (PI → (r |→ PF )).
We call these kind of subformulas, Suffix Operator Subfor-
mulas. Here we present an optimized version of Psl2Ba,
that works only for the Suffix Operator Subformulas, and
builds the NBA without passing through the construction of
the ABA. As a consequence of the optimization, the overall
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algorithm ModPsl2Ba becomes independent of any ABA
representation.
We exploit the structure of the Suffix Operator Subformulas
that have a fixed pattern parametrized only on the SERE r.
This way, given the NFA Ar = 〈A, Q, q0, ρ, F 〉 of r, we
can obtain directly the NBA Aφ corresponding to the Suffix
Operator Subformula φ. In the following two sections, we will
describe the symbolic encoding of such NBA as an FTS which
is produced on top of the symbolic encoding of Ar. Notice
that the encoding is linear in the size of Ar and we do not
add new variables either for the top-level G operator or for
the propositions PI and PF .
1) Encoding φ := G (PI → (r |→ PF )) into NBA Aφ:
The NFA Ar is first completed and determinized. The cost
of these operations is alleviated by considering a symbolic
representation of the labels in the NFA. Instead of representing
the transitions by means of a function ρ : Q × ΣA → 2Q
depending on the letters of the alphabet, we use a function
ρ : Q → 2B
¬(A)×Q depending on Boolean combinations of
atomic formulas. Then, we can obtain a symbolic represen-
tation of the deterministic and completed version of Ar by
introducing a set of variables V := {vq}q∈Q and a triple of
formulas Ir, Tr, Fr where:
















Notice that, in C ⊆ ρ(q) we consider also the empty set ∅.
The FTS Sφ is defined as 〈Vφ,A, Tφ, Iφ, Fφ〉, where Vφ =
V , Iφ := >, Fφ := >, and
Tφ := PI → Ir ∧ Tr[v
′




By Definition 13, we can build an NBA Aφ from Sφ, such
that L(Aφ) = L(Sφ), and by the following theorem we can
conclude L(Sφ) = L(φ).
Theorem 5: L(Aφ) = L(φ).
Example 2: Consider the suffix implication subformula
G (p1 → a[*] ; b |→ p2) of Example 1. Suppose the NFA
related to r = a[*] ; b is
Ar = 〈{q1, q2}, q1, {(q1, a, q1), (q1, b, q2)}, {q2}〉.
Then the transition relation of the final FTS is:
(p1 → vq1) ∧ (vq1 → ((a ∧ b ∧ v
′
q1
∧ v′q2 ∧ p2)∨
(a ∧ ¬b ∧ v′q1)∨
(¬a ∧ b ∧ v′q2 ∧ p2)∨
(¬a ∧ ¬b))).
2) Encoding φ := G (PI → (r ♦→ PF )) into NBA Aφ:
We first obtain a symbolic representation of Ar in a classic
way, by introducing a linear number of symbolic variables
Vr := {vq}q∈Q and a triple of formulas Ir, Tr, Fr where:











The FTS Sφ is defined as 〈Vφ,A, Tφ, Iφ, Fφ〉, where Vφ =
VL ∪ VR, VL := {vqL}vq∈Vr , VR := {vqR}vq∈Vr , Iφ := >,
and

































By Definition 13, we can build an NBA Aφ from Sφ, such
that L(Aφ) = L(Sφ), and by the following theorem we can
conclude L(Sφ) = L(φ).
Theorem 6: L(Aφ) = L(φ).
There are three main approaches to handle multiple fairness
(see also Remark 1): the first is to reduce the fairness to a
single constraint by considering a linear number of copies of
the automaton (see for example [27]); the second is to delegate
the problem to the search by considering the reachability of
every constraint (such as in [28]); the third is to keep track of
every satisfied constraint by considering one symbolic variable
for each constraint (in a sense, MH works in this way). Here,
we are considering the product of NBAs delegating the prob-
lem of handling multiple fairness to the search. Nevertheless
the construction keeps some variables (the “right part” of the
encoding) to track the fairness constraint of each NBA. Thus,
keeping a set of fairness constraints may be inefficient. For
this reason, we may consider a single global condition FC,
shared by all automata corresponding to Suffix Conjunction
Subformulas; in this case, we must change their transition
relation so that the variables that track the fulfillment of the
fairness condition are refreshed only when FC becomes true.
Formally,





























φ is a Suffix Conjunction Formula
Fφ.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluated our methods within the NUSMV model
checker [13]. We compared the monolithic approach (called
MONO), the modular approach without optimizations (called
MOD), and the modular approach with the optimizations of
Section V-B.2 (called MODopt).
We compared the approaches with respect to automaton
generation, fair cycle detection (i.e. language emptiness), and
model checking, using both a BDD-based approach [28], and
SBMC [29]. The BDD-based algorithm for fair cycle detection
is restricted to the set of reachable states, which are prelimi-
narily computed. The BDD algorithms were run with dynamic
variable ordering activated. For SBMC, we used MiniSAT [30]
as SAT engine. These settings provided good performance for
all the approaches.
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For the comparison, we first generated a set of proper-
ties, applying to randomly generated SEREs typical patterns
extracted from industrial case studies [14]. Then, we used
both Boolean combinations and single and double implications
between big conjunctions of typical properties. The latter cases
model problems arising in requirements engineering setting,
i.e. refinement and equivalence among specifications. Model
checking tests have been performed using a number of PSL
properties applied to the Gigamax model taken from the
standard NUSMV distribution.
All experiments were run on a 3GHz Intel CPU equipped
with 4GB of memory, with a time out of 900 seconds and a
memory out of 1GB. The results are collected in Figure 1.
We plot the number of problems solved in a given amount
of time (the samples are ordered by increasing computation
time). We consider the NBA encoding time starting from the
PSL specifications, the search time to perform verification, and
the overall verification time (the sum of the others two).
A. NBA encoding time.
We first compared the performance of the MONO and
MODopt approaches on the encoding of the NBA, over a






















# of formulas solved
MODopt
MONO
The optimized modular approach MODopt clearly outper-
forms MONO. While MODopt is able to complete the gen-
eration for all the properties, MONO times out in more than
200 cases. In the cases where MONO terminated, MODopt is
vastly more efficient: the monolithic approach is able to build
the NBA for 700 properties in about 106 seconds, the modular
approach dealt with almost all 1000 properties in less than 104
seconds, and with about 900 in less than 102 seconds.
We also compared the MOD approach, to evaluate the
impact of the optimizations described in Section V-B.2. It
turns out that such optimization are crucial: MOD is always
inferior to MODopt. The main bottleneck in MOD appears to
be the determinization step on the premises of suffix operator
subformulas resulting from the normalization. For this reason,
hereafter we consider only MONO and MODopt. Additional
details are reported in [16].
B. Overall verification time.
We restricted the further experiments to a sample of 400
properties for which MONO succeeded on building the NBA
in the given time limits. Figure 1(a) shows the results obtained
performing language emptiness via BDDs. Both methods are
not being able to complete the verification for all the properties
within the given time limits. The plot shows that the times
obtained with MODopt are worse than those with MONO.
We conjecture that the bottleneck is twofold. First, MODopt
tends to generate a higher number of fairness conditions.
Second, differently from MONO, no semantic optimizations
are carried out by MODopt on the LTL component. The gap
is reduced when we consider total times (NBA encoding plus
verification time), as shown in Figure 1(c). We remark that
the worse performance are to be put in the right perspective:
when MONO is unable to build the NBA, MODopt is actually
the only chance to attempt the verification.
When using SBMC for language emptiness (on the same
set of properties), the gap between MONO and MODopt is
much smaller (Figure 1(b)), and is basically reverted when
the total of encoding and search is considered (Figure 1(d)).
We also notice that the MONO encoding is unable to complete
the verification for about 20 (unsatisfiable) samples. Although
more investigation is required, we conjecture that the SBMC
algorithm may be able to exploit the higher number of fairness
conditions, and the increased structure of the NBA generated
by MODopt.
Figures 1(e) and 1(f) show, for model checking problems,
the total times for BDD-based search and for SBMC. In the
first case, there is no substantial difference between MONO
and MODopt; in the second case, the advantages of MODopt
seem to be confirmed.
C. Discussion of the results.
The evaluation shows that the MODopt gives great gains in
NBA encoding time.
When combined with SBMC, MODopt gives better overall
performance than MONO, and in a few cases it is able to find
a result when MONO times out.
In the case of BDD-based algorithms, if MONO is able to
complete the generation of the NBA, then the results are better
than MODopt.
We believe that there is space for further investigations and
enhancements. In particular, the monolithic approach applies
semantic optimizations on the explicit NBA before obtaining
its symbolic encoding, that are made possible by the explicit
combination of the automata for subformulas. The NBAs for
the Suffix Operator Subformulas in the normalized formula are
built in isolation; it seems possible to apply similar optimiza-
tions on top of the normalized structure, e.g. by aggressively
simplifying the LTL part, detecting and exploiting possible
relationships between the NBAs. Moreover, preliminary tests
with BDDs have shown that the dynamic reordering takes a
relevant portion of the search time, and that providing a good
initial ordering can dramatically decrease the total time.
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(f) Total times for MC with SBMC.
Fig. 1. Experimental evaluation results.
We also considered for comparison two recently proposed
approaches, i.e. [15] and [7]. It was not possible to experimen-
tally evaluate [15] since an implementation is not yet available.
Given the similarities with our approach, however, we don’t
expect significant differences in performance.
As far as the method proposed in [7], which is tailored to
SAT-based bounded model checking, an experimental compar-
ison is currently ongoing. Detailed results will be included in
the final version of [16].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a new algorithm for the
conversion of PSL into a symbolically represented NBA. The
approach is based on the decomposition of the PSL specifica-
tion into a normal form that separates out the LTL part and
the SERE part. The various components can be independently
generated, and are implicitly conjuncted. Additional opti-
mizations are possible by exploiting the specific structure of
subformulas involving suffix operators. The approach is proved
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to be correct. A thorough experimental evaluation shows that
the construction is extremely efficient, consuming much less
resources than required by the monolithic construction. This
makes it possible to tackle problems that were previously out
of reach. The main limitation of the approach is currently that
the generated automata have a redundant structure, which may
result in degraded performance. In the future, we will work
to find ways to mitigate this problem along the following
directions. First, the structure of the automata could be used
to define a better (initial) BDD variable ordering. Second,
we plan to investigate the application of the reduction of
liveness to safety checking [31], that typically results in shorter
counterexamples, and can be useful in the particular case of
fair cycle detection. Finally, we will investigate the use of
reduction techniques (e.g. bisimulation minimization), which
may result in smaller equivalent automata, thus reducing the
search.
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Abstract— We extend the learning-based automated assume
guarantee paradigm to perform compositional deadlock detec-
tion. We define Failure Automata, a generalization of finite
automata that accept regular failure sets. We develop a learning
algorithm LF that constructs the minimal deterministic failure
automaton accepting any unknown regular failure set using a
minimally adequate teacher. We show how LF can be used
for compositional regular failure language containment, and
deadlock detection, using non-circular and circular assume guar-
antee rules. We present an implementation of our techniques
and encouraging experimental results on several non-trivial
benchmarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring deadlock freedom is one of the most critical
requirements in the design and validation of systems. The
biggest challenge toward the development of effective dead-
lock detection schemes remains the statespace explosion prob-
lem. Compositional reasoning [1], [2], [3] is recognized to
be one of the most promising approaches for alleviating
statespace explosion. This paper presents an automated com-
positional deadlock detection procedure based on assume-
guarantee (AG) [4] reasoning.
In general, AG reasoning revolves around a proof rule that
relates system components and assumptions about them to
global system properties. In order to apply the proof rule,
one is normally required to construct manually appropriate
assumptions that can discharge the premises of the rule. In
most realistic situations however, suitable assumptions are
quite complicated and the absence of automated assumption
generation techniques has been a major stumbling block
toward the wider practical adoption of AG reasoning.
An important breakthrough in this respect has been the use
of learning algorithms for assumption construction [5]. The
general idea is to learn an automaton corresponding to the
weakest assumption [6] that can discharge the AG premises.
The learning process is embedded in the overall verification
procedure in a way that guarantees termination with the correct
result. The choice of the learning algorithm is dictated by the
kind of automaton that can represent the weakest assumption,
which in turn depends on the verification goal. For example,
in the case of trace containment [5], weakest assumptions are
naturally represented as deterministic finite automata, and this
leads to the use of the L∗ [7] learning algorithm. Similarly,
in the case of simulation [8], the corresponding choices are
deterministic tree automata and the LT learning algorithm.
However, neither of the above two options are appropriate
for deadlock detection. Intuitively, word (as well as tree)
automata are unable to capture failures [9], a critical concept
for understanding, and detecting, deadlocks. Note that it is pos-
sible to devise schemes for transforming any deadlock detec-
tion problem to one of ordinary trace containment. However,
such schemes invariably introduce new components and an
exponential number of actions, and are thus not scalable. Our
work, therefore, was initiated by the search for an appropriate
automata-theoretic formalism that can handle failures directly.
Our overall contribution is a deadlock detection algorithm that
uses learning-based automated AG reasoning, and does not
require the introduction of additional actions or components.
As we shall see, two key ingredients of our solution are: (i)
a new type of acceptors for regular failure languages with a
non-standard accepting condition, and (ii) a notion of parallel
composition between these acceptors that is consistent with
the parallel composition of the languages accepted by them.
The accepting condition we use is novel, and employs a
notion of maximality to crucially avoid the introduction of
an exponential number of new actions. To the best of our
knowledge, such acceptors and their composition have not
been discussed before. In addition, we believe that this paper
presents the first use of learning in the context of automated
AG reasoning for deadlock detection. More specifically, we
make the following contributions.
First, we present the theory of regular failure languages
(RFLs) which are downward-closed, and define failure au-
tomata that exactly accept the set of regular failure languages.
Although RFLs are closed under union and intersection, they
are not closed under complementation, an acceptable price we
pay for using the notion of maximality. Further, we show a
Myhill-Nerode-like theorem for RFLs and failure automata.
Second, we show that the failure language of an LTS M is
regular and checking deadlock-freedom for M is a particular
instance of the problem of checking containment of RFLs.
We present an algorithm for checking containment of RFLs.
Note that checking containment of a failure language L1
by a failure language L2 is not possible in the usual way
by complementing L2 and intersecting with L1 since RFLs
are not closed under complementation. Third, we present a
sound and complete non-circular AG rule, called AG-NC, on
failure languages for checking failure language specifications.
Given failure languages L1 and LS , we define the weakest
assumption failure language LW : for every LA, if L1 ‖ LA ⊆
LS , then LA ⊆ LW . We then show, constructively, that if
failure languages L1 and L2 are regular, then LW uniquely
exists, is also regular, and hence is accepted by a minimum
failure automaton AW . Fourth, we develop an algorithm
LF (pronounced “el-ef”) to learn the minimum deterministic
failure automaton that accepts an unknown regular failure
language U using a minimally adequate teacher that can
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answer membership and candidate queries pertaining to U .
We show how the teacher can be implemented using the RFL
containment algorithm mentioned above. Fifth, we develop
an automated and compositional deadlock detection algorithm
that employs AG-NC and LF . We also define a circular AG
proof rule AG-Circ for deadlock detection and show how
it can be used for automated and compositional deadlock
detection. Finally, we have implemented our approach in the
COMFORT [10] reasoning framework. We present encourag-
ing results on several non-trivial benchmarks, including an
embedded OS, and Linux device drivers.
II. RELATED WORK
Machine learning techniques have been used in several
contexts related to verification [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].
We follow the approach of Cobleigh et al. [5] (respectively
Chaki et al. [8]) to automate assume-guarantee reasoning
for trace-containment (respectively simulation) between finite
state systems (Alur et al. [16] have also investigated symbolic
learning in this context). However, we apply this general
paradigm for deadlock detection. Further, the LF algorithm
that we present may be of independent interest. The use of
circular AG rules was also investigated in the context of trace
containment by Barringer et al. [17].
Overkamp has explored synthesis of supervisory controller
for discrete-event systems [18] based on failure semantics [9].
His notion of the least restrictive supervisor that guarantees
deadlock-free behavior is similar to the weakest failure as-
sumption in our case. However, our approach differs from
his as follows: (i) we use failure automata to represent
failure traces, (ii) we use learning to compute the weakest
failure assumption automatically, and (iii) our focus is on
checking deadlocks in software modules. Williams et al. [19]
investigate an approach based on static analysis for detecting
deadlocks that can be caused by incorrect lock manipulation
by Java libraries, and also provide an excellent survey of
related research. The problem of detecting deadlocks for
pushdown programs communicating only via nested locking
has been investigated by Kahlon et al. [20]. In contrast, we
present a model checking based framework to compositionally
verify deadlock freedom for non-recursive programs with
arbitrary lock-based or rendezvous communication. Other non-
compositional techniques for detecting deadlock have been
investigated in context of partial-order reduction [21] and
for checking refinement of CCS processes, using a more
discriminative (than failure trace refinement) notion called
stuck-free conformance [22].
Brookes and Roscoe [23] use the failure model to show
the absence of deadlock in undirectional networks. They
also generalize the approach to the class of conflict-free
networks via decomposition and local deadlock analysis. In
contrast, we provide a completely automated framework for
detecting deadlocks in arbitrary networks of asynchronous
systems using rendezvous communication. Our formalism is
based on an automata-theoretic representation of failure traces.
Moreover, in order to analyze the deadlock-freedom of a set
of concurrent programs compositionally, we use both circular
and non-circular assume-guarantee [4], [1], [17] rules. Amla
et al. [24] have presented a sound and complete assume-
guarantee method in the context of an abstract process com-
position framework. However, they do not discuss deadlock
detection, nor explore the use of learning.
In the rest of this paper we omit proofs for the sake of
brevity. Detailed proofs can be found in an extended version
of this paper [25].
III. FAILURE LANGUAGES AND AUTOMATA
In this section we present the theory of failure languages
and failure automata. We consider a subclass of regular
failure languages and provide a lemma relating regular failure
languages and failure automata, analogous to Myhill-Nerode
theorem for ordinary regular languages. We begin with a few
standard [26] definitions.
Definition 1 (Labeled Transition System): A labeled transi-
tion system (LTS) is a quadruple (S, Init,Σ, δ) where: (i) S
is a set of states, (ii) Init ⊆ S is a set of initial states, (iii)
Σ is a set of actions (alphabet), and (iv) δ ⊆ S × Σ × S is a
transition relation.
We only consider LTSs such that both S and Σ are finite.
We write s
α−→ s′ to mean (s, α, s′) ∈ δ. A trace is any
finite (possibly empty) sequence of actions, i.e., the set of all
traces is Σ∗. We denote an empty trace by ε, a singleton trace
〈α〉 by α, and the concatenation of two traces t1 and t2 by
t1 • t2. We extend the relation δ to a function δ̂ on a set of
states in the usual way. We also employ the usual definitions
of determinism and completeness for LTSs.
Definition 2 (Finite Automaton): A finite automaton is a
pair (M,F ) such that M = (S, Init,Σ, δ) is an LTS and
F ⊆ S is a set of final states.
Let G = (M,F ) be a finite automaton. Then G is said
to be deterministic (complete) iff the underlying LTS M is
deterministic (complete).
Definition 3 (Refusal): Let M = (S, Init,Σ, δ) be an LTS
and s ∈ S be any state of M . We say that s refuses an action
α iff ∀s′ ∈ S  (s, α, s′) ∈ δ. We say that s refuses a set of
actions R, and denote this by Ref(s, R), iff s refuses every
element of R. Note that the following holds: (i) ∀s Ref(s, ∅),
and (ii) ∀s, R, R′ Ref(s, R)∧R′ ⊆ R =⇒ Ref(s, R′), i.e.,
refusals are downward-closed.
Definition 4 (Failure): Let M = (S, Init,Σ, δ) be an LTS.
A pair (t, R) ∈ Σ∗ × 2Σ is said to be a failure of M iff there
exists some s ∈ δ̂(Init, t) such that Ref(s, R). The set of all
failures of an LTS M is denoted by F(M).
Note that a failure consists of both, a trace, and a refusal set.
A (possibly infinite) set of failures L is said to be a failure
language. Let us denote 2Σ by Σ̂. Note that L ⊆ Σ∗ × Σ̂.
Union and intersection of failure languages is defined in the
usual way. The complement of L, denoted by L, is defined to
be (Σ∗ × Σ̂) \ L. A failure language is said to be downward-
closed iff ∀t ∈ Σ∗  ∀R ∈ Σ̂  (t, R) ∈ L =⇒ ∀R′ ⊆
R. (t, R′) ∈ L. Note that in general, failure languages may
not be downward closed. However, as we show later, failure
languages generated from LTSs are always downward closed
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because the refusal sets at each state of an LTS are downward-
closed. In this article, we focus on downward-closed failure
languages, in particular, regular failure languages.
Definition 5 (Deadlock): An LTS M is said to deadlock iff
the following holds: F(M)∩(Σ∗×{Σ}) = ∅. In other words,
M deadlocks iff it has a reachable state that refuses every
action in its alphabet.
Let us denote the failure language Σ∗×{Σ} by LDlk. Then,
it follows that M is deadlock-free iff F(M) ⊆ LDlk.
Maximality. Let P be any subset of Σ̂. Then the set of
maximal elements of P is denoted by M ax(P ) and defined
as follows: M ax(P ) = {R ∈ P | ∀R′ ∈ P  R ⊂ R′}
For example, if P = {{a}, {b}, {a, b}, {a, c}}, then
M ax(P ) = {{a, b}, {a, c}}. A subset P of Σ̂ is said to be
maximal iff it is non-empty and M ax(P ) = P . Intuitively,
failure automata are finite automata whose final states are
labeled with maximal refusal sets. Thus, a failure (t, R) is
accepted by a failure automaton M iff upon receiving input
t, M reaches a final state labeled with a refusal R′ such
that R ⊆ R′. Note that the notion of maximality allows us
to concisely represent downward-closed failure languages by
using only the upper bounds of a set (according to subset
partial order) to represent the complete set.
Definition 6 (Failure Automaton): A failure automaton
(FLA) is a triple (M,F, µ) such that M = (S, Init,Σ, δ)
is an LTS, F ⊆ S is a set of final states, and µ : F → 2Σ̂
is a mapping from the final states to 2Σ̂ such that:
∀s ∈ F  µ(s) = ∅ ∧ µ(s) = M ax(µ(s)).
Let A = (M,F, µ) be a FLA. Then A is said to be
deterministic (respectively complete) iff the underlying LTS
M is deterministic (respectively complete).
Definition 7 (Language of a FLA): Let A = (M,F, µ) be
a FLA such that M = (S, Init,Σ, δ). Then a failure (t, R) is
accepted by A iff ∃s ∈ F ∃R′ ∈ µ(s)s ∈ δ̂(Init, t)∧R ⊆ R′.
The language of A, denoted by L(A), is the set of all failures
accepted by A.
Every deterministic FLA A can be extended to a complete
deterministic FLA A′ such that L(A′) = L(A) by adding a
non-final sink state. In the rest of this article we consider FLA
and languages over a fixed alphabet Σ. 1
Lemma 1: A language is accepted by a FLA iff it is
accepted by a deterministic FLA, i.e., deterministic FLA have
the same accepting power as FLA in general.
Proof: (Sketch) By subset construction and properties
of downward-closed sets.
Regular Failure Languages (RFLs). A failure language
is said to be regular iff it is accepted by some FLA. It
follows from the definition of FLAs that RFLs are downward
closed. Hence the set of RFLs is closed under union and in-
tersection but not under complementation2. In addition, every
regular failure language is accepted by an unique minimal
1FLA are closely related to automata on guarded strings [27], which contain
arbitrary transition labels drawn from a partially-ordered set. In contrast, the
state labels (refusals) in FLA are only maximal elements from such a set.
Further, since it suffices to consider refusals at the end of a trace for checking
deadlock freedom, we only label the final states of a FLA.
2For example, consider Σ = {α} and the RFL L = Σ∗ × {∅}. Then
L = Σ∗ × {{α}} is not downward closed and hence is not an RFL.
deterministic FLA. The following Lemma is analogous to the
Myhill-Nerode theorem for regular languages and ordinary
finite automata.
Lemma 2: Every regular failure language(RFL) is accepted
by a unique (up to isomorphism) minimal deterministic finite
failure automaton.
Note that for any LTS M , F(M) is regular3. Indeed,
the failure automaton corresponding to M = (S, Init,Σ, δ)
is A = (M,S, µ) such that ∀s ∈ S  µ(s) =
M ax({R | Ref(s, R)}).
IV. ASSUME-GUARANTEE REASONING FOR DEADLOCK
We now present an assume-guarantee style [4] proof rule for
deadlock detection for systems composed of two components.
We use the notion of parallel composition proposed in the
theory of CSP [9] and define it formally.
Definition 8 (LTS Parallel Composition): Consider LTSs
M1 = (S1, Init1, Σ1, δ1) and M2 = (S2, Init2,Σ2, δ2).
Then the parallel composition of M1 and M2, denoted by
M1  M2, is the LTS (S1 × S2, Init1 × Init2,Σ1 ∪ Σ2, δ),
such that ((s1, s2), α, (s′1, s
′
2)) ∈ δ iff the following holds:
∀i ∈ {1, 2}  (α ∈ Σi ∧ (si, α, s′i) ∈ δi) ∨ (α ∈ Σi ∧ si = s′i).
Without loss of generality, we assume that both M1 and
M2 have the same alphabet Σ. Indeed, any system with two
components having different alphabets, say Σ1 and Σ2, can
be converted to a bisimilar (and hence deadlock equivalent)
system [8] with two components each having the same alpha-
bet Σ1∪Σ2. Thus, all languages and automata we consider in
the rest of this article will also be over the same alphabet
Σ. We now extend the notion of parallel composition to
failure languages. Observe that the composition involves set-
intersection on the trace part and set-union on the refusal part
of failures. Proofs of all the lemmas are in the full version [25]
of the paper.
Definition 9 (Failure Language Composition): The parallel
composition of any two failure languages L1 and L2, de-
noted by L1 ‖ L2, is defined as follows: L1 ‖ L2 =
{(t, R1 ∪ R2) | (t, R1) ∈ L1 ∧ (t, R2) ∈ L2}.
Lemma 3: For any failure languages L1, L2, L′1 and L
′
2, the
following holds: (L1 ⊆ L′1) ∧ (L2 ⊆ L′2) =⇒ (L1 ‖ L2) ⊆
(L′1 ‖ L′2).
Definition 10 (FLA Parallel Composition): Consider two
FLAs A1 = (M1, F1, µ1) and A2 = (M2, F2, µ2). The
parallel composition of A1 and A2, denoted by A1  A24
, is defined as the FLA (M1  M2, F1 × F2, µ) such that
µ(s1, s2) = M ax({R1 ∪ R2 | R1 ∈ µ1(s1) ∧ R2 ∈ µ2(s2)}).
Note that we have used different notation ( and ‖ re-
spectively) to denote the parallel composition of automata and
languages. Let M1,M2 be LTSs and A1, A2 be FLAs. Then
the following two lemmas bridge the concepts of composition
between automata and languages.
3However, there exists RFLs that do not correspond to any LTS. In
particular, any failure language L corresponding to some LTS must satisfy
the following condition: ∃R ⊆ Σ  (ε, R) ∈ L. Thus, the RFL {(α, ∅)} does
not correspond to any LTS.
4We overload the operator  to denote parallel composition in the context
of both LTSs and FLAs. The actual meaning of the operator will be clear
from the context.
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Lemma 4: F(M1  M2) = F(M1) ‖ F(M2).
Lemma 5: L(A1  A2) = L(A1) ‖ L(A2).
Regular Failure Language Containment (RFLC). We
develop a general compositional framework for checking
regular failure language containment. This framework is also
applicable to deadlock detection since, as we illustrate later,
deadlock freedom is a form of RFLC. Recall that regular
failure languages are not closed under complementation and
hence, given RFLs L1 and L2, it is not possible to verify
L1 ⊆ L2 in the usual manner, by checking if L1 ∩ L2 = ∅.
However, as is shown by the following crucial lemma, it
is possible to check containment between RFLs using their
representations in terms of deterministic FLA, without having
to complement the automaton corresponding to L2.
Lemma 6: Consider any FLA A1 and A2. Let A′1 =
(M1, F1, µ1) and A′2 = (M2, F2, µ2) be the FLA ob-
tained by determinizing A1 and A2 respectively, and let
M1 = (S1, Init1,Σ, δ1) and M2 = (S2, Init2,Σ, δ2). Then
L(A1) ⊆ L(A2) iff for every reachable state (s1, s2) of
M1 M2 the following condition holds: s1 ∈ F1 =⇒ (s2 ∈
F2 ∧ (∀R1 ∈ µ1(s1)  ∃R2 ∈ µ2(s2)  R1 ⊆ R2)).
In other words, we can check if L(A1) ⊆ L(A2) by
determinizing A1 and A2, constructing the product of the
underlying LTSs and checking if the condition in Lemma 6
holds on every reachable state of the product. The condition
essentially says that for every reachable state (s1, s2), if s1 is
final, then s2 is also final and each refusal R1 labeling s1 is
contained in some refusal R2 labeling s2.
Now suppose that L(A1) is obtained by composing two
RFLs L1 and L2, i.e., L(A1) = L1 ‖ L2 and let L(A2) = LS ,
the specification language. In order to check RFLC between
L1 ‖ L2 and LS , the approach presented in lemma 6 will
require us to directly compose L1, L2 and LS , a potentially
expensive computation. In the following, we first show that
checking deadlock-freedom is a particular case of RFLC and
then present a compositional technique to check RFLC (and
hence deadlock-freedom) that avoids composing L1 and L2
(or their FLA representations) directly.
Deadlock as Regular Failure Language Containment.
Given three RFLs L1, L2 and LS , we can use our regular
language containment algorithm to verify whether (L1 ‖
L2) ⊆ LS . If this is the case, then our algorithm returns TRUE.
Otherwise it returns FALSE along with a counterexample
CE ∈ (L1 ‖ L2) \ LS . Also, we assume that L1, L2 and LS
are represented as FLA. To use our algorithm for deadlock
detection, recall that for any two LTSs M1 and M2, M1M2
is deadlock free iff F(M1  M2) ⊆ LDlk. Let L1 = F(M1),
L2 = F(M2) and LS = LDlk. Using Lemma 4, the above
deadlock check reduces to verifying if L1 ‖ L2 ⊆ LS .
Observe that we can use our RFLC algorithm provided L1,
L2 and LS are regular. Recall that since M1 and M2 are
LTSs, L1 and L2 are regular. Also, LDlk is regular since it is
accepted by the failure automaton A = (M,F, µ) such that:
(i) M = ({s} , {s} ,Σ, δ), (ii) δ =
{
s
α−→ s | α ∈ Σ
}
, (iii)
F = {s}, and (iv) µ(s) = M ax({R | R ⊂ Σ}). For instance,
if Σ = {a, b, c} then µ(s) = {{a, b} , {b, c} , {c, a}}. Thus,
deadlock detection is just a specific instance of RFLC.
Suppose we are given three RFLs L1, L2 and LS in the
form of their accepting FLA A1, A2 and AS . To check L1 ‖
L2 ⊆ LS , we can construct the FLA A1A2 (cf. Lemma 10)
and then check if L(A1A2) ⊆ L(AS) (cf. Lemma 5 and 6).
The problem with this naive approach is statespace explosion.
In order to alleviate this problem, we present a compositional
language containment scheme based on AG-style reasoning.
A Non-circular AG Rule. Consider RFLs L1, L2 and LS .
We are interested in checking whether L1 ‖ L2 ⊆ LS . In this
context, the following non-circular AG proof rule, which we
call AG-NC, is both sound and complete:
L1 ‖ LA ⊆ LS L2 ⊆ LA
L1 ‖ L2 ⊆ LS
In principle, AG-NC enables us to prove L1 ‖ L2 ⊆ LS
by discovering an assumption LA that discharges its two
premises. In practice, it leaves us with two critical problems.
First, it provides no effective method for constructing an
appropriate assumption LA. Second, if no appropriate assump-
tion exists, i.e., if the conclusion of AG-NC does not hold,
then AG-NC does not help in obtaining a counterexample
to L1 ‖ L2 ⊆ LS . In this paper we develop and employ a
learning algorithm that solves both the above problems. More
specifically, our algorithm learns automatically, and incremen-
tally, the weakest assumption LW that can discharge the first
premise of AG-NC. During this process, it is guaranteed to
reach, in a finite number of steps, one of the following two
situations, and thus always terminate with the correct result:
(1) It discovers an assumption that can discharge both premises
of AG-NC, and terminates with TRUE. (2) It discovers a
counterexample CE to L1 ‖ L2 ⊆ LS , and returns FALSE
along with CE.
Weakest Assumption. Consider the proof rule AG-NC.
For any L1 and LS , let L̂ be the set of all languages that
can discharge the first premise of AG-NC. In other words,
L̂ = {LA | (L1 ‖ LA) ⊆ LS}. The following central theorem
asserts that L̂ contains a unique weakest (maximal) element
LW that is also regular. This result is crucial for showing the
termination of our approach.
Theorem 1: Let L1 and LS be any RFLs and f is a
failure. Let us define a language LW as follows: LW =
{f | (L1 ‖ {f}) ⊆ LS}. Then the following holds: (i) L1 ‖
LW ⊆ LS , (ii) ∀L  L1 ‖ L ⊆ LS ⇐⇒ L ⊆ LW , and (iii)
LW is regular.
Proof: (Sketch) Parts (i) and (ii) can be proved from
the definition of LW . For (iii) we assume that L1 and LS are
represented as failure automata A1 and A2, and use them to
construct a failure automata AW for LW . The LTS for AW is
the product of the LTSs of A1 and A2. For every state (s1, s2),
where s1 and s2 are final in their respective FLAs, we first
compute a label X as follows: we add a refusal R to X iff for
each refusal R1 labeling s1 there exists a refusal R2 labeling
s2 such that R1∪R ⊆ R2. Finally, if X = ∅, we make (s1, s2)
final and set µ(s1, s2) = M ax(X).
Now that we have proved that the weakest environment
assumption LW is regular, we can apply a learning algorithm
to iteratively construct a FLA assumption that accepts LW . In
particular, we develop a learning algorithm LF that iteratively
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learns the minimal DFLA corresponding to LW by asking
queries about LW to a minimally adequate teacher (MAT)
and learning from them. In the next section, we present
LF . Subsequently, in Section VI, we describe how LF is
used in our compositional language containment procedure. A
reader who is interested in the overall compositional deadlock
detection algorithm more than the intricacies of LF may skip
directly to Section VI at this point.
V. LEARNING FLA
In this section we present an algorithm LF to learn the
minimal FLA that accepts an unknown RFL U . Our algorithm
will use a minimally adequate teacher (MAT) that can answer
two kinds of queries regarding U : (1) Membership query:
Given a failure e the MAT returns TRUE if e ∈ U and FALSE
otherwise. (2) Candidate query: Given a deterministic FLA
C, the MAT returns TRUE if L(C) = U . Otherwise it returns




Observation Table. LF uses an observation table to record
the information it obtains by querying the MAT. The rows and
columns of the table correspond to specific traces and failures
respectively. Formally, a table is a triple (T, E, R) where: (i)
T ⊆ Σ∗ is a set of traces, (ii) E ⊆ Σ∗ × Σ̂ is a set of failures
or experiments, and (iii) R is a function from T̂×E to {0, 1}
where T̂ = T ∪ (T • Σ).
For any table T = (T, E, R), the function R is defined as
follows: ∀t ∈ T̂ ∀e = (t′, R) ∈ E, R(t, e) = 1 iff (t• t′, R) ∈
U . Thus, given T and E, algorithm LF can compute R via
membership queries to the MAT. For any t ∈ T̂, we write
R(t) to mean the function from E to {0, 1} defined as follows:
∀e ∈ E  R(t)(e) = R(t, e).
An observation table T = (T, E, R) is said to be well-
formed iff: ∀t1 ∈ T  ∀t2 ∈ T  t1 = t2 =⇒ R(t1) = R(t2).
Essentially, this means that any two distinct rows t1 and t2 of
a well-formed table can be distinguished by some experiment
e ∈ E. This also imposes an upper-bound on the number of
rows of any well-formed table, as expressed by the following
lemma.
Lemma 7: Let n be the number of states of the minimal
DFLA accepting U and let T = (T, E, R) be any well-formed
observation table. Then |T| ≤ n.
Closed observation table. An observation table T =
(T, E, R) is said to be closed iff it satisfies the following:
∀t ∈ T  ∀α ∈ Σ  ∃t′ ∈ T  R(t • α) = R(t′). Intuitively,
this means that if we extend any trace t ∈ T by any action
α then the result is indistinguishable from an existing trace
t′ ∈ T by the current set of experiments E. Note that any
well-formed table can be extended so that it is both well-
formed and closed. This can be achieved by the algorithm
MakeClosed shown in Figure 1. Observe that at every step
of MakeClosed, the table T remains well-formed and hence,
by Lemma 7, cannot grow infinitely. Also note that restricting
the occurrence of refusals to E allows us to avoid considering
the exponential possible refusal extensions of a trace while
closing the table. Exponential number of membership queries
will only be required if all possible refusals occur in E.
Input: Well-formed observation table T = (T, E, R)
while T is not closed do
pick t ∈ T and α ∈ Σ such that ∀t′ ∈ T  R(t • α) = R(t′)
add t • α to T and update R accordingly
return T
Fig. 1. Algorithm MakeClosed extends an input well-formed table T so
that the resulting table is both well-formed and closed.
Overall LF algorithm. Algorithm LF is iterative. It
initially starts with a table T = (T, E, R) such that T =
{ε} and E = ∅. Note that the initial table is well-formed.
Subsequently, in each iteration LF performs the following
steps:
1) Make T closed by invoking MakeClosed.
2) Construct candidate DFLA C from T and make candi-
date query with C.
3) If the answer is TRUE, LF terminates with C as the final
answer.
4) Otherwise LF uses the counterexample CE to the
candidate query to add a single new failure to E and
repeats from step 1.
In each iteration, LF either terminates with the correct
answer (step 3) or adds a new failure to E (step 4). In the
latter scenario, the new failure to be added is constructed in
a way that guarantees an upper bound on the total number of
iterations of LF . This, in turn, ensures its ultimate termination.
We now present the procedures for: (i) constructing a candidate
DFLA C from a closed and well-formed table T (used in
step 2 above), and (ii) adding a new failure to E based on a
counterexample to a candidate query (step 4).
Candidate construction. Let T = (T, E, R) be a closed
and well-formed observation table. The candidate DFLA
C is constructed from T as follows: C = (M,F, µ)
and M = (S, Init,Σ, δ) such that: (i) S = T, (ii)
Init = {ε}, (iii) δ =
{
t
α−→ t′ | R(t • α) = R(t′)
}
, (iv)
F = {t | ∃e = (ε, R) ∈ E  R(t, e) = 1}, and (v) µ(t) =
M ax({R | R(t, (ε, R)) = 1}).
Adding new failures. Let C = (M,F, µ) be a candidate
DFLA such that M = (S, Init,Σ, δ). Let CE = (t, R) be a
counterexample to a candidate query made with C. In other
words, CE ∈ L(C) ⇐⇒ CE ∈ U . The algorithm NewExp
adds a single new failure to T as follows. Let t = α1•. . .•αk.
For 0 ≤ i ≤ k, let ti be the prefix of t of length i and ti be
the suffix of t of length k − i. In other words, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k,
we have ti • ti = t.
Additionally, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, let si be the state of C reached
by executing ti. In other words, si = δ̂(ti). Since the candidate
C was constructed from an observation table T , it corresponds
to a row of T , which in turn corresponds to a trace. Let us
also refer to this trace as si. Finally, let bi = 1 if the failure(
si • ti, R
) ∈ U and 0 otherwise. Note that we can compute
bi by evaluating si and then making a membership query with(
si • ti, R
)
. In particular, s0 = ε, and hence b0 = 1 if CE ∈
U and 0 otherwise. We now consider two cases.
Case 1: [b0 = 0] In this case, there exists an index j ∈
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{0, . . . , k} such that bj = 0 and bj+1 = 1. LF finds such an




to E. As a result, the
table T becomes non-closed and therefore, the next candidate
FLA has strictly more states than the current candidate C.
Complete details can be found in the full version of this paper.
Case 2: [b0 = 1] In this case, LF adds a new failure to
E that leads to the next candidate differing from the current
candidate C in at least one of the following three ways: (i) it
has strictly more states, (ii) it has a new final state, and (iii)
the labeling of one of the current final states gets augmented.
Complete details can be found in the full version of this paper.
Correctness of LF . Algorithm LF always returns the
correct answer in step 3 since it always does so after a
successful candidate query. To see that LF always terminates,
observe that in every iteration, the candidate C computed by
LF undergoes at least one of the following three changes:
• (Ch1) The number of states of C, and hence the number
of rows of the observation table T , increases.
• (Ch2) The states and transitions of C remain unchanged
but a state of C that was previously non-final becomes
final.
• (Ch3) The states, transitions and final states of C remain
unchanged but for some final state s of C, the size of
µ(s) increases.
Of the above changes, Ch1 can happen at most n times
where n is the number of states of the minimal DFLA
accepting U . Between any two consecutive occurrences of
Ch1, there can only be a finite number of occurrences of Ch2
and Ch3. Hence there can only be a finite number of iterations
of LF . Therefore, LF always terminates.
Number of iterations. To analyze the complexity of LF we
have to impose a tighter bound on the number of iterations.
We already know that Ch1 can happen at most n times. Since
a final state can never become non-final, Ch2 can also occur
at most n times. Now let the minimal DFLA accepting U
be A = (M,F, µ) such that M = (S, Init,Σ, δ). Consider
the set P =
⋃
s∈F µ(s) and let n
′ = |P |. Since each Ch3
adds an element to µ(s) for some s ∈ F , the total number
of occurrences of Ch3 is at most n′. Therefore the maximum
number of iterations of LF is 2n + n′ = O(n + n′).
Time complexity. Let us make the standard assumption that
each MAT query takes O(1) time. From the above discussion
we see that the number of columns of the observation table is
at most O(n + n′). The number of rows is at most O(n). Let
us assume that the size of Σ is a constant. Then the number
of membership queries, and hence time, needed to fill up the
table is O(n(n + n′)).
Let m be the length of the longest counterexample returned
by a candidate query. Then to add each new failure, we have to
make O(log(m)) membership queries to find the appropriate
index j. Also, let the time required to find the maximal element
Rmax be O(m′). Then total time required for constructing
each new failure is O((n + n′)(log(m) + m′)). Finally, the
number of candidate queries equals the number of iterations
and hence is O(n + n′). Thus, in summary, we find that the
time complexity of LF is O((n + n′)(n + log(m) + m′)),
which is polynomial in n, n′, m and m′.
Space complexity. Let us again make the standard assump-
tion that each MAT query takes O(1) space. Since the queries
are made sequentially, total space requirement for all of them
is still O(1). Also, the procedure for constructing a new failure
can be performed in O(1) space. A trace corresponding to a
table row can be O(n) long and there are O(n) of them. A
failure corresponding to a table column can be O(m) long and
there are O(n+n′) of them. Space required to store the table
elements is O(n(n + n′)). Hence total space required for the
observation table is O((n + m)(n + n′)). Space required to
store computed candidates is O(n2). Therefore, the total space
complexity is O((n + m)(n + n′)) which is also polynomial
in n, n′ and m.
VI. COMPOSITIONAL LANGUAGE CONTAINMENT
Given RFLs L1, L2 and LS (in the form of FLA that accept
them) we want to check whether L1 ‖ L2 ⊆ LS . If not,
we also want to generate a counterexamples CE ∈ (L1 ‖
L2) \ LS . To this end, we invoke the LF algorithm to learn
the weakest environment corresponding to L1 and LS . We
present an implementation strategy for the MAT to answer
the membership and candidate queries posed by LF . In the
following we assume that A1, A2 and AS are the given FLAs
such that L(A1) = L1, L(A2) = L2 and L(AS) = LS .
Membership Query. The answer to a membership query
with failure e = (t, R) is TRUE if the following condition
(which can be effectively decided) holds and FALSE otherwise:
∀(t, R1) ∈ L1  (t, R1 ∪ R) ∈ LS .
Candidate Query. A candidate query with a failure
automaton C is answered step-wise as follows:
1) Check if L(A1  C) ⊆ L(AS). If not, let (t, R1 ∪ R)
be the counterexample obtained. Note that (t, R) ∈
L(C) \ U . We return FALSE to LF along with the
counterexample (t, R). If L(A1  C) ⊆ L(AS), we
proceed to step 2.
2) Check if L(A2) ⊆ L(C). If so, we have obtained an
assumption, viz., L(C), that discharges both premises of
AG-NC. In this case, the overall language containment
algorithm terminates with TRUE. Otherwise let (t′, R′)
be the counterexample obtained. We proceed to step 3.
3) We check if there exists (t′, R′1) ∈ L(A1) such that
(t′, R′1∪R′) ∈ L(AS). If so, then (t′, R′1∪R′) ∈ L(A1
A2) \ L(AS) and the overall language containment al-
gorithm terminates with FALSE and the counterexample
(t′, R′1 ∪ R′). Otherwise (t′, R′) ∈ U \ L(C) and we
return FALSE to LF along with the counterexample
(t′, R′).
Note that in the above we are never required to compose A1
with A2. In practice, the candidate C (that we compose with
A1 in step 1 of the candidate query) is much smaller than A2.
Thus we are able to alleviate the statespace explosion problem.
Also, note that our procedure will ultimately terminate with
the correct result from either step 2 or 3 of the candidate
query. This follows from the correctness of LF algorithm: in
the worst case, the candidate query will be made with a FLA
C such that L(C) = LW . In this scenario, termination is
guaranteed to occur due to Theorem 1.
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Exp LOC C St No Deadlock
Plain AG-NC AG-Circ
T M T M A T M A
MC 7272 2 2874 - * 308 903 5 307 903 6
MC 7272 3 2874 - * 766 1155 11 459 1155 12
MC 7272 4 2874 - * * 1453 - 716 1453 24
ide 18905 3 672 571 * 338 50 11 62 47 12
ide 18905 4 716 972 * * 63 - 195 55 24
ide 18905 5 760 1082 * * 84 - 639 85 48
syn 17262 4 117 733 * 1547 19 21 58 21 24
syn 17262 5 127 713 * * 19 - 224 47 48
syn 17262 6 137 767 * * 27 - 1815 189 96
mx 15717 3 1995 1154 * 2079 140 11 639 123 12
mx 15717 4 2058 1545 * - 168 - 713 139 24
mx 15717 5 2121 1660 * - 179 - 2131 185 48
tg3 36774 3 1653 971 * 1568 118 11 406 111 12
tg3 36774 4 1673 927 * - 149 - 486 131 24
tg3 36774 5 1693 1086 * - 158 - 1338 165 48
tg3 36774 6 1713 1252 * - 157 - 3406 313 96
IPC 818 3 302 195 α 703 338 49 478 355 49
DP 82 6 30 274 * 100 330 11 286 414 9
DP 109 8 30 302 * 1551 565 11 * 1474 -
Deadlock
Plain AG-NC AG-Circ
T M T M A T M A
372 β 386 980 13 313 979 16
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
755 * * 80 - 557 551 125
978 * * 84 - 2913 * -
1082 * * 89 - * 498 -
864 * 127 181 2 133 181 6
1088 * 844 * - 867 * -
- * 1188 * - - * -
1182 * 657 364 2 630 364 5
1309 * 1627 * - 1206 * -
- * 3368 * - 2276 * -
894 * 486 393 2 499 393 5
1096 * 1036 * - 1037 * -
- * 2186 * - 1668 * -
1278 * * - - 1954 * -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS. C = # OF COMPONENTS; ST = # OF STATES OF LARGEST COMPONENT; T = TIME (SECONDS); M = MEMORY (MB); A = # OF
STATES OF LARGEST ASSUMPTION; * = RESOURCE EXHAUSTION; - = DATA UNAVAILABLE; α = 1247; β = 1708. BEST FIGURES ARE HIGHLIGHTED.
VII. ARBITRARY COMPONENTS AND CIRCULARITY
We investigated two approaches for handling more than two
components. First, we applied AG-NC recursively. This can
be demonstrated for languages L1, L2, L3 and LS by the
following proof-rule.
L1 ‖ L1A ⊆ LS
L2 ‖ L2A ⊆ L1A L3 ⊆ L2A
L2 ‖ L3 ⊆ L1A
L1 ‖ L2 ‖ L3 ⊆ LS
At the top-level, we apply AG-NC on the two languages
L1 and L2 ‖ L3. Now the second premise becomes L2 ‖
L3 ⊆ L1A and we can again apply AG-NC. In terms of the
implementation of the MAT, the only difference is in step 2
of the candidate query (cf. Section VI). More specifically, we
now invoke the language containment procedure recursively
with L(A2), L(A3) and L(C) instead of checking directly for
L(A2) ⊆ L(C). This technique can be extended to any finite
number of components.
Circular AG Rule. We also explored a circular AG
rule. Unlike AG-NC however, the circular rule is specific to
deadlock detection and not applicable to language containment
in general. For any RFL L let us write W (L) to denote the
weakest assumption against which L does not deadlock. In
other words, ∀L′  L ‖ L′ ⊆ LDlk ⇐⇒ L′ ⊆ W (L). It can
be shown that: (PROP) ∀t ∈ Σ∗  ∀R ∈ Σ̂  (t, R) ∈ L ⇐⇒
(t,Σ\R) ∈ W (L). The following theorem provides a circular
AG rule for deadlock detection.
Theorem 2: Consider any two RFLs L1 and L2. Then the
following proof rule, which we call AG-Circ, is both sound
and complete.
L1 ‖ L1A ⊆ LDlk L2 ‖ L2A ⊆ LDlk
W (L1A) ‖ W (L2A) ⊆ LDlk
L1 ‖ L2 ⊆ LDlk
Implementation. To use this rule for deadlock detection
for two components L1 and L2 we use the following iterative
procedure:
1) Using the first premise, construct a candidate C1 sim-
ilar to Step 1 of the candidate query in AG-NC (cf.
Section VI). Similarly, using the second premise, con-
struct another candidate C2. Construction of C1 and C2
proceeds exactly as in the case of AG-NC.
2) Check if W (L(C1)) ‖ W (L(C2)) ⊆ LDlk. This is
done either directly or via a compositional language
containment using AG-NC. We compute the automata
for W (L(C1)) and W (L(C2)) using the procedure de-
scribed in the proof of Theorem 1. If the check succeeds
then there is no deadlock in L1 ‖ L2 and we exit
successfully. Otherwise, we proceed to Step 3.
3) From the counterexample obtained above construct t ∈
Σ∗ and R ∈ Σ̂ be such that (t, R) ∈ W (L(C1)) and
(t,Σ \ R) ∈ W (L(C2)). Check if (t, R) ∈ L1 and
(t,Σ \R) ∈ L2. If both these checks pass then we have
a counterexample t to the overall deadlock detection
problem and therefore we terminate unsuccessfully. Oth-
erwise, without loss of generality, suppose (t, R) ∈ L1.
But then, from PROP, (t,Σ\R) ∈ W (L1). Again from
PROP, since (t, R) ∈ W (L(C1)), (t,Σ \ R) ∈ L(C1).
This is equivalent to a failed candidate query for C1 with
counterexample (t,Σ \ R), and we repeat from Step 1
above.
Note that even though we have presented AG-Circ in the
context of only two components, it generalizes to an arbitrary,
but finite, number of components.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION AND CONCLUSION
We implemented our algorithms in the COMFORT [10]
reasoning framework and experimented with a set of real-
life examples. All our experiments were done on a 2.4 GHz
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Pentium 4 machine running RedHat 9 and with time limit of 1
hour and a memory limit of 2 GB. Our results are summarized
in Table I. The MC benchmarks are derived from Micro-
C version 2.70, a lightweight OS for real-time embedded
applications. The IPC benchmark is based on an inter-process
communication library used by an industrial robot controller
software. The ide, syn, mx and tg3 examples are based on
Linux device drivers. Finally, DP is a synthetic benchmark
based on the well-known dining philosophers example.
For each example, we obtained a set of benchmarks by
increasing the number of components. For each such bench-
mark, we tested a version without deadlock, and another with
an artificially introduced deadlock. In all cases, deadlock was
caused by incorrect synchronization between components – the
only difference was in the synchronization mechanism. Specif-
ically, the dining philosophers synchronized using “forks”. In
all other examples, synchronization was achieved via a shared
“lock”.
For each benchmark, a finite LTS model was constructed
via a predicate abstraction [10] that transformed the syn-
chronization behavior into appropriate actions. For example,
in the case of the ide benchmark, calls to the spin lock
and spin unlock functions were transformed into lock and
unlock actions respectively. Note that this makes sense be-
cause, for instance, multiple threads executing the driver for a
specific device will acquire and release a common lock specific
to that device by invoking spin lock and spin unlock
respectively.
For each abstraction, appropriate predicates were supplied
externally so that the resulting models would be precise
enough to display the presence or absence of deadlock. In
addition, care was taken to ensure that the abstractions were
sound with respect to deadlocks, i.e., the extra behavior
introduced did not eliminate any deadlock in the concrete
system. Each benchmark was verified using explicit brute-
force statespace exploration (referred to in Table I as “Plain”),
the non-circular AG rule (referred as AG-NC), and the circular
AG rule (referred as AG-Circ). When using AG-Circ, Step 2
(i.e., checking if W (L(C1)) ‖ W (L(C2)) ⊆ LDlk) was done
via compositional language containment using AG-NC.
We observe that the AG-based methods outperform the
naive approach for most of the benchmarks. More importantly,
for each benchmark, the growth in memory consumption
with increasing number of components is benign for both
AG-based approaches. This indicates that AG reasoning is
effective in combating statespace explosion even for deadlock
detection. We also note that larger assumptions (and hence
time and memory) are required for detecting deadlocks as
opposed to detecting deadlock freedom. Among the AG-based
approaches, AG-Circ is in general faster than AG-NC but
(on a few occasions) consumes negligible extra memory. In
several cases, AG-NC runs out of time while AG-Circ is able
to terminate successfully. Overall, whenever AG-NC and AG-
Circ differ significantly in any real-life example, AG-Circ is
superior.
Conclusion. We have extended the learning-based auto-
mated assume guarantee paradigm to deadlock detection. We
have defined a new kind of automata that are similar to finite
automata but accept failures instead of traces. We have also
developed an algorithm, LF , that learns the minimal failure
automata accepting an unknown regular failure language using
a minimally adequate teacher. We have shown how LF can be
used for compositional deadlock detection using both circular
and non-circular assume-guarantee rules. Finally, we have
implemented our technique and have obtained encouraging
experimental results on several non-trivial benchmarks.
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Abstract— We introduce a heuristic for automatically check-
ing the validity of first-order formulas of the form
∀αm ∃βn. Ψ(αm, βn) that are encountered in inductive proofs
of hardware correctness. The heuristic introduced in this paper
is used to automatically check the validity of k-step induction
formulas needed to verify hardware designs. The heuristic works
on word-level designs that can have data and address buses of
arbitrary widths. Our refinement heuristic relies on the idea
of predicate instantiation introduced in [2]. The heuristic proves
quantified formulas by the use of a validity checker, CVC [21],
and a first-order theorem prover, Otter [16]. Our heuristic can
be used as a stand-alone technique to verify word-level designs
or as a component in an interactive theorem prover. We show the
effectiveness of this heuristic for hardware verification by ver-
ifying a number of hardware designs completely automatically.
The large size of the quantified formulas encountered in these
examples shows the effectiveness of our heuristic as a component
of a theorem prover.
I. INTRODUCTION
The complexity of most industrial hardware designs are be-
yond the capacity of formal verification tools. Compositional
techniques have been used to decompose large designs into
smaller ones and model checking each separately [17], [18].
The task of decomposing hardware designs, however, requires
significant effort and detailed knowledge and understanding of
the design.
Abstraction has been used to transform complex and pos-
sibly infinite systems into small finite systems that can be
model checked [11], [12], [8]. Abstraction techniques have
been used successfully to verify many designs. The majority
of real designs, however, are still beyond the capacity of such
tools.
Theorem proving techniques have been used for a long
time to verify complex systems containing complex functional
units, wide busses, and large memories [19], [9], [13]. Those
techniques, however, require significant effort and experience
from the verification engineer to guide the tool. That makes
the use of theorem proving very limited in verification in the
hardware industry.
Validity checkers for decidable segments of first order logic
have been used successfully in many hardware verification
techniques. Such logics were used to verify pipelined mi-
croprocessors [7] and superscalar microprocessors [6], [24],
[15] with a high degree of success. Verification of infinite
systems within these logics is usually done by induction on
time. That requires a lot of manual effort to find and strengthen
invariants needed for the induction proof to go through. Many
techniques have been proposed to automate the process of
finding and strengthening invariants [22], [5], [4], [23]. The
process, however, is still mostly manual.
In [2], the method of symbolic consistency testing was
introduced to strengthen invariants by the use of k-step induc-
tion and then proving those formulas by a validity checker,
CVC [21]. Induction formulas, however, contain existential
quantifiers which cannot be handled by validity checkers for
quantifier-free logics. In [2], the idea of predicate instantiation
(see section II-B) was introduced to eliminate existential
quantifiers. In this method, the user provides symbolic test
vectors which are used as instantiation predicates to eliminate
existential quantifiers. Finding those vectors can be challeng-
ing for complex systems.
In this paper we introduce an automatic refinement heuristic
for checking the validity of such k-step induction formulas
by automatically finding the instantiation predicates. This
heuristic is not limited to k-step induction formulas, but can
be used to check the validity of any formula of the form
∀αm ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn). Hence, our heuristic can be used as
a method for hardware verification or as a component of
an interactive theorem prover. We show the effectiveness of
this heuristic on a number of hardware examples that were
considered in [2]. The examples are various architectures of
cached memory systems and a simple pipelined processor.
In [2], the instantiation predicates were found manually. The
heuristic we introduce in this paper finds those predicates
and verifies those designs completely automatically. The large
sizes of the formulas encountered in these examples also
shows the effectiveness of the heuristic in other applications of
theorem proving. The formulas were generated by word-level
simulation (within CVC) of those designs. Our heuristic can
also be used with any decision procedure (not limited to CVC)
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and any first-order theorem prover (not limited to Otter).
Refinement is a known method in the literature [20], [10],
[14], where we start with a property and try to prove it. If
that fails, the proof failure (the counterexample) is analyzed
to provide guidance into how to refine the formula and try
to prove it again. This process continues iteratively until the
property is proved, disproved, or the available time or memory
is exhausted. Our approach is different from other approaches
in the literature in its use of predicate instantiation and the
heuristics we use to find the refining predicates. That, as we
show in this paper, makes our approach very simple yet very
effective.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II-A, we define
some terminology that we use in this paper. In section II-B, we
review the idea of predicate instantiation. In section III-A, we
describe a simple version of our refinement heuristic and then
we show how it works on a simple example in section III-C.
In section III-E, we describe the main heuristic which avoids
some shortcomings of the first heuristic. We also show how
this heuristic works on the same example. In section IV, we
describe the experiments we did on a number of designs.
Finally, we conclude with some remarks in section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Terminology
Our goal in this paper is to check the validity of formulas
of the form:
∀αm ∃βn [Ψ(αm, βn)], (1)
where we have m universally quantified variables α0, ..., αm−1
referred to by αm and n existentially quantified variables
β0, ..., βn−1 referred to by βn. Ψ is a formula in the logic
of equality and uninterpreted functions with linear arithmetic.
Formula (1) falls into an undecidable class [3]. So, the
refinement method that we introduce is a heuristic that is sound
but not complete.
The main idea behind our refinement heuristics is to use
counterexamples returned by CVC while checking the validity
of the universal version of (1), which is ∀αm, βn [Ψ(αm, βn)],
to guide the formation of the instantiation predicate Φ (in-
stantiation predicates will be described in the next section). A
counterexample C of a formula Ψ is a consistent conjunction
of literals, such that C |= ¬Ψ, where a literal is an atom (an
equality, a predicate, or a Boolean variable) or its negation.
We also refer to a conjunction of literals as a set whose
elements are the literals in the conjunction. We also write
C(x0, ..., xl) to indicate the variables x0, ..., xl that appear
in the literals in a counterexample or a predicate C. When
CVC checks the validity of a universal formula Ψ, it either
returns Valid or returns a counterexample C, such that
C |= ¬Ψ. We are interested in the smallest C′ ⊆ C such
that C′ |= ¬Ψ. To simplify the discussion, we assume that the
counterexamples we get are minimized after they are returned
by CVC. Minimizing a counterexample can be easily done by
a simple greedy heuristic.
Given a counterexample C(αm, βn), we define C∀ as the
set of literals in C that contain only universally quantified
variables (the αs) and C∃ as the rest of the literals. For ex-
ample, if C is{α0 = α1, α0 = β0, P (α0, α1), P (α0, β1), β0 =
f(β1)} then, C∀ is {α0 = α1, p(α0, α1)} and C∃ is {α0 =
β0, p(α0, β1), β0 = f(β1)}, where p is an uninterpreted
predicate and f is an uninterpreted function.
B. Predicate Instantiation of Existential Quantifiers
The existential quantifier in a formula of the form:
∀αm. ∃βn. Ψ(αm, βn) (2)
is traditionally eliminated by constructing a set of functions
f0(αm), f1(αm), ..., fn−1(αm) (fn(αm) for short) and replac-
ing βi by fi(αm):
∀αm. Ψ(αm, fn(αm)). (3)
However, constructing such a function explicitly for hardware
designs is a very tedious process. Instead, we apply a different
technique which we call predicate instantiation. The idea
is to find a predicate or a formula Φ(αm, βn) such that the
following two formulas can be proven valid:
∀αm. ∃βn. Φ(αm, βn) (4)
∀αm. ∀βn. Φ(αm, βn)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn). (5)
It is not hard to derive that the validity of (4) and (5) imply
the validity of (2).
Note that to use the instantiation predicate, one still needs
to prove an existential formula (4), which is undecidable in
general. However, our experiments show that the resulting
formulas are usually simple enough to be solved automatically
by a theorem prover. The theorem prover we use is Otter [16]
which takes a fraction of a second to prove each of the
formulas we encountered.
In instantiation using functions as in (3), given a value αm,
the corresponding value of βn is f1(αm), f2(αm), ..., fn(αm),
where fi(αm) is the instantiation of βi. In predicate instantia-
tion, given an αm, the set {βn| Φ(αm, βn)} is the set of values
of βn instantiated corresponding to the value αm. We refer
to this set by Image(Φ, αm). We call Φ the instantiation
predicate.
There are a number of advantages in using predicate in-
stantiation. First, the formula (4) is usually very small as will
be seen in the examples. That makes it possible to check
its validity with a first order theorem prover without manual
assistance. Second, the predicate Φ is usually constructed in
a simple way from literals from the formula Ψ without the
need for human assistance or intuition. This makes it possible
to automate the process of finding Φ as will be shown in this
paper.
In brief, our approach reduces the problem of checking the
validity of a very large quantified formula into two much easier
problems: 1. checking the validity of a similar formula without
quantifiers using a tool like CVC, and 2. checking the validity
of a very small quantified formula using a first-order theorem
prover like Otter.
Proceedings of the Formal Methods in Computer Aided Design (FMCAD'06)
0-7695-2707-8/06 $20.00  © 2006
III. THE HEURISTIC
For clarity of presentation, we present our heuristic in two
steps. In section III-A, we start by describing Heuristic A,
a simplified version of our final heuristic. In section III-B,
we describe an example and then in section III-C, we show
how Heuristic A works on this example. Then, we point out
a limitation with this simplified heuristic in section III-D. In
section III-E, we present our final heuristic, Heuristic B, which
avoids the limitations of Heuristic A.
A. Heuristic A
Suppose we want to prove formula (1). We start by trying
to prove the formula:
∀αm, βn [Ψ(αm, βn)]. (6)
We check the validity of (6) by CVC. If (6) is valid, then (1)
is also valid and we are done. If (6) is not valid, CVC will
return a counterexample C1 such that:
∀αm, βn [C1(αm, βn)⇒ ¬Ψ(αm, βn)] (7)
Formula (7) has the same form as formula (5), where C1
here is the instantiation predicate. C1 can be thought of as
a “bad” instantiation predicate since it implies ¬Ψ(αm, βn)
and causes the proof of (1) to fail. So, what we need is an
instantiation predicate that avoids those “bad” values of βs
instantiated by C1. We use C1 as a guide to find a better
instantiation predicate Φ (we show how we do that later in
this section) such that:
∀αm ∃βn [Φ(αm, βn)]. (8)
This is required as explained in section II-B. Then we get a
refined formula:
∀αm, βn [Φ(αm, βn)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)] (9)
and we use CVC again to try to prove this refined formula.
If this formula is invalid, we repeat the refinement process
iteratively. We stop when we reach a valid refined formula (9)
or we cannot find an instantiation predicate that satisfies (8).
This is shown in figure 1. In each iteration, the instantiation
predicate, Φ, is updated with a new conjunct Φ′ derived from
the new counterexample returned by CVC. There can be a
bound on the number of iterations of the main loop (line
2) or on the size of the instantiation predicate generated so
far. If the limit is exceeded, the heuristic can just return the
current counterexample as a potentially true counterexample.
Computing Φ′ is the critical part of this heuristic. We next
describe two approaches to do that.
1) First Approach.: Since C1 was a “bad” instantiation, we
could avoid those values of β instantiated by C1 as follows:
∀αm, βn [βn 6∈ Image(C1, αm)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)], (10)
where βn 6∈ Image(C1, αm) is the instantiation predicate.
This is equivalent to:
∀αm, βn [¬C1(αm, βn)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)]. (11)
So, Φ(αm, βn) here is ¬C1(αm, βn). There are, however,
several problems with this approach. 1. For any instantiation
predicate candidate Φ, we need to prove that (8) is valid
using a first order theorem prover. To be able to do that with
a theorem prover, Φ must be a small and simple formula.
However, counterexamples can be very complex, which can
make it infeasible to check the validity of the formula above.
2. It will likely take several iterations before arriving at a Φ
that satisfies (8) and (9). If in every iteration, we add a new
conjunct, ¬Ci, to Φ, we will quickly get very large formulas
in the form of conjunction of disjunctions. This can make it
even harder for a first order theorem prover.
2) Second Approach.: To avoid the problems mentioned
above, we use an alternative approach for finding Φ′ which
proved to be very effective in our experiments. Our approach
is based on the observation that for all the hardware examples
we considered, the instantiation predicates were simple
conjunctions of literals. So, instead of adding the ¬Ci to Φ
in each iteration, we add ¬ℓj , where ℓj is a literal in C∃i
(see section II-A). We pick a literal from C∃i rather than
C∀i because we are trying to instantiate the βs which do not
appear in the literals in C∀i . So, with this approach, lines 9
and 10 of Heuristic A would be:
9. if there is any ℓ ∈ C∃ s.t. ∀αm ∃βn [ Φ ∧ ¬ℓ ]
10. then Φ← Φ ∧ ¬ℓ
There are two main advantages in using literals instead of
complete counterexamples in building Φ. 1. In each iteration,
only one literal is added to Φ. This makes Φ much smaller and
more tractable for the theorem prover. In addition, Φ remains
a simple conjunction of literals compared to a conjunction of
disjunctions in the other approach. This makes it easier to
check its validity. 2. The conjunct ¬ℓj (where ℓj ∈ Ci) is
much stronger than the predicate ¬Ci (i.e., ¬ℓj ⇒ ¬Ci, but
¬Ci 6⇒ ¬ℓj). Stronger predicates result in stronger refinement
in every iteration which in turn makes the heuristic converge
much more quickly. Fewer iterations result in even smaller
Φs. On the negative side, however, this stronger refinement
can exclude “good” values of βs too. If this happens and we
get stuck in later iterations of the heuristic, we can backtrack
and change the literal we picked. The number of times the
heuristic might need to backtrack is a function of the number
of iterations and the number of possible choices in each
iteration. As explained earlier and as experiments show, the
number of iterations in our approach is very small. The number
of choices in iteration i is bounded by the number of literals
in C∃i which is also a small number in general. Hence, the
number of times of backtracking is expected to be relatively
small.
B. Example
In this section we apply Heuristic A to the 2-step induction
formula needed to verify a simple read-only memory system
that was used in [2]. This is a trivial design for the purpose of
showing the basic ideas of the heuristic. The memory system
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4. if ∀αm, βn[Φ(αm, βn)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)] is valid
5. then return (Valid)
6. else
7. {
8. let C be the counterexample
9. if there is a Φ′ (derived from C)
s.t. ∀αm ∃βn [ Φ ∧ Φ′ ]
10. then Φ← Φ ∧ Φ′
11. else return (Failed)
12. }
13. }
Fig. 1. Heuristic A
consists of a main memory with a one-line cache as shown in
figure 2 (a). We call this memory system the concrete module
and we verify it by proving that it is equivalent to an abstract
memory system that represents the desired functionality. The
abstract memory system is just a memory array as shown in
figure 2 (b).
Let N c(sc, α) be the transition function for the concrete
module, where sc is the current state of the module and α is
the input. Also, we use Rc(sc, α) to refer to the result (output)
returned by the concrete module when reading address α from
the concrete memory in state sc. Similarly, Na and Ra refer
to the transition function and output function respectively of
the abstract module.
We prove the two modules equivalent by proving the
formula:
∀ℓ, αℓ. Rc(N c(sc0, α
ℓ)) = Ra(Na(sa0 , α
ℓ)), (12)
where, sc0 and s
a
0 are the initial states of the modules,
N(s0, αℓ) is the state we get by running the module over
an input sequence of length ℓ starting from state s0, and
R(N(s0, αℓ)) is the last result returned by the module at
the end of the run (this is a slight abuse of the notation to
simplify the formula). Formula (12) says that starting both
systems from the initial states (sc0 and s
a
0) and running them
on an arbitrary input sequence αℓ of length ℓ, both systems
will generate the same sequence of outputs. This is the notion
of functional equivalence [1] which implies that the concrete
system is correct with respect to the abstract system.
The standard way to prove formula (12) is by induction on
time:
∀λ. Q(sc0, sa0 , λ)
∀sc, sa, σ, λ ∃β. Q(sc, sa, β)⇒ Q(N(sc, σ), N(sa, σ), λ),
(13)
where Q(sc, sa, λ) ≡ Rc(sc, λ) = Ra(sa, λ). The premise of
the induction step says that the two modules output the same
value at state 〈sc, sa〉 (i.e., the two modules are equivalent in
states sc and sa). In the consequent, we check if both systems
output equal values after one transition (in other words, we
check if the transition function preserves this equivalence
relation).
This simple induction, however, fails most of the time due to
incoherent (unreachable) states. For the example in figure 2, if
we start from an incoherent state sc where a 6= b, the induction
step fails. When λ = π and σ 6= π, the premise of the
induction step simply says that a = d, but the consequent says
that b = d. Clearly, the premise does not imply the consequent
and the proof fails. In [2], it was shown that 2-step induction
removes that incoherency problem:
∀sc, sa, σ2, λ. ∃α, β2
Q(sc, sa, β0) ∧Q(N(sc, α), N(sa, α), β1)⇒
Q(N(sc, σ2), N(sa, σ2), λ).
(14)
To prove this formula with a validity checker, however, we
need to eliminate the existential quantifiers. In [2], we showed
that the instantiation predicate Φ ≡ α 6= π ∧ β0 = β1 =
λ enables us to prove the above formula using predicate
instantiation:
∀sc, sa, σ2, λ. ∃α, β2. Φ
∀sc, sa, σ2, λ, α, β2. Φ⇒ Ψ, (15)
where Ψ is the formula in (14) without the quantifiers. The
idea behind using 2-step induction with this instantiation
predicate is as follows. The premise of the induction step
in (15) (Φ conjoined with the premise of Ψ) corresponds to
reading from λ in the concrete memory, then flushing the
cache by reading from α 6= π, then reading from λ again and
asserting that the two reads are equal. When λ = π (which is
the case that uncovered the incoherency in the simple induction
proof), the premise basically says that a = b which is enough
to guarantee that the concrete system is coherent and hence
the induction proof goes through.
In [2], we used reasoning similar to the paragraph above
to find this instantiation predicate. The designer was expected
to use his intuition to find those predicates. In this section,
we show how Heuristic A can find this instantiation predicate
completely automatically.
C. Applying Heuristic A
The 2-step induction formula we need to prove is formula
(14). In this formula, we have 3 existentially quantified vari-
ables (α, β0, and β1) and 5 universally quantified variables
(sc, sa, λ, σ0, and σ1). We start applying the heuristic with a
Φ ≡ true. The first step is to use CVC to check the validity
of the formula Φ ⇒ Ψ, where Ψ is the formula (14) without
the quantifiers. This formula is invalid and CVC returns the
counterexample:
C ≡ β0 6= λ ∧ λ = π ∧ σ1 6= π ∧ a 6= b. (16)
The variables π, a, and b are part of the state sc and hence
are universally quantified. Now, we find C∀ and C∃ to be:
C∀ ≡ {σ1 6= π, a 6= b, λ = π}
C∃ ≡ {β0 6= λ}
As we can see, C∃ has only one literal in it and hence we
don’t have a choice of which literals to use for adding to Φ. So,
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Fig. 2. Memory Example
Φ becomes β0 = λ. We check ∀λ. ∃β0. [β0 = λ] using Otter
and we find it valid. Next, we check the validity of Φ ⇒ Ψ
using CVC and we get back a counterexample C ≡ β1 6=
λ ∧ λ = π ∧ σ1 6= π. Again, we find C∃ ≡ {β1 6= λ}. And
once more, we are left with only one option in C∃ and we
update Φ to be β0 = λ ∧ β1 = λ and we check it with Otter.
Now, we check the validity the updated Φ ⇒ Ψ with CVC.
The formula is still invalid and we get the counterexample C ≡
α = π ∧ λ = π ∧ σ1 6= π and C∃ ≡ {α = π}. So, we update
Φ to be β0 = λ∧β1 = λ∧α 6= π and we check it with Otter.
Now, we use CVC to check the validity of the formula Φ⇒ Ψ
and this time CVC asserts the validity of this formula. With
this, we have proved that (14) is valid and hence proved the
correctness of the memory system completely automatically.
Notice that the instantiation predicate Φ found by the heuristic
is exactly like the one we found manually.
D. Limitations of Heuristic A
Heuristic A is highly sensitive to the form of the coun-
terexample returned by CVC. If the same counterexample
is returned in a different shape, the heuristic might fail in
finding the right instantiations. Consider for example the one-
line cache. The first counterexample we got back from CVC
was C ≡ β0 6= λ ∧ λ = π ∧ σ1 6= π ∧ a 6= b and C∃ ≡
{β0 6= λ}. From this counterexample, Heuristic A extracted
the first conjunct in the instantiation vector, β0 = λ which was
a good decision to make. Now, assume that CVC returned a
logically equivalent, but syntactically different counterexample
C′ ≡ β0 6= π ∧ λ = π ∧ σ1 6= π ∧ a 6= b. Looking at this
counterexample, it is easy to see that it is equivalent to C. The
difference here is that instead of β0 6= λ, we have β0 6= π,
but these two literals are equivalent in the context of these
counterexamples because λ = π. According to Heuristic A,
C′
∃ ≡ {β0 6= π}. Next, Heuristic A would pick β0 = π as
the new literal to add to Φ. But it is clear that this literal will
not help and the heuristic will fail in constructing a useful
instantiation predicate. The same problem will happen with
later iterations of the heuristic.
E. Heuristic B
In this section, we describe a technique to deal with the
limitation described in the previous section. In the example
we described above, Heuristic A picked β0 = π to add to
Φ, which fails to be a useful instantiation. This instantiation,
however, is still good when π = λ. In other words, it is still a
good instantiation within the context of this counterexample.
The context of a counterexample is the subspace of values
of αm that satisfy the counterexample. Within the context
of a counterexample, the shape of the counterexample does
not matter. For the example above, within the context of C′,
β0 = π and β0 = λ are equivalent, because C′ implies that
β0 = λ. The main idea in Heuristic B is to divide the space
of αm into a number of subspaces based on the contexts of
counterexamples returned by CVC. Then, for each subspace,
an instantiation predicate is constructed. Dividing the space
based on the contexts of counterexamples and finding a
different instantiation for each subspace, makes the heuristic
more robust against the syntactic form of the counterexample,
which avoids the problem described in the previous section.
Formally, we need to find a number of predicates
Π0(αm), Π1(αm), ..., Πj(αm) such that for 0 ≤ i ≤ j:
∀αm. ∃βn. Φi(αm, βn)
∀αm, βn. Φi(αm, βn) ∧Πi(αm)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)
(17)
and
∀αm. Π0(αm) ∨Π1(αm) ∨ ... ∨Πj(αm). (18)
where Πi(αm) is a predicate that defines the ith subspace. For
the cache example, we can first consider the formula π = λ⇒
Ψ and find the right instantiation for it. Then, we consider the
formula π 6= λ⇒ Ψ and find its instantiation which could be
different from the first one. In other words, for this example,
we have two subspaces: Π0 ≡ π = λ and Π1 ≡ π 6= λ. It
follows from (17) and (18) that ∀αm. ∃βn. Ψ(αm, βn). This
is shown in Appendix A.
Heuristic B uses heuristic Check (shown in figure 3) to
divide the αm space into subspaces and find the appropriate
instantiation predicate for each subspace. Heuristic Check
takes as input a formula ∀αm. ∃βn. Ψ(αm, βn) and returns a
subspace predicate Π(αm) such that:
∀αm [Π(αm)⇒ ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn)]. (19)
In each iteration of Check, C∀ is used as the context to refine
the subspace of αm (line 13). We avoid refining the αm space
by adding any literals from C∃. Keeping Π a predicate of
αm (and not βn) is needed to guarantee the soundness of our
heuristic as shown in the Appendix. C∀is a simple yet good
approximation of the context of C.
If Check cannot find such Π, it returns Failed. If Check
is successful in finding such a Π, it returns it after minimizing
it by a call to the function Minimize. This function finds
a smallest subset, Π′, of the literals in Π such that (19) still
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5. if ∀αm, βn [Π(αm) ∧ Φ(αm, βn)
⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)] is valid
6. then Minimize(Π)
7. return (Valid, Π)
8. else
9. {
10. let C be the counterexample
11. if there is any ℓ ∈ C∃ s.t.
∀αm ∃βn [ Φ ∧ ¬ℓ ]
12. then Φ← Φ ∧ ¬ℓ
13. Π← Π ∧ C∀
14. else return (Failed)
15. }
16. }
Fig. 3. Heuristic Check
holds. This could be a greedy heuristic that drops one literal
from Π at a time and checks that (19) still holds until it finds
the smallest such Π. The reason Π is minimized is to find the
largest subspace that is covered by the instantiation predicate
Φ; the less literals in Π the larger the subspace it represents.
The main heuristic, Heuristic B, is shown in figure 4. It starts
with Σ ≡ true, where Σ represents the subspace that was
not covered in previous iterations. In each iteration, Heuristic
Check is called with the formula:
∀αm, ∃βn [Σ(αm)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)].
If Check returns Failed, Heuristic B also returns Failed.
If Check returns Valid, it also returns the subspace that
was checked σ (i.e., the subspace σ for which Check proved
that ∀αm. σ(αm) ∧ Σ(αm)⇒ ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn) is valid). So,
we add ¬σ to Σ indicating that subspace σ was checked and
we do not need to consider it in later iterations. This keeps
repeating until we exit as in line 11 or we reach an iteration
where:
∀αm, βn [Σ(αm)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)] (20)
is valid and we return Valid (line 5). The proof of soundness
of this heuristic can be found in Appendix A.
Heuristic A was limited to formulas that can be proved
with instantiation predicates that are conjunctions of literals.
Heuristic B, however, can handle a much larger class of formu-
las by splitting the space of models into several subspaces and
finding a different instantiation predicate for each subspace.
This makes it possible to handle a larger class of formulas
while maintaining simple conjunctive instantiation predicates
that can be easily handled by first-order theorem provers.
F. Example
In this section we consider the one-line cache example again
and apply Heuristic B to it. Below, we show the heuristic




4. if ∀αm, βn [Σ(αm)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)] is Valid




Check (∀αm ∃βn[Σ(αm)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)])
9. if result = Valid
10. then Σ← Σ ∧ ¬σ
11. else return (Failed)
12. }
13. }
Fig. 4. Heuristic B
through the different iterations.
• Σ ≡ true.
• Iteration 1 (Heuristic B)
– Σ ⇒ Ψ is invalid.
– call Check (Σ ⇒ Ψ)
∗ Iteration 1 (Heuristic Check)
· Π ∧ Φ ⇒ Ψ is invalid.
· C ≡ β0 6= π∧λ = π∧σ1 = π∧a 6= b, C∃ ≡ {β0 6= π}.
· Π ≡ λ = π ∧ σ1 = π, Φ ≡ β0 = π.
∗ Iteration 2 (Heuristic Check)
· Π ∧ Φ ⇒ Ψ is invalid.
· C ≡ β1 6= π∧λ = π∧σ1 = π∧a 6= b, C∃ ≡ {β1 6= π}.
· Π ≡ λ = π ∧ σ1 = π, Φ ≡ β0 = π ∧ β1 = π.
∗ Iteration 3 (Heuristic Check)
· Π ∧ Φ ⇒ Ψ is invalid.
· C ≡ α = λ∧λ = π ∧ σ1 = π ∧ a 6= b, C∃ ≡ {α = λ}.
· Π ≡ λ = π ∧ σ1 = π, Φ ≡ β0 = π ∧ β1 = π.
∗ Iteration 4 (Heuristic Check)
· Π ∧ Φ ⇒ Ψ is valid.
· Minimize Π.
· Return Π ≡ λ = π.
– σ ≡ λ = π.
– Σ ≡ λ 6= π.
• Iteration 2 (Heuristic B)
– Σ ⇒ Ψ is invalid.
– call Check (Σ ⇒ Ψ)
∗ Iteration 1 (Heuristic Check)
· Π ∧ Φ ⇒ Ψ is invalid.
· C ≡ λ 6= π∧ ≡ β0 6= λ∧σ1 = π∧a 6= b, C∃ ≡ {β0 6=
λ}.
· Π ≡ λ 6= π ∧ σ1 = π, Φ ≡ β0 = λ.
∗ Iteration 2 (Heuristic Check)
· Π ∧ Φ ⇒ Ψ is invalid.
· C ≡ λ 6= π∧ ≡ β1 6= λ∧σ1 = π∧a 6= b, C∃ ≡ {β1 6=
λ}.
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· Π ≡ λ 6= π ∧ σ1 = π, Φ ≡ β0 = λ ∧ β1 = λ.
∗ Iteration 3 (Heuristic Check)
· Π ∧ Φ ⇒ Ψ is invalid.
· C ≡ λ 6= π∧ ≡ α = π ∧ σ1 = π ∧ a 6= b, C∃ ≡ {α =
π}.
· Π ≡ λ 6= π ∧ σ1 = π, Φ ≡ β0 = λ ∧ β1 = λ ∧ α 6= π.
∗ Iteration 4 (Heuristic Check)
· Π ∧ Φ ⇒ Ψ is valid.
· Minimize Π.
· Return Π ≡ true.
– σ ≡ true.
– Σ ≡ false.
• Iteration 3 (Heuristic B)
– Σ ⇒ Ψ is valid.
– Return (Valid).
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In addition to the one-line cache example, we used
this heuristic to verify four more examples: (1) unbounded
direct-mapped cache, (2) unbounded two-level direct mapped
cache, (3) unbounded 2-way set-associative cache, and (4)
simple DLX-like pipeline. These designs are available at
http://verify.stanford.edu/refinement. In all of these examples,
the heuristic was able to find the right instantiation predicates
in a small number of iterations. Processing and passing the
formulas to and from CVC and Otter was done manually.
Some statistics about the designs are shown in figure 5. The
second column shows the number of nodes in the formula we
checked for each design. These formulas were generated by
k-step induction and symbolic simulation. The nodes in the
formulas include word-level ite’s, Boolean operators, linear
arithmetic operators, uninterpreted functions and predicates,
equalities, unbounded array reads, and unbounded array writes.
The formulas are in structural form.
The remaining columns show the number of unbounded
integer variables (I), the number of Boolean variables (B),
the number of finite-domain variables (F), and the number of
unbounded arrays (A) in each design. Some of the arrays were
over integers, while others were over complex tuples of data.
Checking the validity of each of these formulas results in
several calls to Otter and CVC. The calls to Otter were with
very small formulas (the instantiation predicates); each call
took less than a second (on a Pentium 3 800MHz machine).
Hence, the time spent on proving quantified formulas was a
small fraction.
Each call to CVC is on a slightly modified version of the
original formula (the k-step induction formula without the
quantifiers) with only a few literals added as described in the
heuristic. Our heuristic changes the formula in a minor way
that does not change the CVC run time per call.
So, from a practical point of view, the heuristic reduced the
problem of checking the validity of large quantified formulas
into the problem of validity checking of a number of quantifier-
free formulas of approximately the same size as the original
formula.
formula I B F A
size
direct mapped cache 9450 35 6 3 3
2-level direct mapped cache 31860 44 9 4 4
2-way set associative cache 17289 36 11 3 3
DLX pipeline 2862 50 6 5 4
Fig. 5. Verified Designs
V. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a refinement heuristic for checking the valid-
ity of first-order formulas of the form ∀αm ∃βn. Ψ(αm, βn).
The use of predicate instantiation along with our heuristic for
finding instantiation predicates proved to be very effective in
proving complex quantified formulas from hardware verifica-
tion.
Our approach reduces the problem of checking the validity
of large quantified formulas into two much easier problems:
1. checking the validity of a number of similar formulas that
are quantifier-free with a validity checker like CVC and 2.
checking the validity of a number of very small quantified
formulas with a first-order theorem prover like Otter.
Experiments show the effectiveness of our approach in
hardware verification as well as theorem proving.
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APPENDIX A
SOUNDNESS OF HEURISTIC B
We show that if Heuristic B returns Valid, then the
formula ∀αm ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn) is valid. Let σi be the σ
returned in iteration i and let Σi be the Σ at the beginning of
iteration i. Hence, Σ0 ≡ true and Σi ≡ Σi−1 ∧ ¬σi−1.
Lemma 1: If a call to heuristic Check in iteration i returns
Valid with a predicate σi, then:
∀αm [σi(αm)∧¬σi−1(αm)∧...∧¬σ0(αm)⇒ ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn)].
Proof: The first thing to note is that if Check returns
Valid with a predicate σi, then there is a Φ(αm, βn) such
that:
∀αm ∃βn [Φ(αm, βn)]. (21)
∀αm, βn [σi(αm) ∧ Σi(αm) ∧ Φ(αm, βn) (22)
⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)].
From (21) and (23) we conclude:
∀αm ∃βn [σi(αm) ∧ Σi(αm)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)], (23)
which is equivalent to:
∀αm [σi(αm) ∧ Σi(αm)⇒ ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn)], (24)
which can be rewritten as:
∀αm [σi(αm)∧¬σi−1(αm)∧...∧¬σ0(αm)⇒ ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn)].
(25)
Lemma 2: If a call to Heuristic B with
∀αm ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn) returns Valid, then the formula
∀αm ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn) is valid.
Proof: Suppose Heuristic B returns Valid in the kth
iteration. In this case, we know that:
∀αm, βn [Σk(αm)⇒ Ψ(αm, βn)] (26)
Formula (26) implies:
∀αm. [Σk(αm)⇒ ∃βn. Ψ(αm, βn)] (27)
Since the heuristic returned Valid, by Lemma 1, we know
that:
∀αm. [ σi(αm)∧¬σi−1(αm)∧...∧¬σ0(αm)⇒ ∃βn Ψ(αm, βn) ]
(28)
is valid, for 0 ≤ i < k.
Now, consider the case where Σk is false. If Σk is false, it
means there must be at least one i such that σi is true. From
this and formula (28), we conclude that whenever Σk is false,
then:
∀αm ∃βn. [Ψ(αm, βn)].
In other words, we know that:
∀αm. [¬Σk(αm)⇒ ∃βnΨ(αm, βn) ]. (29)
From formula (27) and formula (29), we conclude:
∀αm ∃βn. [ Ψ(αm, βn) ], (30)
Notice that in deriving formulas (27) and (29), we used the
fact that βn does not appear in Σk and hence we were able
to push in the ∃βn quantifier. If Σ has any literals containing
βn, then a Valid returned by Heuristic B does not imply the
validity of ∀αm ∃βn. [ Ψ(αm, βn) ]. That is why we do not
add any literals from C∃ to Π and hence to Σ.
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Abstract
A link between the ACL2 and HOL4 proof assistants is
described. This allows each system to be deployed smoothly
within a single formal development. Several applications
are being considered: using ACL2’s execution environment
for simulating HOL models; using ACL2’s proof automa-
tion to discharge HOL proof obligations; and using HOL to
specify and verify properties of ACL2 functions that cannot
easily be stated in the first-order ACL2 logic.
Care has been taken to ensure sound translations be-
tween the logics supported by HOL and ACL2. The initial
ACL2 theory has been defined inside HOL, so that it is pos-
sible to prove mechanically that first-order ACL2 functions
on S-expressions correspond to higher-order functions op-
erating on a variety of types. The translation between the
two systems operates at the level of S-expressions and is in-
tended to handle large hardware and software models.
1. Introduction
Higher-Order Logic (HOL) and First-Order Logic (FOL)
are both used to model hardware and software. Separate
verification communities have evolved based on each kind
of logic (e.g. a verification group in one major processor
company uses higher-order logic, whilst the correspond-
ing group in a competitor company uses first-order logic).
There are projects in progress that use models in both logics
(e.g. the Cryptol/AAMP7 project at Rockwell Collins and
Galois, Inc., which is discussed briefly later). In this paper
we describe a method of linking the HOL4 [21] and ACL2
[16] proof assistants in a way that enables the strengths of
each system to be smoothly deployed within a single formal
development and the resulting verifications to be evaluated
to very high levels of assurance. Our work links two par-
ticular systems, but the approach is intended to be portable:
we are investigating linking Isabelle/HOL [20] and ACL2.
The key idea is a HOL theory, SEXP, that bridges the gap
between the HOL4 and ACL2 logics. HOL4 developments
are mapped to SEXP developments and the relationship ver-
ified by proof. SEXP developments closely correspond to
ACL2 developments and can be converted to them by sim-
ple reading and writing of files containing S-expressions.
Our initial motivation was to use ACL2 for high perfor-
mance simulation of HOL models (see Section 7). A differ-
ent kind of application is to use higher-order logic to spec-
ify properties that cannot easily be stated in the first-order
ACL2 logic. An instance of this is validating the transla-
tion of Cryptol [4] programs to AAMP7 [26] binary code
whose semantics are defined in ACL2, as currently being
undertaken by Galois, Inc. and Rockwell Collins [10, 23].
The idea is to start with a Cryptol program, translate it to
an ACL2 function definition, import the generated ACL2
definition into HOL and then prove, using the semantics of
Cryptol, which is formulated in higher-order logic, that the
translated Cryptol program correctly implements the source
specification. Another example, which we are working on
in collaboration with Joe Hurd, is to verify that an ACL2
function implementing a probabilistic primality test satis-
fies a specification based on concepts from measure theory
[13]. ACL2 executes this algorithm very fast, but it is hard
to express its specification in the ACL2 logic.
In the next section we discuss previous work on con-
necting HOL and Boyer-Moore provers. The underlying
logical ideas for embedding ACL2 in HOL are then moti-
vated and the theory of the ACL2 logic in higher order logic
is described. We then give details, using simple examples,
of how we convert between HOL and ACL2. Next comes
a simple example illustrating the use of ACL2 to execute
HOL, together with runtime data illustrating the kind of per-
formance gains that can be achieved. The paper ends with
future work and some conclusions.
We use “HOL” both to refer to higher-order logic and to
proof systems supporting the logic. We use “HOL4” when
that particular implementation is intended. We use “ACL2”
for both the system and the logic it supports.
1
Proceedings of the Formal Methods in Computer Aided Design (FMCAD'06)
0-7695-2707-8/06 $20.00  © 2006
2. Related work
In 1991, Fink et al. described a proof manager PM [6]
that enabled HOL input to be transformed into “first-order
assertions suited to the Boyer-Moore prover”. In 1999
Mark Staples implemented a tool called ACL2PII for link-
ing ACL2 and HOL98 [28]. As far as we know these are
the only previous attempts to link HOL to ACL2. ACL2PII
was used by Susanto and Melham [29, 30].
Both PM and ACL2PII translate between higher-order
logic and first-order logic. When translating from untyped
Boyer-Moore logic to typed higher-order logic it can be
hard to figure out which types to assign. Staples points
out that the ACL2 S-expression NIL might need to be
translated to F (boolean type), or [] (list type) or NONE
(option type), depending on context. The ACL2PII user
has to set up “translation specifications” that are pattern-
matching rewrite rules to perform the ACL2-to-HOL trans-
lation. These are encoded in ML and are thus not supported
by any formal validation.
The previous links between HOL and Boyer-
Moore/ACL2 systems have been open to the criticism
that the translation of formulae between the systems may
be unsound. Our contribution is to design and implement an
approach that provides high assurance that the correspond-
ing HOL and ACL2 formulae have equivalent semantics.
Our approach provides higher assurance than that provided
by PM or ACL2PII because we perform proof-based formal
translation between the higher-order logic formulae of
HOL4 and the first-order formulae of ACL2. The logically
tricky parts of the translations are done within a formal
framework, namely translation to SEXP within HOL. Thus
the meta-language scripts of PM or ACL2PII are replaced
by deductions in the HOL4 system together with a clean
and semantically simple link between SEXP and ACL2.
There has been lots of work on connecting together other
proof assistants. Felty and Howe [5] import HOL90 theo-
ries into Nuprl. The theory justifying this is sophisticated
(the two logics are fairly different) and the link is only one
way. More recently, Mason and Talcott linked the Maude
rewriting system to PVS [18] using an architecture based on
the Actor model of computation. Both of these linkings use
complex meta-theory to justify the soundness of transfer-
ring formulae between logics. In contrast, our approach me-
chanically checks the semantically tricky parts of the link-
age (higher-order logic to SEXP). The actual data transfer
between HOL4 and ACL2 uses terms (S-expressions) with
identical structure and meanings in each system.
Recently, motivated by the Flyspeck project [31], tools
have been implemented [19] to move Isabelle/HOL devel-
opments into HOL Light [11] and HOL Light develop-
ments into Isabelle/HOL [22]. HOL light is a proof as-
sistant for exactly the same logic as the one supported
by HOL4, but it has slightly different proof infrastructure
and is implemented in O’Caml rather than Standard ML.
Isabelle/HOL [20] is a proof assistant for a significantly
more complex and expressive version of higher order logic
than the one supported by HOL4 and HOL Light (e.g. it
has type classes). Obua and Skalberg’s paper provides a
framework for importing HOL4 and HOL Light proofs into
the Isabelle/HOL logic and then replaying them inside the
Isabelle/HOL system. No trusting of the source system
(HOL4 or HOL Light) is needed. A proof recording mech-
anism generates proof scripts that can be replayed. This
direction is logically easy as the logic being imported is a
subset of the Isabelle/HOL logic. The paper by McLaugh-
lin describes a transfer of proofs going the other way (Is-
abelle/HOL to HOL Light) and shows how to generate ML
code for Isabelle/HOL type classes than can replay class
instance proofs inside HOL Light, using ML functors to
elaborate type class instances. The work in these two pa-
pers bridges a smaller semantic gap than that from HOL
to ACL2, but accomplishes more, namely the translation
of proofs as well as formulae. HOL4, HOL Light and Is-
abelle/HOL are all LCF-style tactic-based systems, so share
the same proof scripting methodology. The proof develop-
ment methodologies of HOL and ACL2 are not at all the
same, so harder to link. Developing tools to mechanise the
replaying of HOL proofs in ACL2, and vice versa is a topic
for future research.
The linking of proof assistants to automatic tools, like
decision procedures, automatic theorem provers and model
checkers, has been studied extensively. One approach is to
embed the logic of the automatic tool in the logic of the
proof assistant. This may be easy as the former logic might
just be a subset of the latter logic. For example, SAT solvers
operate on propositional logic, which is a subset of first or-
der logic or higher order logic. However, in some cases the
automatic tool has a specialised logic. Examples of this are
model checkers, which decide properties of Kripke struc-
tures (the models) expressed in temporal logic. One ap-
proach to linking these is to build a theory representing the
formulae of the specialised logic in the proof assistant logic,
which is usually some kind of higher order logic. The lan-
guages used for model checking (Kripke structure notations
for models and temporal logic for properties) can easily be
defined in higher order logic. Problems solvable by model
checking can then be converted (e.g. by rewriting) into for-
mulae in the embedded checkable language, and then ex-
ported to external model checkers, which are used as trusted
oracles. An early pioneering example linked PVS to a sym-
bolic mu-calculus checker [24] and more recently SMV has
been linked to HOL4 [32]. This approach to linking model
checkers to proof assistants is similar to the way we are
linking HOL4 and ACL2. However, the details and general
flavour are different since the logics of HOL4 and ACL2
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are both general purpose specification languages. It is easy
to define Kripke structures and temporal logic operators in
higher order logic, but it turns out to be quite complex and
tricky to embed the entire ACL2 logic in HOL.
3. ACL2: axiomatic theory or interpreter?
Consider the ACL2 axiom ASSOCIATIVITY-OF-*
occurring in the ACL2 source file axioms.lisp:
(EQUAL (* (* X Y) Z) (* X (* Y Z))). This can be
viewed as an S-expression in ACL2’s version of Lisp, or
as a formula of first-order logic.
Under the first view the axiom is valid because if X, Y
and Z are replaced by any S-expressions, then the resulting
instance of the axiom will evaluate to ‘true’, i.e., T in Com-
mon Lisp. Under the second view, the formula is an axiom
that defines what it means for evaluation to be correct: it is a
partial semantics of Lisp evaluation. Thus, in order to build
a formal model of the ACL2 logic, we are faced with decid-
ing whether to take Lisp evaluation or the ACL2 axioms as
‘golden’ – i.e., as the primary specification.
If the first view were adopted, we could try to
build a formal model of ACL2’s Lisp evaluation in
HOL, so that the ACL2 axioms can be proved con-
sistent with Lisp semantics by, for example, proving
(EQUAL (* (* X Y) Z) (* X (* Y Z))) always evalu-
ates to T. However, the model of Lisp evaluation in HOL
would need to be validated against some reference evalua-
tor and it is not clear what this reference should be, since
there is no ACL2 definition of S-expression evaluation.
We have decided to adopt the second view, namely that
the axioms in the ACL2 source file axioms.lisp define
the logic [14], rather than some ‘golden’ evaluator. If there
are discrepancies between this and the actual behaviour of
ACL2 evaluation (and as far as we know there are none),
then our view is that it would be a bug in the evaluator, not
in the ACL2 axioms.
Our approach is to define S-expressions in higher-order
logic by defining a HOL type sexp and then to specify
HOL functions operating on this type that correspond to the
ACL2 functions axiomatised in axioms.lisp (cons,
car, cdr, etc.). The key property we must ensure is that
for any formula provable in ACL2, its translation is prov-
able in the SEXP theory in HOL. This property guarantees
that we can use ACL2 as a trusted oracle for HOL. The
property follows from a standard theory interpretation argu-
ment: the axioms of SEXP are direct translations of axioms
of ACL2, and the rules of inference in HOL are powerful
enough to model the first-order and induction rules of infer-
ence of ACL2.
4. SEXP: a theory of the ACL2 logic in HOL
We define a HOL theory, called SEXP, which includes a
type sexp representing S-expressions in higher-order logic
and constants corresponding to the ACL2 primitive func-
tions that satisfy the ACL2 logic axioms. The type sexp
is a recursively defined datatype composed of four kinds
of atoms (symbols, strings, characters and complex rational
numbers) and pairs of S-expressions. Further details about
SEXP can be found in a companion paper [9].
HOL and ACL2 each have their own notions of char-
acters, strings and numbers. Fortunately the match between
characters and strings in HOL and ACL2 is exact. In ACL2,
numbers are specified axiomatically in axioms.lisp,
which contain axioms like the associativity and commu-
tativity of addition and multiplication. ACL2 complex ra-
tional numbers consist of two rationals: a real part and an
imaginary part. Rational numbers in HOL are defined as
a quotient type [12] using a rational package developed by
Jens Brandt [2] and consist of two integers: the numera-
tor and denominator. Thus an ACL2 number can be repre-
sented by four integers (real part numerator, real part de-
nominator, imaginary part numerator, imaginary part de-
nominator). The first-order axiomatisation of numbers in
ACL2 admits non-standard interpretations, but the higher-
order HOL definition of numbers does not – it constrains
numbers to be standard. Thus, there may be properties of
numbers in the SEXP theory that cannot be proved in ACL2.
We do not view this as a problem as we already know that
there are things that can be proved in HOL but not in ACL2.
Not all symbols in the HOL datatype sexp correspond
to valid ACL2 symbols due to ACL2’s rules for ‘intern-
ing’ symbols in packages. This is handled by having an
explicit definition of the package structure in HOL and by
making the definition of symbolp return nil on “sym-
bols” which are not symbols according to this structure.
Symbols in ACL2 consist of a package name and a sym-
bol name separated by “::”, but normally only the sym-
bol name is input and output, the package name being
implicit via the current package. It simplifies the repre-
sentation of ACL2 inside HOL if we use fully expanded
ACL2 names as the names of the corresponding HOL con-
stants. For convenience when working with HOL we have
implemented a mechanism for overloading parser-friendly
names onto ACL2 names. For example, mult, add
and unary minus are the parser-friendly HOL names
overloaded onto ACL2::BINARY-* (multiplication),
ACL2::BINARY-+ (addition) and ACL2::UNARY--
(unary minus), respectively. These particular names are
used in the example in Section 5.
Certain ACL2 symbols represent primitive notions in the
initial theory. Examples are t, nil, car, cdr, cons,
consp and if. There are 33 such primitive symbols:
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t nil acl2-numberp bad-atom<= binary-*
binary-+ unary-- unary-/ < car cdr
char-code characterp code-char complex
complex-rationalp coerce cons consp
denominator equal if imagpart integerp
intern-in-package-of-symbol numerator
pkg-witness rationalp realpart stringp
symbol-name symbol-package-name symbolp
The ACL2 logic constrains the interpretation of these by
about eighty axioms listed in the file axioms.lisp. For




(equal (cons (car x) (cdr x)) x)))
This uses an auxiliary function implies defined in terms
of the primitives by:
(defun implies (p q) (if p (if q t nil) t))
We have defined all the ACL2 primitives, and all the aux-
iliary functions they use, as constants or functions in the
HOL theory SEXP. The constants t and nil are names
of particular symbols, and the function cons is a primitive
constructor of the datatype sexp. The functions car and
cdr map sexp pairs to their first and second components,
respectively, and all other sexp values (i.e. strings, char-
acters and numbers) to nil. The function consp maps
pairs to t and all other sexp-values to nil. The function
equal is defined in HOL by:
` ∀x y. equal x y = if x = y then t else nil
where equality (=) and the conditional are those of the HOL
logic. Unfortunately, the HOL parser makes it inconvenient
to use “if” for the ACL2 conditional on S-expressions in
the theory SEXP, because it is a HOL keyword (as illus-
trated above), so we use “ite” (for “if-then-else”) instead:
` ∀x y z. ite x y z = if x = nil then z else y
The auxiliary function implies used in the ACL2 axiom
car-cdr-elim is defined in SEXP by:
` ∀p q. implies p q = ite p (ite q t nil) t
ACL2 formulae are S-expressions, but HOL formulae
are terms of type bool. When an ACL2 term p is used
as a formula it means that p is not nil, thus we define the
HOL formula |= p by:
` ∀p. |= p = ¬(p = nil)
to mean that p is true. The axiom car-cdr-elim is then
verified in the HOL model of ACL2 by proving:
` ∀x. |= implies
(consp x)
(equal (cons (car x) (cdr x)) x)
To ensure that our definitions of the ACL2 primi-
tives are sound, we have proved many of the axioms in
axioms.lisp (we plan to prove them all eventually).
The first-order logic of ACL2 is not typed, but the
higher-order logic of HOL4 is. All constants defined in
HOL must have a fixed type. For example, the HOL types
of the functions in the theory SEXP described above are:




cons, equal, implies sexp→sexp→sexp
ite sexp→sexp→sexp→sexp
5. Encoding HOL developments into ACL2
We have implemented a set of tools that can take a se-
quence of definitions in HOL and create a sequence of
definitions in the theory SEXP, together with a proof that
the encoding of the definitions is correct. The coding and
decoding of HOL functions is performed recursively, us-
ing ideas from ‘polytypism’ [27], by composing the en-
codings and decodings of sub-functions, starting from a li-
brary of encodings and decodings of primitive functions.
(e.g. booleans, arithmetic, list-processing, et.).
There is an initial set of functions for encoding/decoding
primitive HOL types (e.g. booleans, arithmetic, list-
processing etc.) to S-expression. HOL allows new types to
be defined recursively, and we have tools that automatically
generate encodings to S-expressions from type definitions.
For example, consider a HOL type definition:
Hol datatype
`rose tree = Branch of (α × rose_tree) list`
This defines a new polymorphic unary type operator
rose tree, where, for arbitrary type α, the values of type
(α)rose tree are the empty tree Branch[] and non-
empty trees Branch[(a1,t1);. . .;(an,tn)], where ai
has type α and ti has type (α)rose tree (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
From this HOL type definition, our encoder generates
an encoder function for rose tree, parameterised on an
encoder for the type parameter α, i.e. a HOL constant:
encode_rose_tree:(α →sexp)→(α)rose_tree→sexp
If List:(sexp)list→sexp encodes HOL lists of S-
expressions as ACL2 lists and nat:num→sexp is a pre-
defined encoder of HOL natural numbers as S-expressions,





List[List[nat 0]; List[nat 1; List[nat 2]]]
Each HOL type whose values can be encoded as S-
expressions also has an automatically generated recogniser,
which is a HOL function of type sexp→sexp (the S-
expression returned will be t or nil). For example,
consp, natp are recognisers for encoded dotted-pairs
and encoded HOL natural numbers, respectively. If a
type is parameterised, then its recogniser will be a func-
tion that takes recognisers for the type parameters as ar-
guments. For example, the recogniser for S-expressions
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encoding HOL lists of type (α)list is listp of type
(sexp→sexp)→(sexp→sexp). The recogniser for
Cartesian product types α × β is a (curried) function that
takes recognisers for α and β as arguments. The definitions
of listp and pairp are given below, using an auxiliary
function andl that is similar to the ACL2 macro and (its
definition uses HOL’s infix list-cons operator ::).
(andl [] = t) ∧ (andl [s] = s) ∧
(andl (x::y::l) = ite x (andl (y::l)) nil)




(andl[consp x; p(car x); listp p (cdr x)])
pairp f g x =
andl[consp x; f(car x); f(cdr x)]
Whenever an encoder for a user-defined HOL type is gen-
erated a recogniser is also created.
rose_treep f s =
listp (pairp f (rose_treep f)) s
Our encoding tools handle polymorphic type operators, but
only ground instances of polymorphic functions can be rep-
resented as functions on sexp and exported to ACL2. A
‘flattening’ process generates first-order functions in HOL
suitable for exporting to ACL2.
nat_rose_treep s =
ite (equal s nil) t
(andl
[consp s; consp (car s);
natp (car (car s));
nat_rose_treep (cdr (car s));
nat_rose_treep (cdr s)])
Functions defined in HOL are automatically translated
to first-order functions on S-expressions. For example, the
counting function count defined by:
(count (Branch[]) = 0) ∧
(count (Branch ((x,hd)::tl)) =
1 + count hd + count(Branch tl))











and a correctness theorem automatically proved:
` ∀tl. count tl =
sexp_to_nat
(acl2_count(encode_rose_tree nat tl))
If a HOL function operates only on datatypes that are
in the initial library of encodings to S-expressions, then no
type encoding functions need to be generated. For exam-
ple, the infixed exponentiation operator ** is defined re-
cursively in HOL by a conjunction of equations, one for the
basis and one for the inductive step. Built-in natural number
multiplication (*) and successor (SUC) functions are used.
(∀m. m ** 0 = 1)
∧
(∀m n. m ** SUC n = m * (m ** n))
The encoder generates a definition of a constant acl2 exp
that represents ** as a first-order operation on S-
expressions in HOL.
acl2_exp m n =
ite
(andl [natp n; natp m])
(ite




(nfix (add n (unary_minus (nat 1)))))))
(int 0)
together with the correctness-validating theorem:
` ∀m n. m ** n =
sexp_to_nat(acl2_exp (nat m) (nat n))
Note that the translator generated a definition of the func-
tion acl2 exp that returns the S-expression corresponding
to zero (int 0) when either of its arguments are not num-
bers. Similarly, the predefined SEXP encodings of addition
and multiplication return int 0 on non-number arguments.
This ensures that axioms like ASSOCIATIVITY-OF-*
are true in the HOL model.
6. Moving between ACL2 and HOL
The link between the HOL4 and ACL2 systems is im-
plemented by printing and reading files of S-expressions.
To send an S-expression from HOL4 to ACL2 an ML func-
tion recursively prints the S-expression to a file suitable for
input by ACL2. The reverse direction is similar: ACL2 re-
cursively writes an S-expression to a file that can be input
to ML. Before S-expressions are moved between systems
they are elaborated into a simple form. For example, HOL
terms are simplified by rewriting away auxiliary function
like andl and let-terms are eliminated by β-reductions.
ACL2 definitions and formulae have all macros expanded
and lets replaced by equivalent ACL2 lambdas. This
elaboration is done securely (i.e. the elaborated forms are
provably equivalent to the unelaborated sources).
There are a few low-level details that need care, includ-
ing the treatment of character, string and number literals.
Modelling of ACL2 packages is quite complicated, reflect-
ing the inherent complexity of ACL2 namespace manage-
ment: see the companion paper [9].
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The conversion of HOL definitions to S-expressions is
straightforward. An equation f x1 · · · xn = e is con-
verted to (defun f (x1 · · · xn) ê), where ê is the
translation of e. A HOL theorem ` (|= e) corresponds
to (defthm name ê), where name is generated from the
name of the theorem in HOL.
The transfer of S-expressions between the HOL4 and
ACL2 systems is not validated by any proof. It is thus
vital that the translation code be trustworthy. We have at-
tempted to achieve this by keeping it straightforward. To
test our code, we have imported all the ACL2 axioms, defi-
nitions and theorems from axioms.lisp and also a com-
plete ACL2 model of Y86 (a simple X86-like machine [3])
into HOL, converted them to HOL theorems and defini-
tions, then exported them back to ACL2, and successfully
checked that the results are correct. This substantially adds
to our confidence that our code for printing and reading S-
expressions is sound. Note that this “round trip” test just
helps validate the conversions between ML and Lisp, it
doesn’t prove that the axioms follow by proof in HOL in
the SEXP theory (doing this is work in progress).
Definitions and theorems imported from ACL2 can ei-
ther be trusted, or proof obligations can be established to
validate them in HOL. Theorems created in the SEXP the-
ory by trusting ACL2 are ‘tagged’ with their source, so
one can always distinguish theorems proved entirely inside
HOL from those proved using ACL2 as an oracle. ACL2
will only admit a definition if it is proved that it is consis-
tent (indeed, conservative) to add it [15]. HOL has a similar
discipline. We believe that any definition admitted by ACL2
could also be soundly admitted in HOL (because HOL pro-
vides induction support at least as strong as the ε0-induction
used by ACL2).
7. Performance
In this section we briefly describe a simple example that
shows the kind of performance that can be attained by using
ACL2 to execute HOL specifications.
Consider a simple memory model that can interpret
‘read’ and ‘write’ instructions of the form (b,x,y) where
b is a Boolean (T for a write, F for a read), x is an address (a
natural number) and y a value to write (ignored by reads).
The state of a memory is represented in HOL by a list
[(a1,v1);...;(an,vn)] where a1, . . ., an are the
addresses holding non-zero values, and the value stored at
ai is vi (1≤ i ≤n) – thus an empty list [] represents a
memory in which all addresses hold 0.
The function read step takes an address and a mem-
ory state and returns the value stored at the address. The
function write step takes an address, a value and a
memory state and returns an updated memory state with the
value written to the address.
A tail-recursive function run takes a list of instructions,
a memory state and an accumulator consisting of a list
of previously read values (in reverse order). It then exe-
cutes the instructions, adding any values read to the front
of the accumulator. A function make instrs generates
text programs consisting of sequences of reads and writes
starting from a given initial state.
As a benchmark we created a program with a million
instructions. The results shown below should be taken
as illustrative only, as they involve three different systems
(Moscow ML, MLton [33], and ACL2 built on Gnu Com-
mon Lisp), and it is not clear if the same things are being
timed: the ML compilers report “gc”, “sys” and “usr”
times (figures given below are gc+sys+usr times), whilst
ACL2/LISP reports “real”, “run-gbc” and “gbc” times
(figures given below are real times). Timings were done
on the same machine.
HOL Moscow MLton ACL2 Common ACL2 +
EVAL ML Lisp stobj
∞? 5.8 1.26 8.16 5.6 0.06
Evaluation by proof in HOL (EVAL) runs out of mem-
ory after 10 hours. Translating to ML and using the stan-
dard Moscow ML interpreter is a little faster than using the
ACL2 read-eval-print loop on the compiled functions and
about the same as running them in Common Lisp1. The
fastest execution is with a manually verified translation to
single-threaded code [1]. The MLton ML compiler is the
most optimising ML compiler we know, but it is more than
an order of magnitude slower than single-threaded ACL2.
Execution in ACL2 is within a theorem prover and so the
results are based on formal definitions in the logic, unlike
those from the ML compilers.
8. Future work and conclusions
We plan to prove all the axioms of the ACL2 logic in
HOL. This will verify that we have a sound model of ACL2.
So far we have concentrated on using ACL2 to exe-
cute HOL models. The biggest example we have done is
a hand translation of the floating point evaluation function
that forms part of an ARM co-processor [25]. This executed
about 300 times faster in interpreted ACL2 than with HOL’s
native execution facility (EVAL). Automatic encoding of
this is in progress. We plan to use ACL2 to run an existing
HOL model of an ARM processor [7]. This will be linked
to the floating point co-processor. Using ACL2, it is hoped
that we can validate the HOL ARM model against ARM’s
internal simulator and against actual ARM hardware.
1The “Common Lisp” time comes from inserting hand-generated
guards into the ACL2 functions and evaluating with those functions in the
ACL2 loop; but those functions immediately call their compiled Common
Lisp counterparts.
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We want to investigate translating HOL goals, and the
definitions they depend on, into SEXP. Once the problem
has been reformulated into SEXP, we export it to a file of
ACL2 S-expressions as an ACL2 book that may be pro-
cessed by ACL2. An ACL2 user then creates an ACL2
book that includes the contents of the one that was gen-
erated and perhaps additional intermediate definitions and
lemmas. After ACL2 has been led to validate the extended
book, it will be trivial to certify the generated book, at which
point the original SEXP goal can be declared to have been
solved and an ACL2-tagged SEXP theorem achieving the
goal is created. For this to be sound, we need to be sure that
the original goal is a theorem of HOL, but we are confident
this is true because the theorems about S-expressions prov-
able in the HOL theory SEXP are a superset of the theorems
provable in ACL2. Note that in ACL2 there is an implicit
assumption that all instances of induction up to the ordinal
ε0 are available. The HOL logic is sufficiently strong that
these instances are provable in SEXP.
Our current treatment of macros may not work for im-
porting a large ACL2 development, say the JVM, into SEXP
because elimination of macros can cause significant expan-
sion in code size and loss of mnemonic abstractions. By
defining appropriate auxiliary HOL definitions or ML func-
tions, like the functions List and andl mentioned in Sec-
tion 5, it may be possible to provide better support for
importing macros, but for current work, expanding them
seems adequate. Macros require more thought and exper-
imental studies to identify technical issues.
No simplifying assumptions about the ACL2 logic have
been made. We believe that if you trust ACL2 and HOL4
then you should be able to trust shared developments using
the systems linked according to our approach.
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Abstract— We present a hardware verification environment
that integrates the ACL2 theorem prover and SixthSense, an IBM
internal formal verification tool. In this environment, SixthSense
is invoked through an ACL2 function acl2six that makes use of
a general-purpose external interface added to the ACL2 theorem
prover. This interface allows decision procedures and model-
checkers to be connected to ACL2 by simply writing ACL2
functions. Our environment also exploits a unique approach
to connect the logic of a general-purpose theorem prover with
machine designs in VHDL without a language embedding.
With an example of a pipelined multiplier, we show how our
environment can be used to divide a large verification problem
into a number of simpler problems, which can be verified using
automated verification engines.
I. INTRODUCTION
Formal verification technology can be grouped into two
major categories, automated verification techniques and in-
teractive theorem proving techniques. Automated verification
techniques can verify a system without much human involve-
ment, but fail to scale to large systems. On the other hand,
interactive theorem proving techniques can scale, but require
significant human efforts.
The combination of these two techniques can create an ideal
tool for formal verification. We can use automated verification
techniques to verify properties of machine components, and
then use theorem proving to combine the results. Or we can
verify the correctness of algorithms using theorem proving,
and then use automated verification techniques to check that
the algorithms are correctly implemented in the hardware.
In order to make the verification tool practical, it is essen-
tial to access a hardware description language (HDL). It is
preferable to access an HDL that is already used by industrial
designers, such as Verilog or VHDL. For this reason subsets
of Verilog and VHDL have been embedded into the ACL2
theorem prover on a number of occasions [5], [13], [14].
Embedding even a core subset of such an HDL into the formal
language of a general-purpose theorem prover, however, has
proven to be tedious and difficult.
Another problem with embedding an HDL into a theorem
prover is that the theorem prover ends up with a very low-
level model of the hardware. We think this is not the best
place to apply theorem proving techniques. Rather theorem
proving is best applied at a more abstract level, such as during
the verification of the fundamental algorithms that perform
mathematical operations.
Our strategy uses an automated tool to verify properties
about low-level circuits. The use of the theorem prover is
directed toward high-level work such as combining those
results and verifying algorithms. That way, we lessen the
amount of theorem proving effort, and enable the automatic
reverification of hardware after making any low-level mod-
ifications. Furthermore we have, for the most part, avoided
embedding the formal semantics of an HDL in a general-
purpose theorem prover.
In this paper, we focus on the approach and techniques
used in combining the ACL2 theorem prover [8], [6] and
SixthSense, an IBM internal verification tool [10]. In this
combination, we translate ACL2 properties to be checked into
VHDL, instead of embedding the VHDL hardware model
into the ACL2 logic. SixthSense then compiles the VHDL
for the property as well as the hardware under test, and runs
verification algorithms to check the property on the hardware.
In a sense, SixthSense is used as ACL2’s interface to VHDL,
hiding all the details of the low-level design.
This combined tool is built on top of a small extension of
the ACL2 theorem prover, which allows connection to external
tools. This extension itself is general purpose, and not specific
to SixthSense. Thus other tools can be connected to the ACL2
theorem prover by simply providing an ACL2 function similar
to the one described in this paper, without further changing
the source code of the ACL2 theorem prover.
After introducing minimal facts about ACL2 and SixthSense
in Section II, we discuss how we build the connection of those
tools in Section III and Section IV. In Section V, we explain
the verification of a pipelined multiplier using this combined
tool. We cover related work in Section VI and conclude in
Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides a quick overview of the ACL2 theo-
rem prover and the SixthSense verification tool.
The ACL2 logic, the language of the ACL2 theorem prover,
is an applicative subset of Common Lisp with certain exten-
sions. All functions and theorems are written in typical Lisp-
like prefix notation. We assume some knowledge of Common
Lisp in this paper. A basic ACL2 tutorial can be found on the
web [7].
In the ACL2 logic, all functions are defined with defun, as
in Common Lisp. ACL2 can be used to create quite complex
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programs. In fact, the majority of the ACL2 system itself is
written in the ACL2 logic. This is made possible by a program
mode in which functions may be defined without extending
the ACL2 theory. These functions have no logical meaning
for the theorem prover and no properties can be proven about
them. The system-call function, for example, is a program-
mode function.
Theorems are defined using the defthm event. Often a
defthm takes the form of
(defthm thm-name thm-body :hints hint-list).
This defthm tries to prove the expression thm-body with
ACL2 proof algorithms, and stores it with thm-name if it is
successfully proven. During the course of the proof, ACL2
might be guided by hints in hint-list. Each hint is of the
form (goal-spec :key1 val1 . . . :keyn valn), where goal-
spec specifies the node in the proof tree to apply the hint,
and the key-value pairs specify what actions to be taken.
For example, the hint ("Goal" :use theorem1) directs
ACL2 to apply theorem1 at the beginning of the proof, as
"Goal" refers to the root of the proof tree.
Although an extensive programing capability is provided
in the system, ACL2 does not allow the user to extend the
theorem proving algorithms. In this way it differs from HOL
[2], which uses user-defined functions to implement theorem
proving algorithms. We will explain how we change this
limitation in the following section.
SixthSense is a powerful IBM internal industrial verification
tool. The target hardware and the checked properties are
provided as finite state machines written in VHDL or Verilog.
SixthSense can prove safety properties that always hold, or
present counter-examples, as waveforms, to safety properties
that do not. SixthSense can in effect prove many types of
properties by reformulating them into safety properties, includ-
ing bounded LTL model-checking properties and properties
specifying that a condition holds after a specific number of
clock cycles.
SixthSense employs a transformation-based verification
approach[10]. It has numerous automated verification engines
that take a verification problem and either prove it, or convert
it to a simpler problem and pass it to the next engine. Some
of the engines used in SixthSense are:
• Redundancy removal engine: Identifying functionally re-
dundant gates and removing them.
• Re-timing engine: Moving logic gates beyond hardware
latches, in an attempt to reduce the number of latches.
• Structural target enlargement engine: Using preimage
computation to enlarge the target states.
• Localization engine: An over-approximate transformation
that isolates a cut point of the net-list and replaces it by
primary inputs.
• Semi-formal search engine: Searching for counter exam-
ples in symbolic and random simulations.
• SAT engine: Solving the problem by using a SAT solver.
SixthSense applies these engines successively in an attempt to
verify a property. If it cannot solve a verification problem with
the current engine, it passes a simplified verification problem
to the next engine. Some of the engines such as the SAT engine
are terminating, and either solve the problem or fail.
By default, SixthSense’s expert-system mode intelligently
applies various engine sequences. If a certain engine sequence
does not look promising, it backtracks to an earlier stage and
applies different engines with different parameters. Alterna-
tively, one can provide SixthSense with a configuration file
that guides it to use engines in a specified order with specific
parameters.
III. :External HINT EXTENSION TO ACL2
In order to combine ACL2 and SixthSense into one en-
vironment, we implemented an interface between the ACL2
theorem prover and outside procedures. This extension is
implemented as a new ACL2 hint, which is invoked by the key-
word :external. Like all other ACL2 hints, :external
reduces a conjectured ACL2 term to other forms that are
supposed to be easier to prove. The :external hint does
this reduction by calling a user-defined ACL2 function.
A function fn called through :external hint should
have the type signature of (fn args cl state) =>
(mv err lst state)—i.e. fn takes an optional argument
args, a clause to be proven cl and an ACL2 state state
and returns a triple of error flag err, a list of new clauses
lst and an updated ACL2 state. Note that the ACL2 primitive
mv creates a multi-valued structure, which is then accessed
through mv-let—for example, (mv-let (x y) (mv a
b) x) is equal to a.
ACL2 internally represents a clause l1 ∨ l2 ∨ · · · ∨ ln by
a list of literals (l1 l2 . . . ln). The function fn is supposed
to reduce the clause into a set of simpler clauses, and return
them as a list lst. The reduction should be such that proving
all the clauses in lst is sufficient to derive the original clause
cl.
We provide an example of the :external hint below.
(defun split-a-and-b (cl state)
(mv nil
(list
;; when a is not bool
(append ’((booleanp a)) cl)
;; when b is not bool
(append ’((booleanp b)) cl)
;; when a and b
(subst ’’t ’b (subst ’’t ’a cl))
;; when ˜a and b
(subst ’’t ’b (subst ’’nil ’a cl))
;; when a and ˜b
(subst ’’nil ’b (subst ’’t ’a cl))
;; when ˜a and ˜b




(and (booleanp a) (booleanp b))
(or (not b) (and a b) (and (not a) b)))
:hints (("Goal" :external (split-a-and-b))))
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When called through an :external hint, the function
split-a-and-b splits cl into six cases depending on the
values of the variables a and b. The first two are for the
case where a and b are not Boolean, and this case is proven
by clauses (booleanp a) ∨ cl and (booleanp b) ∨
cl, respectively. Each of the following four cases substitutes
the truth value t and the false value nil for a and b. This
hint proves a tautology of a and b such as theorem-1, by
simply trying all combinations of truth values. Note that the
:external hint passes arguments cl and state to the hint
function implicitly.
Although this example is very simple, a user can write a
more detailed theorem proving procedure as a new function,
and call it through the :external hint interface. This way,
the user can extend the capability of the ACL2 theorem prover.
Since the function called through :external takes an ACL2
state as an argument, it can also search the ACL2 database for
already proven theorems and apply them to the conjectured
clause.
Additionally, the external hint can be used to call any de-
cision procedures, model checkers, or other theorem provers.
The :external hint function can also write or read to a file
system. We use this as the foundation of our interface between
ACL2 and SixthSense.
On the other hand, the :external hint can be a very
dangerous feature. Since any function can be called from
the :external hint, a user may end up proving an invalid
theorem. For example, a hint function:
(defun wrong-hint (cl state)
(mv nil nil state))
reduces the given clause cl to an empty list of clauses, and
“proves” any theorem. A user must be extremely cautious in
using the :external hint capability.
Although our :external hint interface does not provide
an LCF-style type-system to guarantee the correctness of
user defined extensions, we can mitigate the dangers of the
:external hint by adding tags to theorems. Similar tags
are used in the HOL theorem prover [3] for the connection
to external decision procedures. Such tags allow the user to
control and check which :external hint extensions have
been used for the verification of their theorems.
IV. INTERFACE TO SIXTHSENSE
We defined an ACL2 program-mode function acl2six,
which is called by this :external hint interface. This
extension is used to verify that a property, written in the
ACL2 logic, holds for a hardware design described in VHDL.
The acl2six function translates an ACL2 property that we
want to verify to VHDL, and passes it to the SixthSense
verification tool, which in turn attempts to verify that the
VHDL design satisfies the property. If the property is verified
by SixthSense, then ACL2 uses this result to further its proof
effort. If SixthSense fails to verify the property, then one

















Fig. 1. The flow of acl2six function call. A rectangle represents data,
whereas an ellipse represents a process.
To describe the implementation of acl2six in detail,
we first introduce two new function symbols sigbit and
sigvec, with the following type signatures:
(sigbit entity signame cycle phase)
=> bit
(sigvec entity signame lbit hbit cycle phase)
=> bv
These functions output a single-bit value bit or bit-vector
value bv of a signal in our hardware design, given a machine
model entity, the signal name signame, integer pair lbit
and hbit providing the lowest and highest index of a bit-
vector, and natural numbers cycle and phase denoting the
time.
The machine model entity not only designates the ma-
chine module called “entity” in VHDL, but also specifies its
interface, its initial state, the primary inputs to the machine,
and its clocking information. Essentially, entity denotes the
machine and its execution environment. Functions sigbit
and sigvec return the value of a signal in that particular run
at the given time. Time is designated by the pair of cycle
and phase, where cycle increments from 0, and each clock
cycle is divided into two phases denoted by 1 and 2.
A data flow diagram of the acl2six function is shown in
Fig. 1, which proceeds through the following steps:
• Translate property to VHDL. The acl2six function
uses simple heuristics to pick the ACL2 term that will be
checked by SixthSense. This term is then translated into a
VHDL function that inputs the given sigvec signals and
produces a one bit signal that is high when the term holds.
The user may also manually select a term for translation.
The ACL2VHDL translator [15] is used to convert the
ACL2 term to VHDL. Properties must be written in
the subset of the ACL2 language supported by the
ACL2VHDL translator. This subset includes a library of
basic logical primitives, including bit negation (b-not),
bit conjunction (b-and), bit-vectors negation (bv-not),
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bit-vector conjunction (bv-and), addition (bv+), shift,
sub-vector extraction, and many others. For each primi-
tive, we have a definition in ACL2 and a corresponding
definition in VHDL. The translator merely substitutes
each ACL2 function with its corresponding VHDL func-
tion.
• SixthSense Execution. After creating a configuration and
driver file to control the SixthSense run, acl2six exe-
cutes SixthSense by using ACL2’s system call function.
SixthSense then checks that the given property is always
true.
• Interpreting SixthSense Results. If SixthSense suc-
cessfully verifies its property, a new clause list is re-
turned to the theorem prover. If the original clause is
(l1 l2 . . . ln) and property l′ is proven by SixthSense,
acl2six returns (¬l′ l1 l2 . . . ln) as the new clause.
In other words, the theorem prover now has to prove
the original formula assuming the property proved by
SixthSense.
If SixthSense fails to verify the property, a counter-
example to the checked property is usually provided. The
user can analyze it by using a GUI-based waveform-
viewing tool. In order to help the user debug it, the
value of arbitrary ACL2 expressions can be also viewed
in the wave-form, if those expressions are provided to the
acl2six hint.
Note that the entire acl2six process can be written as an
ACL2 function.1 Except the implementation of the general-
purpose :external hint feature, we did not modify the
underlying ACL2 code. This suggests that we can use the same
:external mechanism to connect other decision procedures
by simply writing new interface functions. Considering the
complexity of the underlying ACL2 source code, this makes
it much easier to write a similar extension. The extension
function itself should be carefully written to avoid semantic
errors, but at least we do not have to endanger the soundness
of the core algorithm of ACL2.
Part of the uniqueness of our approach is in its use of a
translator from ACL2 to VHDL, rather than the other way
around. This allows us to write a relatively simple translator
from ACL2 functions to VHDL functions, rather than a more
complex translator from VHDL designs to equivalent ACL2
models. Note that this approach does not put restrictions on
the designs being verified.
Another merit of our approach is that the theorem prover
does not have to deal directly with the low-level details of
hardware designs. These details change frequently, putting a
heavy maintenance burden on user-guided proofs concerning
them. In our approach theorem provers can focus on what they
do best, leaving automated tools to check the design changes.
1At the moment of writing this article, ACL2VHDL translation written in














(a :in std_ulogic_vector (0 31))
(b :in std_ulogic_vector (0 31))




(and (integerp n) (<= 1 n))
(equal
(bv+ (sigvec (add32) a (0 31) (1- n) 2)
(sigvec (add32) b (0 31) (1- n) 2))






Fig. 3. The entity definition of the adder and its proof script.
A. Adder Example
We use the simple adder in Fig. 2 as an example. This adder
takes two 32-bit inputs, a and b, and produces their 32-bit,
sum, when clk is triggered.
The verification script for this adder is shown in Fig. 3.
The function add32 defines the entity information as a
list of the VHDL entity name, its interface, and its clocking
information. The input clk is driven by a built-in clock source
called c0. The function add32 definition is “disabled” to
prevent the theorem prover from expanding it. This entity
definition allows us to succinctly write the sigvec signal
expression, even for a hardware module with many interface
ports and many other execution conditions. Although this
might seem a minor point, it is important to be able to write
all of the detailed execution environment in a short form for
an industrial setting. Often such details can affect the validity
of the tested properties, and it is desirable that the user not
have to repeatedly specify them.
The defthm expression in Fig. 3 shows a theorem that can
be proven using our system. The sigvec expression
(sigvec (add32) sum (0 31) n 2)
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denotes the value of the 32-bit vector signal sum at cycle n in
phase 2. The sigvec expressions involving a and b are the
same, except that their values are observed at cycle n−1. The
theorem adder-adds proves that the output sum is equal
to the modular summation of the inputs a and b from the
previous cycle. Typical properties checked by our system are
like the conditions involving signals at different timing. In this
example, we use only the input and output signals, but we can
also prove theorems about internal signals, such as sum int
in Fig. 2.
When the defthm adder-adds is executed, the
acl2six function processes the theorem following steps:
• Translate property to VHDL. The following term is
selected for translation:
(equal
(bv+ (sigvec (add32) a (0 31) (1- n) 2)
(sigvec (add32) b (0 31) (1- n) 2))
(sigvec (add32) sum (0 31) n 2))
The function bv+ is a logical primitive, with a VHDL
definition known to ACL2VHDL and the sigvec func-
tions are interpreted as references to the adder hardware
design.
Note that add32 does not provide the initial state, or
explain how to drive the input ports a and b. Unless
otherwise specified, acl2six considers all possible
combination of initial state and input values. Internally
by SixthSense, they are assigned new input variables.
• SixthSense Execution. SixthSense is now asked to verify
the created VHDL property. Note that since the first
sum comes out a cycle after the machine starts, the
property does not hold in cycle zero. The argument
(:ignore-cycles 1) tells SixthSense to ignore the
first cycle.
• Interpreting SixthSense Results. SixthSense returns that
the property holds for all time after the first cycle.
The acl2six function then adds a new hypothesis to
represent this statement. The theorem prover then finishes
the proof by showing that this new hypothesis implies the
original theorem.
Note that if a larger :ignore-cycle argument were
provided, however, the property verified by SixthSense
would be too weak to imply adder-adds and the proof
attempt would fail.
B. Soundness
In this sub-section we present a proof sketch showing that
the use of an acl2six hint does not result in an inconsistent
theory. Our strategy is to show that any theorem admitted by
the acl2six hint can be theoretically proven by the ACL2
theorem prover.
Since the hardware design is a finite state machine, we
can express its behavior in ACL2 as a recursive function,
stepn(s, i, n), where s is an initial state, i is an input sequence,
and n a cycle number. The definitions of sigbit and
sigvec then return a value of signals based on this function.
Let us also define an ACL2 function M(S, I, n) that returns
the set of reachable states of the machine by enumerating
stepn(s, i, n) for all possible s ∈ S and i ∈ I at cycles up to
n.
Now let us show that any theorem ti, proven by acl2six
is also provable by the pure ACL2 theorem prover. Since
every property that can be proven by SixthSense is a safety
property, ti can be reformulated using a predicate P to x ∈
M(S, I, n) → P (x) for arbitrary cycle n. Because this is
a finite state machine, M(S, I, n0) = M(S, I, n) for all n
larger than some n0, which can be proven by ACL2 using
induction. Since SixthSense proves the VHDL equivalent of
P (x) holds for all reachable states, ACL2 can prove that
x ∈ M(S, I, n0) → P (x) by evaluating P (x) for every
x ∈ M(S, I, n0). Combining these results, ACL2 can prove
that ti holds. QED.
In this argument, we make a few assumptions:
• SixthSense does not prove any properties that are not
really valid in the hardware design.
• All functions defined in both VHDL and ACL2 (such as
bv+), have equivalent semantics.
• The constrained functions sigbit and sigvec are
never instantiated. ACL2 allows a constrained function
fc to be instantiated with another function f if f sat-
isfies all the constraints of fc. Although we implement
sigbit and sigvec as constrained functions, they
have a specific meaning with respect to the hardware
design, and should therefore never be instantiated with
another function.
V. MULTIPLIER EXAMPLE
We have used our integration of ACL2 and SixthSense to
verify a pipelined 54x53 bit multiplier design, which is used
in an industrial floating point unit. The verification of this
multiplier is described in detail in a previous paper[12]. Here
we describe the overall approach used.
An overview of the multiplier design is shown in Fig. 4.
The inputs A and C first go through the Booth encoding stage,
which produces 27 partial sum vectors that when summed are
equal to the multiplication of A and C. These 27 vectors are
then compressed during successive stages into 18, 12, 6, 4, and
finally 2 bit-vectors, Sum and Carry, which when summed are
equal to the multiplication of A and C. The final summation
is not implemented in the multiplier itself, as it is a typical
design in a floating-point unit. The multiplier requires four
and a half clock cycles, starting at the beginning of a cycle
and ending by the middle of one four cycles later.
The correctness of this design is encoded by the following
ACL2 theorem:
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(bv+ (Sum-output n 1)
(Carry-output n 1))
(bv (* (bv-val (A-input (- n 4) 2))
(bv-val (C-input (- n 4) 2)))
108))))
Note that the function bv-val returns the natural number that
a bit vector represents, and bv converts a natural number into
its corresponding bit-vector. Also, the function bv+ returns
a bit vector representing the summation of its two input bit
vectors. The macros A-input, C-input, Sum-output,
and Carry-output produce the corresponding input and
output signals of the multiplier at a given cycle and phase.
These macros are defined by using sigbit and sigvec.
Multiplier designs are particularly difficult to verify with
SixthSense, since it does not implement any algorithms spe-
cialized for multipliers. This makes the multiplier a good
example to illustrate how we can verify designs using the
combination of ACL2 and SixthSense.
Our proof begins by verifying the algorithm used in
the Booth encoding multiplier. The definition of a Booth
encoding multiplier and some proof scripts are shown in
Fig. 5. The encoder computes the multiplication of two n
bit vectors x and y by summing n/2 partial sums, each
of which consist of either 2 ∗ y, y, 0, −y, or −2 ∗ y
shifted to the left. Function acl2-Booth-vector com-
putes a single partial sum, and acl2-Booth-mult adds
all of them. The correctness of the multiplier is given
as a theorem simple-Booth-encoder-correct. The
proof is conducted by first proving the intermediate lemma
simple-Booth-encoder-lemma by mathematical in-
duction, and then substituting (* 2 x) for x. This arithmetic
proof on the Booth algorithm is a good example where the use
of the ACL2 theorem prover is most suitable.
The next step in the verification of the multiplier is to check
the partial sums generated by the real Booth encoder stage is
;; We’re really considering the two’s
;; complement encoding of (mod x 8).
(defun acl2-Booth-vector (x y)
(case (mod x 8)







(4 (* -2 y))))
;; Each recursive step involves a two bit
;; right-shift of x and a two bit
;; left-shift of y.
(defun acl2-Booth-mult1 (x y)
(if (zp x)
0
(+ (acl2-Booth-vector x y)
(acl2-Booth-mult1 (floor x 4)
(* 4 y)))))
;; The multiplication begins by adding
;; a zero to x.
(defun acl2-Booth-mult (x y)





(equal (acl2-Booth-mult1 x y)





(equal (acl2-Booth-mult x y)
(* x y))))
Fig. 5. The definition of a simple Booth encoder, along with the main lemma
required to verify it in the ACL2 theorem prover, and a theorem stating that
it performs multiplication.
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(bv+ (stage1-output-sum8 n 2)
(stage1-output-carry8 n 2))
(bv+ (vhdl-Booth-output-26 n 1)
(bv+ (vhdl-Booth-output-25 n 1)
(vhdl-Booth-output-24 n 1)))))
:hints (("Goal" :external (acl2six ...))))
Fig. 6. Stage1-compressor-8-correct uses SixthSense to verify
that the summation of the inputs to the 8th stage 1 compressor is equal to the
summation of its three outputs
equivalent to the one generated by acl2-Booth-vector.
This is a little harder than we thought, because the real
Booth encoder implements a number of tricks to optimize
the design. Also we have to define an intermediate function
using the ACL2VHDL library, as the functions in Fig. 5
cannot be directly fed to the acl2six hint. By defining such
functions and calling SixthSense via acl2six, we prove that
the real Booth encoder generates the correct partial sums. The
theorem prover then composes these results to prove that the
summation of the Booth encoder output signals is equal to the
multiplication of the original inputs.
To complete the verification of the multiplier, we must
prove that the summation of all the vectors are preserved
at each compression stage. We first verified that each carry-
save adder reduces three or four inputs into two outputs while
preserving the sum. Stage1-compressor-8-correct,
in Figure 6, is an example of such a lemma, which is verified
by SixthSense automatically. We next used the ACL2 theorem
prover to combine all the lemmas together. It repeatedly
applied rewriting of the summation term using commutativity
and associativity of bv+ rules to prove the preservation of the
sum. The results from the three steps are combined to prove
the theorem multiplier-correct.
VI. RELATED WORK
There have been many integrations between model-checking
and theorem proving tools. The general-purpose theorem
prover PVS was built with model checking as a primitive
proof engine [11]. The SyMP model prover uses a more
general approach to integrating the two techniques [1]. With
the ACL2 theorem prover, numerous model-checking inspired
engines have been integrated, most recently UCLID [9]. What
makes our system unique is the fact that we are verifying, in
a scalable manner, industrial RTL-level designs written in an
HDL.
Within the ACL2 theorem proving community there are
three systems of which we know that verify RTL-level designs
in HDL: AMD’s system that translates Verilog to ACL2 [14],
Hunt and Reeber’s system that translates Verilog to DE2 [5],
and Borrione’s system that translates VHDL to ACL2 [13]. All
of these use the embedding of HDL in ACL2 logic, making our
approach unique. And of these only AMD’s system captures
a broad enough range of the RTL to capture many industrial
designs.
Outside the ACL2 theorem proving community, FORTE
[17], developed by Intel and descended from HOL-Voss [4], is
the most well-known verification system closely related to our
approach. It combines a symbolic trajectory evaluator (STE)
and an LCF-style higher-order-logic theorem prover called
ThmTac to verify a broad range of industrial RTLs. Both
FORTE and our acl2six systems use similar approaches
to the verification problem, using the automated verification
engine for fast changing hardware design, while theorem
provers are used for verifying high-level specifications that
are less likely to change and can be reused.
However, there are a few critical differences between
FORTE and our approach. The first difference is the theorem
prover. FORTE uses what they repeatedly describe a “light-
weight” theorem prover. It is mostly used for stitching indi-
vidual STE verification results together, and less emphasis is
put on the proof of high-level concepts. On the other hand,
we combined a general-purpose theorem prover to an industrial
verification tool. A full-featured prover is beneficial, especially
one takes a progressive approach to verifying hardware prop-
erties. The beginning user might only use the prover for case-
splitting and result stitching. An advanced user, however, can
gradually use more features, eventually proving more difficult
and mathematically deep theorems.
Another difference is that FORTE integrates the underlying
STE as a white-box to the theorem prover, while we treat our
underlying SixthSense system as a black-box. The developers
of FORTE claim that their tight integration gives them access
to the internal data structures, allowing better debugging and
tuning. We do not agree with this, as our black-box approach
can also control the SixthSense’s parameters through configu-
ration files, and also use the low level debugging tools. Rather
we see more advantages for black-boxing. For example, the
SixthSense calls can be repeated independently of the theorem
prover, allowing us to pass the failed information to the
engineers who do not wish to run the ACL2 theorem prover.
Furthermore our generic integration approach can, in principle,
call other model checkers on demand; by loading another
definition of an integration function similar to acl2six.
Finally, FORTE incorporates the VHDL as a netlist into
the system after compilation. This is similar to other language
embedding approach. Our system only incorporates the proven
properties into the theorem prover.
VII. CONCLUSION
The integration of ACL2 and SixthSense is implemented
as an ACL2 function acl2six on top of a simple new
ACL2 hint, :external. Only 57 lines of the theorem prover
source code were modified to implement this new hint. The
implementation of acl2six, on the other hand, consists of
over 3000 lines of ACL2 functions. These functions form a
library, whose compiled code can be dynamically loaded. In
this way, we cleanly separate the acl2six implementation
from the rest of the ACL2 system.
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We avoided embedding the VHDL language into the ACL2
logic by using the ACL2VHDL translator, which translates a
subset of ACL2 to VHDL, along with a simple machine model
based on the entity data-structure and the constrained
functions sigbit and sigvec. While our method restricts
the properties that can be proven automatically, it allows for
a broad range of models—i.e. all VHDL designs currently
understood by SixthSense.
In Section V we describe how our system was used to
verify a pipelined multiplier, but we believe our system will
scale well to much larger designs. The verification of the
entire floating-point unit, relative to the IEEE-754 standard
would be an interesting application of our system. Considering
the richness of the arithmetic analysis required for the divide
and square root verification [16], the combination of theorem
proving and fully automated verification should shine in this
application.
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Abstract— SystemC is becoming a de-facto standard for the
early simulation of Systems-on-a-chip (SoCs). It is a parallel
language with a scheduler. Testing a SoC written in SystemC
implies that we execute it, for some well chosen data. We are
bound to use a particular deterministic implementation of the
scheduler, whose specification is non-deterministic. Consequently,
we may fail to discover bugs that would have appeared using
another valid implementation of the scheduler. Current methods
for testings SoCs concentrate on the generation of the inputs,
and do not address this problem at all. We assume that the
selection of relevant data is already done, and we generate
several schedulings allowed by the scheduler specification. We
use dynamic partial-order reduction techniques to avoid the
generation of two schedulings that have the same effect on
the system’s behavior. Exploring alternative schedulings during
testing is a way of guaranteeing that the SoC description, and
in particular the embedded software, is scheduler-independent,
hence more robust. The technique extends to the exploration of
other non-fully specified aspects of SoC descriptions, like timing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Register Transfer Level (RTL) used to be the entry point
of the design flow of hardware systems, but the simulation
environments for such models do not scale up well. Devel-
oping and debugging embedded software for these low level
models before getting the physical chip from the factory is no
longer possible at a reasonable cost. New abstraction levels,
such as the Transaction Level Model (TLM) [1], have emerged.
The TLM approach uses a component-based approach, in
which hardware blocks are modules communicating with so-
called transactions. The TLM models are used for early
development of the embedded software, because the high level
of abstraction allows a fast simulation. This new abstraction
level comes with new synchronization mechanisms which
often make existing methods for RTL validation inapplicable.
In particular, recent TLM models do not have clock anymore.
SystemC is a C++ library used for the description of SoCs at
different levels of abstraction, from cycle accurate to purely
functional models. It comes with a simulation environment,
and is becoming a de facto standard. As TLM models appear
first in the design flow, they become reference models for
SoCs. In particular, the software that is validated with the TLM
model should remain unchanged in the final SoC. Here, we
concentrate on testing methods for SoCs written in SystemC.
The current industrial methodology for testing SoCs in
SystemC is the following. First, we identify what we want
to test (the System Under Test, or SUT), which is usually
an open system. We make it closed by plugging input gen-
erators and a result checker, called oracle. SCV [2] is a
testing tool for SystemC. It helps in writing input gener-
ators by providing C++ macros for expressing constraints:
SCV_CONSTRAINT((addr()>10 && addr()< 50)||
(addr()>=2 && addr()<= 5)); is an SCV constraint
that will generate random values of addr. In most existing
approaches, the SUT writes in memory, and the oracle consists
in comparing the final state of the SUT memory to a reference
memory. As usual, the main difficulty is to get a good quality
test suite, i.e., a test suite that does not omit useful tests (that
may reveal a bug) and at the same time avoids redundant
tests (that can expose the same bugs) as much as possible.
Specman [3] is a commercial alternative of SCV which uses
the e language for describing the constraints.
Contributions and Structure of the paper: We assume that
the choice of relevant data for the testing phase has already
been done: we consider a SoC written in SystemC, including
the data generator and the oracle. For each of the test data, the
system has to be run, necessarily with a particular implemen-
tation of the scheduler. Since the specification of the scheduler
is non-deterministic, this means that the execution of tests
may hide bugs that would have appeared with another valid
implementation of the scheduler. Moreover, the scheduling is
due to the simulation engine only, and is unlikely to represent
anything concrete on the final SoC where we have true paral-
lelism. We would like the SoC description, and in particular the
embedded software, to be scheduler-independent. Exploring
alternative schedulings is a way of validating this property.
We present an automatic technique for the exploration of
schedulings in the case of SystemC. It is an adaptation and
application of the method for dynamic partial order reduction
presented in [4]. This method allows to explore efficiently
the states of a system made of parallel processes (given as
object code) that execute on a preemptive OS and synchro-
nize with a lock mechanism. We show here that it can be
applied to SystemC too. Adaptations are needed because: the
SystemC scheduler is not preemptive; SystemC programs use
non-persistent event notifications instead of locks; evaluation
phases alternate with update phases; an eligible process cannot
be disabled by another one.
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Our tool is based on forking executions: we start executing
the system for a given data-input, and as soon as we suspect
that several scheduler choices could cause distinct behaviors,
we fork the execution. We use an approximate criterion to
decide whether to fork executions. The idea is to look at the
actions performed by the processes, in order to guess whether
a change in their order (as what would be produced by distinct
scheduler choices) could affect the final state. This criterion
is approximate in the following sense: we may distinguish
between executions that in fact lead to the same final state;
but we cannot consider as equivalent two executions that lead
to distinct final states. The result is a complete, but not always
minimal, exploration of the scheduling choices for the whole
data-input.
The paper is structured as follows: section II presents
an overview of SystemC. Section III is the formal setting;
Section IV explains the algorithms and section V proves the
properties of the method. We present our implementation and
evaluate it in section VI, related work in section VII, and we
conclude with section VIII.
II. SYSTEMC AND THE SCHEDULING PROBLEMS
A TLM model written in SystemC is based on an archi-
tecture, i.e. a set of components and connections between
them. Components behave in parallel. Each component has
typed connection ports, and its behavior is given by a set
of communicating processes that can be programmed in full
C++. For managing the set of concurrent processes that
appear in the components, SystemC provides a scheduler, and
several synchronization mechanisms: the low-level events, the
synchronous signals that trigger an event when their value
changes, and higher level, user-defined mechanisms based on
abstract communication channels.




Fig. 1. Diagram of an execution
The static architecture is built by executing the so-called
elaboration phase (ELAB), which creates components and
connections. Then the scheduler starts running the processes
of the components, according to the informal automaton of
figure 2. Simulations of a SystemC model look like sequences
of evaluation phases (EV). Signals update phase (UP) and
time elapse (TE) separate them (see figure 1).
A. The SystemC Scheduler
According to the SystemC Language Reference Manual [5],
the scheduler must behave as follows. At the end of the
elaboration phase ELAB, some processes are eligible, some
others are waiting. During the evaluation phase EV, eligible
processes are run in an unspecified order, non-preemptively,
and explicitly suspend themselves when reaching a wait in-
struction. There are two kinds of wait instructions: a process

















Fig. 2. Automaton of the SystemC Scheduler
While running, it may access shared variables and signals,
enable other processes by notifying events, or program delayed
notifications. An eligible process cannot become “waiting”
without being executed. When there is no more eligible
process, signals values are updated (UP) and δ-delayed no-
tifications are triggered, which can wake up processes. A δ-
cycle is the duration between two update phases. Since there is
no interaction between processes during the update phase, the
order of the updates has no consequence. When there is still
no eligible process at the end of an update phase, the scheduler
lets time elapse (TE), and awakes the processes that have the
earliest deadline. A notification of a SystemC event can be
immediate, δ-delayed or time-delayed. Processes can thus be





if (x) cout << "Ok\n";






Fig. 3. The foo example
To illustrate possible consequences of scheduling choices,
let us introduce two small examples of SystemC programs.
Figure 3 shows the example foo made of two processes A
and B. It has three possible executions according to the chosen
scheduling, leading to very different results:
• A;B;A;[TE];B;A: This scheduling leads to the printing of
the string “Ok”.
• A;B;A;[TE];A;B: The string “Ko” is printed. It is a
typical case of data-race: x is tested before it has been
set to 1.
• B;A;[TE];B: The execution ends after three steps only.
The “wait(e)” statement has been executed before any
notification of event e. Since events are not persistent
in SystemC, process A has not been woken up. It is a
particular form of deadlock.
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void top::A()
as in example foo
void top::B()





Fig. 4. The foobar example
It is useful to test all executions of the foo example
because they lead to different final states. But consider
now the foobar example defined in figure 4. foobar
has 30 possible executions, but only 3 different final states.
12 executions are equivalent to “C;A;B;A;[TE];C;B;A”, 12
to “C;A;B;A;[TE];C;A;B” and 6 to “C;B;A;[TE];C;B”. The
method we present generates only 3 executions, one for each
final state (or equivalence class).
In general testing techniques, the idea of generating one
representative in each class of an equivalence relation is called
partition-based testing [6]. It is not always formally defined.
C. Communication Actions
We call communication actions all actions that affect or use
a shared object. We consider only two kinds of shared objects:
events and variables. All other synchronization structures can
be modeled using these two primitives.
There are two operations on events: wait and notify; and
two operations on variables: read and write. In the sequel we
will distinguish caught notifications (those that have woken
up a process) from missed notifications, and writes that have
modified the current value from non-modifying ones. Of
course, theses distinctions can only be done dynamically in
the general case.
III. FORMAL SETTING
We will now explain how we generate schedulings for multi-
threaded models written in SystemC. In the whole section,
the SUT is a SystemC program. We suppose that we have an
independent tool for generating test cases that only contain
the data. We call SUTD the object made of the SUT plus one
particular test data1. We have to generate a relevant set of
schedulings for this data.
Most of the definitions in this section are quite standard in
the literature on partial order reduction techniques.
A. Representation of the SUTD
When data is fixed, a SUT execution is entirely defined by
its scheduling; a scheduling is entirely defined by an element
of (P ∪ {δ, χ})∗ where P is a process identifier and δ, χ are
special symbols used to mark the δ-cycle changes and time
elapses respectively. We consider full states of a SUTD to be
full dumps of the SUTD memory, including the position in the
code of each process. The SUTD can be seen as a function
from the schedulings to the full states. It is partial: not all the
elements of (P ∪ {δ, χ})∗ represent possible schedulings of
the SUTD (because of the synchronization constraints between
processes).
1Strictly speaking, the SUT includes a data generator, not a single piece
of data. But the generator does not depend on the scheduling, hence the
distinction is not necessary here.
Definition 1 (Schedulings): Let M be a SUTD. PM is the
set of its processes; SM is the set of its reachable full states;
FM : (PM ∪ {δ, χ})
∗ −→ SM is its associated function. FM
is partial. A scheduling is an element of (PM ∪ {δ, χ})
∗; a
valid scheduling is an element of the definition domain of
FM : DFM ⊂ (PM ∪ {δ, χ})
∗.
For the programs of Section II-B, we have: DFfoo =
{ABAχBA,ABAχAB, BAχB} and Ffoobar(ABC) =
Ffoobar(ACB) = Ffoobar(CAB).
Definition 2 (Transitions): A transition is one execution of
one process in a particular scheduling. Each transition of a
scheduling is identified by its process identifier indexed by the
occurrence number of this process identifier in the scheduling.
For example, in the scheduling pqp there are 3 transitions: p1,
q1 and p2, in that order.
Definition 3 (Permutations): Let u = vpiwqj be a valid
scheduling where the transition pi (resp. qj) corresponds to the
i-th (resp. j-th) execution of process p (resp. q). Permuting the
transitions pi and qj means generating a new valid scheduling
u′ such that u′ begins by v and the j-th transition of q in u′
is before the i-th transition of p: there exists x, y, z such that
u′ = vxqjypiz. u
′ is called a permutation of pi and qj for u.
We will use letters p, q, r to denote processes, a, b, c, . . .
to denote transitions and u, v, . . . to denote sub-sequences
of schedulings. Indexes will be omitted when obvious by
context. An equivalence on the set of schedulings is needed
to determine whether two schedulings lead to the same final
state. We first define the relation ∼:
∀uabv ∈ DFM , uabv ∼ ubav ⇔
(ubav ∈ DFM ∧ FM (uabv) = FM (ubav))
Definition 4 (Equivalence of Schedulings): The
equivalence of schedulings is the reflexive and transitive
closure of the relation ∼. It is noted ≡.
This definition complies with the property: ∀u, v ∈ DFM , u ≡
v ⇒ F (u) = F (v). Therefore, if we generate one element of
each equivalence class of ≡, we will have all possible final
states. It allows to detect all property violation as soon as the
corresponding output checker has been included into the SUT
and drives it to a special final state when it detects an error.
B. Transition Dependency and Permutation Choice
We produce alternative schedulings by permuting some
transitions of a given scheduling, but only when this can lead
to a non-equivalent scheduling. For example, suppose that
we are executing a SUTD and we have just executed the
process p and then the process q (u = u1piqj). If there is
no causal reason why the transition qj was after the transition
pi (process q was not waiting for an event notified in pi), then
we can permute these two transitions. In that case, executing
q instead of p in the state FM (u1) can be a divergent path as
illustrated on figure 5. The question we have to answer is: “Do
these two schedulings lead to the same state?” or formally:
“FM (u1pq) = FM (u1qp)?”. Note that we may not be able
to prove that FM (u1pq) = FM (u1qp) because we want to
answer this question without executing u1qp entirely. Hence
we rely on the common objects accessed by the transitions to
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guess whether a permutation has some effect on the final state.
This is incomplete. If we cannot prove that the final states are












Fig. 6. Dynamic Dependency Graph
We now study the two questions: which transitions can
we permute? which transition permutations are useful? The
answer to the first question is given by the permutability
relationship; the answer to the second question is given
by the commutativity relationship (it is useless to permute
commutative transitions).
The Dynamic Dependency Graph (DDG) represents the
synchronizations that occur for a particular scheduling. Fig-
ure 6 represents the scheduling abaχba of the foo program
of figure 3. Each horizontal line is a process. New cycles
(δ or χ) are represented by vertical lines. Each box is a
process transition. Dashed arrows (resp. plain lines) between
boxes indicate that the two transitions are dependent but not
permutable (resp. non commutative). We may move some
transitions on the horizontal axis, remaining among the valid
and equivalent schedulings, provided we do not permute two
boxes linked by an arrow or line.
Definition 5 (Permutability): The transitions a and b are
causally permutable in the valid scheduling u1au2bu3, noted
(a, b) ∈ P , if and only if: {u1v1ba ∈ DFM |∃v2, u1v1abv2 ≡
u1au2bu3} = ∅.
In other words, two transitions are not permutable if:
1) there is an equivalent scheduling in which they are
consecutive;
2) the second transition b can be elected in place of the first
transition a in this equivalent scheduling.
Definition 6 (Commutativity of Transitions): The non-
causally ordered transitions a and b are commutative in the
valid scheduling u1au2bu3 if and only if:
∀u1v1abv2 ≡ u1au2bu3, u1v1abv2 ≡ u1v1bav2
Commutativity is not defined for causally ordered transitions.
The theory of partial order reduction relies on the definition
of dependent transitions [7]. In our work, we define the
dependency relationship D as follows:
Definition 7 (Dependency of Transitions): The transitions
a and b are dependent if and only if they are not permutable,
or permutable but not commutative.
The causal order specifies which transitions can be per-
muted in a particular scheduling without permuting dependent
transitions, including themselves. All schedulings of the same
equivalence class have the same causal order. Unlike the
permutability relationship, the causal order is a partial order.
Definition 8 (Causal Order): The transitions a and b are
causally ordered in the valid scheduling u = u1au2bu3,
noted a ≺u b, if and only if (a, b) ∈ transitive closure of
{(x, y) ∈ D|x <u y}.
IV. ALGORITHMS
A. Computation of the Commutativity Relationship
The first step is to detect pairs of transitions which are
not commutative. We compute here a relationship C for all
pairs of transitions. This computed relationship is correct for
permutable transitions, which is sufficient for our problem.
Two transitions may be non-commutative ((a, b) 6∈ C) only if
they contain non-commutative communication actions on the
same shared object (see section II-C). Note that the order of
these actions within a transition is irrelevant. We examine all
cases below.
For shared variables there are three cases of non-commutative
actions (since operations on variables have no effect on process
eligibility, we just need to check whether the equality of
resulting states is still verified after permutation):
1) a read followed by a modifying write
2) a modifying write followed by a read
3) a write followed by a modifying write
In all other cases, the transitions are commutative, as in
example 2. Note that the nature of a write depends on the
scheduling we consider. A modifying write can become a non-
modifying write for another scheduling, and reciprocally.
Example 1: Variable x initially set to 0. The first transition
executes the action x=x+2. The second executes x=4-x. It
is a modifying write followed by a read so we consider that
the two transitions are not commutative (point 2 above).
Example 2: Variable x initially set to 2. The first transition
executes the action x=4. The second transition also executes
this instruction. It is a modifying write followed by a non-
modifying write.
Note that C is symmetric, which may not be obvious from
point 3 above. But permutating a modifying write with a non-
modifying write is still a modifying write followed by a non-
modifying write, except if there is another pair of dependent
actions. Example 2 also illustrates this remark.
For events, there are three cases of non-commutative actions:
1) a notification followed by a wait
2) a wait followed by a notification
3) a caught notification followed by a notification
The dependency between a wait and a notify is quite obvious:
if the wait comes first, then the corresponding process is woken
up by the notify, otherwise it remains sleeping. Example 3
illustrates the third case.
Example 3: Suppose one runs this three-process model:
• Initial state: process A waiting for e, B and C eligible.
• Process A: cout <<’a’; x = 1;
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• Process B: cout <<’b’; x = 2; e.notify();
• Process C: cout <<’c’; e.notify();
There is exactly one transition per process, noted a, b and
c. Four schedulings are valid: bac, bca, cba and cab. In bac
and bca, b is dependent with a (2 modifying writes) but they
are causally ordered (process A was enabled by the transition
b). However if we permute b and c, b is no longer causally
ordered with a since A was enabled by c instead of b.
Permuting two notifications of an event does not modify the
resulting state of the SUTD, but modifies the computed causal
order. That’s why they are considered as non-commutative.
B. Computation of the Causal Partial Order
In order to compute the permutability, we need to compute
the causal order ≺. We denote prec(u) the set {a, b ∈ u|a ≺ b}
obtained after the execution of the scheduling u.
We compute the causal order step by step. Obviously, for
the empty scheduling we have prec(ε) = ∅. Let a and b be
two transitions, we have a ≺ b and so (a, b) ∈ D at least in
the three following cases:
• a or b indicate a new δ-cycle or time-elapsed.
• a and b belong to the same process (by definition)
• the process of transition b has been woken up by a.
In these cases, we note: a ≺β b. The rest of the paragraph









(ub) ∪ {(a, b) 6∈ C|a ∈ u}
prec(ub) = transitive closure of prec
2
(ub)
Finally, we have (a, b) ∈ P in u1au2bu3 if and only if: (a, b) ∈
transitive closure of prec
1
(u1au2b).
The following property is useful to optimize the implemen-
tation: Let u1au2bu3cu4 be a scheduling. Then process(a) =
process(b) ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c. Owing to this property, we can
represents the causal order with an array T of size p×s where
s is the number of steps and p is the number of processes.
The element T [a, q] is the last transition of process q which
is causally before a; i.e.: a ≺ b ⇔ num(a) ≤ T [b, process(a)].
Some other optimizations are well explained in [4].
C. Generation of one alternative scheduling
We are now able to determine if two transitions are not
commutative (hence should be permuted). Now we explain
how we treat such a pair of transitions. Let uavb be a
scheduling such that (a, b) ∈ D ∩ P . Let v = v1 . . . vn where
v1, . . . , vn are transitions. The goal is to generate a new valid
scheduling with b before a. We proceed as follows:
• The first part u is unmodified.
• We execute all vi such that a 6≺ vi.
• We execute b and then a (unlike some other concurrent
languages, b cannot disable a in SystemC).
• Then, since two dependent transitions have been per-
muted, we do not know whether the non-executed tran-
sitions vi such that a ≺ vi are still defined. We are then
free to choose the rest of the scheduling.
D. Generation of a full schedulings suite
We start by executing the SUTD with a random scheduling.
In parallel with the SUTD execution, we run a checker:
• the checker computes the causal partial order “≺” and
builds the Dynamic Dependency Graph.
• if it discovers two non-commutative transitions pi and qj ,
with pi before qj :
– it generates a new scheduling such that qj before pi by
permuting the transitions with the algorithm described
above; the constraint “qj before pi” is saved with the
new scheduling to prevent further permutations of the
same transitions.
– it continues the current execution, adding the opposite
constraint “pi before qj” to all of its further children.
Then we replay the SUTD with each generated scheduling u.
When we reach the end of u, we continue the SUTD execution
with a random scheduling. In parallel, we compute the causal
order and generate new schedulings for each non-commutative
pair of transitions, as for the previous schedulings. Thanks
to the constraints saved with the generated schedulings, each
new generated scheduling is more constrained than its father
scheduling and so there are fewer and fewer new schedulings
at each iteration. When the checker does not generate any new














A; B; A; B; A
B; A
Fig. 7. First iteration of the analysis for the foo example. The first execution
activates processes A and B in the order ABAAB. The checker generates
two new schedulings. One to permute A1 and B1 (unordered accesses to
event e) and the other to permute A3 and B2 (unordered accesses to shared
variable x).
V. PROPERTIES
The algorithm guarantees that we generate at least one
element of each equivalence class (for the equivalence of
definition 4).
Theorem 1: Let GM be the set of all generated schedulings
of a model M . For any scheduling u ∈ DFM , there exists a
scheduling v ∈ GM such that u ≡ v.
There are two useful and direct corollaries. First, if a local
process state is present in a scheduling of DFM , it is also
present in a scheduling of GM . Furthermore, we generate all
the final states, including all deadlocks.
To prove the property, we need the definition of ≡−prefix
and ≡−dominant for schedulings, directly adapted from prefix
and dominant properties of Mazurkiewicz traces [7].
Definition 9: Let p, d ∈ DFM be two schedulings, p is an
≡−prefix of d and d an ≡−dominant of p if and only if there
exists a scheduling u ∈ DFM such that u ≡ d and p is a
string-prefix of u.
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Proof: We proceed by contradiction, and assume that
there exists a scheduling u ∈ DFM which breaks the property.
We can write u in the form u = u1au2 where u1 is the longest








This decomposition is unique so we just have to prove that
u1a has an ≡−dominant in G to get the wanted contradiction.
Let v ∈ G be a generated completed scheduling such that







≡ v If there is no non-





and so v would be a ≡−dominant of u1a.
Consequently a is neither δ nor χ and the process of a
is defined and eligible in FM (u). Since an eligible process




= w1aw2. Since a is eligible in FM (u), it is not causally
after any element of w1. There are three cases:
• if w1 is empty then we get the needed contradiction












• if w1 = xb with (b, a) ∈ D then:
– Transition b is before a in v but they are permutable.
– So we have generated a scheduling v′ with a before b,
using the algorithm described in section IV-C.
– There exists a possible scheduling u1u
′′
2










Consequently, by induction on the length of w1, we get the
needed contradiction.
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
A. The prototype
Figure 8 is an overview of the tool. The checker implements
the checking algorithm of section IV-D. It has to be aware
of all communication actions. Some of them can be detected
by instrumenting the SystemC kernel, some other cannot
(like accesses to a shared variable, that are invisible from the
SystemC kernel). We choose to instrument the C++/SystemC
source code. For each communication action in the code of
a SystemC process, we add an instruction that notifies the
operation to a global recorder. For example, consider the
instruction x=y where x and y are shared variables. The
two following instructions are added close to the assignment:
recorder->read(&y);recorder->write(&x). In-
strumentation is based on the open-source SystemC front-end
Pinapa [8], and is compositional.
Another solution would have been to interpret or instrument
the binaries. However, using a SystemC front-end has some
benefits: it allows to generate a static dependency graph (SDG)
which represents a superset of the communications that can
occur between processes (see Figure 9). Moreover, it is easier
to link the observed behavior to the source code.
The instrumented SystemC program is compiled with a
patched SystemC kernel. The patches are: 1) replacing the
election algorithm of the SystemC scheduler by an interac-




























Fig. 9. Static Dependency Graph for the foobar example. Nodes represent
processes. Arrows represent possible communications between processes. An
arrow goes from the master (i.e. the notifier for a SystemC event, the writer
for a shared variable) to the slave.
2) adding code to record the communication actions that
cannot be detected in the code of the processes, and their
consequences (e.g., enabling of a process). When we execute
the instrumented platform with the patched SystemC kernel,
we can detect dependencies dynamically or save a detailed
trace and run the checker afterwards. In both cases, we get
a list of new schedulings to be executed, and a record of the
computed dependencies, usable as input for other checkers
or visualization tools, like the production of the dynamic
dependency graph (DDG).
B. Evaluation
In order to validate our tool and to evaluate the quality of the
test suites produced, we studied several industrial SoC models.
Assume that running one test-case takes some time T . In order
to cover the scheduling choices, we have to run more than one
test-case. Let us denote V the number of valid schedulings,
and G the number of schedulings generated by our tool. It is
interesting to compare V × T with G × T + O, where O is
the overhead due to the computation of new schedulings.
With a real application, it is often difficult to evaluate V .
We chose to evaluate our method on three examples. First,
we considered a SystemC encoding of the indexer problem
presented in [4]2, because it is easy to evaluate V . However,
the indexer is not representative of the typical SystemC code
found in industry. We then looked at two industrial case-
studies: the first one has about 50 000 lines of code but only
4 processes, and it does not model a full SoC; the second
one has about 250 000 lines of code and 57 processes, and it
represents a full SoC.
1) The Indexer Example: There are n components and
one global 128-element array used as a hash table. Each
component is composed of 2 threads which communicate
using a shared variable and a SystemC event. Each component
writes 4 messages in the global hash table. This corresponds to
schedulings of length 11×n. For n ≤ 11, there is no collision
2For the SystemC version see: http://www-verimag.imag.fr/
˜helmstet/indexer.cpp.
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in the hash table and all schedulings lead to the same final
state. For n ≥ 12 there are collisions hence non-equivalent
schedulings. Our prototype generates valid schedulings leading
to distinct states of the hash table. In this example, we generate
exactly one scheduling per equivalence class. The number of
generated schedulings is far smaller than the number of valid
schedulings (at least 3.35E11 for n = 2, and 2.43E25 for
n = 3). Results are summarized in table I. Time is given only
to help estimating the curve, not as an absolute measure.
components generated schedulings time
1 . . . 11 1 ≤ 11 ms
12 8 60 ms
13 64 4 s
14 512 35 s
15 4096 5 mn
TABLE I
RESULTS FOR THE INDEXER EXAMPLE
2) The MPEG Decoder System: This system has 5 compo-
nents: a master, a MPEG decoder, a display, a memory and a
bus model. There are about 50 000 lines of code and only 4
processes. This is quite common in the more abstract models
found in industry, because there is a lot of sequential code,
and very few synchronizations. We added 340 instrumentation




Fig. 10. Architecture of the MPEG decoder system
The test is stopped after the third decoded image, which
corresponds to 150 transitions. One simulation takes 0.39 s.
Our tool generates 128 schedulings in 1 mn 08 s. No bug is
found, which guarantees that this test-case will run correctly
on any SystemC implementation. Running the model 128
times takes more time than generating the schedulings (we
have G×T = 128×0.39 s ≈ 50 s and O ≈ 1 mn 08−50 s ≈
18 s). Thus the overhead O remains acceptable.
On this example, we noticed that the number of generated
schedulings could be improved. This MPEG decoder, as many
other TLM models, uses a pair (event, variable) to implement
a persistent event as follows (x is initially 0):
Process P runs: x=1; e.notify();
Process Q runs: if (!x) wait(e); x=0;
The two valid schedulings P; Q and Q; P; Q lead to the
same final state, but our tool currently generates both schedul-
ings because it cannot prove it. The intuition is that these
schedulings are not equivalent according to the dependency
relationship as computed in section IV. Detecting this kind of
structures in the source code and taking them into account for
the computation of the dependency relationship would allow
to generate less schedulings.
3) A Complete SoC: Complete models of Socs are typi-
cally 3 to 6 times bigger than the MPEG decoder. We are
currently evaluating our tool on a model —let us call it XX—
corresponding to a full SoC: it has about 250 000 lines of
code and 57 processes. At the moment we are limited by the
code instrumentation tool which still requires some manual
work, so we looked at only one case study of this type, but
the instrumentation tool will soon be fully automatic. For tests
of length around 200 transitions, we expect the tool to behave
well on XX: the ability to cope with this number of processes
has been tested with the indexer example, and the ability to
cope with the complexity of a large and realistic SystemC
description has been tested with the MPEG example.
The interesting point with XX is the granularity of the
transactions. With the MPEG decoder, the granularity cor-
responds to an algorithm that takes one line of the image
at a time. Something interesting can be observed by a test
oracle after 150 transitions only (three images have already
been decoded). XX corresponds to an algorithm that takes
one pixel of the image at a time. It may be the case that the
test oracle has to observe thousands of transitions. XX is a
very good case-study for observing the combined influence of
the test length and the granularity on the performances of our
technique. One phenomenon we can expect, and that we have
to validate with the case-study, is the following: very abstract
TLM descriptions have large-grain transactions, but loose
synchronisations; while the more detailed TLM descriptions
have finer-grain transactions, but stronger synchronizations. If
the number of alternative schedulings decreases (because of
stronger synchronizations) when the granularity of a descrip-
tion increases (and thus the length of the interesting test-cases),
the method may still be applicable. We also comment on this
point in the conclusion.
VII. RELATED WORK
Existing work (see, for instance [9]) addresses formal ver-
ification for TLM models. The idea is to extract a formal
model from the SystemC code, and to translate it into the
input format of some model-checker. In such an approach,
the complete model that is model-checked has to include a
representation of the scheduler. It is sufficient to use a non-
deterministic representation that reflects the specification of
SystemC, and then a property that is proved with this non-
deterministic scheduler is indeed true for any deterministic
implementation. Model-checking is likely to face the state-
explosion problem, so testing methods are still useful. But we
need the same guarantee on the results of the test being valid
for any implementation of the simulation engine.
Partial order reduction techniques are quite old, but their
dynamic extension is quite recent. As far as we know, it is
not included in VERISOFT [10] yet. Partial order reduction is
used in many model checkers for asynchronous concurrent
programs such as Spin [11] or JAVA PATHFINDER [12].
However, since we use testing, our work is more related with
tools which work directly on the program without abstractions,
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such as VERISOFT or CMC [13]. The main difference is that
our tool is adapted to the TLM SystemC constructs.
To get a complete validation environment, one need to
include a test case generator and an output checker. For
the latter, assertion-based verification [14] proposes to derive
monitors from assertion languages. However, these languages
are often based on the notion of clocks which are absent in
TLM. If ABV is extended to TLM, it will become useful in
our framework.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
We presented a method to explore the set of valid schedul-
ings of a SystemC program, for a given data input. This is
necessary because the scheduling is a phenomenon due to the
simulation engine only, and is unlikely to represent anything
concrete on the final SoC. Exploring alternative schedulings
during testing is a way of guaranteeing that the SoC descrip-
tion, and in particular the embedded software, is scheduler-
independent, hence more robust. By using dynamic partial or-
der reduction, we maximize the coverage and keep the number
of tests as low as possible. Our tool also produces several
graphical views that help in debugging SoCs. With the proto-
type tool, we have highlighted unwanted non-determinism in
a bus arbiter for a transaction-accurate protocol. Also, some
SoC descriptions are scheduler-dependent because they exploit
the initial state of the most used implementation. In this case,
covering the valid schedulings reveals deadlocks. Our tool
is already mature enough to be used for industrial SystemC
descriptions of SoCs.
There are at least two ways of improving the prototype
performances. The first is to reduce the number of branches
explored. A promising solution is to use partial state mem-
orization. It is unrealistic to save all the states and compare
the new state at each step due to the size and complexity of
a SystemC model state. However, we can save some states
and compare only particular new states. We plan to compare
each forked execution every new delta-cycle. The second way
is to reduce the time overhead needed for runtime checking.
Some check results are predictable. Consequently doing static
analysis before simulation can avoid runtime computation.
Further work on testing SoCs is threefold. First, the algo-
rithm that fully explores alternative schedulings can be used
on large platforms only if the length of the test is reasonable.
A promising idea for very long tests is to use the method
locally on the TLM description: a first execution of the whole
platform P is used to record the output transactions of some
sub-system S of P. Then, our method is applied on a platform
P’ obtained by substituting S’ with S in P. S’ is a sequential
algorithm that plays the recorded transactions. It does not
introduce scheduling choices. The idea is that the method then
concentrates on the schedulings due to P−S, forgetting the
schedulings due to S.
Second, the whole approach and the SystemC prototype is
being adapted to the exploration of non-fully specified timings
in the TLM models. Indeed, TLM models are not cycle-
accurate, but people use to label them by approximate timing
properties of the components, in order to estimate the timing
properties of the SoC early. In this case, the timings should not
be taken as fixed values. The embedded software will be more
robust if it works correctly for slightly distinct timings. In the
testing process, it is useful to explore alternative timings, with
the same idea of generating only those timings that are likely
to change the global behavior of the SoC. An overview of the
method can be found in [15].
We also started working on efficient implementations of
the SystemC simulation engine, by exploiting multi-processor
machines. Here, the difficulty is to guarantee that a multi-
processor simulation does not exhibit behaviors that are not
allowed by the non-deterministic reference definition of the
scheduler. The formal setting we described here is appropriate
for defining the set of behaviors that the multi-processor
simulation may produce, without changing the behavior of the
embedded software.
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Abstract— This paper addresses simulation-based verification of high-
level descriptions of arithmetic datapaths. Instances of such designs are
commonly found in DSP for audio, video and multimedia applications,
where the word-lengths of input/output bit-vectors are fixed according
to the desired precision. Initial descriptions of such systems are usually
specified as Matlab/C code. These are then automatically translated into
behavioural/RTL descriptions (HDL) for subsequent hardware synthesis.
In order to verify that the initial Matlab/C model is bit-true equivalent
to the translated RTL, how many simulation vectors need to be applied?
This paper explores results from number theory and commutative algebra
to show that exhaustive simulation is not necessary for testing their equiv-
alence. In particular, we derive an upper bound on the number of simula-
tion vectors required to prove equivalence or identify bugs. These vectors
cannot be arbitrarily generated; we determine exactly those vectors that
need to be simulated. Extensive experiments are performed within prac-
tical CAD settings to demonstrate the validity and applicability of these
results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing size and complexity of digital systems has re-
sulted in a vast array of formal verification techniques which
operate at different levels of abstraction. In spite of many such
advances, simulation-based validation has remained an impor-
tant method for ensuring functional correctness during vari-
ous stages of the design cycle. Fig. 1 describes a typical de-
sign flow for arithmetic datapath intensive (signal-processing)



















Fig. 1. The Equivalence Verification problem: Matlab to RTL design flow.
Initial algorithmic specifications (such as MATLAB models)
of most signal processing applications involve data representa-
tion using floating-point formats. However, they are often im-
plemented with fixed-point architectures, where the required
precision dictates the bit-vector sizes of the variables. Vari-
ous automated tools exist for this translation [1]. For synthesis
and optimization purposes, these high-level descriptions may
be subsequently converted to HDL using automatic utilities [2]
∗This work is sponsored in part by NSF CAREER grant CCF-546859 and
NSF grant CCF-515010.
[3]. Design optimization may be further achieved by applying
high-level synthesis and restructuring operations on the trans-
lated RTL model [4] [5]. It is required to show that the trans-
lated and optimized RTL models are bit-true equivalent to the
fixed-point specification.
Simulation is extensively used to validate the input-output
behavior of the original model (at the MATLAB, C level);
say to validate the pass-band of a filter. These vectors can
then also be applied at the RT-level. Validation of the Mat-
lab model is fast, even with a large number of test vectors,
since it is compiled-code simulation. However, simulating the
RTL model with the same set of vectors is generally slow.
In this regard, this paper derives an important result related
to simulation-based verification of high-level descriptions of
arithmetic datapaths. In particular, we show that:
1. Exhaustive simulation is not always necessary to verify
equivalence or to find bugs;
2. An upper bound is derived for the maximum number of test
vectors required for this purpose; and
3. Which vectors to choose for simulation.
Further, we model such arithmetic-intensive design descrip-
tions as polynomial functions. Moreever, the word-lengths of
the variables are usually predetermined and fixed. For correct
modeling, we need to account for the effect of the fixed bit-
widths of the input/output variables. Hence, the polynomial
functions are computed over finite-integer rings where the ring
cardinality corresponds to the datapath size. We then apply
concepts from number theory to systematically establish the
claims mentioned above.
Let us motivate this issue using a practical example and put
our contribution in perspective.
A. An Example Application
Given two degree-k polynomials F1(x) and F2(x), their co-
efficients can be represented as (k + 1)-length vectors A =
(a0, . . . ,ak) and B = (b0, . . . ,bk). Computing the convolution





a jbi− j 0 ≤ i ≤ k (1)
where, ci is the ith component in the vector C. This procedure,
however, has a complexity of O(n2). It is well-known [6] [7]
that convolution can be effectively implemented in hardware
by:
1. Computing the DFT of vectors A and B,
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2. Calculating their pairwise product; and finally,
3. Taking the inverse DFT of the result. In other words, the
result vector (c′0,c
′
1, . . . ,c
′
k) is computed as
C′ = DFT−1(DFT (A) ·DFT (B)) (2)
This operation is shown in Fig. 2 for degree-3 polynomials.
Such a ’divide-and-conquer’ strategy results in a complexity
of O(n · logn), and is a popular way of implementing the con-
























Fig. 2. Convolution of A and B.
Suppose that we intend to verify that both implementations
compute the same values, say, for coefficients c0 (obtained
via direct convolution) and c′0 (obtained via DFT-product-
InvDFT). Further, as is often the case, assume that the entire
datapath word-length in both cases is fixed to a certain width,
say 4-bits. Since each of the inputs (ai and bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3) can
take values between {0, . . . ,24 −1}, is it necessary to simulate
a total of 24∗8 test vectors to prove bit-true equivalence or to
identify the presence of a bug?
This paper derives results which prove that in the above
case: i) if the two designs are not equivalent (bug), a maxi-
mum of 68 simulations are sufficient to capture the erroneous
behavior; ii) if for these 68 vectors, no bug is detected, then the
designs are indeed equivalent. A method for generating these
specific simulation vectors is also derived.
B. Problem Modeling and Scope
We model the arithmetic computations over bit-vectors as
follows. Let x1,x2, . . . ,xd denote the d-variables (bit-vectors)
in the design. Let n1,n2, . . . ,nd denote the size of the corre-
sponding bit-vectors. Therefore, x1 ∈ Z2n1 ,x2 ∈ Z2n2 , . . . ,xd ∈
Z2nd . Note that Z2ni corresponds to the finite set of integers
{0,1, . . . ,2ni − 1}. Let m correspond to the size of the out-
put bit-vector f ; hence, f ∈ Z2m . Subsequently, we model the
arithmetic datapath computation as a polynomial function (or
polyfunction) from Z2n1 × Z2n2 × ·· · × Z2nd to Z2m [8]. Here
Za×Zb represents the Cartesian product of Za and Zb. In other
words, the computation is modeled as a multi-variate poly-
nomial F(x1,x2, . . . ,xd) %2m, where each xi ∈ Z2ni and F is
computed %2m. The equivalence problem then corresponds to
checking the congruence of two polynomials: F ≡ G%2m.
Note: Our approach is applicable to high-level descriptions
of bit-vector arithmetic that can be easily abstracted as poly-
functions. For this reason, our approach cannot be used to ver-
ify a behavioural RTL model against its gate-level netlist.
The verification problem of Fig. 1 has seen a lot of interest
recently in [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]. The works of [12] [13] use
the same polynomial function model to derive a symbolic ap-
proach to prove/disprove equivalence of arithmetic datapaths.
However, these works are restricted inasmuch as they can only
provide a “yes/no” answer to the equivalence check. They can-
not provide an error trace when bugs are detected. Moreover,
our results also have implications on the applicability of the
fundamental theorem of algebra which has been used in hard-
ware design and verification [9] [10] [11], as discussed below.
C. Bit-Vector Arithmetic versus the Fundamental Theorem of
Algebra
Lemma I.1: Let P(x) be a degree-k uni-variate polynomial.
If P(x) = 0 for (k + 1) distinct values of x, then all the coeffi-
cients of P(x) are zero.
The above lemma [14] is based on the fundamental theorem
of algebra [15]. This theorem states that a degree-k univari-
ate polynomial P(x) has exactly k complex roots, unless all
its coefficients are zero. Since integers are a special case of
complex numbers, this theorem holds for the set Z as well.
The work of [10] used this result for equivalence verification
by modeling arithmetic datapaths as polynomials, and showed
that k + 1 vectors were sufficient to prove equivalence of any
given degree-k polynomials. It was later extended in [14] to
be applicable to multi-variate polynomials as well, and was
further applied to reduce the complexity of model-checking.
Also, [9] used the same concepts for polynomial extraction for
high-level synthesis purposes.
However, the above results are only relevant in unique fac-
torization domains (UFDs), such as the set of real numbers
(R), the set of integers (Z), finite fields (Zp,GF(pn), p =prime)
and so on. Finite-word-length arithmetic does not correspond
to UFDs. Since a bit-vector of size m represents integer val-
ues reduced %2m, bit-vector arithmetic corresponds to a ring
(and not a field) Z2m , which contains zero-divisors. Therefore,
when the bit-vector sizes are accounted for in our model, poly-
nomials are computed modulo an integer power of 2. Conse-
quently, factorization is not unique as shown for the polyno-
mial F(x) = x2 +6x below.
x2 +6x = x(x+6) %23
= (x+4)(x+2) %23
The polynomial F(x) has a degree k = 2, but can be factorized
in two non-unique ways; corresponding to four unique roots.
In such cases, Lemma I.1 does not hold; simulating for k +
1 values such as x = 0,2,4, does show F = 0 but that does
not mean that all the coefficients of F(x) are zero. Therefore,
simulating for only k+1 vectors is insufficient for verification.
Clearly, for finite-word-length bit-vector arithmetic, proper-
ties of these class of rings (of the type Z2m) need to be investi-
gated further for simulation-based verification. This paper ex-
plores results for polynomial functions over such finite integer
rings and develops solutions to such problems with applica-
tions in simulation-based verification of arithmetic datapaths.
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D. Paper Organization
This paper is organized as follows: The next section re-
views related work in simulation-based verification. Section
III covers preliminary concepts and background material re-
garding polynomial functions and finite ring theory. Section
IV describes the proposed results for univariate polynomials
and provides the mathematical foundation for their support.
These results are extended for multi-variate computations as
well. Finally, Section V describes the experimental setup and
results, while Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Bryant, in [16] [17], used three-valued logic simulation to
reduce the required number of simulation vectors for circuit
verification. Subsequently, [18] incorporated some of these
techniques into their framework, which provided a method for
design verification at different levels of abstraction. Brand [19]
proposed exploiting information from the design specification
to significantly reduce the complexity of simulation. Clarke et
al. further researched the problem of specifications and gen-
erators in [20]. However, BDDs were used to demonstrate a
practical approach to this problem in the SimGen project [21].
Later on, Shimizu et al. [22] [23] automated this approach to
verify large industrial designs. The above methods are focused
towards generating the appropriate number of test vectors to
ensure sufficient verification coverage. Our approach, on the
other hand, applies polynomial methods that make exhaustive
simulation unnecessary for arithmetic datapaths.
An algebraic approach to reducing the test vector set was
proposed in [10], and later extended in [11]. These works
model the given datapaths as polynomials and apply the fun-
damental theorem of algebra to verify the descriptions. Re-
cently, [14] extended the theorem to be applicable to multi-
variate polynomials as well. However, as mentioned earlier,
these results do not always hold over the more practical cases
of finite word-length bit-vector arithmetic.
The works which come closest to ours have been presented
in [24][13]. Both approaches model the given datapath as a
polynomial function over a system of finite integer rings. [24]
proves equivalence of fixed-size datapaths by using canoni-
cal representations of polynomials over finite rings. The con-
cept of vanishing polynomials is used in [13] to derive a sym-
bolic approach to test equivalence of polynomial functions.
Both approaches utilize some form of algebraic simplification,
which suffers from the well-known intermediate-expression
swell problem [25]. In addition, these techniques cannot pro-
vide an error trace whenever non-equivalence is detected.
This paper reinterprets the polynomial function model and
extends the concepts presented in [8] to derive a novel solution
for simulation-based verification of high-level descriptions of
arithmetic datapaths. The next two sections cover some pre-
liminary concepts, and then derive the theoretical contributions
of this paper. Practical application of our work is subsequently
demonstrated.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In what follows, Z corresponds to the set of integers and
Z2m to the finite set of integers {0,1, . . . ,2m − 1}, over which
addition and multiplication are closed. Z2m [x] denotes the
ring of univariate polynomials over the variable x, with co-
efficients from Z2m . We use the following multi-index nota-
tion: k =< k1,k2, . . . ,kd > are the (non-negative) degrees cor-
responding to the d input variables x =< x1,x2, . . . ,xd >, re-
spectively. Also, n1,n2, . . . ,nd and m are the input and output
bit-vector sizes. Subsequently, we represent the RTL compu-
tations as polyfunctions from Z2n1 × Z2n2 × ·· ·× Z2nd to Z2m ,
which are defined as [8]:
Definition III.1: A function f from Z2n1 ×Z2n2 × . . .×Z2nd
to Z2m is said to be a polynomial function (or polyfunction)
if it is represented by a polynomial F ∈ Z[x1,x2, . . . ,xd ]; i.e.
f (x1,x2, . . . ,xd)≡ F(x1,x2, . . . ,xd) for all xi = 0,1, . . . ,2ni −1;
i = 1,2, . . . ,d. Here, ≡ denotes congruence mod 2m.
Example III.1: Let f : Z21 ×Z22 → Z23 be a polyfunction in
two variables (x1,x2), defined as:
f (0,0) = 1, f (0,1) = 3, f (0,2) = 5, f (0,3) = 7, f (1,0) = 1,
f (1,1) = 4, f (1,2) = 1, f (1,3) = 0.
Then, f is a polyfunction representable by F = 1+2x2 +x1x22,
since f (x1,x2)≡ F(x1,x2) %23 for x1 = 0,1 and x2 = 0,1,2,3.
It is possible for a polynomial with non-zero coefficients to
vanish on such mappings, in which case it represents a nil poly-
function. Such polynomials are often called vanishing polyno-
mials.
Example III.2: Consider the function f (x1,x2) : Z2 ×Z22 →
Z23 represented by the polynomial F = 4x1x
2
2 + 4x1x2. While
F has non-zero coefficients, F %8 ≡ 0,∀x1 ∈ Z2,∀x2 ∈ Z4.
Properties of such polynomials have been extensively stud-
ied in number theory and commutative algebra [26] [27] [8].
We summarize some of these results in the context of our work.
A. On Vanishing Polynomials
In the ring Z2m , let λ denote the least value such that
2m|λ!. This value is called the Smarandache function of 2m
or SF(2m). For example, SF(23) = 4 as 8 divides 4! (=
4× 3× 2× 1 = 8× 3). Note that 8 does not divide 3!, and
hence the least λ in question = 4.
The significance of the above concept can be explained as
follows. Consider the ring Z23 , where SF(2
3) = 4 since 23|4!.
Consequently, any integer that can be factored into a product
of (at least) λ = 4 consecutive numbers will be divisible by 23
and vanish in Z23 . Now consider a polynomial f (x) in the ring
Z23 , such that 2
3| f (x). Therefore, if f , evaluated at x, can be
represented as the product of 4 consecutive numbers (depend-
ing on x), then f would vanish in Z23 . A natural example of
such a polynomial is: (x)(x−1)(x−2)(x−3). In this regard,
Chen [27] proposed a set of monic polynomials, Yk(x), where
each Yi(x) represents (in polynomial form) a product of i con-
secutive numbers in x. More formally, we have the following
definition and corresponding result:
Definition III.2: Falling factorials of degree k are defined
as:
• Y0(x) = 1
• Y1(x) = x
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• Y2(x) = x(x−1)
...
• Yk(x) = x · (x−1) · · ·(x− k +1)
In the case of d variables, Yk(x) = ∏di=1 Yki(xi).
Lemma III.1: Any polynomial in Z2m [x] that can be ex-
pressed as a factor of Yλ(x) will be divisible by 2m and vanish.
When such a factorization is not feasible, it is still possible
for a given polynomial to ≡ 0 %2m. In this regard, Singmaster
[26] identified the constraints on the coefficients which would
determine whether the polynomial in question would vanish.
We state the following result.





• ck is an arbitrary integer in Z,
• Yk(x) is as defined above,
• (k!,2m) is the greatest common divisor (GCD) of k! and 2m
and
• k is the degree of the expression b ·Yk(x), such that k < λ.
In other words, ck ≡ 0 % 2m(k!,2m) implies that ck ·Yk(x) ≡ 0.
Example III.3: Let F(x) = 4x2 − 4x over Z23 [x]. Note that
F(x) = 4(x)(x−1) = 4 ·Y2(x). Therefore, in this case k = 2 and
c2 = 4. Also, c2 ≡ 0% 23(2!,23) (= 4). Because the above condi-
tion is satisfied, F(x)%23 ≡ 0. Note if c2 were replaced by 3,
then F(x) = 3(x)(x−1) would not be a vanishing polynomial
as 3 = 0% 23(2!,23) .
Based on the above concepts, Singmaster proposed a unique
representation for any univariate vanishing polynomial over








• ck ∈ Z is a multiple of 2m(2m,k!)
• Qλ(x) ∈ Z is any arbitrary polynomial
• Yλ(x) represents the product of λ consecutive numbers.
Example III.4: Let us explain this result using the previ-
ous example. Consider F(x) = 4x2 − 4x over Z23 . Here,
λ = SF(23) = 4. However, F cannot be factored into Y4(x),
therefore Q4 = 0. Similarly, c3 = 0, as F cannot be factored
into Y3(x). Now, F can be factored using Y2(x), implying
c2 = 4 which is a multiple of 2
3
(23,2!) = 4. Therefore, corre-
sponding to Eqn. 3, F(x) = 4 ·Y2(x) ≡ 0 %23.
The above results were extended by Chen [8] for multivari-
ate polynomials in d variables over Z2n1 ×Z2n2 × . . .×Z2nd to
Z2m .
B. Multivariate Vanishing Polynomials
The notion of exploiting the value λ for divisibility of poly-
nomials was extended by [8] to expressions in multiple vari-
ables. Chen consequently, defines µi, which is the minimum of
λ and 2ni , for 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Lemma III.3: If a polynomial F(x) over Z2n1 ×Z2n2 × . . .×
Z2nd to Z2m can be factorized into a product of µi consecutive
numbers in at least one of the variables xi, then it vanishes
%2m.
Example III.5: Let f : Z21 ×Z22 → Z23 and its correspond-
ing polynomial be F = x21x2 − x1x2. Here, λ = 4, degree(x1) =
k1 = 2 and degree(x2) = k2 = 1. Note that µ1 = min{2n1 ,λ} =
min{21,4}= 2 = k1 (the condition in Lemma III.3 is satisfied)
and µ2 = min{2n2 ,λ} = min{22,4} = 4 > k2. Thus, F can be
written as a product of mu1 consecutive numbers in x1:
x21x2 − x1x2 ≡ x1(x1 −1)x2
≡ Y<2,1>(x1,x2)
≡ 0 %23




• ck ∈ Z is an arbitrary integer;
• k =< k1, . . . ,kd >∈ Zd such that ki < µi,∀i = 1, . . . ,d;
• Yk is from Def. III.2 and
• (2m,∏di=1 ki!) is the greatest common divisor (GCD) of 2m
and ∏di=1 ki!.




implies ck ·Yk ≡ 0.
Example III.6: Consider the polynomial F = 4x1x22 +4x1x2
corresponding to f (x1,x2) : Z21 × Z22 → Z23 . We can use
Lemma III.4 to prove that f is a nil polyfunction. Here,
λ = 4; µ1(2) = min{2,4} = 2, µ2(4) = min{4,4} = 4. Also,
k =< k1,k2 >=< 1,2 > corresponds to the highest degrees of
x1,x2. Moreover, ∏2i=1 ki! = 1! ·2! = 2.
F ≡ 4x1x22 +4x1x2
≡ 4 · x1 · x2 · (x2 −1)
≡ c<1,2> ·Y<1,2>(x1,x2)
≡ 0 %23
because c<1,2> = 4 ≡ 0 % 8(8,1!·2!) .
The canonical representation for a multivariate vanishing
polynomial is shown below. F(x1,x2, . . . ,xd) ≡ 0%2m if and





• µi = min{2ni ,λ}
• µ =< µ1,µ2, . . . ,µd >
• Yµ(x) = Yk(x) for some ki = µi
• ck ∈ Z is a multiple of 2m(2m,k!) where k! = ∏di=1 ki!.
Example III.7: Consider a polynomial F(x) = x21 + 7x1 +
4x1x22 + 4x1x2 for f : Z2 × Z22 → Z23 . Here, λ = 4. Further,
µ1 = min{2,λ} = 2; µ2 = min{22,λ} = 4. F(x1,x2) can be
written as follows:
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F(x1,x2) ≡ x1(x1 −1)+4 · x1 · x2 · (x2 −1)
≡ Y<2,0>(x1,x2)+ c<1,2>Y<1,2>(x1,x2)
≡ 0%23
Here, Y<2,0>(x1,x2) represents a product of µ1 consecutive
numbers in x1. Also, c<1,2> = 4 is a multiple of 8/(8,1! ·2!) =
4. Clearly, F can be written in the form given by Eqn. 4, and
is thus a vanishing polynomial.
We now describe how some of these results can be used in
the context of this work.
IV. THEORY
A. Univariate Polynomials
Given a polynomial function f (x) and its representative
polynomial F(x) over Z2m , we need to reinterpret F in a way
that would be more suitable for our purposes. In this context,
we first define the forward difference operator (∆) [28], which
is a discrete analog to the derivative of a polynomial function.
Definition IV.1: Let F(x) be a polynomial over Z.
(∆F)(x) = F(x+1)−F(x)











F(k− i+ x) (5)
Let us now apply the forward difference operator on a
degree-2 polynomial in x.
Example IV.1: Let F(x) = 4x2 + 3x be a polynomial in Z.
Applying the ∆ operator described in Def. IV.1, we get
(∆F)(x) = F(x+1)−F(x)
= 4(x+1)2 +3(x+1)− (4x2 +3x)
= 8x+7
(∆2F)(x) = (∆F)(x+1)− (∆F)(x)
= 8(x+1)+7− (8x+7)
= 8
(∆3F)(x) = (∆2F)(x+1)− (∆2F)(x)
= 0
We now state Newton’s interpolation formula [29] based on
the above definition. The proof for this formula is widely avail-
able in literature and is not reproduced here.
Definition IV.2: If F(x) is a polynomial of degree k with in-











In other words, the given univariate polynomial can be ex-
pressed as an interpolation over a given set of tabulated points,
which are in terms of the first value (F(0)) and the powers of
the forward difference (∆). It should be noted that the binomial












The numerator of this term, Yi(x), is the falling factorial








Since F(x) has integral coefficients, the expression (∆
iF)(0)
i!
is always an integer for 0 ≤ i ≤ k. Note that F(x) has a maxi-
mum of (k+1) coefficients. This is illustrated in the following
example:
Example IV.2: Consider the polynomial F(x) = 4x2 +3x in
Z. Here, the degree of F(x) : k = 2 and F can be expanded into
k + 1 = 3 terms. Using, Eqn. 8 and the values computed in




















Let us now apply the above interpretation to polynomials
over finite integer rings, using the properties of vanishing ex-
pressions from Sec. III. Note that Eqns. 5 - 8 still hold, since
the coefficients remain integral.
Let F be any given polynomial corresponding to a polyfunc-
tion f in Z2m . Let λ denote the value of SF(2m). From Eqn. 3,
F can be written as,
F(x) = Qλ(x)Yλ(x)+R(x) (9)
where, degree (R(x)) < λ. For any arbitrary Qλ ∈ Z[x],
Qλ(x)Yλ(x) represents a multiple of λ consecutive numbers and
is ≡ 0 %2m. The degree of F(x) has now been reduced to < λ.
Let us explain this representation with an example.
Example IV.3: Consider the polynomial F(x) = x4 + 3x3 +
7x2 + 6x over Z23 . The degree of F(x) is 4. We compute λ =
SF(23) = 4, and divide F(x) by Y4 to represent it as:
F(x) = Y4(x)+ x3 +4x2 +4x (10)
Here, Q4 = 1 and R(x) = x3 +4x2 +4x. Now, Y4(x) represents
a product of λ consecutive numbers in Z23 , and evaluates to
0%23. Thus, F(x) = x3 + 4x2 + 4x, where the degree is now
3 < λ.
Now, using Newton’s interpolation formula, we know that
any function with integral coefficients can be represented ac-
cording to Eqn. 8. Hence, we can now rewrite F(x) as
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since deg(R(x)) < λ. According to Lemma III.2, if all the co-
efficients bk of this expression reduce to 0 when computed
% 2
m
(2m,k!) , then R(x) (and correspondingly, F(x)) vanishes in
Z2m .
B. Application to Equivalence Verification
We now use the concepts stated in the previous sections to
obtain the following result:
Theorem IV.1: Let F1(x) and F2(x) be two polynomials with
coefficients in Z2m . To prove F1(x)%2m ≡ F2(x)%2m, it is suf-
ficient to show that F1 and F2 are equivalent in Z2m for any λ
consecutive values of x. Here, λ is the least integer such that
2m|λ!.
Proof:
We use the the results described in previous sections to outline
a systematic procedure as part of the proof for Theorem IV.1.
• Compute the value of λ. Express both F1(x) and F2(x) in the
form of Eqn. 9. The degrees of R1(x) and R2(x) are now < λ.
• Represent R1(x) and R2(x) according to Newton’s formula,
given by Eqn. 11. The coefficients (bk) are computed for 0 ≤
k < λ, and are unique.
• We know that if all the bk coefficients are ≡ 0% 2m(2m,k!) , then
the polynomial vanishes. We can use this property to prove
equivalence according to:












Thus, for each pair of corresponding coefficients bk(F1) and
bk(F2), check if they are congruent modulo 2
m
(2m,k!) .
• If this check fails, then the polynomials are not equivalent.
We halt the procedure. Else, we repeat the above step for all
bk, 0 ≤ k < λ.
Following the above procedure, we need to compute and
compare the bk values for at most λ steps. Computation of
each coefficient bk(F1) (or bk(F2)) requires evaluation of F1(x)
(or F2(x)) according to Eqn. 11. This implies that F1(x) (or
F2(x)) is evaluated a maximum of λ consecutive times.
Theorem IV.1 directly follows from this procedure.
Example IV.4: Consider the polynomials F1(x) = x5 +
15x4 +5x3 + x2 +2x+8 and F2(x) = x4 +10x3 +3x2 +2x+8
over Z24 . Here, λ(24) = 6. To check their equivalence, we need
to compare the values of F1(x) and F2(x) for any 6 consecutive
values of x.
F1(2) = 8; F2(2) = 8
F1(3) = 0; F2(3) = 8
F1(4) = 0; F2(4) = 0
F1(5) = 0; F2(5) = 0
F1(6) = 0; F2(6) = 0
F1(7) = 0; F2(7) = 0
F1(3) = F2(3)%24; hence, these two polynomials are not the
same in Z24 .
C. Multivariate Polynomials
The results of the previous section can be easily extended to
arbitrary polynomials in d variables.
Given any polynomial F(x) corresponding to the polyfunc-
tion f : Z2n1 ×Z2n2 × . . .Z2nd → Z2m , we use Eqn. 4 to represent
it as
F(x) = Qµ(x)Yµ(x)+R(x) (14)
From Lemma III.3, Qµ(x)Yµ ≡ 0%2m. This results in reducing
the degree k of F(x), such that ki < µi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Example IV.5: Let F(x) = x21 + 7x1 + 3x1x
2
2 + 4x1x2 over
Z2 × Z22 → Z23 . Here, λ = 4, and µ1 = min{2,λ} = 2 and
µ2 = min{4,λ} = 4. We represent the polynomial as,
F(x1,x2) = Y<2,0>(x1,x2)+3x1x22 +4x1x2 (15)
In this case, Y<2,0>(x1,x2) is a product of µ1 = 2 consecutive
numbers in x1 and thus vanishes %23. Thus, F(x) = R(x) =
3x1x22 +4x1x2 and has a degree k =< 1,2 >, where k1 = 1 < µ1
and k2 = 2 < µ2.
We now define Newton’s interpolation formula for multiple
variables.
Definition IV.3: Let F be a polynomial in d variables
x1,x2, . . . ,xd with degrees k =< k1,k2, . . . ,kd >. Then, New-





















In the above, i ≤ k implies that i1 < k1, i2 < k2, . . . , id < kd .
Applying this to F(x), we get








Again, note that maximum degree of F(x) < µ. The coef-
ficients bk of the above formula are computed for the k =<
k1, . . . ,kd > vectors, where each ki = 0, . . . ,µi − 1. This cor-
responds to a maximum of ∏di=1 µi coefficients. We now state
the following theorem.
Theorem IV.2: Let F1(x1, . . . ,xd) and F2(x1, . . . ,xd) be
two polynomials over Z2n1 × Z2n2 × . . .Z2nd to Z2m . To
prove/disprove their equivalence, it is sufficient to check for
a total of ∏di=1 µi values, where µi is defined as the min{2ni ,λ}.
Note that each ’value’ is actually a d-tuple < x1, . . . ,xd >, such
that each xi corresponds to any µi consecutive values.
Proof:
The proof is based on the corresponding procedure for univari-
ate polynomials, which is extended and reproduced below.
Proceedings of the Formal Methods in Computer Aided Design (FMCAD'06)
0-7695-2707-8/06 $20.00  © 2006
7
• Compute the values µ1, . . . ,µd . Express both F1(x) and F2(x)
in the form of Eqn. 14. The degrees of R1(x) and R2(x) are
now < µ.
• Represent R1(x) and R2(x) according to Newton’s formula,
given by Eqn. 17. The coefficients (bk) are computed for all k,
where 0 ≤ ki < µi, and are unique.
• We know that if all the bk coefficients are ≡ 0% 2m(2m,∏di=1 ki!) ,
then the polynomial vanishes. As in the univariate case, we
use this property to prove equivalence. Thus, for each pair of





• If this check fails, then the polynomials are not equivalent.
We halt the procedure. Else, we repeat the above step for all
bk.
Following the above procedure, we need to compute and
compare the bk values for the tuples k =< k1,k2, . . . ,kd >,
where each ki can take on any µi consecutive values. This re-
quires evaluation of F1(x) (or F2(x)) a maximum of ∏di=1 µi
times.
Theorem IV.2 can be inferred from the above procedure.
Example IV.6: Let us now consider the polynomials
F(x1,x2) = x1x32 + 5x1x
2









2 + 4x1x2 over Z21 × Z22 → Z23 . Here,
µ1 = 2 and µ2 = 4. We need to check if F1 ≡ F2 %23.
Therefore, we evaluate both polynomials for a maximum of
µ1 · µ2 = 8 tuples. Here, x1 can take any µ1 = 2 consecutive
values and x2 can take any µ2 = 4 consecutive values. Evalu-
ating for x1 = 0,1 and x2 = 0,1,2,3 for Z23 , we get
F1(x1 = 0) = 0 ; F2(x1 = 0) = 0
F1(x1 = 1;x2 = 0) = 0 ; F2(x1 = 1;x2 = 0) = 0
F1(x1 = 1;x2 = 1) = 4 ; F2(x1 = 1;x2 = 1) = 4
F1(x1 = 1;x2 = 2) = 0 ; F2(x1 = 1;x2 = 2) = 0
F1(x1 = 1;x2 = 3) = 6 ; F2(x1 = 1;x2 = 3) = 6
Since F1(x) ≡ F2(x) for 2 consecutive values of x1 and 4 con-
secutive values of x2, the two polynomials are equivalent.
V. RESULTS
Using the results from Theorems IV.1 and IV.2, we have
been able to perform simulations over a number of designs
collected from a variety of benchmark suites.The results are
presented in Table I.
The first example is an image rejection computation. The
phase-shift keying (PSK) [4] is used in digital communication.
The polynomial filters [30] are Volterra models of polynomial
signal processing applications. MIBench is a 9th-degree poly-
nomial from [31]. The anti-aliasing function is commonly used
in MP3 decoders and is from [4]. Horner polynomials [32] are
commonly used in DSP - often implemented using multiply-
add-accumulate units. In [4], it was shown how computations
by these MAC units can be extracted as polynomials in Horner’s
form. The last example is a vanishing polynomial of degree 10.
Some of these designs were available as RTL code. The
others were available as high-level specifications in MATLAB
or C code. RTL code for these reference designs was automat-
ically generated using the MATLAB Simulink and Filter De-
sign toolboxes (particularly for the digital filter designs) [3].
Once the reference RTL descriptions were obtained, they were
further optimized using techniques from [4] and [5]. In [4],
application of high-level restructuring and symbolic algebra-
based transformations was presented for high-level synthesis.
These include factorization and expansion, tree-height reduc-
tion, etc. The recent work of [5] has derived a sequence of
polynomial algebra based transformations to reduce the area-
cost of the implementation. This is achieved by modulating
and segmenting the coefficients and subsequently removing al-
gebraic redundancy (vanishing polynomials). These transfor-
mations were applied to the original RTL description to obtain
functionally equivalent implementations.
Subsequently, the data-flow graphs for the original and op-
timized RTL descriptions were extracted using GAUT [33].
Traversing the DFGs from the inputs to the outputs, the poly-
nomial representations were constructed. The datapath sizes of
both inputs and outputs (n1, . . . ,nd and m) were also recorded.
Using the proposed results, the maximum number of required
test vectors was determined for all benchmarks. The descrip-
tions were then simulated with these vectors to verify equiva-
lence. We also wanted to analyze the performance of our ap-
proach in the presence of bugs. To verify that our algorithm
can detect non-equivalence of designs, we experimented with
some designs by arbitrarily changing one or more of the coeffi-
cients. In all cases, we were able to detect the erroneous values
within the required number of simulations.
A. Limitations of our approach
Our approach works only on arithmetic datapaths whose
functionality can be captured as polynomial functions. Hence,
we cannot apply our technique to verify gate-level netlists.
Also, many DSP systems implement some form of com-
putation approximation, by incorporating various rounding
schemes. Our approach is currently restricted inasmuch as
it cannot verify those datapaths where intermediate signals
have varying precision (due to rounding). Similarly, saturation
arithmetic architectures can also not be verified using our tech-
nique. Analysis of such designs requires substantially more
work, and is the subject of our future investigations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method to determine simulation-
bounds for equivalence verification of high-level descriptions
of arithmetic datapaths. Our approach models the design as
a polyfunction from Z2n1 × Z2n2 × . . .× Z2nd → Z2m . Estab-
lished concepts from number theory and commutative algebra
have been analyzed and extended to derive the requisite theo-
retical results. Practical application of these results was also
demonstrated for simulation-based verification. We were able
to verify equivalence for a number of circuits by simulating the
RTL descriptions. Also, the bugs in the design were detected
within the proposed bound. As part of future work, we are in-
vestigating applications of the proposed results to various other
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TABLE I
REQUIRED NUMBER OF SIMULATION VECTORS
Benchmark Specs Total Proposed Required EQUIV/
Var/Deg/< n1, . . . ,nd >/m Test Vectors Test Vectors Test Vectors BUG ?
Fault-free circuits
IRR 2/4/< 12,8 >/16 220 182 182 EQUIV
PSK 2/4/< 11,14 >/16 225 182 182 EQUIV
Degree-4 filter 1 3/4/< 15,11,13 >/16 239 183 183 EQUIV
Degree-4 filter 2 1/4/< 12 >/16 212 18 18 EQUIV
Savitzky-Golay filter 5/3/< 16,16,14,12,8 >/16 266 185 185 EQUIV
4th Order IIR 2/4/< 24,29 >/32 253 342 342 EQUIV
MIBENCH 2/9/< 16,12 >/16 228 182 182 EQUIV
Faulty circuits
Anti-alias function 1/6/< 11 >/16 211 18 18 BUG
Horner Polynomial 3/4/< 10,8,16 >/16 234 183(5832) 4335 BUG
Vanishing polynomial 2/10/< 12,12 >/16 224 182(324) 103 BUG
datapath computations such as those that implement rounding
and saturation arithmetic.
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Abstract— The importance of re-usable Intellectual Properties
(IPs) cores is increasing due to the growing complexity of
today’s system-on-chip and the need for rapid prototyping. In
this paper, we provide a design for verification approach of a
PCI-X bus model, which is the fastest and latest extension of
PCI technologies. We use two different modeling levels, namely
UML and AsmL. We integrate the verification within the design
phases where we use model checking and model based testing,
respectively at the AsmL and SystemC levels. This case study
presents an illustration of the integration of formal methods and
simulations for the purpose of providing better verification results
of SystemC IPs.
I. MOTIVATION AND PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
With the advent of high technology applications, an increas-
ingly evident need has been that of incorporating the tradi-
tional microprocessor, memories and peripherals on a single
silicon. This is what has marked the beginning of the System-
on-Chip (SoC) era. An SoC can be viewed as a collection of
various Intellectual Property (IP) cores, with interconnecting
buses running among them. There is a dire need for standard
buses to connect IPs obtained from different vendors. One
such and latest bus standards is PCI-X [8], which is a high
performance bus for interconnecting chips, expansion boards,
and processor/memory subsystems. It has the performance
to feed the most bandwidth-hungry applications and helps
to alleviate the I/O bottleneck problem while at the same
time maintaining complete hardware and software backward
compatibility to previous generations of PCI [8].
In this paper, we present a design for verification effort done
for the PCI-X bus. We start with an informal specification
of PCI-X and model it with the Unified Modeling Language
(UML) in order to have a clear view of the design modules
and their interactions. Then, we construct an Abstract Machine
Language (AsmL) [3] model from the UML representation.
We define a set of properties of the PCI-X in the Property
Specification Language (PSL) [1] that we verify using model
checking. Finally, we translate the AsmL model to SystemC
[5]. Unfortunately, not all bus properties can be verified using
model checking, that is why we use model based testing
(MBT) [6] to perform a guided simulation of the IP.
Related work to ours in the context of PCI technologies
design and verification environment concerns, in particular, the
work of Shimizu et al. [7] who presented a specification of the
PCI bus as a Verilog monitor. Any modification or refinement
of the model provided [7] is complex due to the low level
of specification of the bus. Furthermore, the PCI-X standard
includes very complex transaction rules in comparison to PCI
which cannot be handled only using model checking.
II. PCI-X BUS
PCI-X provides backward compatibility by allowing devices
to operate at conventional PCI frequencies and modes. The
bus structure includes an arbiter that performs the bus access
arbitration among multiple initiators and targets (see Figure
1). Unlike the conventional PCI bus, the arbiter in PCI-X
systems monitors the bus in order to ensure good functioning
of the bus. PCI-X supports two modes of operations: Mode 1
and Mode 2. In Mode 1 operation, data transfers always use
common clock. Mode 2 operation of PCI-X also supports 16
bit bus interface which facilitates low cost interface.
Fig. 1. General Architecture of PCI-X.
III. DESIGN PHASES
UML Level: From the specification of PCI-X, we identify the
core components of the bus viz, initiators, targets, arbiters,
PCI-X bus, which will be represented as classes, where
specific instances of the components are called as objects.
In addition to these four components, we also added another
component, the Simulation Manager (SimManager), in order
to have a notion of updates. We modeled different modes and
types of operations of PCI-X using sequence diagrams which
enable us to model the bus in AsmL easily and efficiently.
AsmL Level: Class diagrams in UML help implementing the
classes in AsmL. Each of the five core components of PCI-X
has its own data members (signals) and methods (behavior)
in addition to a constructor. We also use enumeration features
(enum) of AsmL to model different modes of PCI-X, different
types of transaction phases, the state of the system and
the clock. In Figure 2, we show how a target can signal
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its readiness using the TRDY# signal. We call this method
as PCIX Target TRDY Assert(). The pre-conditions are the
following: TRDY# is false, FRAME# and DEVSEL# are true,
CLK is CLK UP, Phase is DATA PHASE FIRST and the AD
of the Bus should be the ID of the target. If the pre-conditions
are true, then TRDY# will be asserted.
public PCIX Target TRDY Assert()
require me.TRDY = false and Bus.FRAME = true
and Bus.AD = me.ID and Bus.DEVSEL = true
and Smanager.CLK = CLK UP




Phase := DATA PHASE
Fig. 2. Target Assert AsmL Method.
SystemC Level: After the AsmL model of a PCI-X is verified
against the properties, we translate it to SystemC using a sound
syntactical transformation developed by Habibi et al. in [4].
IV. VERIFICATION APPROACH
Model Checking: The AsmL model is validated using a set
of user-defined PSL properties. Any incorrect property de-
tection halts the reachability algorithms and outputs a trace
for counter-examples. Table I provides the results of model
checking of PCI-X model with 5 initiators and 5 targets 1. We
show the CPU time, number of states and transitions for the
PCI-X model with various properties that we defined. As can
be seen from the table, all properties have been verified except
Property 6 and Property 7 due to a state explosion problem.
For instance, these properties are related to the successful




Property CPU Time (s) States Transitions
P1 385.24 2169 3250
P2 194.23 1800 2563
P3 150.52 1578 2156
P4 130.45 1489 2096
P5 156.35 1478 2265
P6 – – –
P7 – – –
P8 173.50 1925 2439
P9 174.47 2013 2698
P10 178.42 1873 2359
P11 256.63 2192 2980
P12 143.52 1356 1923
Model Based Testing: In MBT the behavior of a system is
defined in terms of actions that change the state of the system.
Such a model of the system results in a well-defined Finite
State Machine (FSM) which helps understand and predict the
1Experimentation platform: Pentium IV(2.4 GHz) / 768 MB of memory.
system’s behavior. We first generate the FSM of the PCI-
X model in AsmL based on the algorithm developed by
Grieskamp et al. in [2]. Then, using existing graph traversing
techniques, test cases are obtained from the generated FSMs to
validate the PCI-X model. Table II shows the CPU time, states
and number of transitions in the generated FSM, for several
combinations of initiators and targets. Using the generated
FSM, we apply various techniques to choose the tests. We
took advantage of several efficient graph traversing techniques
in the open literature, in particular, the Chinese Postman Tour
(CPT) and Random walk methods. MBT was of a great help
in identifying several bugs in the SystemC PCI-X model we
developed.
TABLE II
FSM GENERATION: DIRECT ALGORITHM.
Number of CPU States Transitions
Initiators Targets Time (s)
1 5 27.95 234 253
2 5 59.50 466 505
3 5 108.04 698 757
4 5 171.73 930 1009
5 2 69.89 472 511
5 3 118.20 702 761
5 4 204.93 932 1011
5 5 254.82 1162 1261
10 10 2925.31 4622 5021
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a design for verification approach applied on
the latest high speed PCI-X standard bus. Starting with a UML
formal specification, we derived an AsmL model which we
model checked against a set of PSL properties. We then trans-
lated the AsmL model to SystemC on which we investigated
the potential of model based testing approach for SystemC
designs. The traversal of the FSM was performed to generate
test cases. The final PCI-X SystemC IP was thoroughly and
formally verified, which makes it very suitable for use as
external monitor to validate existent PCI-X compatible IPs.
We believe that our approach shows how one can improve the
verification of SystemC models by integrating formal methods
and guided simulation in a single design flow.
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Abstract— In this paper we formally specify and verify an
implementation of the IEEE802.11a standard physical layer
based OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing)
modem using the HOL (Higher Order Logic) theorem prover. The
versatile expressive power of HOL helped model the original de-
sign at all abstraction levels starting from a floating-point model
to the fixed-point design and then synthesized and implemented
in FPGA technology. The paper also investigates the rounding
error accumulated during ideal real to floating-point and fixed-
point transitions at the algorithmic level.
I. INTRODUCTION
OFDM [7] is a modulation technique where data is spread
over many channels and transmitted in parallel. In this method,
an available bandwidth is divided into several subchannels
which are independently modulated with different carrier
frequencies. The name orthogonal comes from the fact that the
subcarriers are orthogonal to each other. This orthogonality
eliminates the need of guard band and the carriers can be
placed very close to each other without causing interference
and thus conserving bandwidth. Due to these characteristics of
OFDM, it is used in many applications such as digital audio
broadcasting and IEEE802.11a/g wireless LAN standard.
In this paper, we use theorem proving techniques based on
the HOL system [2] to verify an implementation of an OFDM
modem for the physical layer of the IEEE802.11a standard [6].
The specifications and implementations of the design blocks
are modeled in formal logic and then mathematical theorems
are proved for their correctness. Besides, we carry out a
formal error analysis of the OFDM modem in order to analyze
the round-off error accumulation while converting from one
number domain to the other. They are a direct application of a
general methodology proposed in [1] for the formal modeling
and verification of DSP (Digital Signal Processing) designs.
The results of this paper demonstrate the functional correctness
of the OFDM system and proves the feasibility of applying
formal methods for similar systems.
There exists a couple of work related to the application
of formal methods for the IEEE802.11 using probabilistic
model checking technique based on the PRISM tool [5, 8].
They are dealing with the protocol verification and address
the verification issues related to the upper layers of the OSI
model. In contrast, in this paper we concentrate on the physical
layer and its hardware implementation. Moreover, instead of
model checking with its inherent state space limitations, we
use theorem proving based on HOL.
Previous work on formal error analysis was done by a
number of researchers including Harrison [3], Huhn et al. [4],
and Akbarpour et al. [1]. In particular the work in [1] proposed
an error analysis technique in HOL for the transition from ideal
real to floating- and fixed-point levels. In this paper, we intend
to extend this work using a larger case study (OFDM modem).
II. OFDM MODEM AND VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY
A standard block diagram implementation of the
IEEE802.11a OFDM modem is shown in Figure 1. The
design is implemented in Xilinx Virtex II FPGA. The main
RTL blocks are the quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM),
the demodulation (DQAM), the serial to parallel (S/P),
parallel to serial (P/S), and the guard interval insertion and
removal blocks. The core computational blocks are fast
Fourier transform (FFT) and inverse fast Fourier transform
(IFFT). The OFDM modem design was first modeled in the
floating-point domain. The second step in the design flow
was fixed-point modeling and simulation. Then developed
design blocks are implemented in VHDL. Finally, the RTL
design is synthesized and mapped into FPGA.
The formal specification, verification and error analysis
used in this paper is adopted from the DSP verification
framework proposed by Akbarpour et al. [1] (see Figure 2).
Thereafter, the ideal real specification of the OFDM modem
algorithms and the corresponding floating-point (FP) and
fixed-point (FXP) designs, as well as the RTL implementation
are all provided in higher-order logic based on the idea of
shallow embedding of languages. For the transition from real
to FP and FXP levels, an error analysis is used in which the
real values of the floating-point and fixed-point outputs are







































Fig. 1. OFDM Block Diagram [6]
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Fig. 2. DSP Specification and Verification Approach [1]
specification. The verification of the RTL is performed using
well-known classical hierarchical proof approaches in HOL.
III. VERIFICATION OF RTL BLOCKS
For the formal verification of the RTL blocks, we first model
the QAM, DQAM, S/P and P/S blocks using higher-order
logic. Then a specification of the design is selected either from
the IEEE802.11a standard or from existing generic behavioral
models of S/P and P/S. Having both the specification and im-
plementation embedded in HOL, we set a relationship between
them as a mathematical theorem. We have used the HOL
theories wordTheory and realTheory to build many helpful
definitions and lemmas to prove the above theorems and thus
established the correctness of the RTL blocks formally.
The main purpose for using formal verification was to find
bugs in the design. We did not find any major bugs except
in one case. Namely, for the QAM block, it is given in the
IEEE802.11a standard that the input for a 64-QAM modulation
must follow a specific constellation diagram. The constellation
gives output between −7 to 7, where the x and y axis are
labeled as -1, -3, -5, -7, 1, 3, 5, 7—in total eight values, so,
three bits should have been enough. But, the implementation
used 16 bit 2’s complement to represent these eight numbers.
If the IEEE802.11a standard is to be followed exactly, then
this issue might have resulted in a bug in the design; but
the standard gives some flexibility to the designers and thus
the design is implemented in such a way that the output
from the modulation block reaches the IFFT block through
S/P block with high resolution in order to get more precise
computation after applying fast fourier transform. We encoded
the specification in HOL as stated by the standard and same
encoding is carried out for the implementation without delving
into the designer’s point of view. As, we were aware about
the deviation in the implementation at the time of verification,
we constrained it using the proper number of bits. The same
comments are applied to the DQAM block. For the rest of the
blocks, we did not find any issue like this.
IV. ERROR ANALYSIS
In the error analysis of the OFDM modem, we focus on
the two computational blocks, FFT and IFFT. Both blocks are
probably the most widely used DSP cores, which do introduce
computation errors and considered as raison d’être of OFDM
system. We use HOL to model the computational blocks and
the accumulated errors due to the conversion from one domain
to the next using different established theories and lemmas
built in HOL. To accomplish the complete theory of error
analysis, we proved three main theorems based on formalized
real and imaginary parts of the combined FFT-IFFT expansion
and also theorems related to the error for arithmetic operations.
All definitions were derived from many existing HOL theories,
e.g., realTheory, boolTheory, ieeeTheory, wordTheory, etc. In
particular, we used the floatTheory and fxpTheory to overload
the operators for establishing the real, floating-point and fixed-
point counterparts of the design.
Given the nature of the formal specification and proofs
conducted for the above error analysis, the use of higher-
order logic was imperative. No design flaws have been found
through this error analysis as the implementation of the OFDM
modem strictly adhered to the error boundaries provided in the
IEEE802.11a standard specification.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper is mainly an application of formal verification
techniques, in a new domain—an implementation of an OFDM
modem based on the IEEE standard. The OFDM design is
fairly complex. Its verification in HOL took about 6 months
to complete for a learned HOL user. We formally modeled
and verified the RTL blocks against the corresponding speci-
fications in the IEEE802.11a standard. We also analyzed the
errors in the OFDM system occurring at the time of converting
from one number domain to the other, for all three domains—
ideal real, floating-point, and fixed-point numbers. We used
the IFFT-FFT combination as a model for the error analysis
of the whole system. Then we derived fundamental theorems
for the accumulation of round-off error in the OFDM system.
This formalization can be considered as a large application of
the formal error analysis using HOL theorem proving. As a
future work, we will look at a hybrid verification approach
linking HOL to some automated computer algebra tools such
as Maple or Mathematica. The goal is to achieve more efficient
verification process.
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Abstract— We present a formal model of the bit transmission
between registers with arbitrary clock periods. Our model
considers precise timing parameters, as well as metastability.
We formally define the behavior of registers over time. From
that definition, we prove, under certain conditions, that data are
properly transmitted. We discuss how to incorporate the model
in a purely digital model. The hypotheses of our main theorem
define conditions that must be satisfied by the purely digital part
of the system to preserve correctness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems rely on different layers. A particular
application is designed and compiled to be executed by an
real time operating system on several distributed processors.
The pervasive verification of such artifacts is achieved by
the proof of a theorem stating that the distributed hardware
simulates the initial application. This proof must show the
formal correctness of safety critical applications, processors,
real time operating systems, compilers and communication
systems. In the context of automotive systems, a pencil and
paper proof of an entire system has already been sketched [3].
In this paper, we provide, for part of this proof, a slightly more
general theory, which has been implemented in an automated
theorem prover for higher-order logics.
We focus on the very lowest layer of embedded commu-
nications. A sender loads a register at some clock rate clk s,
with clock period τs. On the other side, a receiver samples
the output value of the sender register at some clock rate clk r,
with clock period τs (See Fig. 1). Clock periods are constant
over time. We model clocks as offset/period pairs. Functions
α and τ access clock components. The date of clock edge
c equals the product of c with the clock period, plus some
offset: e(c, clk) = α(clk) + c · τ(clk). The date of the cth
rising of clock clku of unit u is noted eclku(c). To simplify
our notations, we shall write eu(c) = αu + c · τu. Signals are
functions from time to a three valued logic: 1 and 0 for “high”





















Fig. 3. Behavior of the register w.r.t. edge c
II. REGISTERS
Registers (see Fig.2) have one input In, one clock clk , one
control signal ce and one output Out. In Fig. 3, we detail the
behavior of a register. If ce is low, the register keeps its old
value (at the previous cycle c − 1); if ce is high the output
keeps its previous value during tpmin , then is undefined (i.e. is
Ω) to finally reach its final output at time eclk (c) + tpmax .
To sample the input value properly, signals In and ce must
be defined and stable during the setup time (noted ts) and
the holding time (noted th). The metastability window w.r.t.
some edge c is defined by interval [eclk(c)− ts : eclk (c)+ th].
A signal is defined if it holds a Boolean value during some
time interval. A signal is stable if it keeps the same value
during some time interval. These two conditions are defined
as follows:
stadep(t1, t2, s) , ∃b ∈ B, ∀t ∈ [t1 : t2], s(t) = b
If ce or In do not satisfy stadep during the metastability
window, the register may get metastable and cease for a
while to act as a digital device. During that time its output
is undefined.
The formal definition of this behavior is given by function
R below. We need to consider both cycles and times. Function
R represents the state of register R for all times t during cycle
c. In other words, we represent the output value for all times
during the cth cycle after some “reset”. To make it total, Ω is
output for t’s that are outside the cycle.
Definition 1: Register.
R(c, clk , ce, In,Out0) ,
if c = 0 then Out0 else
if stadep(eclk(c)− ts, eclk(c) + th, ce)
∧stadep(eclk (c)− ts, eclk(c) + th, In) then
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if t ∈ eclk(c) + (0 : tpmin ] then
R(c− 1, clk , ce , In,Out0)(eclk (c))
if t ∈ eclk(c) + (tpmin : tpmax ) then Ω
if t ∈ [eclk(c) + tpmax : eclk(c + 1)] then
In(eclk (c))
if t /∈ (eclk(c) : eclk(c + 1)] then Ω





if t ∈ (eclk (c) : eclk (c + 1)] then








A sender units loads register Rs, the output of which is read
by register Rr. The value output by Rs at cycle c is “seen”
by register Rr at the first edge after the minimum propagation
delay. Let cy(c) be that edge and defined as follows:
cy(c) = Min{c′|er(c
′) + th > es(c) + tpmin } (1)
To make sure that most of the time, the receiver will not
sample during the metastability window, the output of the
sender is kept constant for several cycles (say k cycles).
Consequently, there is only one metastability window and if
k is big enough there exists a “safe sampling window” (noted
SSW, and defined by interval (es(c) + tpmax : es(c + k + 1) +
tpmin ]) in which the receiver can sample properly. To be robust
w.r.t. alterations of the transmitted bits, the receiver performs
a majority vote over n bits. Thus, SSW must be large enough
to entail n receivers cycles outside the metastability window.
By definition, cy(c) is in an interval not larger than a receiver
period, i.e. cy(c) ∈ es(c) + tpmin + (0 : τr]. From this upper
bound, we can derive the lower bound of k:
BigEnough(k, n) ≡ τs · (k + 1) ≥ τr · (n + 2) (2)
If SSW is big enough, it entails n receiver cycles.
Theorem 1: S.S.W. Long Enough.
BigEnough(k, n)
→ ∀l ∈ [0 : n], er(cy(c) + 1 + l) ∈ SSW
Proof: By induction on n. Because τr > tpmin , the cycle
following cy(c) is in SSW. This concludes the base case. The
induction hypothesis leaves us with cycle cy(c)+n+1, which
is in SSW by definition of BigEnough(k, n + 1).
If the sender creates an SSW large enough (the first 7
hypotheses of the theorem below), the receiver will recover
n times the value sent at (sender) cycle c.
Theorem 2: Correct Transfer.
BigEnough(k, n) ∧ ces(es(c)) = 1 ∧ c > 0
∧ stadep(es(c)− ts, es(c) + th, ces)
∧ stadep(es(c)− ts, es(c) + th, Ins)
∧ ∀l ∈ [1 : k + 1],
stadep(es(c + l)− ts, es(c + l) + th, Ins)
∧ ∀l ∈ [1 : k + 1],
stadep(es(c + l)− ts, es(c + l) + th, ces)))
∧ ∀l ∈ [1 : k], ces(es(c + l) = 0 ∧ ∀t, cer(t) = 1
∧ ∀c, Inr = R(c, clk s, ces, Ins,Out
0
s)
→ ∀l ∈ [0 : n],
R(cy(c) + 1 + l, clkr, cer, Inr,Out
0
r)(er(cy(c) + 2 + l))
= Ins(es(c))
Proof: From the first hypothesis and Theorem 1, we have
n cycles in SSW. The first and the last cycles of SSW are
proved by definition of R; the rest by induction on k.
IV. CONNECTION WITH A FULLY DIGITAL WORLD
Our goal is to integrate our theory in existing correctness
proofs, which consider “untimed” registers (∗ denotes bit lists):
Definition 2: Untimed Register.
R̂(c, ce∗, In∗,Out0) ,
if c = 0 then Out0else if hd(ce∗) = 1 then hd (In∗)
else R̂(c− 1, tl(ce∗), tl(In∗),Out0) endif endif
Because of metastability, the connection with function R is
not direct. Let f generate a signal s(t) = fclk (l) from a clock
and a bit list, such that for all times t around edge i + 1,
s(t) equals the ith bit of Inl. This is formally expressed by
∀t, i, t ∈ eclk(i+1)+[−ts : th]→ f(l, clk) = l[i]. Let Dig be
such that Dig(0) = 0, Dig(1) = 1, and Dig(Ω) = x ∈ {0, 1}.
Theorem 3: Connection Theorem.
R̂(c, ce∗, In∗,Out0) =
Dig(R(c, clk , fclk (ce
∗), fclk (In
∗),Out0)(eclk (c + 1)))
Proof: By induction on c.
To instantiate Theorem 2, one only needs to prove that the
digital model satisfies the hypotheses. At each cycle, digital
signals have a defined and stable value. The only remaining
property is that the sender register is kept stable long enough.
V. CONCLUSION
We have embedded our theory in Isabelle [2]. Currently,
time is defined over the naturals. The dense property of the
reals is not required. The next affected cycle is not defined as a
minimum. Conclusions of theorems are weaken by supposing
the existence of a receiver cycle in es(c) + tpmin + (0 : τr].
Because of its very low level, our model can serve as a
justification for making idealize timing diagrams for system
component specification as in data sheets. Another research
direction is to justify abstract models (e.g. [1]) from our theory.
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